EN BANC
|
ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP, as represented by Rep. Mujiv S.
Hataman, and MAMALO DESCENDANTS
ORGANIZATION, INC., as represented by its Chairman Romy Pardi,
Petitioners, - versus - THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, and THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN/LAND REFORM, THE HON. RENE C. VILLA,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 166052
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List
Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in
2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief.
E.O.
No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued on
EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 364
TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
WHEREAS, one of
the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Social Justice and
Basic [N]eeds;
WHEREAS, one of
the five anti-poverty measures for social justice is asset reform;
WHEREAS, asset
reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform,
urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform;
WHEREAS, urban
land reform is a concern of the Presidential Commission [for] the Urban Poor
(PCUP) and ancestral domain reform is a concern of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP);
WHEREAS, another
of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Anti-Corruption and
Good Government;
WHEREAS, one of
the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo administration is rationalizing the
bureaucracy by consolidating related functions into one department;
WHEREAS, under
law and jurisprudence, the President of the
NOW[,]
THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the powers vested in me as
President of the Republic of the
SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It shall be responsible for all land reform in
the country, including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain
reform.
SECTION 2. The
PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the
Department of Land Reform. The
Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of
Land Reform for
SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the
supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the NCIP shall be ex-officio
Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain
Reform.
SECTION 4. The
PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the services provided by the
Department’s Finance, Management and Administrative Office; Policy, Planning
and Legal Affairs Office, Field Operations and Support Services Office, and all
other offices of the Department of Land Reform.
SECTION 5. All
previous issuances that conflict with this Executive Order are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No.
364 a month later or on
EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 379
AMENDING
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371
created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987, the President has the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the
Section 1. Amending Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated
“Section 3. The
National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached
agency of the Department of Land Reform.”
Section 2. Compensation. The
Chairperson shall suffer no diminution in rank and salary.
Section 3. Repealing Clause.
All executive issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring
in the original)
Petitioners
contend that the two presidential issuances are unconstitutional for violating:
-
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND OF THE RULE OF LAW[;]
-
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME AND POLICIES FOR AGRARIAN
REFORM, URBAN LAND REFORM, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL DOMAIN[;
AND]
-
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR
ORGANIZATIONS TO EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING,
INCLUDING THROUGH ADEQUATE CONSULTATION[.][1]
By
Resolution of
The
issue on the transformation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into the
Department of Land Reform (DLR) became moot and academic, however, the
department having reverted to its former name by virtue of E.O. No. 456[2] which
was issued on
The Court is thus left with the sole
issue of the legality of placing the Presidential Commission[3]
for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached
agency.
Before
inquiring into the validity of the reorganization, petitioners’ locus standi or legal standing, inter
alia,[4]
becomes a preliminary question.
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of respondents, concedes that
AMIN[5]
has the requisite legal standing to file this suit as member[6] of
Congress.
Petitioners
find it impermissible for the Executive to intrude into the domain of the
Legislature. They posit that an act of
the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress.[7] They add that to the extent that the powers
of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.[8]
Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[9]
The
OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a registered people’s
organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi
and South Upi in the
As
co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of
NCIP’s becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral
domain claims. It fears that
transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the processing of ancestral
domain claims filed by its members.
Locus
standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[10]
It
has been held that a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have
a direct and personal interest. It must show
not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained
or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must show that it has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or
that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.[11]
For
a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show
that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.[12]
An
examination of MDOI’s nebulous claims of “negative impact” and “probable
setbacks”[13] shows that
they are too abstract to be considered judicially cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers between
the challenged action and alleged injury is too attenuated.
Vague propositions that the
implementation of the assailed orders will work injustice and violate the
rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite standing. Neither would its status as a “people’s
organization” vest it with the legal standing to assail the validity of the
executive orders.[14]
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Ramos,[15] which MDOI cites in support of its
claim to legal standing, is inapplicable as it is not similarly situated with
the therein petitioners who alleged personal and substantial injury resulting
from the mining activities permitted by the assailed statute. And so is Cruz v. Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources,[16]
for the indigenous peoples’ leaders and organizations were not the petitioners
therein, who necessarily had to satisfy the locus standi requirement,
but were intervenors who sought and were allowed to be impleaded, not to assail
but to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
Moreover,
MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a relaxation of
the rule on legal standing. To be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, Senate of the
Philippines v. Ermita[17] requires
that the following elements must be established: (1) the public character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised. The presence of these
elements MDOI failed to establish, much less allege.
