THIRD
DIVISION
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MARISSA CENIZA-MANANTAN, Petitioner, -
versus - THE PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No.
156248 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
x - - - - - - - - - - -
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
In this
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Marissa Ceniza-Manantan prays for the reversal of the Decision,[2]
dated 29 August 2001, and Resolution,[3]
dated 26 November 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23676,
affirming with modification the Decision,[4]
dated 30 July 1999, of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72787, finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
On
That on or about the
period comprised from July 15, 1994 to September 3, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ALBERTO CARILLA, in
the following manner to wit: the said accused, pursuant to their conspiracy,
received in trust from said complainant several pieces of jewelry worth P1,079,000.00,
Philippine Currency, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis
under the express obligation on the part of the said accused of turning over
the proceeds of the sale to said Alberto Carilla, if
sold, or of returning the same if unsold to said complainant, but the said
accused, once in possession of the said items, far from complying with their
obligations as aforesaid, with intent to defraud, unfaithfulness and grave
abuse of confidence, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to fulfill
their aforesaid obligation despite repeated demands made upon them to do so,
and instead misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same or the value
thereof, to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said Alberto Carilla, in the aforesaid amount of P1,079,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
On
The
facts, according to the prosecution, are summarized in the Comment dated
Herein private
complainant, Alberto Carilla, is a jeweler whose
office is located at P1,079,000.00. They received the jewelry in trust with the
obligation to sell them within two (2) weeks and remit the proceeds to private
complainant within another two (2) weeks or to return them within the same
period if they were unable to sell. The sisters-in-law would earn any amount
that they would add to the selling price.
After the lapse of the
above-mentioned period, accused sisters-in-law failed to remit the purchase
price or return the pieces of jewelry. As such, Carilla
made verbal demands for their return or the proceeds of the sale. After several
verbal demands, the sisters-in-law issued several checks. Regina Manantan-Vizconde
issued thirteen (13) postdated checks, while Marissa Ceniza-Manantan
issued four (4) postdated checks.
Upon maturity of the
checks, Carilla deposited the checks to his bank
account. But to his dismay, the checks were dishonored for the reason that the
account from which the checks were drawn had been closed. The checks that were
still to fall due were stamped on their face “account closed.”
Carilla thus sought the help of
a lawyer who made out a written demand upon the accused through their counsel.
But despite this, the two accused still refused to pay. Hence, Carilla was constrained to file a criminal complaint.[7]
Manantan denied
the foregoing accusations. In her Counter-Affidavit
with Motion to Dismiss dated July 1996,[8] Manantan alleged that Carilla’s
filing of estafa case against her was a mere harassment
suit as Carilla desperately tried but failed to
recover from her the jewelries allegedly entrusted to her and to Vizconde; that Vizconde borrowed
several checks from her after Vizconde ran out of her
own checks; that Vizconde told her that the borrowed
checks will only be shown to the former’s customers
or other persons from whom she received jewelries so as to convince them that
she had collections; and that Vizconde promised to
return the checks. During her direct examination before the RTC,[9] Manantan denied that she had any business transaction with
Carilla. Manantan also disclaimed any knowledge as to
how the four dishonored checks in her name came into the possession of Carilla.
On
WHEREFORE, this Court
finds accused MARISSA CENIZA-MANANTAN, GUILTY of the crime of Estafa, defined
and penalized under par.1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of, there being no mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TWELVE
(12) YEARS, and one (1) DAY, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, and EIGHT (8) MONTHS, as maximum, of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period.
Further, the award of
civil liability is appropriate as the preponderance of evidence sanctioned by
the Rules has been satisfied, the accused Marissa Ceniza-Manantan
is ordered to pay P1,079,000.00 as actual
damages.[10]
Aggrieved,
Manantan filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED and the assailed decision of the
court a quo in Criminal Case No.
Q-97-72787 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as
minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.[11]
Manantan filed
a motion for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated
Hence, Manantan filed the instant Petition. In our Resolution
dated 10 March 2003,[12]
we denied the Petition due to Manantan’s (a) failure
to state the material dates showing when the notice of the assailed decision
and resolution were received and when the motion for reconsideration was filed
thereby violating Sections 4(b) and 5 of Rule 45, in relation to Sec. 5(d) of
Rule 56; and (b) failure to indicate in the Petition the counsel’s roll number
as required in Bar Matter 1132. Manantan filed a Motion for Reconsideration which we
subsequently granted in our Resolution dated
Manantan
proffered the following issues[14]
for our consideration:
I.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT,
WHICH FINDINGS THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, CONSIDERING INTER ALIA THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE CHARGED, SPECIFICALLY CONSPIRACY
AND THE ALLEGED CONTRACTUAL RELATION (i.e., THE RECEIPT IN TRUST BY PETITIONER
OF CERTAIN PIECES OF JEWELRY FROM PRIVATE COMPLAINANT), WERE ESTABLISHED.
