FIRST DIVISION
NELSON
CABALES and G.R.
No. 162421
RITO
CABALES,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus -
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
COURT
OF APPEALS,
Promulgated:
JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents. August
31, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for
review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319
entitled “Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales
v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano,” which affirmed with modification
the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August
11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the
appellate court are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on
On P2,000.00, with right to repurchase
within eight (8) years. The three (3)
siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a
share of P666.66.
The following month or on P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife
and son, petitioner Nelson.
On P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document
of sale with pacto de retro after
Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his “vale”
of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four
(4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel
of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of
It
is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of
Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of
this instrument are held
in trust by the
VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.
On
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4)
children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only
receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches
the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for
the obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale
with pacto de retro as well as his “vale”
of P300.00.
On P1,143.00
from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the former’s share in the proceeds
of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could
not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors,
petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a
complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained
that petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over subject property
considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount
corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and
(2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of
the redemption price necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the
grounds of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at
pre-trial. Trial ensued and on
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision
of the trial court. It held that the
sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to the property was
unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the
contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Rito’s receipt of the proceeds on
P966.66,
representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner
Nelson’s late father Alberto. Finally, however,
it denied petitioner Nelson’s claim for redemption for his failure to tender or
consign in court the redemption money within the period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing
petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right
of legal redemption, and (2) not
recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar
right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of
petitioners to subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife
Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora,
Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides
that “[i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left,
the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of
the children.” Verily, the seven (7)
heirs inherited equally on subject property.
Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelson’s father, inherited in
their own rights and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected,
Alberto died. By operation of law, his
rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to his
legal heirs – his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2)
sales of subject land to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers
and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his
share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs,
namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson.
But the records show that it was Saturnina, Alberto’s mother, and not
his heirs, who repurchased for him. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to
Alberto’s or his heirs’ rights to the property when she repurchased the
share.
In Paulmitan
v. Court of Appeals,[3] we held that a co-owner who redeemed
the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of
co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.[4] But the one who redeemed had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the
subject property for the amount due.[5] Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for
Alberto’s heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso
share in subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for
the redemption price and held a lien upon the property for the amount due until
reimbursement. The result is that the
heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and
his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject
property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors
and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in
trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the
age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was
unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code[6] state that:
Art.
320. The father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give
a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Art.
326. When the property of the child is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a
guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of
guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his
absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of
giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed
two thousand pesos.[7] Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any
judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed two thousand
pesos,[8]
thus:
Sec.
7. Parents as guardians. – When the
property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or
less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment,
shall be his legal guardian x x x x[9]
Saturnina was clearly petitioner
Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that
the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00,
which is less than two thousand pesos.
However, Rule 96, Sec. 1[10]
provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. –
A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of
his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate
only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall
have the management of all the estate of the ward within the
Indeed,
the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s
property. It does not include the power of
alienation which needs judicial authority.[11] Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of
petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso
share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art.
1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who
has acted beyond his powers;
x x
x x
Accordingly, the contract of sale as
to the pro-indiviso share of
petitioner Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on
the other hand, the contract of sale was void.
He was a minor at the time of the sale.
Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians
with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian
and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share
to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others
sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only
sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso
shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother
retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property.[12]
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from
respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623
of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art.
1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art.
1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The
right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be
exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held
in common. As demonstrated, the sale as
to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his
ratification on
However, as likewise established, the sale as to
the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that
they were not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject
property from respondents-spouses. But
they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their
co-owners vendors. In reckoning this
period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[13] thus:
x
x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus,
we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x x
x
x x x While we may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to
“the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to
the lawmaker’s will.
In
requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter)[14]
seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to
indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of
the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
In the instant case, the
right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was made in
1978. We are not unmindful of the fact
that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988,
petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject
property. Moreover, it was noted by the
appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and
he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal
redemption and damages on
In the face of the established facts, petitioner
Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of
the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge
thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient
notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson.
The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner
Nelson sought the barangay
conciliation process to redeem his property.
By
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of
the facts of the instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will
render justice.[15]
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners
thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly,
title to subject property must include them.
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals of
SO
ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Arsenio J. Magpale.
[2] Penned
by Judge Romeo M. Gomez.
[3] G.R.
No. 61584,
[4]
[5]
[6] Law
applicable to the case. Executive Order
No. 209 otherwise known as the Family Code of the
[7] See Badillo v. Ferrer, No. L-51369,
[8]
[9] The
New Rules on Guardianship of Minors, adapted in the
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule.
– This Rule shall apply to petitions for guardianship over the person or
property, or both, of a minor.
The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the person and property
of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of
the Family Code on guardianship.
[10] Revised
Rules of Court of 1964.
[11] Revised
Rules of Court of 1964, Rule 95.
[12] Nothing
on the records indicates that petitioner Nelson’s mother predeceased him.
[13] No.
L-72873,
[14] Included
for its application in the case at bar.
[15] See note 3.