|
FLORANTE VIDAD, SR.,
ARLENE VIDAD-ABSALON and FLORANTE VIDAD, JR., Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 160554
Present: |
|
- versus - ELPIDIO TAYAMEN and |
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
|
LAUREANA TAYAMEN, Respondents. |
August
24, 2007 |
x- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -x
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated
The facts culled from the records of this case are as follows.
On
To protect their rights, respondents filed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim with the Registry of Deeds on
During the pendency of the case, however, petitioners filed a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 89-49741 before the RTC of Manila, Branch
20, and also caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on the original
of the title. Petitioners in their
complaint alleged that three years before the respondents made the alleged
purchase of the three apartments and the lot, the spouses Batara and the
petitioners had already entered into a contract of sale of the apartment unit
which petitioners were occupying.[6] Petitioners alleged that a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) was executed between the parties and that petitioners made a
downpayment of P25,000.
Thereafter, the Bataras allegedly also agreed to sell the entire three-door
apartment for P160,000, which the petitioners had paid in full.[7]
However, Civil Case No. 89-49741 filed by petitioners was
dismissed on
Respondents forthwith demanded that petitioners vacate the
apartment they were occupying, but petitioners refused. Thus, on P161,000 with legal interest as past rentals as
well as P5,000 monthly rental from the filing of the complaint until the
time the place is vacated, P10,000 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.[10]
After trial, the trial court held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant ordering the DISMISSAL of this Complaint for want of merit.
The counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On motion for reconsideration by the respondents, the trial
court modified its judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is
hereby rendered against plaintiffs and in favor of the defendant ordering the
DISMISSAL of this Complaint for want of merit. However, defendant is hereby
ordered to pay plaintiffs Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
representing 1/3 of P600,000.00 paid to Cabanos with six percent (6%)
interest per annum from April 22, 1997 until fully paid.
The counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which reversed the trial court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed Decision and Resolution dated
The defendant-appellant and all other persons living in the subject apartment unit are hereby ORDERED:
(a) to VACATE the subject apartment unit; and
(b) to
PAY plaintiffs-appellees the amount of P1,000.00 per month as
rental plus legal interest from September 1982 to the time the complaint was
filed in May 1997 and the amount of P5,000.00 per month thereafter until
it is finally vacated.
The prayer for payment of attorney’s fees and cost of suit is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The Court of Appeals also denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[14] Hence, this petition.
Petitioners raise the following as grounds to allow their
petition:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED/MODIFIED THE DECISION OF
BRANCH 34 OF THE
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
GRANTED THE RESPONDENTS AN AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT THEY OBTAINED
FROM THE
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PREMISES IN QUESTION WHICH IS NOT ONE OF THE ASSIGNED
ERRORS IN THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL BRIEF OR NOT AN ISSUE OF THE APPEAL.
IV.
COROLLARY THERETO WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECLARING THAT THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONG TO THE PETITIONERS.[15]
Simply stated, first, can the Court of Appeals grant an
affirmative relief other than that obtained from the lower court? Second, did the Court of Appeals err when it decided
the issue of ownership which allegedly is not one of the assigned errors in the
appeal? Third, did the Court of Appeals
err when it reversed the decision of the trial court declaring that the
property in question belonged to the petitioners?
On the first issue, petitioners contend that whenever an
appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the
ones granted in the decision of the court below.[16]
Respondents counter that such could be obtained from the
Court of Appeals since the latter had the solemn duty to dispense justice and
uphold the law.[17]
The pertinent rule is Section 8, Rule 51 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It states:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided.–No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed
from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error
and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors
and clerical errors.
This, notwithstanding, in several cases we have
also explained that the Court of Appeals is imbued with sufficient authority and
discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice.[18]
In Sesbreño v. Central Board of
Assessment Appeals,[19]
we held that an appellate court has an inherent authority to review unassigned
errors (1) which are closely related to an error properly raised; (2) upon
which the determination of the error properly assigned is dependent; or (3)
where the Court finds that consideration of them is necessary in arriving at a
just decision of the case.[20]
Thus, in the case now before us, the appellate court did not
err in passing upon an unassigned error, in the light of the foregoing
considerations and precedents.
On the second issue, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals could only consider errors raised which are limited to the order of the
trial court requiring the payment of P200,000.[21]
Respondents counter that the petitioners themselves had
raised the issue of ownership. [22]
We note that indeed petitioners had assigned ownership as one of the
errors of the lower court when it rendered the assailed decision, to wit:
x
x x x
V.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
DEED OF
Furthermore, to determine whether petitioners were really
liable to the respondents for P200,000, the appellate court had first to
determine who actually owned the property.
On the last issue, petitioners contend that they have a Deed
of Absolute Sale. On the other hand,
respondents contend that petitioners do not have title to the property.
The MOA which the petitioners claim as
Deed of Absolute Sale provides:
That by virtue of the said agreement and for
and in consideration of the Sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency to me in hand paid by Mrs. Corazon Vidad do hereby
to (sic) commit to sell One (1) Door
Apartment [l]ocated at 4756 Road I, V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila (this one
door apartment is a part of a three (3) door Apt. in the said address). Subject of this agreement includes one door
apartment and the lot therein. That the
terms and conditions of this agreement are to wit:
1. That
the above mentioned amount is part payment of subject One door apartment and
lot[;]
2. That
the balance of the entire amount shall be paid and a Deed of Absolute Sale be
executed upon agreement later on by both parties;
x x x x
5. That
in case both parties have agreed on the full payment[,] the area of the
Now, is the cited MOA a contract of sale or a contract to sell?
The following are the differences
between a Contract OF Sale and a Contract TO Sell: (a) In a Contract OF Sale, the non-payment of
the price is a resolutory condition which extinguishes the transaction that,
for a time, existed and discharges the obligations created thereunder;[25]
in a Contract TO Sell, full payment of the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective;[26]
(b) In the first, title over the property generally passes to the buyer upon
delivery; in the second, ownership is retained by the seller, regardless of
delivery and is not to pass until full payment of the price; [27]
and (c) In the first, after delivery has been made, the seller has lost
ownership and cannot recover it unless the contract is resolved or rescinded;
in the second, since the seller retains ownership, despite delivery, he is
enforcing and not rescinding the contract if he seeks to oust the buyer for
failure to pay.[28]
Note that the MOA contains an implicit agreement that the
seller retained ownership regardless of whether or not there was delivery. Ownership was not to pass until full payment
of the price, as “the balance of the entire amount shall be paid and a Deed of
Absolute Sale be executed as per agreement later on by the parties.” The payment in full of the price was a
positive suspensive condition, another peculiar characteristic of a contract to
sell. Noteworthy also is the term
“commit to sell” in the first paragraph of the MOA. Since the MOA is a contract to sell, the
petitioners do not have full ownership rights to the subject property.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the Deed of Absolute
Sale[29] between
respondents and Batara was valid, the deed having been made in accordance with
law, since Dr. Cabanos had waived, and quitclaimed any and all rights, interest
or participation that she may have over the subject property arising from the
execution sale and thereby allowed the consolidation of title and ownership
thereon unto the respondents by reason and arising from the execution sale. Thus, the title and ownership in the name of the
respondents could already be consolidated by reason of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-52. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Edgardo F. Sundiam concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 2.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] St.
Michael’s Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280,
[19] G.R.
No. 106588,
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 144.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140715,
[26] Id., citing Salazar v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118203, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 317.
[27] V E. Paras, Civil Code of the
[28]
[29] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[30]