EN BANC
|
PEOPLE OF
THE Petitioner, - versus - SANDIGANBAYAN
(Special Division) and JOSE “JINGGOY” ESTRADA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 158754
|
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
*CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
|
August 10, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution[1] of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special
Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal
Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator
Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada (hereafter “Jinggoy” for brevity), as effectively
reiterated in its Resolution[2] of May 30, 2003, denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this proceeding
are set forth in the Court’s Decision[3]
of
In November 2000, as an offshoot of
the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of
the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former
President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators
were filed with the … Office of the Ombudsman.
On
The Information was amended and
filed on
The amended information referred to,
like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the former
President and several others, with plunder, defined and penalized under RA No.
7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659, allegedly committed as follows:
That during the period from June,
1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER,
…, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his
co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,
did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting,
directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF… (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS,
FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused … Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, …, [and] JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds … [P130,000,000.00], more or
less, representing a portion of the … [P200,000,000]
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A.
No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR
HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS … [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS … [P1,847,578,057.50];
AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT … [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE”;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS,
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS … [P3,233,104,173.17] AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE” AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK.[4]
What transpired next are narrated in the same
On
On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed
a “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion” alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to
put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a “series or
combination of overt or criminal acts” as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2)
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
[He] prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information …. In the alternative, [he] also prayed that he
be allowed to post bail …..
On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a
“Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its
Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable
Offense As To Him.”
xxx
xxx xxx
On
xxx xxx xxx
The following day,
From the denial action of the
Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for
certiorari before this Court claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in, inter
alia, (a) sustaining the charge
against him for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators with whom he is
not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Pending
resolution of this petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical
Reasons.” The Ombudsman opposed the motion. For three (3) days in September
2001, the Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail, with one
Dr. Roberto Anastacio of the
On
The
report was submitted as directed.
Attached to the Report was a
copy of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution
dated
On
The constitutional mandate makes
the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. This requires
that the trial court conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with
the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position
to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based
its Resolution of
Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy],
respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the evidence
of [Jinggoy’s] guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to [him].[9]
(Underscoring and words in brackets added).
On
In
the herein assailed Resolution[11] of
WHEREFORE, in light of all the
facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, JOSE “JINGGOY” ESTRADA’s “OMNIBUS
APPLICATION FOR BAIL” dated
This resolution is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration thereto which the respondent court denied via the herein equally assailed
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the
prosecution’s “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [RE: GRANT OF JOSE “JINGGOY”
ESTRADA’S PETITION FOR BAIL] dated
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition on the
submission[13]
that respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction -
I.
IN
GRANTING BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA,…[CONSIDERING] THE WELL-ESTABLISHED THEORY OF OVERLAPPING
CONSPIRACIES AND, THUS, GRIEVOUSLY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF ACCEPTED
CRIMINAL LAW PRECEPTS AND THEREBY SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.
II.
xxx WHEN
IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT
THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA POINTED TO A CONCURRENCE OF
SENTIMENT OR CRIMINAL DESIGN INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA AND JINGGOY ESTRADA.
III.
xxx WHEN
IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA CONSIDERING THAT THE UNDISPUTED
FACT CLEARLY EVIDENCES THAT RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, EVEN WITHOUT A FINDING
OF CONSPIRACY, IS EQUALLY GUILTY AND LIABLE AS ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA HIMSELF
BY HIS INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION AND/OR DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION
OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
IV.
xxx WHEN
IT LIMITED THE CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE, AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL
[LIABILITY] OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, TO SUBPARAGRAPH “A” OF THE AMENDED
INFORMATION.
