Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA G.R. NO. 159617
de R.C.
SICAM, INC.,
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
LULU
V. JORGE and CESAR
JORGE, Promulgated:
Respondents. August 8, 2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Roberto C. Sicam, Jr. (petitioner Sicam) and
Agencia de R.C. Sicam,
Inc. (petitioner corporation) seeking to annul the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2003, and its Resolution[2]
dated August 8, 2003, in CA G.R. CV No. 56633.
It appears that on different dates from September to October
1987, Lulu V. Jorge
(respondent Lulu) pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia
de R. C. Sicam located at No. 17 Aguirre Ave.,
BF Homes Parañaque, Metro Manila, to secure a loan in
the total amount of P59,500.00.
On
Investigation shows that at above TDPO, while victims were inside the office, two (2) male unidentified persons entered into the said office with guns drawn. Suspects(sic) (1) went straight inside and poked his gun toward Romeo Sicam and thereby tied him with an electric wire while suspects (sic) (2) poked his gun toward Divina Mata and Isabelita Rodriguez and ordered them to lay (sic) face flat on the floor. Suspects asked forcibly the case and assorted pawned jewelries items mentioned above.
Suspects after taking the money and
jewelries fled on board a Marson Toyota unidentified
plate number.[3]
Petitioner Sicam sent respondent
Lulu a letter dated
On
Petitioner
Sicam filed his Answer contending that he is not the
real party-in-interest as the pawnshop was incorporated on April 20, 1987 and
known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc; that petitioner corporation had exercised due
care and diligence in the safekeeping of the articles pledged with it and could
not be made liable for an event that is fortuitous.
Respondents
subsequently filed an Amended Complaint to include petitioner
corporation.
Thereafter,
petitioner Sicam filed a Motion to Dismiss as far as
he is concerned considering that he is not the real party-in-interest. Respondents
opposed the same. The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision[6]
dated
The RTC further ruled that petitioner
corporation could not be held liable for the loss of the pawned jewelry since
it had not been rebutted by respondents that the loss of the pledged pieces of
jewelry in the possession of the corporation was occasioned by armed robbery;
that robbery is a fortuitous event which exempts the victim from liability for
the loss, citing the case of Austria v. Court of Appeals;[7]
and that the parties’ transaction was that of
a pledgor and pledgee
and under Art. 1174 of
the Civil Code, the pawnshop as a pledgee is not
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen.
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision
to the CA. In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is
GRANTED, and the Decision dated January 12, 1993,of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 62,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, ordering the appellees
to pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry amounting to P272,000.00,
and attorney' fees of P27,200.00.[8]
In finding petitioner Sicam liable
together with petitioner corporation, the CA applied the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate entity reasoning that respondents were misled into
thinking that they were dealing with the pawnshop owned by petitioner Sicam as all the pawnshop tickets issued to them bear the
words “Agencia
de R.C. Sicam”; and that there was no
indication on the pawnshop tickets that it was the petitioner corporation that
owned the pawnshop which explained why respondents had to amend their
complaint impleading
petitioner corporation.
The CA further held that the
corresponding diligence required of a
pawnshop is that it should take steps to secure and protect the pledged items
and should take steps to insure itself against the loss of articles which are entrusted to its custody
as it derives earnings from the pawnshop trade which petitioners failed to do;
that Austria is not applicable to this case since the robbery incident
happened in 1961 when the criminality had not as yet reached the levels
attained in the present day; that they
are at least guilty of contributory negligence and should be held liable for
the loss of jewelries; and that robberies and hold-ups are foreseeable risks in
that those engaged in the pawnshop business are expected to foresee.
The CA concluded that both petitioners
should be jointly and severally held liable to respondents for the loss of the
pawned jewelry.
