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LAGONOY BUS CO., INC./ NYMPHA O. BUENCAMINO, Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 165598
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- versus - COURT OF
APPEALS (former Fourth Division), JOSE B. CARIÑO, LORENZO FERMANO, ELEUTERIO P. PADIN, JR., MELVIN F.
MORALEDA, LEYNARD O. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN RINGANATE, JR., LORETO B.
CONCINA, REY B. OLIVER, JR., and RUPERTO O. REBUYA, JR., Respondents. |
Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 14, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING,
J.:
Assailed
by petition for review on certiorari are both the Decision[1] dated
Petitioner Lagonoy
Bus Co., Inc. (LBCI) is a transportation company which commenced operations in
September 1991. It was headed by
Reynaldo D. Buencamino as President and General Manager (old LBCI). Reynaldo is the husband of petitioner Nympha
O. Buencamino.
On various dates, LBCI
hired respondents Jose B. Cariño, Lorenzo Fermano, Eleuterio P. Padin, Jr., Melvin
F. Moraleda, Leynard O. Alvarez, Benjamin Ringanate, Jr., Loreto B. Concina,
Rey B. Oliver, Jr., and Ruperto O. Rebuya, Jr., in different capacities as bus
driver, alternate driver, bus conductor, and bus inspector, respectively.
Meanwhile, LBCI
obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Nabua, Inc.,
with Alfredo F. Odiamar, Nympha’s
father, as co-maker/borrower. When LBCI
defaulted, the bank filed a case for a sum of money with damages.
On
On
For their part, petitioners
specified dishonesty and loss of confidence as additional grounds to dismiss
respondents.[5]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of complainants, and against respondents, in the manner following:
1. Declaring the
dismissal of the complainants by respondents Lagonoy Bus Co., Inc./[Nympha] O.
Buencamino, illegal;
2. Ordering
respondents to pay complainants their full backwages, computed as of the date
of this decision, as follows:
1) Jose B. Cariño
(P2,240 x 38 mos.) Php 85,120.00
2) Lorenzo Fermano (P200 x 26 x 38) 197,600.00
3) Eleuterio P. Padin, Jr. (P173 x 26 x 35) 157,430.00
4) Melvin F. Moraleda (P200 x 26 x 35) 182,000.00
5) Leynard O. Alvarez (P173 x 26 x 35) 157,430.00
6) Benjamin Ringanate, Jr. (P200 x 26 x 35) 182,000.00
7) Loreto B. Concina (P200 x 26 x 35) 182,000.00
8) Rey B. Oliver, Jr. (P200 x 26 x 35) 182,000.00
9) Ruperto O. Rebuya, Jr. (P200 x 26 x 35) 182,000.00
Php
1,507,580.00
3. Ordering
respondents to pay complainants their respective separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, computed as follows:
1) Jose B. Cariño
(P2,240 x 5 yrs) Php 11,200.00
2) Lorenzo Fermano (P200 x 26 x 2) 10,400.00
3) Eleuterio P. Padin, Jr. ([P]173 x 26 x 6) 26,988.00
4) Melvin F. Moraleda (P200 x 26 x 3) 15,600.00
5) Leynard O. Alvarez ([P]173 x 26 x 6) 26,988.00
6) Benjamin Ringanate, Jr. (P200 x 26 x 7) 36,400.00
7) Loreto B. Concina (P200 x 26 x 7) 36,400.00
8) Rey B. Oliver, Jr. (P200 x 26 x 4) 20,800.00
9) Ruperto O. Rebuya, Jr. (P200 x 26 x 4) 20,800.00
Php
205,576.00
All other claims and charges are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On
Respondents sought
relief from the Court of Appeals on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Court of
Appeals ruled that the old LBCI and the new LBCI were one and the same because
the new LBCI (1) engaged in the same line of business and carried the same
corporate name; (2) utilized the same rolling stocks, passenger buses, and
facilities; (3) plied the same route; and (4) had the same personnel. Thus, the new LBCI should be treated as
respondents’ employer in resolving their complaints for illegal dismissal.
The
appellate court also noted that respondents have worked for LBCI for at least
two years and performed services that were desirable and necessary to LBCI’s
business; thus, they had attained regular status despite the contrary
stipulations in their contracts with the new LBCI. They could not be dismissed without just cause
and due process as done by petitioners.
Petitioners now allege
in the instant petition that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I.
GRANTING
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AS IT IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY TO REVIEW A DECISION THAT HAS ALREADY BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II.
HOLDING
THAT LAGONOY BUS COMPANY, INC. (LBCI) UNDER THE OLD MANAGEMENT OF REYNALDO
BUENCAMINO AND LAGONOY BUS COMPANY, INC. (LBCI) UNDER THE NEW MANAGEMENT OF
[NYMPHA] BUENCAMINO ARE ONE AND THE SAME COMPANY AND TOTALLY IGNORED THE
SUBROGATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1303 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF ALFREDO F. ODIAMAR
& HERMOGENA S. ODIAMAR OVER THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE RURAL BANK OF
NABUA, INC. IN CIVIL CASE NO. IR-2891 AND THEIR EVENTUAL ENTRY AS THE NEW
OWNERS OF LBCI.
III.
