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ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 156978
Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 24, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
In its Motion for Reconsideration,[1]
petitioner seeks the reversal of this Court’s Decision[2]
dated
The pertinent facts are undisputed.
On
Respondent filed an action docketed as
Civil Case No. 82-1475 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36,
for recovery against petitioner, among others, claiming P142,401.60 as actual damages, attorney’s fees, exemplary
damages and costs of suit. On
Petitioner elevated the case to this
Court raising the issue of whether the doctrine of limited liability, which
limits respondent’s award of damages to its pro
rata share in the insurance proceeds, applies in this case.[7] In our May 2, 2006 Decision, we denied the
petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
holding petitioner liable for the total value of the lost cargo.[8]
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration,
raising the following as issues:
I.
THE DECISION DISREGARDED
THE EARLIER RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN GAFLAC (217 SCRA 259) AND
THE MONARCH CASES (333 SCRA 71), WHERE BOTH HELD THAT ABOITIZ’ LIABILITY
IS LIMITED TO THE VALUE OF THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING
THAT ABOITIZ WAS AT FAULT.
II.
THE DECISION VIOLATES
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH STATES IN PART
THAT – “NO DOCTRINE OR PRINCIPLE OF LAW LAID DOWN BY THE COURT IN A DECISION
RENDERED EN BANC OR IN DIVISION MAY BE MODIFIED OR REVERSED EXCEPT BY THE
COURT SITTING EN BANC.” (CITATIONS OMITTED.)[9]
Simply, the issue is: Did the May 2,
2006 Decision modify or reverse the rulings in Monarch and GAFLAC contrary
to Section 4(3)[10] of Article VIII of the Constitution?
Petitioner seeks the referral of this
case to the Court En Banc alleging that our May 2, 2006 Decision
modified or reversed the doctrines in GAFLAC and Monarch, where
we ruled that petitioner’s liability was limited to the claimants’ pro rata share in the insurance proceeds
in view of the doctrine of limited liability.
Invoking Section 4(3) of Article VIII of the Constitution, petitioner
contends that no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered in division may be modified or reversed, except by the Court sitting En
Banc.
Respondent counters that petitioner
should be held liable for the total value of the lost cargo. It insists that the doctrine of limited
liability does not apply because petitioner was found negligent.
We are not swayed to reconsider.
Petitioner’s arguments are mere rehash
of those already submitted to and pronounced without merit by this Court in our
A perusal of GAFLAC and Monarch
vis-á-vis the instant case will show
that our May 2, 2006 Decision did not modify or reverse the doctrines in GAFLAC
and Monarch. The factual findings
of this case were different from GAFLAC, which precludes this Court to
apply the principles enunciated therein.
Here, petitioner was found concurrently negligent with the ship captain
and crew, while in GAFLAC, there is no such finding. Then the peculiar circumstances in Monarch
called for the application of the
doctrine of limited liability, as we have extensively discussed in our May 2,
2006 Decision.
We need only to stress that from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence over the goods they transport according to all the circumstances of
each case.[11] In the event of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are responsible, unless
they can prove that the loss, destruction or deterioration was brought about by
the causes specified in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.[12] In all other cases, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence.[13]
The weather was moderate when M/V P. Aboitiz sank.
Both the trial and appellate courts also ruled that the M/V P. Aboitiz sank due to its unseaworthiness
and not due to typhoon. To limit
petitioner’s liability to the amount of the insurance proceeds, it has the
burden of showing that the unseaworthiness of the
vessel was not due to its fault or negligence.
But it failed to do so. Where the
shipowner fails to overcome the presumption of
negligence, the doctrine of limited liability cannot be applied.[14]
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and referral to the Court En Banc is DENIED WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings shall
be allowed.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 474-481.
[2] Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. New India Assurance
Company, Ltd., G.R. No. 156978, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 563.
[3] G.R. Nos. 92735, 94867 and 95578,
[4] G.R. No. 100446,
[5] Rollo, p. 166.
[6]
[7] Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. New India Assurance Company, Ltd., supra at 569-570.
[8]
[9] Rollo, p. 474.
[10] Section 4.…
x x x x
(3) …no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
[11] Civil Code, Art. 1733.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.
[12]
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
[13]
Art.
1735. In all cases other than those
mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are
lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
[14] Central Shipping Company, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 150751, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 511, 523-524.