II.
MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT MISERABLY FAILED AND/OR REFUSED TO
DISCHARGE HIS BOUNDEN DUTY TO HIS CLIENT. STATED DIFFERENTLY, SAID COUNSEL’S
INCOMPETENCE WAS SO GREAT AND SO EXECRABLE THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE, AT LEAST A NEW TRIAL SHOULD
BE ORDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IF ONLY TO AFFORD PETITIONER THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HERSELF WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF
AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOICE. THE AFORESAID FAILURE
AND/OR REFUSAL OF HER COUNSEL WERE A VIRTUAL GIVEAWAY TO THE PROSECUTION TO
SEND HER TO THE GALLOWS. THE CONSEQUENCE WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
Anent
the first issue, Manantan alleged that the RTC
conducted only one hearing where the prosecution presented only one witness,
which was Carilla himself, and thereafter rested its
case; that the said lone hearing was abbreviated at the expense of the rights
and liberty of Manantan; that the direct testimony of
Carilla, upon which the RTC based its conviction of Manantan, consisted only of five double-spaced pages as
shown in the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN); and that Manantan’s guilt cannot be proven on the basis of the few
questions propounded by the private prosecutor on Carilla
and Manantan.[15]
EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION
The
prosecution presented the lone court testimony of Carilla
as its testimonial evidence. Carilla testified that Manantan and Vizconde agreed to
be his agents in selling jewelries; that Manantan and
Vizconde received from him in trust jewelries with
the obligation to sell them within two weeks from receipt thereof, and to remit
the proceeds to him within two weeks after the sale or to return the jewelries
in case they were not sold; that Manantan and Vizconde would earn from any amount that they would add to
the original sale price of the jewelries fixed by him; that after the
expiration of the stipulated period, Manantan and Vizconde failed to remit to him the proceeds of the sale of
the jewelries or return the unsold jewelries themselves; that he made several
verbal demands on Manantan and Vizconde
to remit the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries or return the unsold
jewelries; that Manantan and Vizconde
issued to him postdated checks as supposed payment of the sales proceeds of the
jewelries; that these checks were dishonored by reason of “Account Closed”;
that Manantan and Vizconde
failed to make good the value of the dishonored checks despite his repeated
demands for them to do so; and that by reason of the foregoing, he instituted
the instant case against Manantan and Vizconde.
The
prosecution also offered documentary evidence to buttress Carilla’s
court testimony. It introduced Carilla’s Complaint-Affidavit dated
EVIDENCE FOR THE
DEFENSE
On the
other hand, the defense presented Manantan as its
sole witness. No documentary evidence was utilized.[20]
Manantan
conjured denials and alibi in support of her contentions. Manantan
denied having any transaction with Carilla. She claims that she lent the dishonored checks
to Vizconde as the latter was running out of checks;
that she had no idea as to how the dishonored checks came into the possession
of Carilla; and that Carilla
had an ill motive to accuse her of a crime since Carilla
failed to recover from her the alleged entrusted jewelries.
The
threshold issue is, whose evidence is credible?
It is
axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of their testimonies.[21] In the determination of the sufficiency of
evidence, what matters is not the number of witnesses but their credibility and
the nature and quality of their testimonies.[22] The testimony of a lone witness, if found
positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction
especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity. While the number of witnesses may be
considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not necessarily with the greatest number.[23]
Witnesses
are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach a
conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. Conviction of the accused may still be had on
the basis of the positive and credible testimony of a single witness.[24]
Verily,
the prosecution presented only one witness, who was Carilla
himself as the complainant. However, we
find the latter’s testimony consistent with his Complaint-Affidavit dated
More
telling are the documentary evidences consisting of various checks issued by Manantan which later bounced and the demand letters of Carilla addressed to Manantan. Although the admissibility of these checks was
objected to by Manantan during the trial, the RTC,
nevertheless, admitted them as part of the testimony of Carilla.
