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LYNX INDUSTRIES CONTRACTOR,
INC., ROGER GERNALE, CORAZON GERNALE,
GAY GERNALE and LORENZO CAAMPUED, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No. 164333
Present: QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA,
and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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EUSTERIO
T. TALA, LEONITO VIAGEDOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER NIEVES DE CASTRO and THE NLRC SHERIFF, Respondents. |
Promulgated: August
24, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails both the Decision[1] dated
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent
Eusterio T. Tala was an employee of petitioner Lynx Industries Contractor, Inc.,
from P10,412.90. On the other hand, private co-respondent Leonito E. Viagedor was employed from 1976 to P12,623.
On
No such memorandum was served on Viagedor. He was simply not paid his salaries from
On
In a Decision dated
Premises considered, respondent company, Roger Gernale,
Gay C. Gernale, Lorenzo Caampued and Corazon Gernale and Reo Gernale are jointly
and severally liable to pay complainants’ full backwages in the amounts of
P173,099.96 to Tala, P210,442.12 to Viagedor; separation pay of one month’s
salary for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of
P180,258.00 to Tala, and P290,562.50 to Viagedor. Likewise, for failure of the respondent to
show proof of payment of service incentive leave pay, respondent must be suffered
to pay them in the amount of P4,935.43 to Tala and P6,388.66 to Viagedor plus
10% of the total award for attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On
stating, among others, that the decision had become final and executory
since neither party appealed.
On
July 9, 2002, petitioners filed with the NLRC a petition for relief from
judgment with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction,[7]
on the following grounds: (1) the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was patently erroneous and unjust; (2) the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction to entertain Viagedor’s complaint as it involved an
intra-corporate controversy; and (3) the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding
the individual incorporators jointly and severally liable was unwarranted in
the absence of a clear showing of conspiracy to commit fraud.[8]
Petitioners also maintained that they failed to appeal the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on time due to their former counsel’s
indifference and neglect and that such negligence entitled them to a new trial.
The NLRC dismissed the
petition and denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, ratiocinating
thus:
The petition is [dismissible] for having been filed late.
It is settled that a petition for relief
from judgment must be filed within sixty (60) days from the date of the receipt
of the decision or notification and not more than six (6) months after the
Labor Arbiter’s decision became final and executory (Ges[u]lgon vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561). While the [petitioners’] former counsel
received [a] copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the findings of the NLRC. Reconsideration
having been denied, petitioners now come before this Court alleging that the appellate
court committed serious and reversible errors of law, as follows:
I.
WHEN IT CALLOUSLY AND [ERRONEOUSLY]
AFFIRMED THE NLRC’S RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS ALLEGEDLY FILED ONE DAY
LATE, AND WITHOUT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES AND
EXISTING SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
II.
WHEN IT DID NOT PASS UPON THE
SECOND GROUND IN THE AMENDED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI --- GROUNDED ON SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, --- BASED ON ITS ERRONEOUS AND
TRITE CONCLUSION OF BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRESCINDING FROM ITS ERRONEOUS
FINDING THAT THE PETITION FOR RELIEF WAS FILED ONE (1) DAY LATE.[10]
Simply, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err in
affirming the dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment?
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure lays
down the requirements for a petition for relief from judgment –
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition;
contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and
the facts constituting the petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must
strictly comply with two reglementary periods: first,
the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict
compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from
judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy
cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in
order to put at last an end to litigation.[11]
It is undisputed that petitioners’ previous counsel received
a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on
Petitioners, however, maintain that they learned of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision only on
It is long established by jurisprudence that the reglementary
period is reckoned from the time the party’s counsel receives notice of the
decision, for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for
purposes of Section 3, Rule 38.[12] Thus,
while the failure of a party’s counsel to notify him of an adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal therefrom constitutes inexcusable negligence, it is not a
ground for relief from judgment.[13]
Furthermore, under Section 1, Rule 38,[14] the negligence
must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is
imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client.[15] It is settled that a party is bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of his counsel.[16] To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to
disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative,
and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal
of the court’s ruling.[17]
What is more, petitioners dismally
failed to substantiate their allegation of gross negligence. Their petition for relief lacked the requisite
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting their good and substantial cause of action.[18]
While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in
stone, it is equally true that strict compliance with the rules is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Unfortunately for them, petitioners failed to
show that their counsel’s negligence was so gross and palpable as to call for
the exercise of this Court’s equity jurisdiction. Neither have they shown that the ends of
justice will be better served by relaxing procedural rules. It should be recalled that petitioners were
accorded an opportunity by the Labor Arbiter to present their evidence although
her decision was ultimately adverse to them. They cannot feign lack of due process.[19]
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 36-40. Penned by Associate Justice
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 16-19.
[4] Rollo, p. 53.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 14.
[11] Gold Line Transit, Inc.
v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144813,
[12] Mercury Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138571, July 13, 2000, 335 SCRA 567, 577.
[13] Azucena v. Foreign
Manpower Services, G.R. No. 147955,
[14] SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
[15] Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739,
[16] Insular Life Savings and Trust Company v. Runes, Jr., G.R. No. 152530, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 317, 325; See Heirs of the Late Cruz Barredo v. Asis, G.R. No. 153306, August 27, 2004, 437 SCRA 196, 200.
[17] Que v.
Court of Appeals, supra.
[18] Heirs of the Late Cruz Barredo v. Asis, supra at 201.
[19]