Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
SUMMERVILLE GENERAL G.R. No. 163741
MERCHANDISING & CO., INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR.,
in his capacity as PRESIDING
JUDGE of
and ELIDAD KHO, VIOLETA KHO, Promulgated:
and ROGER KHO,
Respondents. August 7, 2007
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R E S O L U
T I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77180, which upheld the October
24, 2001,[3]
August 21, 2002,[4]
and April 2, 2003[5]
Orders of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24.
The instant petition originated from a
complaint for unfair competition filed by petitioner against private
respondents Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho, before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. After due investigation, the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Manila came out with its
That on or about January 10, 2000 and for sometime prior
and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, then engaged in
a business known as KEC Cosmetic Laboratory, located at 2407 Topacio Street and
2412 Raymundo Street, San Andres, this City, in an unfair competition, and for
the purpose of deceiving/defrauding the public in general and the Summerville
General Merchandising and Co. (Summerville) which is engaged, among others, in
the importation and distribution of facial cream products with the trademark
known as Chin Chun Su, herein represented by VICTOR CHUA, its General Manager,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell/dispose
and/or cause to be sold/disposed to the public facial cream products using
tools, implements and equipments in its production, labeling and distribution,
which give and depict the general appearance of the Chin Chun Su facial cream
products and likely influence the purchasers to believe that the same are those
of the said Summerville.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Arraignment
was scheduled for
On
Upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondents, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez issued his June
18, 2001 Resolution which recalled and set aside the August 17, 2000 Resolution
of Undersecretary Puno, but without however issuing a ruling on the propriety
of the complaint and merely indicated that the case would be further reviewed
and the corresponding resolution would be issued.[9]
The
arraignment pushed through on
On
On October 23, 2001, the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion
to Withdraw Information[11]
on the basis of the September 28, 2001 Resolution issued by Secretary Perez.
The next day, the RTC issued the first assailed Order, dated
Acting on the
Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the trial prosecutor dated
The Information
against the accused is hereby ordered withdrawn.
This order
likewise renders the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused through counsel
dated
SO ORDERED.[12]
On
On
On
On
Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the
On
On
On
Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA which sought to annul the October 24, 2001,
August 21, 2002, and April 2, 2003 Orders issued by the Manila RTC. In its
This is because once a complaint or
information has been filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the
sound discretion of the court (Mamburao v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 139141-42, Nov.
15, 2000), and the said undulating stance of the prosecution was reason enough
to grant its withdrawal without the judge having to divine and weigh the
probable evidence of both the prosecution and the defense.[19]
Finding
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court, the CA, in
its May 26,
2004 Decision, denied due course and dismissed the petition.[20]
Petitioner
now comes before this Court assailing the Decision of the CA on the following
grounds:
1.
The [CA]
erred in not finding that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in proceeding with the arraignment despite the fact that the petition for
review is still pending with the DOJ.
2.
The [CA]
gravely erred in not finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the information without making an
independent assessment of the evidence.
3.
The [CA]
failed to apply the doctrine laid down by the Hon. Supreme Court in Martinez
versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112387, promulgated October 12, 1994 in
consonance with another doctrinal ruling in Crespo v. Mogul (151 SCRA
462), by not finding that the trial court gravely abused its jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing the withdrawal of the Information
in Crim. Case No. 00-183261 and in disregarding the latest Resolution of the
DOJ directing the continuation of the prosecution of the Respondents for Unfair
Competition.
4.
The [CA]
seriously erred in law in ruling that the reinstatement of the Information in Crim.
Case No. 00-183261 pursuant to the DOJ Resolution directing the continued
prosecution of the respondents for Unfair Competition will constitute double
jeopardy.[21]
The issues submitted for our resolution can be summarized
into (1) whether Judge Eugenio committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the withdrawal of the Information against the accused without making an
independent assessment of the evidence, contrary to established jurisprudence;
and (2) whether the re-filing or the reinstatement of the Information would
constitute double jeopardy.
The petition has merit.
We
have ruled time and again that once a case is filed with the court, any
disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. This rule,
however, is not without restrictions. We held in
[T]he trial court is not bound to adopt the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree
with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial
court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[22]
Thus, the courts should not blindly follow the resolutions
issued by the DOJ. On the contrary, it should determine on its own whether
there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.
In this case, it can be readily seen from the October 24,
2001 Order of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal of the Information, that
the trial court glaringly failed to conduct its own determination of a prima facie case, and simply adopted the
September 28, 2001 Resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice. Where the
prosecution is, as in this case, disappointingly unsure, irresolute, and
uncertain on whether it should prosecute the accused, the court should have
been most circumspect and judicious in the resolution of the Motion to Withdraw
Information, and should have conducted its own determination whether or not
there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.
This failure of Judge Eugenio to independently evaluate and
assess the merits of the case against the accused violates the complainant’s
right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. And, all other acts which trace their roots from this
act committed in excess of his jurisdiction, including the assailed Orders, lose
their standing and produce no effect whatsoever. Thus, it is only but proper
for this Court to remand the case to the trial court to rule on the merits of
the case to determine if a prima facie
case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information anew.
On the issue of double jeopardy, we
hold that it does not bar the reinstatement of the Information.
The right against double jeopardy is contained in Sec. 21,
Art. III of the Constitution, which reads: “No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.”
For double jeopardy to set in, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a valid complaint or information; (2) the complaint should
be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded
to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted, acquitted, or the case
has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.[23]
Since we have held that the
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE,
and the assailed May 26, 2004 Decision of the
CA and the October 24, 2001, August 21, 2002, and
April 2, 2003 Orders of the Manila RTC are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
The case is remanded to the Manila RTC, Branch 24 to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to hold the accused for trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-40.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra
note 3.
[13] Rollo, p. 148.
[14] Supra note 4.
[15] Rollo, p. 165.
[16]
[17] Supra note 5.
[18] Rollo, p. 189.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] G.R. No. 158236,
[23] Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471
SCRA 94, 105.