The imputation of grave abuse of
discretion to the public respondent is untenable.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:
Section
13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged
is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail
may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.[14] Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed
Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as
determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be
a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in
this regard:
It
is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been
consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by
deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued
incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility
of his escape in this case seems remote if not nil.[15]
The likelihood of escape on the part
individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on
Petitioner’s first argument denigrates
as grave abuse of discretion the public respondent’s rejection of the theory
of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator
in the first level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in
furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next level of which the actor is not
an active party. As the petitioner’s logic goes following this theory,
respondent Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President
Estrada in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth from “jueteng” under par. (a)
of the amended information. He has also a culpable connection with the
conspiracy, under par. (b), in the
diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving commissions and kickbacks
from the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other
illegal sources under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last
three paragraphs. And since the central figure in the overlapping conspiracies,
i.e., President Estrada, is charged with
a capital offense, all those within the conspiracy loop would be considered
charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.
Explaining its point, petitioner cites
People v. Castelo[16]
which, as here, also involves multiple levels of conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead
accused is a former President no less, the prime suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking
government official – a former Judge who later rose to hold, in a concurrent capacity, the positions
of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National Defense, to be precise. In Castelo,
charges and countercharges were initially hurled by and between Castelo and
Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star
witness against Castelo in a scandal case.
Castelo left the Philippines for Korea.
While away, someone shot Monroy dead.
Evidence pointed to a conspiracy led by a certain “Ben Ulo” (who
appears to be the mastermind) and a group of confidential agents of the
Department of National Defense, one of whom was the triggerman. Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close
bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the
Solicitor General tagged Ben Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in the
conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the
Court held Castelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder, because only he
had a motive for desiring Monroy’s demise.
The conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be overlapping
with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of whom
was the triggerman.
Further explaining the theory of
overlapping conspiracies, petitioner cites the ruling in People v. Ty Sui Wong,[17] featuring a love triangle involving a
certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the heart of Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano
was found with multiple stab wounds in a dark alley in
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, petitioner presently argues:
It should be noted that this is the
same scenario of accused Joseph Estrada conspiring with former Gov. Singson
for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng
protection money); and of former Gov. Singson involving respondent Jinggoy
Estrada in yet another level of conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e.,
the regular collection of jueteng protection money for accused Joseph Estrada;
and, respondent Jinggoy Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy
between accused Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson, agreeing to remit the greater
part of his collection of bribes to accused Joseph Estrada as its ultimate
beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada reached an agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed the plan and
participated in furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and collection
of jueteng protection money, i.e.,
collecting P3 Million in jueteng
protection money every month; remitting P2 Million thereof to former Gov.
Singson for delivery to accused Joseph Estrada and retaining P1 Million
thereof for himself.
Similarly, therefore, respondent
Jinggoy Estrada should have been denied bail since he is as guilty and liable
as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-bailable offense of Plunder.[18]
As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing
sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking
Jinggoy’s release on bail.
As it were, the petitioner erroneously
equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his virtual
acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for
the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of
a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail application, was
not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent
Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and merits of
the main case. In the words of the
public respondent:
As a cautionary parting word, it
must be categorically stated herein that in making the above pronouncements, this
Court [Sandiganbayan] is not making any judgment as to the final outcome of
this case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with respect to accused
Estrada. This Court [Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine whether, at
this stage, the evidence of movant's guilt is strong as to warrant
his temporary release on bail. xxx.[19]
Revoking the bail thus granted to
respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies that
the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre‑empting
the Sandiganbayan’s ongoing determination of the facts and merits of the main
case.
Petitioner’s second and third arguments
focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy in the crime of
Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical
conclusions, tend to cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a
direction quite the opposite of the other.
For while the second argument attempts to establish an “implied conspiracy” between Jinggoy
and his father - hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third
argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless
“equally guilty” as President
Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation and/or direct participation
in the crime of Plunder.
By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[20]
Venturing into the gray areas of the concept of conspiracy, petitioner cites
the following obiter defining “implied
conspiracy,” thus:
When by their acts, two or more
persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same felonious object, with
each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in
fact connected, showing a closeness of formal association and concurrence of
sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.[21]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential
to establish conspiracy. Since by its
nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by
direct evidence. Consequently, the
presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[22]
From the above pronouncements,
petitioner then proceeds to present voluminous documents and transcripts of
stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had been deep inside the
web of “implied conspiracy” under the second argument of this petition. From
the “implied conspiracy” theory, it then shifts gears to embrace the “equally
guilty” hypothesis under the fall-back third argument.