Francisco,
Jr. v. Fernando[18] more
specifically declares that the transcendental importance of the issues raised must
relate to the merits of the petition.
This
Court, not being a venue for the ventilation of generalized grievances, must
thus deny adjudication of the matters raised by MDOI.
Now,
on AMIN’s position. AMIN charges the
Executive Department with transgression of the principle of separation of
powers.
Under the principle of separation of
powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may not encroach on fields
allocated to each of them. The
legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application
to cases and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by
and between the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the
government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as
they see fit.[19]
AMIN
contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,[20]
they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere
executive orders.
While
AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President[21]
who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices,[22] it
posits that this broad power of control including the power to reorganize is
qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to law,
citing the constitutional duty[23]
of the President to ensure that the laws, including those creating the
agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN
cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an
extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an “independent
agency under the Office of the President.”[24] It thus argues that since the legislature had
seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with distinct mandates,
the President should respect that legislative disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any
reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the subject of a
statute.
AMIN’s
position fails to impress.
The Constitution confers, by express
provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices
in the President alone. And it lays down
a limitation on the legislative power.
The line that delineates the
Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is “the authority, under
the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.” The Constitution, as the will of the people
in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the
While Congress is vested with the
power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws.
It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department,
the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of
its officials. Corollary to the
power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising and
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.[25]
(Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)
The
Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President justifies
an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad
authority of law.[26]
In
enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full
knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject.[27] It is thus reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it
was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power
to reorganize.
In
establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily
ordains an executive agency’s position in the scheme of administrative
structure. Such determination is
primary,[28] but
subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure. As far as
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the
power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a
particular office. Or a law may expressly
grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.[29] The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such
law:[30]
SEC.
30. Functions of Agencies under the
Office of the President.– Agencies under the Office of the President
shall continue to operate and function in accordance with their respective
charters or laws creating them, except as otherwise provided in this
Code or by law.
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office.– The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies;
and
(3) Transfer any agency under the
Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.[31]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In
carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped
to assess whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance
with its charter or the law creating it.
This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of making a similar
assessment and appropriate action within its plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores
the need to provide the President with suitable solutions to situations on hand
to meet the exigencies of the service that may call for the exercise of the
power of control.
x x x The law grants the President
this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” The Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry
out his directives and policies. After
all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This is
the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.[32]
The
Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the
agencies under it.[33] It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were
formed as agencies under the Office of the President.[34] The “Agencies under the Office of the
President” refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those
under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those
attached to the Office for policy and program coordination, and those that are
not placed by law or order creating them under any special department.[35]
As
thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. Gauged against these
guidelines,[36] the challenged
executive orders may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of
discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
The
references in E.O. 364 to asset reform as an anti-poverty measure for social
justice and to rationalization of the bureaucracy in furtherance of good
government[37]
encapsulate a portion of the existing “policy in the Executive Office.” As averred by the OSG, the President saw it
fit to streamline the agencies so as not to hinder the delivery of crucial
social reforms.[38]
The
consolidation of functions in E.O. 364 aims to attain the objectives of
“simplicity, economy and efficiency” as gathered from the provision granting
PCUP and NCIP access to the range of services provided by the DAR’s technical
offices and support systems.[39]
The
characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office
of the President does not remove said body from the President’s control and
supervision with respect to its performance of administrative functions. So it has been opined:
That
Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in
all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was
placed by Congress “under the office of the President” and, as such, is
still subject to the President’s power of control and supervision granted
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution with respect to its
performance of administrative functions[.][40]
(Underscoring supplied)
In
transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the President
effectively tempered the exercise of presidential authority and considerably
recognized that degree of independence.
The
Administrative Code of 1987 categorizes administrative relationships into (1)
supervision and control, (2) administrative supervision, and (3) attachment.[41] With respect to the third category, it has
been held that an attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral
relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for “policy and
program coordination.”[42] Indeed, the essential autonomous character of
a board is not negated by its attachment to a commission.[43]
AMIN
argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts because there can be no
policy and program coordination between conceptually different areas of
reform. It claims that the new framework
subsuming agrarian reform, urban land reform and ancestral domain reform is
fundamentally incoherent in view of the widely different contexts.[44] And it posits that it is a substantive
transformation or reorientation that runs contrary to the constitutional scheme
and policies.
