FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF MARCELA SALONGA G.R. No. 157567
BITUIN,
Petitioners,
Present:
- versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
TEOFILO
CAOLENG, SR., GONZALO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CAOLENG,
JUANA CAOLENG, CORONA,
ANGELA
CAOLENG, JOSE GOZUM, AZCUNA, and
ROSITA
GOZUM, EUFROCINA GARCIA, JJ.
GOZUM,
LOURDES GOZUM,
EPIFANIA
GOZUM, CRESENCIA
GOZUM,
INES GOZUM, NICOLAS Promulgated:
GOZUM,
CARMEN GOZUM,
GORGONIO
GOZUM, BERNARDO August
10, 2007
SALONGA,
ARCELI SALONGA,
JULIANA
SALONGA, ERLINDA
SALONGA,
VICENTE SALONGA,
LYDIA
SALONGA, FERNANDA
SALONGA,
and AGUIDO SALONGA,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
This petition for review
on certiorari assails the June 20, 2002 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54684, which reversed the March 13,
1996 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No.
G-2107, as well as the
The facts of the case, as
culled from the records, are:
Two parcels of land were
originally owned by siblings Juan Romero and Epifania Romero, the common ancestors
of the parties in this instant petition. Both properties are located at Sta.
Ines, Betis, Guagua, Pampanga covering an area of 1,713 square meters and 788
sq. m., respectively. The first property was denominated as Cad.
Juan Romero and Maria
Pecson bore Jacoba Romero. Agustin Caoleng was the only child of Epifania
Romero and Jose Caoleng.
Eventually, Jacoba Romero
married Antonio Salonga and they begot Marcela Salonga, the immediate
predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. Marcela was married to German Bituin
and they were blessed with ten children. On
Meanwhile, Agustin
Caoleng married Maria David and they had seven children, respondents in this
case. The children are: Silverio (deceased), Gonzalo, Rita (deceased), Juana,
Teofilo, Angela, and
On
Petitioners alleged in
the Complaint that due to stealth and high-handed machination, Teofilo Caoleng
succeeded in securing a title for Cad.
Petitioners averred that
they are entitled to the one-half pro-indiviso share of Cad. Lot Nos.
3661, 3448, and 3449 as the only surviving heirs of Juan Romero. They admit
that the other half belongs to the surviving heirs of Epifania Romero,
respondents herein. Petitioners likewise assert that respondents Gonzalo
Caoleng, Arceli Manalac (the daughter of Lourdes Caoleng), Teofilo Caoleng
together with daughter Victoria, Jose Caoleng, and Melanio Caoleng are
occupying most of Cad.
Petitioners further state
that on November 24, 1983, an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Person with Sale[7] was
executed wherein the subject of the instrument was a real property covered by
OCT No. 3399 Free Patent No. (III-1) 002490 [
Furthermore, petitioners
recounted that when Marcela Salonga Bituin died on July 24, 1986, the
properties she left behind were consolidated and it was only at that time that
they discovered OCT No. 3399, the document referring to the extra-judicial
settlement, and the corresponding subdivision plan[8]
which was issued after the execution of the extra-judicial settlement.
Pursuant to the
subdivision plan, petitioners fenced the portion allotted to the late Marcela
Salonga Bituin. Petitioners alleged that they have been in possession of the
property since time immemorial. They claim that they were only able to fence
the three sides of the property, excepting the side adjoining the portion being
occupied by the Gozums, because of a misunderstanding as to the boundaries of
the property.
On
In their Answer,
respondents, except for Gonzalo Caoleng, declare that the complaint stated no
cause of action because OCT No. 3399 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga
cannot be attacked, cancelled, and annulled through the remedy availed by the
petitioners. According to them, a collateral attack of the title is not allowed
by law. Moreover, respondents claim that petitioners are guilty of estoppel and
laches since OCT No. 3399 was issued as early as
On
a) ordering the cancellation and annulment of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 3399 and 3398 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga;
b) declaring the Plaintiffs owners of Cad. Lots Nos. 3661, 3448, and 3449 of Guagua Cadastre to the extent of one half (½) pro-indiviso;
c) ordering the Defendants to reconvey to Plaintiffs one half (½) pro-indiviso share of Cad. Lots Nos. 3661 and 3449 and covered by O.C.T.’s Nos. 3399 and 3398 respectively;
d) ordering the Defendants to vacate Cad. Lots No. 3448 and 3449 to the extent of one half (½) pro-indiviso share;
e)
ordering Defendants – Teofilo Caoleng, Sr. and Gozums,
to pay jointly and severally the Plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and
for attorney’s fees and incidental expenses, aside from other litigation
expenses and costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs pray further for such and other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.[13]
During
the trial, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Gonzalo Caoleng and
German Bituin.
