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SOLID DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(SDCWA-UWP) and EDGAR VILLENA, Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 165995
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- versus - SOLID
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DOMINGO GAW,
JR., OWNER/PRESIDENT, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. |
Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 14, 2007 |
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SOLID DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(SDCWA-UWP) and JERRY G. COLCOL, Petitioners, |
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- versus - SOLID
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DOMINGO GAW,
JR., OWNER/PRESIDENT, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners seek the reversal of the Decision[1] dated
Petitioners Edgar Villena and Jerry* G. Colcol were employed as Roving
Doffer and Trouble Shooter Mechanic, respectively, by private respondent Solid
Development Corporation.
On
Due to this incident, Gaw called a meeting of all roving
doffers. He reminded them to devote
their time to their work and cited his experience with Villena. At this point, Villena approached Gaw and told him, “Bakit ako pa ang nasilip mo! Nagtatrabaho naman ako ah! Kayo talagang mga intsik! Letseng buhay ito!”
On the same date, Villena was served an
infraction report[3] where
he was charged with disrespect to a superior officer and/or
impolite/discourteous manner. He was also
required to submit
a written explanation within 12 hours from receipt of the report. In addition, the report also mentioned
that Villena frequently violated company rules, incurred absences without
official leave and slept while on duty. On
Meanwhile, on
Petitioners filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement and monetary claims. They claimed that they were dismissed without
just cause and without due process. On
With respect to Colcol, the Labor
Arbiter ruled that the infraction report failed to specify the acts or
omissions he made. It did not also bear
his signature which would indicate his receipt thereof. Further, the Labor Arbiter found that Colcol had
a justifiable excuse for refusing to operate the carding or rolyohan
machine. With respect to Villena, the
Labor Arbiter noted that the 12-hour period given to him was too short. Villena should have also been subjected to a
confrontational investigation with the assistance of counsel since there were
witnesses against him. Finally, the
Labor Arbiter found it unlikely for Villena to challenge Gaw inside the company
premises. The decretal portion of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainants to their former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appurtenant
thereto with full backwages until reinstated, which to date is computed in the
amount of P85,025.46 for complainant Jerry Colcol and P40,573.50 for
complainant Edgar Villena.
The claim for
moral and exemplary damages are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Private respondents appealed to the NLRC
which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[7] The NLRC gave more credence to private
respondents’ assertion that Colcol received the infraction report but simply ignored
it. It also rejected Colcol’s excuse in
refusing to operate the carding or rolyohan machine since he was an
all-around mechanic and the machine has been used by the company for many years.
On the other hand, the NLRC found that
the Sama-Samang Salaysay of Villena’s
co-workers sufficiently established that he insulted Gaw. In fact, Villena did not refute that he
insulted Gaw, but he simply contended that the Sama-Samang Salaysay had no evidentiary
value for want of confrontation. The
NLRC also ruled that a formal trial-type hearing was unnecessary since Villena
was given the opportunity to explain his side.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification the NLRC decision. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the
assailed Decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner JERRY G. COLCOL is adjudged entitled to and should be paid
separation pay equivalent to half month salary for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now come
before us with a petition alleging that the appellate court erred:
I
… IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONERS, AND LIKEWISE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT:
A) PETITIONER GERRY COLCOL’S TERMINATION IS VALID ON THE GROUND
OF INSUBORDINATION OR REFUSAL TO OBEY LAWFUL ORDER IN RELATION TO WORK AND
HAVING POOR PERFORMANCE OF WORK.
II
B) PETITIONER EDGAR VILLENA’S TERMINATION IS VALID ON THE GROUND
OF MISCONDUCT, LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AND GROSS HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTY.[9]
The instant petition, in our view, mainly involves factual
issues, i.e., whether there is
evidence on record to support the findings of the NLRC and of the Court of
Appeals that petitioners Edgar Villena and Jerry G. Colcol were dismissed for
cause and with due process.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts except in certain instances. One of these is when there is a conflict
between the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter, on one hand, and the NLRC,
on the other, which is the situation here.
Thus, we are constrained to review the facts of the present case on the
basis of the records.[10]
It is settled that to constitute a valid
dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the
causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must
be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. This means that an employer can terminate the
services of an employee for just and valid causes, which must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence. It also
means that, procedurally, the employee must be given notice, with adequate
opportunity to be heard, before he is notified of his actual dismissal for
cause.[11]
After a painstaking study of the records of this case, we
rule that petitioners were dismissed for cause.