AMIN
goes on to proffer the concept of “ordering the law”[45]
which, so it alleges, can be said of the Constitution’s distinct treatment of
these three areas, as reflected in separate provisions in different parts of
the Constitution.[46] It argues that the Constitution did not
intend an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to encompass the two other
areas, and that how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be
undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of administrative efficiency.
The
Court is not persuaded.
The
interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social justice is not
something implausible or unlikely.[47] Their interlocking nature cuts across labels
and works against a rigid pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of
the President’s official family.
Notably, the Constitution inhibited from identifying and
compartmentalizing the composition of the Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one person
rather than in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest the
power holder with energy.[48]
AMIN
takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform areas in marked
provisions of the Constitution. It is a
precept, however, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or section headings
are entitled to very little weight.[49] And so must reliance on sub-headings,[50]
or the lack thereof, to support a strained deduction be given the weight of
helium.
Secondary aids may be consulted to
remove, not to create doubt.[51] AMIN’s thesis unsettles, more than settles
the order of things in construing the Constitution. Its interpretation
fails to clearly establish that the so-called “ordering” or arrangement of
provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply a signification
in terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional mandate can per
se be derived or asserted. It fails
to demonstrate that the “ordering” or layout was not simply a matter of style
in constitutional drafting but one of intention in government structuring. With its inherent ambiguity, the proposed
interpretation cannot be made a basis for declaring a law or governmental act
unconstitutional.
A
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.[52] Any reasonable doubt should, following the universal
rule of legal hermeneutics, be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
law.[53]
Ople
v. Torres[54] on
which AMIN relies is unavailing. In that
case, an administrative order involved a system of identification that required
a “delicate adjustment of various contending state policies” properly lodged in
the legislative arena. It was declared
unconstitutional for dealing with a subject that should be covered by law and
for violating the right to privacy.
In
the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by
executive fiat would hamper the exercise of citizen’s rights and privileges. It
rested on the ambiguous conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes
economic, social and cultural rights. It
intimated, without expounding, that the agendum behind the issuances is to
weaken the indigenous peoples’ rights in favor of the mining industry. And it raised concerns about the possible
retrogression in DAR’s performance as the added workload may impede the
implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
AMIN
has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an attached agency of the
DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction and
adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving
rights of indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged, that the
reorganization was made in bad faith.[55]
As
for the other arguments raised by AMIN which pertain to the wisdom or soundness
of the executive decision, the Court finds it unnecessary to pass upon them. The raging debate on the most fitting
framework in the delivery of social services is endless in the political
arena. It is not the business of this
Court to join in the fray. Courts have
no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and, as a rule,
will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases,
advisory opinions and cases that have become moot.[56]
Finally,
a word on the last ground proffered for declaring the unconstitutionality of
the assailed issuances ─ that they violate Section 16, Article XIII of
the Constitution[57] on the
people’s right to participate in decision-making through adequate consultation
mechanisms.
The framers of the Constitution
recognized that the consultation mechanisms were already operating without the
State’s action by law, such that the role of the State would be mere
facilitation, not necessarily creation of these consultation mechanisms. The State provides the support, but
eventually it is the people, properly organized in their associations, who can
assert the right and pursue the objective.
Penalty for failure on the part of the government to consult could only
be reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government action.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos. 364 and 379 issued on
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 6.
[2] Entitled
“RENAMING THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM BACK TO DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM”
which declared that agrarian reform “goes beyond just land reform but includes
the totality of all factors and support services designed to lift the economic
status of the beneficiaries.”
[3] Formerly “Committee” until modified
by Memorandum Order No. 68 issued
on
[4] As
there is no disagreement between the parties over the rest of the requisites
for a valid exercise of judicial review, discussion on the same shall be
unnecessary, as deemed by the Court. Vide
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988,
[5] Anak
Mindanao is a registered party-list group with one seat in the House of
Representatives occupied by Rep. Mujiv S. Hataman whose constituency includes
indigenous peoples (Lumads), peasants and urban poor in
[6] Vide discussion in Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 170, for a discussion on the entitlement of a party-list organization to participate in the legislative process vis-à-vis the intertwining rights of its representative/s.
