FIRST DIVISION
|
NACE SUE P.
BUAN, Petitioner, - versus - FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No.
161179 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: August 7, 2007 |
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D E C
I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74094, to wit:
1.
Decision[1] dated September
4, 2003, reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice which overturned that of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City and directed
him to cause the filing of an information for attempted rape against herein
respondent; and
2.
Resolution[2] dated
The current proceedings were started on
Back in 1995, petitioner was a regular
employee of the provincial government of Surigao del
Norte where respondent, Francisco Matugas, was then the provincial
governor. Sometime from
The complaint alleges that on one of
those days from
Afterwards, the Governor
came out of the comfort room allegedly without any shirt on, explaining
that he would have to change his shirt to be dressed properly when meeting some
guests during lunch. Then, without any warning, he suddenly grabbed petitioner
by her shoulder as he passed by the chair she was seated on, embraced and
kissed her, prompting her to resist by pushing and elbowing
him, causing him to lose his balance and immediately desisted.
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident to her
mother who prevailed on her not to file any complaint yet since respondent was
still powerful and influential being the Provincial Governor
of Surigao del Norte at that time. Petitioner
nevertheless decided to immediately resign from her
work at the Provincial Government.
Almost six years later, or on
On
In a Resolution dated
On February 13, 2002, the Secretary of
Justice issued a Resolution reversing the findings of the City Prosecutor and
holding that there is reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. A subsequent Resolution of
On
In its decision of September
4, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the CA reversed and set aside
the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal information for Attempted Rape filed against
the respondent then pending before Branch 111 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The questioned resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice dated
SO ORDERED.
Then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now a
Comelec Commissioner) dissented from the majority, voting to
uphold the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and to
dismiss respondent’s petition.
Her motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the CA in its Resolution of
The petition is impressed with merit.
First off, it should
be stressed that the CA is empowered under its
certiorari jurisdiction
to annul and declare void the
questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, but
only on two (2) grounds, namely, lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The task before
us now is to determine whether the CA correctly exercised its power, or,
better still, whether the CA gravely erred when it REVERSED and SET ASIDE the
questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by
substituting its own judgment to that of the former. Admittedly, the CA
has the original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
not only under the Rules but also under the judicial power granted to
courts by no less that the Constitution.[3] But, the
question is, can the CA reverse and set aside a decision of the Secretary of
Justice and substitute its own judgment, as it did
in this case?
Definitely not.
The power to reverse and set aside
partakes of an appellate jurisdiction which the CA does not have over judgments
of the Secretary of Justice exercising quasi-judicial functions.
There is a whale of a
difference between the CA’s power of review in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction and its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari as
that filed by the respondent in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74094.[4]
Certiorari power is limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion only. Wisdom or error of judgment on the part of the Secretary of
Justice in arriving at his conclusions of fact and law
which is proper in an appeal cannot legitimately be the subject of review in a
petition for certiorari before the CA because the decision of the Secretary of
Justice is not appealable to the CA.
It is only too unfortunate that the CA
confused these two powers in resolving the petition for certiorari lodged
before it by the respondent. It is now our duty to put things in their
proper light.
The assailed CA decision starts out on
precarious footing when it made the following pronouncements:
At the outset, it must be stated that while
in this petition We are not called upon to pronounce the innocence or guilt of
the [respondent], in the very nature of things, however, We are doubtless really asked to
determine whether it was ultimately fair, just, even necessary, on the basis of
the factual details and circumstances alleged in the complaint itself, for the
government to have allowed said complainant [herein petitioner] to sully
[respondent's] name and reputation and stigmatize his family, and put him to
great inconvenience and expense, to say nothing of the repercussions upon his
political future, x x x[5] (Words in
bracket added).
In his dissenting opinion,[6] Justice Brawner
correctly pointed out:
x x x [B]y considering such extraneous
matters as the possible effect a pending rape case will have on his [respondent’s] political future,
[the decision] may send the wrong signal to other litigants that a [sic] one
set of rules apply to those who are wealthy and powerful, and another to those
who are possessed of neither fortune nor authority: that to the former, the
Courts show a more merciful and indulgent [judiciary]; but to the latter, the
Judiciary if harsh and unbending.[7]
We thus agree
with the observation of Justice Brawner that the only issue rightfully
presented before the CA was whether or not the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the City
Prosecutor, dismissing the complaint, and directing the filing of an information for attempted rape against the herein
respondent.
This is, as it
should be for the determination of probable cause, a
function that, by law, pertains to the public prosecutor.[8] Absent a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the appellate
court is precluded, under the principle of separation of powers, from
usurping the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
to the executive branch, the Department of Justice.