The
rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high
respect if not conclusive effect.[26] This is more true if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court.[27]
In
stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials. Manantan denied having transacted with Carilla.
Beyond her bare denials, however, she
has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for
the prosecution.
It is
jurisprudentially settled that as between bare denials and positive testimony
on affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.[28]
The next
question now crops up – were the elements of estafa for which Manantan is charged proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
x x
x x
1.
With
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x x
x x
(b) By misappropriating
or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
The
elements[29]of estafa in the above provision are as follows:
a) That
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
b) That
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and
c) That
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
The
essence of estafa under this paragraph is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of
the owner thereof. It takes place when a
person actually appropriates the property of another for his own benefit, use
and enjoyment.[30] In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary
where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion; and failure to
account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation.[31]
All of
the foregoing enumerated elements of estafa under
paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, are duly established
herein.
First, Manantan received in trust the jewelries from Carilla for the purpose of selling them within two weeks
from receipt thereof; and to remit the proceeds to Carilla
within two weeks after the sale or to return the jewelries in case they were
not sold. It was also agreed that Manantan will earn from any amount that she would add to
the original sale price of the jewelries fixed by Carilla.
This, in effect, created a fiduciary
relationship between Carilla and Manantan.
The
absence of a written document showing receipt of jewelries or other property in
trust does not necessarily mean that no such contract exists between the
parties. Contracts can be made verbally
for as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the parties thereto.[32] Carilla positively
and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between him and Manantan.
Second, there
is misappropriation or conversion by Manantan of the
jewelries or the proceeds of the sale thereof, as well as a denial on her part
of receipt of the jewelries.
The
words “misappropriate” and “convert” as used in the said provision of law
connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s
own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved
by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[33]
In an
agency for the sale of jewelries, as in the present case, it is the agent’s
duty to return the jewelry upon demand of the owner and failure to do so is
evidence of conversion of the property by the agent. In other words, the demand for the return of
the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account for it
are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. However, this presumption is rebuttable. If the
accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing
delivered in trust or to account for the money, he may not be held liable for estafa.[34]
Manantan
misappropriated Carilla’s properties, which she held
in trust, by failing to remit the sale price of the jewelries or return the
same to Carilla upon the expiration of the stipulated
period, despite repeated demands by the latter. Manantan issued
checks to Carilla as supposed payment of the sales
proceeds of the jewelries but these checks were dishonored. Carilla
hired a lawyer and sent a demand-letter to Manantan
but the latter still failed to turn over the jewelries or the sale prices thereof.[35]
As
already heretofore pointed out, failure to account upon demand for the return
of the thing delivered in trust raises a presumption of misappropriation. Manantan’s bare
denials are not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
Estafa may
also be committed by denying untruthfully that the thing was received.[36] Manantan denied
having received jewelries from Carilla. However, as
we have already determined, such denial is unsubstantiated and therefore cannot
prevail over the categorical declarations of Carilla
that the jewelries were turned over in trust to Manantan.
Hence, Manantan’s
denial of the receipt of jewelries also constitutes estafa.
Finally,
Manantan’s failure or refusal to
account for or return the jewelries to Carilla had
evidently prejudiced the rights and interests of the latter. Not only did Carilla
fail to recover his investment, but he also lost the opportunity to realize
profits from the sales of the jewelries. Carilla
further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the present
case.[37]
Apropos the second assignment of
error, Manantan seeks a new trial because her former
counsel, Atty. Donato A. Mallabo
(Atty. Mallabo) of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
was incompetent and had failed to discharge his duty as her defense counsel
resulting in a denial of due process to her. She claims that Atty. Mallabo asked Carilla only a few
questions during the latter’s cross-examination and did not conduct a re-cross
examination; that after the prosecution had rested its case, the RTC Presiding
Judge inquired from Atty. Mallabo if he would file a
motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence, which was already a hint of the
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, but Atty. Mallabo
ignored the question and presented, instead, Manantan
as sole witness for the defense; and after a few perfunctory questions to Manantan, already rested the case for the defense.[38]
Settled
is the rule that mistake and negligence of a counsel bind his client. The basis is the tenet that an act performed
by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded
as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of a counsel
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against his client.[39]
A
contrary view would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For all that a losing party will do is to
invoke the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or
setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation.[40] To allow this obnoxious practice would be to
put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by accused
persons and their counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of
conviction.[41]
Mistakes
of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof;
and failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witness and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new trial.[42] Error of the defense counsel in the conduct of
the trial is neither an error of law nor an irregularity upon which a motion
for new trial may be presented.[43]
Concededly,
the foregoing rule admits of exceptions. Hence, in cases where (1) the counsel’s
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his
day in court, or (2) the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, the
client is not bound by his counsel’s mistakes, and a new trial may be
conducted.[44]
Tested
against these guidelines, we find that Manantan’s
case falls within the general rule rather than the exceptions.