Gonzalo
Caoleng is 81 years old and one of respondents herein. He testified, among
other things, that Lot No. 3661 is located near the sugar land and is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 07026-300.[14]
Aside from Marcela Salonga Bituin, the other dwellers of this lot are Rita
Caoleng and her family, Juana Caoleng, and Angela Caoleng. Gonzalo also
affirmed that Marcela occupied a bigger portion of this land.[15]
The witness stated that Lot Nos. 3448 and 3449 are covered by Tax Declaration
No. 07026-215[16] and are
situated near a creek and now occupied by Loudes Caoleng, Teofilo Caoleng, and
Silverio Caoleng.[17]
Gonzalo further testified that the disputed properties are titled though he had
no idea how Teofilo Caoleng had them registered in the name of Agustin Caoleng.
He elaborated that when the titles were released, Marcela summoned her
relatives for a meeting and they agreed that the property being occupied by
Marcela would be given to her. Thereafter, the parties prepared an agreement
which they called Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with
The
second witness, German Bituin, testified that he is the widower of Marcela
Salonga Bituin. Salient points of his testimony show that petitioners are
claiming more than 1,000 sq. m. of the disputed properties which are already in
their possession. Some of the improvements made on the property were a fence
and a bodega that unfortunately burned during the pendency of the case. He
added that his family is occupying a bigger portion of Lot No. 3661 because his
deceased wife was the sole heir of Jacoba Romero; and while Marcela was still
alive, she exchanged her share with that of her cousin.[22]
The witness explained that the contested lots are titled; but his family did
not secure a separate title for themselves inasmuch as the relatives of his
wife refused to acknowledge their right over the property after Marcela died.
The relatives did not even recognize the extra-judicial settlement after the
death of Marcela.[23]
The
lone witness for respondents, Rosita Gabriana, testified that the signature
appearing above her name in the extra-judicial settlement was not her
signature. After discovering the forgery in the document, Rosita filed a
complaint. She further avowed that the subdivision plan, presented as evidence
for the petitioners, is likewise fake because it was based on a forged
document.[24] On
cross-examination, Rosita admitted that she came to know the properties subject
of this case only when she saw the documents indicating that Agustin Caoleng
was the owner of the lots. The witness admitted that she never learned how
Agustin got the properties although she knows that Agustin is the owner of the
lots.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring plaintiffs as owner to the extent of 941
square meters of
2. Ordering defendants to cause the segregation of the aforementioned portion and to reconvey the same to plaintiffs. Segregations shall be accomplished by means of an approved subdivision plan and an agreement of subdivision/partition. The expense for the subdivision plan shall be born [sic] by plaintiffs and defendants pro-rata.
3. After the segregation and the subdivision plan have been accomplished defendants are ordered to surrender the owners’ duplicate copy of OCT 3399, Free Patent No. 002490 to the Registrar of Land Titles and Deeds of Pampanga who inturn [sic] is directed to cancell [sic] said title and to issue two separate titles, one in the name of plaintiffs for 941 square meters and another in the name of defendants for 538 square meters on the basis of the approved subdivision plan to be submitted by the parties to the said office; the herein parties shall bear their own expense for their own title.
4.
Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs P10,000.00
by way of attorney’s fees and expense of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Not satisfied with the
decision of the RTC, respondents interposed an appeal.
Stating that respondents’
ownership over Lot No. 3661 is based on OCT No. 3399 issued under Free Patent
No. (III-1) 002490, the appellate court ruled that respondents are the
registered owners of the lands in dispute. The CA reasoned that a free patent
issued by the proper authority is granted only to qualified applicants and
indicates that the land was previously public in character. Thus, OCT No. 3399
registered in the name of the respondents gives an indefeasible title in their
favor.
As to the issue of
reconveyance of property, the CA held that the action had prescribed. The CA
further declared that the allegation of fraud on the part of respondents was
not proven by petitioners as OCT No. 3399 was issued by the Government through
a free patent. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated
SO ORDERED.[26]
Petitioners now seek relief
from this Court.
The lone issue raised by
petitioners is whether or not the CA committed grave error in applying the law
on prescription.
Petitioners posit that
there are two fundamental legal grounds why prescription should not have been
applied by the appellate court against them to defeat their rights over the
property at issue:
1. Prescription was not raised by Respondents as a defense -- in a Motion to Dismiss, in their Answer, or even in their Appeal Brief; and
2. Petitioners were, have been, and still are in possession of the portion allotted to their predecessor-in-interest, Marcela Salonga-Bituin.[27]
In their Comment, respondents assert
that reconveyance is not a proper remedy because the lands were previously
public in character and only the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources has the capacity to determine who are qualified to be awarded. They add that the lots are covered by OCT Nos.