There is grave abuse of discretion only
when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and it must be
so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation
of law.[9] Not
every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
is grave abuse of discretion.[10] Hence, in his dissent, Justice Brawner noted with dismay:
x x x Sadly, the majority, in resolving the issue, may have trodden
on territory forbidden to the Judicature when they completely foreclosed the
right of [petitioner] to a trial of her accusations on the merits, by
substituting the judgment of this Court to that of the agency of the Executive
Branch specifically tasked with the prosecution of criminal offenses.
Differently stated, We may have acted like prosecutors when We should have
acted more magisterially.[11]
xxx xxx xxx
x x x While a resolution of the existence of grave abuse
in this case necessitates an examination of the evidence on record, such
evaluation should never touch upon the quality of the evidence, or the defenses to which the
same are subject, but should be confined to a determination of whether or not
there is such evidence as to support the act of the respondent Secretary,
regardless of whether or not the same may later be shown to be of little
probative value during trial. Nor should certiorari issue simply because We happen to disagree with
the conclusions of the Secretary of Justice. For here, We are
not a trier of facts. That office properly belongs to the trial court, and all
allegations pointing towards the exculpation of the petitioner are matters of
evidence, which should be put forward during trial. x x x[12]
The CA, in reviewing
and weighing/evaluating the evidence submitted, exercised
appellate jurisdiction and stepped down to the role of becoming
a trier of facts which is definitely uncalled
for under the circumstances. The appellate court had “jumped the gun,” so to
speak, when it
had, for all intents and purposes, acquitted the respondent based on the
facts alleged and the defenses he raised in denial of said allegations. It had,
indeed, missed a crucial step: the trial proper. Had the respondent been convicted
by the trial court and an appeal
therefrom taken to the CA, then the latter’s consideration of such matters as his defense of alibi
would be proper, but not in a certiorari proceedings before
it.
We may also be well reminded that the
purpose of preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the commission of
a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.[13] A finding of probable cause need only rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed
by the suspect. While probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires
less than evidence which would justify conviction. A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.[14]
It is exclusively within the ambit of
the prosecutor's powers to determine whether probable cause exists and which
crime to prosecute for. Should it be determined later on after a full-blown
trial where a full account can be made of the incident, that not all the
elements of attempted rape exist, it is then for the trial court to acquit
respondent or convict him for a lesser crime necessarily included therein such
as acts of lasciviousness or unjust vexation. But the Secretary of Justice has
the discretion to determine for which crime he should prosecute for.
It is understandable for the
prosecutor to ordinarily aim high. It has a valid reason. There are many instances when, for example,
an information for murder is filed and the trial court finds it to be only
homicide due to the failure of the prosecution to prove certain qualifying
circumstances. These are instances when the
prosecution deems it prudent to play safe because had it only filed an
information for homicide and facts come out during trial that could qualify the
crime to murder, there would be nothing that can be done to change the crime
charged, lest a violation of due process or double jeopardy results. The
same logic applies in the present case. It is for the trial
court to decide whether lewd design exists. Again, to
quote Justice Brawner in his dissenting opinion:
x x x [W]hen the majority states in its
decision that there is an absence of lewd designs on the part of the
petitioner, it exercises a power properly the province of an investigating
prosecutor. And when it argues that the crime committed is acts of lasciviousness
or perhaps merely
unjust vexation, it plays a role not given to it by the rules governing the
Judiciary. For “lewd designs” is a state of the mind not discernible by a
simple reading of the dry, lifeless pages of [petitioner's] complaint affidavit
or [respondent's] counter-affidavit: it is a creature whose being, or lack
thereof, must be threshed out in a full-blown trial wherein parties are given
the opportunity to give their testimony in open court and the opponent given
the chance to cross-examine, under the watchful eye of the trial judge who
observes with an adept eye the truthfulness of the witness' avowals. x x x (Words in brackets supplied).
In fine, we rule and so hold that
the Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion when it
found the existence of probable cause. The CA, therefore, had erred in
reversing its findings at this embryonic stage of the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED, and
the assailed decision
and resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO
ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos (now deceased), with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (now retired), Josefina Guevarra-Salonga and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner dissented; rollo, pp. 68-81.
[2]
[3] Article VIII, Section 1.
[4] Supra note 1.
[5] Supra note 1 at 69-70.
[6] Rollo, pp. 82-88.
[7]
[8] Lim
v. Felix, G.R. Nos.
94054-57, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 292, citing Castillo v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 34285, March 8, 1989, 171 SCRA 39.
[9] Chua Huat v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 53851,
[10] Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340 (1939).
[11] Rollo, pp. 82-83.
[12]
[13] Paderanga
v. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080,
[14] Webb v. De Leon, et al., G.R. No.
121234,