HOLDING
THAT COMPLAINANTS WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT [DESPITE THEIR]
PROBATIONARY STATUS AND ON THE GROUND OF LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EXPRESS MANDATE OF ARTICLES 281 AND 282 OF THE LABOR CODE.[12]
Simply put, petitioners raise the following issues: (1) Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court the proper remedy
against a decision of the NLRC that has become final and executory? (2) Are the old LBCI and the new LBCI distinct
companies or are they one and the same? (3) Were respondents illegally dismissed?
On the first issue,
petitioners contend that an appeal from the final disposition of the NLRC
should be by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Respondents counter that although the
decision of the NLRC was declared final and executory, they were not precluded
from filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 within the reglementary period provided in the Rules of Court.
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,[13]
we held that the special civil action of certiorari
is the mode of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC either by this
Court or the Court of Appeals, but the latter court is the more appropriate
forum in view of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and that, in the
exercise of this power, the Court of Appeals can review the factual findings or
the legal conclusions of the NLRC.[14]
In this case, when
respondents received the
On the second
issue, petitioners argue that after the old LBCI ceased operations on
Respondents insist that the old LBCI and the new LBCI are one
and the same since the cessation of operations by the old LBCI was merely
temporary. In fact, it resumed operations only a month thereafter.
Under Article 286[15] of the Labor
Code, an employer may bona fide suspend the operation of its
business for a period not exceeding six months. In such a case, there is no termination of the
employment of the employees, but only a temporary displacement. When the suspension of the business operations
exceeds six months, then the employment of the employees could be deemed
terminated. Worth stressing, if the
operation of the business is resumed within six months, it shall be the duty of
the employer to reinstate his employees to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights, if the latter would indicate their desire to resume work
within one month from such resumption of operations.[16]
In compliance, therefore, with said Article 286 and the
applicable jurisprudence, it was the duty of the new LBCI to reinstate respondents
to their former positions without loss of seniority rights when it resumed
operations on
Considering the circumstances in this case, we find no merit
in petitioners’ argument that Alfredo became LBCI’s majority
stockholder after he paid LBCI’s loan and, as purchaser of its stocks, he had
no legal obligation to continue employing respondents. That argument lacks factual as well as legal
foundation.
First, even if Alfredo was
subrogated to the bank’s rights against LBCI, he became at most a creditor. Being a creditor differs from being a
purchaser or majority stockholder. We
note likewise that petitioners did not substantiate their claim of a sale, nor even
the date thereof. Even LBCI’s change of name
to ANH Transport Services, Inc. on
Second, granting
that a sale took place, the old LBCI should have given respondents the required
notice and separation pay prior to their dismissal. While we recognize that an employer has a
right to sell or dispose of all or substantially all of its assets and
properties, which could bring about the dismissal of its employees in the
process, such right should not be interpreted in such a manner as to insulate
the employer or the divesting corporation (the old LBCI) from its obligation to
its employees, particularly the payment of separation pay. Such interpretation could not be tolerated in labor
law. It strikes at the very concept of
social justice.[17]
Third, as astutely
observed by the Court of Appeals, the old LBCI and the new LBCI are one and the
same because the new LBCI (1) engaged in the same line of business and carried
the same corporate name; (2) utilized the same rolling stocks, passenger buses,
and facilities; (3) plied the same route; and (4) had the same personnel.
On the third issue,
petitioners contend that respondents were hired by the new LBCI under
probationary status and were bound by the rules on probationary
employment. Thus, petitioners had just
cause to dismiss them when they failed to meet the company standards and
committed acts tantamount to dishonesty and loss of
confidence.
Respondents respond that having worked
for LBCI for at least two years and performed services that were desirable and necessary to LBCI’s
business, they had attained regular status. Hence, they could not be dismissed without just
cause and due process.
Having ruled out a sale of LBCI during its temporary
suspension of operations, we hold that respondents remained regular employees of
LBCI regardless of the change of management. They could likewise not be dismissed without just
cause and due process. On this point, we
find no reason to depart from the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the
Court of Appeals. They are positively instructive
and well considered.
On the matter of dishonesty and loss of confidence, respondents’
termination letters cited only failure to meet the company
standards as ground for their dismissal.[18] This
only shows that at the time respondents were dismissed, the particular and
specific charges of dishonesty and loss of confidence had not yet surfaced. In fact, petitioners even admitted that they received information on
non-collection or under-collection of fares only on
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-37. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Elvi John Asuncion concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 57-68.
[4]
[5] Id. at 51-53.
[6] Id. at 66-68.
[7] Id. at 91-98.
[8] Id. at 103-105.
[9] Id. at 122.
[10] Id. at 4-13.
[11] Rollo, p. 36.
[12] Id. at 11.
[13] G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295
SCRA 494.
[14] Bascon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144899, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 122, 129-130; See Agustilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142875, September 7, 2001, 364 SCRA 740, 747.
[15] ART. 286. When employment not deemed terminated - The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment.
In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.
[16] Nasipit Lumber Company
v. National Organization of Workingmen (NOWM), G.R. No. 146225, November
25, 2004, 444 SCRA 158, 172.
[17] San
Felipe Neri School of Mandaluyong, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78350,
[18] Supra note 4.
[19] CA rollo, p. 52.