3398 and 3399, and, therefore, cannot be impugned collaterally. Lastly,
respondents aver that they raised the defense of prescription in connection
with estoppel and laches.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Well entrenched is the rule that an
action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which
is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its
title, which has been erroneously or wrongfully registered in another person’s
name to its rightful or legal owner, or to one who has a better right.[28]
However, in a number of cases in the
past, the Court declared that if the person claiming to be the owner of the
property is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.[29]
The reason for this is that one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being that his
undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
the one who is in possession.[30]
In his testimony, Gonzalo Caoleng,
who is one of respondents, admitted that Marcela Salonga Bituin occupies a
portion of Lot No. 3661. His telling testimony follows:
Q - Will
you please tell us Mr. Witness who is now in possession of that land near
the “sugar” land which is denominated
as cadastral lot 3661?
WITNESS:
A - Rita
Caoleng and her family, Sir.
ATTY.
DIMALANTA:
Q - Who
else?
A - Juana
and Angela, Sir.
Q - Who
else aside from these persons you mentioned?
Atty.
PUNZALAN:
That is putting the answer
to the mouth of the witness, objection,
Your Honor.
ATTY.
DIMALANTA:
Q - Are
they the onely [sic] persons occupying that land?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - What
about on the portion of the land near the creek, who is in possession of the said land?
A - I
and
Q - What
about this Marcela Salonga, what portion of the land was she occupying?
A - She
is occupying the land near the sugarland, Sir.
Q - The
one being occupied by Rita Caoleng?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - Who
is occupying a bigger portion of that land near the sugarland which [is] denominated as cadastral lot 3661?
A - Marcela
Salonga, Sir.
Q - Are
these properties covered by titles?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
how were they titled?
A - I
don’t know how Teofilo Caoleng had them registered in the name of Agustin Caoleng, Sir.
ATTY.
DIMALANTA:
Q - Are
you referring to these two lots?
WITNESS:
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
how were you able to discover that these two parcels of land [were] caused to be titled by Teofilo
Caoleng in the name of
Agustin Caoleng?
A - When
the titles were released, Marcela Salonga called a sort of a
meeting among us, Sir.
Q - What
did you talk in that meeting?
A - We
agreed that the portion being occupied by Marcela Salonga would be given to her, Sir.
Q - When you said that portion, do you refer to the portion you mentioned covered by cadastral lot 3661?
ATTY.
PUNZALAN:
That would be leading,
Your Honor.
ATTY.
DIMALANTA;
That is only a clarification.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
A - Yes,
Sir.[31]
More
revealing is the confession of the respondents’ sole witness, Rosita Gabriana,
when she testified in this manner:
Q - Mrs.
Witness, will you please tell us if this case is covered by two properties, am I
correct?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - One
is located near the Betis river, and the other is a former riceland or “mulahan”?
A - Yes,
Sir.
ATTY.
DIMALANTA:
Q - And
the one located near the Betis river is occupied by Gonzalo Caoleng?
WITNESS:
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
also by Teofilo Caoleng?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
also the daughter of Lourdes Caoleng by the name of Araceli Manalang, is it not?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
the daughter of Teofilo Caoleng by the name of Victoria
Caoleng?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
also the two sons of Teofilo Caoleng by the name of Jose and Melanio?
A - I
don’t know, Sir.
Q - But
you know Jose Caoleng?
A - There
is, Sir.
Q - While
this former agricultural land is now enclosed by a hallow [sic] block fence on three sides?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
at the edge of the open side is the house of your sister and also the children of Rita Caoleng, is
it not?
A - Yes,
Sir.
Q - And
it
was the plaintiff, particularly German Bituin
who caused the fencing
of the three sides of the portion
of the former
agricultural land?
A - Yes,
Sir.[32]
Surprisingly,
respondents did not controvert petitioners’ allegations that they are in
possession of a large portion of Lot No. 3661 in the cross-examination or any
of the pleadings. If respondents were
truly the owners of Lot No. 3661, why did they allow petitioners to stay there
for such a long period of time? All this time that petitioners introduced
improvements on the land in controversy, respondents did not oppose or complain
about the improvements. Even the trial court was correct in observing that
petitioners’ possession of Lot No. 3661 is an advantage for them, thus:
Gonzalo
Caoleng, a man of 81 years of age and one of the defendants in this case
testified for and in behalf of the plaintiffs. He supported the claim of the
plaintiffs. His testimony is a declaration against his own interest because by
saying that plaintiffs have an interest over the land in dispute he practically
waived his right and interest, which is substantial over the property which is
already titled in the name of the Heirs Agustin Caoleng and he happens to be
one of the heirs of Agustin Caoleng being one of his children. His testimony
which is credible deserves full faith and credit. A very old man, he undoubtedly
has sufficient knowledge of the history of the disputed land especially of its
possessor, so that when he said plaintiff Marcela Salonga was in possession
of the bigger portion of
However,
the appellate court decided otherwise and emphasized the fact that respondents
are grantees of a free patent and eventually became holders of a title.