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, the instant petition for
review with the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND WHEN IT DID, IT OPENED ITSELF TO REVERSAL, WHEN IT ADOPTED UNCRITICALLY (IN FACT IT REPRODUCED AS ITS OWN WITHOUT IN THE MEANTIME ACKNOWLEDGING IT) WHAT THE RESPONDENTS ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF, WHICH ARGUMENT WAS PALPABLY UNSUSTAINABLE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AND WHEN IT DID, IT OPENED ITSELF TO REVERSAL BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, WHEN IT AGAIN ADOPTED UNCRITICALLY (BUT WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT) THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR BRIEF WITHOUT ADDING ANYTHING MORE THERETO DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED IN VIEW OF UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[9]
Anent the first assigned error,
petitioners point out that the CA’s finding that petitioner Sicam
is personally liable for the loss of the pawned jewelries is “a virtual and
uncritical reproduction of the arguments set out on pp. 5-6 of the Appellants’
brief.”[10]
Petitioners argue that the reproduced
arguments of respondents in their Appellants’ Brief suffer from infirmities, as
follows:
(1) Respondents conclusively asserted in paragraph 2 of their Amended Complaint that Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc. is the present owner of Agencia de R.C. Sicam Pawnshop, and therefore, the CA cannot rule against said conclusive assertion of respondents;
(2) The issue resolved against petitioner Sicam was not among those raised and litigated in the trial court; and
(3) By reason of the above infirmities, it was error for the CA to have pierced the corporate veil since a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members.
Anent the second error, petitioners
point out that the CA finding on their negligence is likewise an unedited
reproduction of respondents’ brief which had the following defects:
(1) There were unrebutted evidence on record that petitioners had observed the diligence required of them, i.e, they wanted to open a vault with a nearby bank for purposes of safekeeping the pawned articles but was discouraged by the Central Bank (CB) since CB rules provide that they can only store the pawned articles in a vault inside the pawnshop premises and no other place;
(2) Petitioners were adjudged negligent as they did not take insurance against the loss of the pledged jelweries, but it is judicial notice that due to high incidence of crimes, insurance companies refused to cover pawnshops and banks because of high probability of losses due to robberies;
(3) In Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit (179 SCRA 39, 45-46), the victim of robbery was exonerated from liability for the sum of money belonging to others and lost by him to robbers.
Respondents filed their Comment and petitioners filed their
Reply thereto. The parties subsequently
submitted their respective Memoranda.
We
find no merit in the petition.
To begin with, although it is true that indeed the
CA findings were exact reproductions of the arguments raised in respondents’
(appellants’) brief filed with the CA, we find the same to be not fatally
infirmed. Upon examination of the Decision, we find that it expressed clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based as required by Section
8, Article VIII of the Constitution. The discretion to decide a case one way or
another is broad enough to justify the adoption of the arguments put forth by
one of the parties, as long as these are legally tenable and supported by law
and the facts on records.[11]
Our jurisdiction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to the review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. Generally, the findings of fact of the
appellate court are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and
calibrate all over again the evidence adduced by the parties in the court a
quo.[12] This
rule, however, is not without exceptions, such as where the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory[13]
as is obtaining in the instant case.
However,
after a careful examination of the records, we find no justification to absolve
petitioner Sicam from liability.
The CA correctly pierced the veil of the corporate fiction
and adjudged petitioner Sicam liable together with petitioner corporation. The rule is that the veil of
corporate fiction may be pierced when made as a shield to perpetrate fraud
and/or confuse legitimate issues. [14]
The theory of corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives or
otherwise to shield them.[15]
Notably,
the evidence on record shows that at the time respondent Lulu pawned her
jewelry, the pawnshop was owned by petitioner Sicam
himself. As correctly observed by the CA, in all the pawnshop receipts issued
to respondent Lulu in September 1987, all bear the words “Agencia
de R. C. Sicam,” notwithstanding that the
pawnshop was allegedly incorporated in April 1987. The receipts issued after such alleged
incorporation were still in the name of “Agencia
de R. C. Sicam,” thus inevitably misleading,
or at the very least, creating the wrong impression to respondents and the
public as well, that the pawnshop was owned solely by petitioner Sicam and not by a corporation.
Even petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Marcial T. Balgos, in his letter[16]
dated
We also find no merit in petitioners' argument
that since respondents had alleged in their Amended Complaint that petitioner corporation is the present owner of the pawnshop,
the CA is bound to decide the case on that basis.