The Sama-Samang
Salaysay[12]
of Villena’s co-workers described with particularity when, where and how Villena
insulted Gaw. While Villena presented
another Sama-Samang Pahayag at
Pagpapa-Walang Bisa[13]
where his co-workers retracted their earlier statements, we cannot accord it any
weight. First, we note that this document was never mentioned or considered
in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Villena anchored his claim on this document
only in his petition before the Court of Appeals. As such, we find the same dubious, if not
spurious. Second, the document was signed by only four of the nine affiants
who signed the first Sama-Samang Salaysay.
Thus, the statements therein cannot
possibly bind those who did not sign it. Third,
we have often looked at retractions with disfavor.[14]
Just because one has executed an
affidavit of retraction does not imply that what has been previously said is
false or that the latter is true.[15]
For these reasons, the Sama-Samang Salaysay stands and the
truth of the statements therein binds Villena who did
nothing but deny the same.
It is settled that for serious misconduct to be a just cause
for dismissal, it must (1) be serious; (2) relate to the performance of the
employee’s duties; and (3) show that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.[16] Villena’s act of insulting Gaw,
the company’s owner and president, may be considered, from a layman’s
perspective, as a serious misconduct. Moreover,
it was done in relation to the performance of his duties as would show him to
be unfit to continue working for the company.
Similarly, Colcol’s excuse in refusing to operate the carding or rolyohan machine was properly rejected. First,
as troubleshooter or all-around mechanic, he was tasked to maintain and repair
all of the company’s equipment including the carding or rolyohan
machine. Second, the machine has been used by the company for many years. Because of these, Colcol could not have been
ignorant of its proper operation.
Willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders, as a
just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least
two requisites: (1) the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.[17]
In this case, the willfulness of Colcol’s disobedience was
shown by his continued refusal to operate the carding or rolyohan
machine. He merely ignored the
infraction report requiring him to submit a written explanation. If he honestly believed that he did not have
sufficient knowledge to operate the machine, then he should have informed
private respondents at that opportune time.
Likewise, there was nothing unreasonable in the order. It is the employer’s prerogative, based on its
assessment and perception of its employee’s qualifications, aptitudes and
competence, to move the employee around in the various areas of its business
operations in order to ascertain where he will function with utmost efficiency
and maximum productivity or benefit to the company. An employee’s right to security of tenure does
not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company
of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be
most useful.[18] In this case, it is presumed that private
respondents have carefully evaluated Colcol’s competence as troubleshooter
mechanic to require him to operate the carding
or rolyohan machine.
Finally, on the matter of due process, well-settled is the
dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that
the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
second informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand,
is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not
necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.[19]
In separate infraction reports, petitioners were both
apprised of the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against
them. They were also required to submit their
written explanation within 12 hours from receipt of the reports. Yet, neither of them complied. Had they found the 12-hour period too short,
they should have requested for an extension of time. Further, notices of termination were also sent
to them informing them of the basis of their dismissal. In fine, petitioners were given due process
before they were dismissed. Even if no
hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process had been met since they
were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy.[20]
In sum, we find that the dismissal of petitioners from the
service was in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo,
pp. 189-202. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate
Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Arsenio
J. Magpale concurring.
[2]
* Gerry in some parts of the records.
[3] CA rollo, p. 94.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo,
p. 202.
[9] Id. at 10-11.
[10] Stanley
Garments Specialist v. Gomez, G.R. No. 154818, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA
535, 540; See Cajucom VII v. TPI Philippines Cement Corporation,
G.R. No. 149090, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 70, 78.
[11] Fujitsu
Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737, 759.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 90-91.
[13] Id. at 92-93.
[14] Alonte
v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. Nos. 131652 & 131728, March 9, 1998,
287 SCRA 245, 264.
[15] Naval
v. Panday, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283,
[16] Philippine
Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124617, April 28,
2000, 331 SCRA 237, 245-246.
[17] Bascon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144899,
[18] Westin
Philippine Plaza Hotel v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121621, May 3, 1999, 306 SCRA 631,
637.
[19] Maneja
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998, 290 SCRA 603, 623-624.
[20] Midas
Touch Food Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111639, July 29, 1996, 259 SCRA 652,
658-659; Philippine National Bank v.
Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 514, 531.