[7] Philconsa
v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105,
[8] Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622.
[9]
[10] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 893 (2003).
[11] Vide Agan, Jr. v. Phil.International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil 744 (2003).
[12] Vide Telecom and Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153, 168 (1998); vide also Lozada v. Comelec, 205 Phil. 283 (1983) on the need to establish concrete injury.
[13] Rollo, pp. 5-6.
[14] Vide
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482, 508 (2004) citing Kilosbayan
v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910,
[15] 465 Phil. 860 (2004).
[16] 400 Phil. 904 (2000).
[17] G.R. No. 169777,
[18] G.R. No. 166501,
[19] Vide
Atitiw v.
[20] The DAR was created by Republic Act No. 6389 (1971); the PCUP by Executive Order No. 82 (1986) as modified by Memorandum Order No. 68 (1987) in Pres. Aquino’s exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation No. 3, and Republic Act No. 7279 (1992); the NCIP by Republic Act No. 8371 (1997).
[21] Constitution,
Art. VII, Sec. 1.
[22] Id., Art. VII, Sec. 17.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Republic Act No. 8371 (1997), vide Sec. 40.
[25] Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 966-968 (1998).
[26] Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, 455 Phil. 761 (2003).
[27] Didipio Earth-Savers’
Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882,
[28] Vide Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 312 Phil. 1145, 1152 (1995) which quotes Am Jur 2d on Public Officers and Employees, viz: “Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far [sic] as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary or convenient.”
[29] Vide Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281, 291 (2001).
[30]
[31] Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book III, Chapter 10.
[32] Domingo v. Hon. Zamora, 445 Phil. 7, 13 (2003).
[33] Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book III, Chapter 8, Sec. 21.
[34] Vide Executive Order No. 82 (1986), Sec. 1; Republic Act No. 8371 (1997), Sec. 40.
[35] Executive
Order No. 292 (1987), Book III, Chapter 8, Sec. 23. The President shall, by executive order,
assign offices and agencies not otherwise assigned by law to any department, or
indicate to which department a government corporation or board may be attached.
(
[36] Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, supra at 776, adds that the numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith.
[37] Executive Order No. 364 (2004), perambulatory clauses.
[38] Rollo, p. 130.
[39] Executive Order No. 364 (2004), Sec. 4 & perambulatory clauses.
[40] Separate Opinion of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra at 1087-1088.
[41] Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book IV, Chapter 7, Sec. 38.
[42] Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 689.
[43] Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, supra at 1155.
[44] Rollo, Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 85, 99. Particularly between agrarian reform and ancestral domain, (rural-based) on the one hand, and urban land reform (urban-based), on the other hand; and between agricultural land (DAR’s concern) and non-agricultural land (concern of PCUP and NCIP, the latter dealing mostly with timber & forest), citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 51.
[45]
[46] On
Agrarian Reform – Art. XIII, Secs. 4-8. On Urban Land
Reform – Art. XIII, Secs. 9-10; On Indigenous
People’s Rights – Art. XIII, Sec. 6; Art. II, Sec. 22; Art. XII, Sec. 5; Art.
XIV, Sec. 17; Art. XVI, Sec. 12. Also,
Art. VI, Sec. 5 (2) on the erstwhile system of sectoral
representation providing for separate representation of peasant, urban poor and
indigenous cultural communities.
[47] E.g., Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 6 which reads: “The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.”
[48] Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
[49] Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 258-259 (1911); Crawford, The Construction of Statutes 359-360 (1940); vide the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno in Santiago v. Comelec, 336 Phil. 848, 911 (1997).
[50] Found particularly in Article XIII of the Constitution.
[51] People v. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499 (1933).
[52] Beltran v. Secretary of Health,
G.R. No. 133640,
[53] Garcia v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 111511,
[54] Supra note 25.
[55] Cf. Canonizado v. Hon. Aguirre, 380 Phil. 280, 296 (2000); Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345 Phil. 962, 980 (1997) wherein it was held that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith and, as a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
[56] Cutaran v. DENR, 403 Phil. 654, 662-663 (2001).
[57] “The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.”
[58] Vide Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers 999, 1003-1005 (1995).