Section 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
Thus, the general rule that a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof, admits of two
exceptions, to wit: (1) when it is shown that such admission was made through
palpable mistake, and (2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact
made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying
that he made such an admission.[17]
The Committee on the Revision of the Rules
of Court explained the second exception in this wise:
x x x if a party
invokes an “admission” by an adverse party, but cites the admission “out of
context,” then the one making the “admission” may show that he made no “such”
admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.
x x x that the
party can also show that he made no “such admission”, i.e., not in the sense in
which the admission is made to appear.
That is the reason for the modifier “such” because if the rule simply states that the admission may be contradicted by showing that “no admission was made,” the rule would not really be providing for a contradiction of the admission but just a denial.[18] (Emphasis supplied).
While it is true that respondents
alleged in their Amended Complaint that petitioner corporation is the present
owner of the pawnshop, they did so only because petitioner Sicam
alleged in his Answer to the original
complaint filed against him that he was not the real party-in-interest
as the pawnshop was incorporated in April 1987. Moreover, a reading of the
Amended Complaint in its entirety shows that respondents referred to both
petitioner Sicam and petitioner corporation where
they (respondents) pawned their assorted pieces of jewelry and ascribed to both
the failure to observe due diligence commensurate with the business which
resulted in the loss of their pawned jewelry.
Markedly, respondents, in their
Opposition to petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, insofar as
petitioner Sicam is concerned, averred as follows:
Roberto C. Sicam was named the defendant in the original complaint because the pawnshop tickets involved in this case did not show that the R.C. Sicam Pawnshop was a corporation. In paragraph 1 of his Answer, he admitted the allegations in paragraph 1 and 2 of the Complaint. He merely added “that defendant is not now the real party in interest in this case.”
It was defendant Sicam's omission to correct the pawnshop tickets used in
the subject transactions in this case which was the cause of the instant
action. He cannot now ask for the dismissal of the complaint against him simply on the mere allegation that
his pawnshop business is now incorporated. It is a matter of defense, the merit
of which can only be reached after consideration of the evidence to be
presented in due course.[19]
Unmistakably,
the alleged admission made in respondents' Amended Complaint was taken “out of context” by
petitioner Sicam to suit his own purpose. Ineluctably,
the fact that petitioner Sicam continued to issue
pawnshop receipts under his name and not under the corporation's name militates
for the piercing of the corporate veil.
We likewise find no merit in petitioners' contention that the
CA erred in piercing the veil of corporate fiction of petitioner corporation,
as it was not an issue
raised and litigated before the RTC.
Petitioner Sicam
had alleged in his Answer filed with the trial court that he was not the real party-in-interest
because since April 20, 1987, the pawnshop business initiated by him was
incorporated and known as Agencia de
R.C. Sicam. In
the pre-trial brief filed by petitioner Sicam, he
submitted that as far as he was concerned, the basic issue was whether he is
the real party in interest against whom the complaint should be directed.[20]
In fact, he subsequently moved for the dismissal of the complaint as to him but
was not favorably acted upon by the trial court. Moreover, the issue was
squarely passed upon, although erroneously, by the trial court in its Decision
in this manner:
x x x The defendant Roberto Sicam, Jr likewise denies liability as far as he is concerned for the reason that he cannot be made personally liable for a claim arising from a corporate transaction.
This Court sustains the contention of the defendant Roberto C. Sicam, Jr. The amended complaint itself asserts that “plaintiff pawned assorted jewelries in defendant's pawnshop.” It has been held that “ as a consequence of the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the corporate debt or credit is not the debt or credit of the stockholder, nor is the stockholder's debt or credit that of a corporation.[21]
Clearly, in view of the alleged incorporation of the
pawnshop, the issue of whether petitioner Sicam is
personally liable is inextricably connected with the determination of the question
whether the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should or should not apply
to the case.
The next question is whether
petitioners are liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their
possession.
Petitioners insist that they are not
liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.