Regardless, however, of whatever
legal strategy petitioner may have in mind, the fundamental principle that the Court is not a trier of facts
remains. Petitioner’s second and third arguments
are to be sure relevant to the proceedings for the grant or denial of bail
that were pending before in the Sandiganbayan.
They are of little moment here where the only issue now is whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting
bail to the private respondent.
With the view we take of this case, the
respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
resolutions, because the grant of bail
therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence
adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the
right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not
prevent the trier of facts, the same
xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at
best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final
assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an
accused person granted bail is convicted in due course. [23]
Petitioner’s last argument is, at
bottom, an attempt to have the Court
reverse in this case its earlier holding in another case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we
stated:
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs,
charges petitioner [Jinggoy] and his other co-accused with the crime of
plunder. The first paragraph names all
the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in
detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the
co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The
predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph
(a) alleged the predicate act of
receiving, on several instances, money
from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner [Jinggoy] as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the
predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
From the
foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused
named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada
to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth …. As
the Amended Information is worded,
however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable
the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner
cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with
the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended
Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We
hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which
were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was
to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.[24] (Emphasis
added.)
Obviously hoping to maneuver around
the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent for predicate acts
described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and
(d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now argues:
It should be emphasized that in the
course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent Jinggoy Estrada
waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as
he did participate and later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses whose
testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other constitutive acts of
Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs “b”, “c” and
“d”.[25]
We disagree.
At bottom, the petitioner assumes
that the ruling accorded “benefits” to respondent Jinggoy that were inexistent
at the start of that case. But no such benefits
were extended, as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as
couched, something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoy’s participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings
involving sub-paragraphs “b,” “c” and “d,” did not change the legal situation set
forth in the aforequoted portion of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No.
148965. For when it passed,
in G.R. No. 148965, upon the
inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed
in the Amended Information against
Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for.
In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, a right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution.[26]
In fine, all that the Court
contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of
the accusation in the light of the filing of the Amended Information as
worded. If at all, the Court’s holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed individual
respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to
the Amended Information.
In all, the
Court rules that public respondent
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and
evaluating the weight of the prosecution’s evidence, it determined that the
evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of
that determination, resolved to grant him bail.
As a final consideration, the Court
notes a statement made by the respondent court which adds an appropriate
dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed resolution
of
xxx
Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms
the possibility that, in case of conviction, [respondent Jinggoy’s] criminal
liability would probably not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua. (Underscoring in the original; Words in
bracket added).
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
|
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice
|
(No part) MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* No
part.
[1] Penned
by Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Minita V. Chico-Nazario with Associate
Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Teresita J. Leonardo – De Castro concurring;
rollo, Volume 1, pp. 199-230.
[2] Penned
by the same ponente with a separate
opinion by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Edilberto
G. Sandoval; id. at 231-241.
[3] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 538, 543-44.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo,
Volume 1, pp. 283-291.
[11] Supra
note 1.
[12] Supra
note 2.
[13] Petition,
pp. 103-104; rollo, pp. 104-105.
[14] People v. Baldoz, G.R No. 140032,
[15] Assailed
Resolution dated
[16] People v. Castelo, G.R. No. L-10774,
[17] People v. Ty Sui Wong, G.R. No. L-32529,
[18] Petitioner’s
Memorandum, pp. 127-128, rollo, pp. 5195-5196.
[19] Assailed
Resolution dated
[20] Revised
Penal Code, Article 8, 2nd paragraph.
[21] People v.
[22] People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755,
[23] People v. Baldoz, supra.
[24] Supra
note 3 at 553-554.
[25] Petitioner’s
Memorandum, pp. 209-218, rollo, pp. 5277-5288.
[26] Constitution,
Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 14(2).