Elementary
is the rule that simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive to a holder’s genuine ownership of property. If a person obtains
title that includes land to which he has no legal right, that person does not,
by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the land illegally or
erroneously included.[34] This Court has held time and again that the
rule on indefeasibility of title cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud
against the legal owner.[35]
Hence, registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud. To
hold otherwise would be to put a premium on land-grabbing and transgress the
broader principle in human relations that no person shall unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.[36]
In
Vital v. Anore, et al.,[37]
this Court ruled that:
x
x x if the registered owner, be he a patentee or his successor-in-interest to
whom the free patent was transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land
described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another and who
together with his predecessors-in-interest has been in possession thereof, and
if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof,
then the statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free
patent does not apply, and the true owner may bring an action to have the
ownership or title to the land judicially settled, and if the allegations of
the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free
patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his
predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew
that the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued
upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey
the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner
thereof.[38]
In
the present case, it cannot be contradicted that petitioners have been in
actual possession of Lot No. 3661. The reconveyance is just and proper in order
to bring to a halt the intolerable anomaly that the patentees resort to in
obtaining a
After
a careful scrutiny of the pleadings of the case, it was unearthed that petitioners
were asking for the reconveyance of the one-half portion of Lot Nos. 3661,
3448, and 3449. Sadly, this cannot be done as the records lack sufficient
evidence to support this contention. Petitioners were only able to prove their
right to ownership of the 1,021 sq. m. of Lot No. 3661 because they showed
adequate proof of their lengthy possession of that area of land which was
concurred in by the witness for the defendants. This Court cannot grant
petitioners ownership of half of Lot Nos. 3448 and 3449 as they have not shown
any credible and trustworthy evidence that they are entitled to that share in
accordance with law or any existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June
20, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54684 is MODIFIED.
The
Court hereby AFFIRMS the ownership of petitioners of Lot No. 3661 to the
extent of 1,021 square meters and respondents are ORDERED to RECONVEY title
to the same to petitioners. The Register of Deeds is ORDERED to CANCEL OCT No. 3399 and ISSUE another certificate of title over
the property in favor of petitioners, to the extent of 1,021 square meters, as co-owners
thereof, and another certificate of title in the name of respondents for the
remainder of the lot as pro-indiviso
co-owners. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz with Associate Justices Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr., and Regalado E. Maambong concurring; rollo, pp. 26-37.
[2] Penned by Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales, id. at 38-47.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III, and Regalado E. Maambong concurring, id. at 49.
[4] Records, Folder 1, p. 4.
[5]
[6] Exhibit “4,” Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 135.
[7] Exhibit “1,” id. at 10-132.
[8] Exhibit “D,” id. at 133.
[9] Records, Folder 1, pp. 18-19.
[10]
[11]
[12] Exhibit “3,” Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 134.
[13] Records, Folder 1, p. 79.
[14] Exhibit “A,” Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 128.
[15] TSN, July 8, 1992, pp. 5-6.
[16] Exhibit “B,” Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 129.
[17] TSN, July 8, 1992, pp. 5-6.
[18]
[19] TSN, November 23, 1992, p. 2.
[20]
[21]
[22] TSN, July 26, 1993, p. 5.
[23]
[24] TSN, October 10, 1994, pp. 4-5.
[25] Records, Folder 1, pp. 186-187.
[26] Rollo, p. 37.
[27]
[28] Leyson
v. Bontuyan, G.R. No. 156357,
[29] Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying, G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 496, 510, citing Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 330.
[30] Cuizon v. Remoto, G.R. No.
143027,
[31] TSN, July 8, 1992, pp. 5-7; emphasis supplied.
[32] TSN, November 11, 1994, pp. 6-7; emphasis supplied.
[33] Rollo, p. 44; emphasis supplied.
[34] Bejoc v. Cabreros, G.R. No.
145849,
[35] Id. at 87, citing Bayoca v. Nogales,
G.R. No. 138201,
[36] Leyson v. Bontuyan , supra note 28, at 115, citing Almarza
v. Arguelles, G.R. No. L-49250,
[37] 90 Phil. 855 (1952).
[38]
[39] Leyson v. Bontuyan , supra note 28, at 115, citing Linaza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73741, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 855, 860.