We are not persuaded.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. [22]
To constitute a fortuitous event, the
following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that
constitutes the caso fortuito
or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations
in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury or loss. [23]
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous
event rests on him who invokes it.[24] And, in order for a fortuitous event to
exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. [25]
It
has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a
loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing
damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt
one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person's participation -- whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable
to acts of God. [26]
Petitioner Sicam
had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of
the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business
in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of
safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned
articles should only be stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had
allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Petitioner Sicam’s
testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show
that they were free from any negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry
may have been occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not
foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. In Co v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court held:
It
is not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to escape liability simply
because the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due
to carnapping. Carnapping
per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was
unlawfully and forcefully taken from another's rightful possession, as in cases
of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a
fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping
entails more than the mere forceful taking of another's property. It must be
proved and established that the event was an act of God or was done solely by
third parties and that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be
negligent has any participation. In accordance with the Rules of Evidence, the
burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who
invokes it — which in this case is the private respondent. However, other
than the police report of the alleged carnapping
incident, no other evidence was presented by private respondent to the effect
that the incident was not due to its fault. A police report of an alleged
crime, to which only private respondent is privy, does not suffice to establish
the carnapping. Neither does it prove that there was
no fault on the part of private respondent notwithstanding the parties'
agreement at the pre-trial that the car was carnapped.
Carnapping does not foreclose the possibility of
fault or negligence on the part of private respondent.[28]
Just like in Co,
petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque
Police Station on the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners' employees which is not
sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that
petitioners were not at fault.
On the contrary, by the very evidence
of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that petitioners are guilty of
concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.[29]
Article 2123 of the Civil Code
provides that with regard to pawnshops and other establishments which are
engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations
concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily,
the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly
Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall take
care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This
means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person
would as to his own property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the
Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
We
expounded in Cruz v. Gangan[30] that negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.[31]
It is want of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows
that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners
were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business.
Petitioner Sicam testified, thus:
Court:
Q. Do you have security guards in your pawnshop?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. Then how come that the robbers were able to enter the premises when according to you there was a security guard?
A. Sir, if these robbers can rob a bank, how much more a pawnshop.
Q. I am asking you how were the robbers able to enter despite the fact that there was a security guard?
A. At the time of the incident which happened about 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and it happened on a Saturday and everything was quiet in the area BF Homes Parañaque they pretended to pawn an article in the pawnshop, so one of my employees allowed him to come in and it was only when it was announced that it was a hold up.
Q. Did you come to know how the vault was opened?
A. When the pawnshop is official (sic) open your honor the pawnshop is partly open. The combination is off.
Q. No one open (sic) the vault for the robbers?
A. No one your honor it was open at the time of the robbery.
Q. It is clear now that at the time of the robbery the vault was open the reason why the robbers were able to get all the items pawned to you inside the vault.
A. Yes sir.[32]
revealing that there were no security measures adopted by petitioners
in the operation of the pawnshop.
Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners
to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing
that there was any security guard at all.
Or if there was one, that he had sufficient training in securing a
pawnshop. Further, there is no showing
that the alleged security guard exercised all that was necessary to prevent any
untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were allowed to
enter the premises. In fact, it is even
doubtful that there was a security guard, since it is
quite impossible that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed
with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the employees.[33] Significantly, the alleged security guard was
not presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam's
claim; not one of
petitioners' employees who were present during the robbery
incident testified in court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicam's admission that the vault was open at the time of
robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners' failure to observe the care,
precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded. Petitioner Sicam testified that once the pawnshop was open, the
combination was already off. Considering
petitioner Sicam's testimony that the robbery took
place on a Saturday afternoon and the area in BF Homes Parañaque
at that time was quiet, there was more reason for petitioners to have exercised
reasonable foresight and diligence in protecting the pawned jewelries. Instead
of taking the precaution to protect them, they let open the vault, providing no
difficulty for the robbers to cart away the pawned articles.
We, however, do not agree with the CA
when it found petitioners negligent for not
taking steps to insure themselves against loss of the pawned jewelries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank
Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations for Pawnshops, which took effect on
Sec.
17. Insurance of
However, this Section was subsequently
amended by CB Circular No. 764 which took effect on
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office
Building and Pawns – The office building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must
be insured against fire. (emphasis
supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was
deleted. Obviously, the Central Bank
considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned articles against
burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in
1987, and considering the above-quoted amendment, there is no statutory duty
imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was error
for the CA to consider it as a factor in concluding that petitioners were
negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of
evidence shows that petitioners failed to exercise the diligence required of
them under the Civil Code.
The diligence with which the law
requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the
nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act
which he is to perform.[34] Thus,
the cases of Austria v. Court of Appeals,[35]
Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit[36]
and Cruz v. Gangan[37]
cited by petitioners in their pleadings, where the victims of robbery were
exonerated from liability, find no application to the present case.
In
We found in Austria that under
the circumstances prevailing at the time the Decision was promulgated in
1971, the City of Manila and its suburbs
had a high incidence of crimes against persons and property that rendered
travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable
precaution and protection; that the conduct of
Maria Abad in returning alone to her house in
the evening carrying jewelry of considerable value would have been negligence
per se and would not exempt her from responsibility in the case of robbery.
However we did not hold Abad liable for negligence
since, the robbery happened ten years previously; i.e., 1961, when criminality
had not reached the level of incidence obtaining in 1971.
In contrast, the robbery in this case
took place in 1987 when robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact
had already foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank
for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in
In Hernandez, Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC and special disbursing
officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism in
Unlike in Hernandez where the
robbery happened in a public utility,
the robbery in this case took place in the pawnshop which is under the
control of petitioners. Petitioners had the means to screen the persons who were
allowed entrance to the premises and to protect itself from unlawful intrusion.
Petitioners had failed to exercise precautionary measures in ensuring that the
robbers were prevented from entering the pawnshop and for keeping the vault open for the
day, which paved the way for the robbers to easily cart away the pawned
articles.
In
Cruz, Dr. Filonila O. Cruz, Camanava District Director of Technological Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA), boarded the Light Rail Transit (LRT) from
P4,238.00. The COA found no sufficient
justification to grant the request for relief from accountability. We reversed
the ruling and found that riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a
negligent act more so because Cruz’s mode of transit was influenced by time and
money considerations; that she boarded
the LRT to be able to arrive in Caloocan in time for
her 3 pm meeting; that any prudent and rational person under similar
circumstance can reasonably be expected to do the same; that possession of a cellphone should not hinder one from boarding the LRT coach
as Cruz did considering that whether she rode a jeep or bus, the risk of theft
would have also been present; that because of her relatively low position and
pay, she was not expected to have her own vehicle or to ride a taxicab; she did
not have a government assigned vehicle; that placing the cellphone
in a bag away from covetous eyes and holding on to that bag as she did is
ordinarily sufficient care of a cellphone while
traveling on board the LRT; that the records did not show any specific act of
negligence on her part and negligence can never be presumed.
Unlike in the Cruz case, the robbery in this case happened in petitioners' pawnshop and they were negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.
WHEREFORE,
except for the insurance aspect, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] CA rollo, pp. 63-73; Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (ret.) and concurred in by Justices Sergio L. Pestaño and Noel G. Tijam.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] 148-A Phil. 462 (1971).
[8] CA rollo, p. 72.
[9] Rollo, pp. 5-6.
[10] Rollo, p. 7.
[11] Nuez v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 107574,
[12] Litonjua
v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 148116,
[13] Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).
[14] See Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 80043,
[15] See Sibagat Timber Corporation v. Garcia, G.R.
No. 98185,
[16]
[17] Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 546, 552 (1997).
[18] Minutes of the meeting held on
[19] Records, p. 67.
[20]
[21]
[22] Republic v.
[23] Mindex Resources Development Corporation v. Morillo, 428 Phil. 934, 944 (2002).
[24] Co v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 305, 313 (1998).
[25] Mindex Resources Development Corporation v. Morillo, supra citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 126, citing Sian v. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 (1912); Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 228 Phil. 564, 578 (1986). Cf. Metal Forming Corporation v. Office of the President, 317 Phil. 853, 859 (1995).
[26]
[27] Supra note 24.
[28]
[29] Civil Code, Art.
1170.
[30] 443 Phil. 856, 863 (2003) citing McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517 (1992).
[31] Cruz v. Gangan, supra note 30, at 863.
[32] TSN,
[33] Exhibit “1,” Excerpt from the Police Blotter dated October 17, 1987 of the Parañaque Police Station, p. 121.
[34] Cruz v. Gangan, supra note 30, at 863 citing Sangco, Torts and Damages, Vol. 1, 1993 rev. ed. p. 5.
[35] Supra note 7.
[36] G.R. No. 71871,
[37] Supra note 30.
[38]