It is
true that Atty. Mallabo asked only few questions
during the cross-examination of Carilla. Quoted hereunder is Atty. Mallabo’s
cross-examination of Carilla:
Court:
Cross.
Atty. Mallabo:
With the permission of this Honorable
Court.
Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Mallabo:
Q: You are a jeweler, sir?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is your office?
A:
Q: Is it a single proprietor or a
corporation?
A: I am only an agent, sir.
Q: You are only an agent,
you do not actually own it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you do not own that
jewelry and you are not the owner of those jewelry, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mallabo: That
will be all for the witness, Your Honor.[45]
It
appears from the foregoing that Atty. Mallabo’s
questions were aimed at proving that Carilla was not
the owner of the subject jewelries. It can be reasonably deduced from the
questions that Atty. Mallabo’s strategy in securing
petitioner’s acquittal was to display the absence of the element of prejudice
or damage on the part of Carilla. Notably, however,
the questions were confined to the issue of the ownership of jewelries.
Despite
the preceding, Atty. Mallabo cross-examined Carilla and conducted a direct examination of Manantan. Atty. Mallabo also interposed several objections during the
re-direct examination of Carilla and challenged the
admissibility of the dishonored checks as evidence for the prosecution.[46] Atty. Mallabo even
moved for the dismissal of the charge against Manantan.[47]
Admittedly,
Atty. Mallabo committed mistakes and shortcomings in
conducting examinations on Carilla and Manantan and in assessing the proper and sufficient evidence
for the defense. Nonetheless, such
cannot be considered as recklessness or gross negligence on his part, because
there was neither a total abandonment nor a disregard of Manantan’s
cause or a showing of conscious indifference to or disregard of consequences.[48] If at all, the mistakes and omissions of Atty.
Mallabo may only be considered as simple negligence
or a slight want of care that circumstances reasonably impose.
As
regards the prison term of Manantan, a perusal of the
pertinent provision of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is in order:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).
– Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The
penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The
penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time
included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the
penalty imposed forming one period of each of the three portions.[49]
Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty given are:
Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium – 5 years, 5 months, 11 days, to 6 years,
8 months, 20 days
Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5
months, 10 days
In the
present case, since the amount involved is P1,079,000.00,
which exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 further
states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every
additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00,
but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Carilla
greatly exceeds the amount of P22,000.00 which,
when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000.00
defrauded, goes beyond 20 years. Under
the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed in the present case should be 20
years of reclusion temporal.[50]
We now
apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law in computing the proper penalty. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against Manantan
is prision correcional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional
in its minimum to medium periods. Thus,
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, while the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be 20 years.[51]
Thus,
the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing a prison term of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional
as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
We also
sustain the indemnification of actual damages in favor of Carilla
in the sum of P1,079,000.00 made by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals as this is supported by the records[52]
of the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T.
REYES
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-32.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria
Tirona with Associate Justices Eugenio
S. Labitoria and Eloy R.
[3]
[4] Penned
by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez; rollo, pp.
44-47.
[5] Records,
p. 1.
[6]
[7] Rollo,
pp. 80-82.
[8] Records,
pp. 37-41.
[9] TSN,
[10] Rollo, p. 47.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Records, Exhibit A.
[17] TSN,
[18] Records, Exhibits B-E.
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21] People v. Ramos, G.R. No.
135204,
[22] Cariaga v. Court of Appeals, 411
Phil. 214, 229 (2001).
[23] People v. Mallari,
369 Phil. 872, 881-882 (1999).
[24]
[25] CA
rollo,
pp. 179-180; People v. Genosa, 464 Phil. 680, 710 (2004); People v. Ahmad, 464 Phil. 848, 857 (2004); People v. Torres, 464 Phil. 971, 978 (2004); People v. Cajurao, 465 Phil. 98, 107 (2004).
[26] People v. Aguila,
G.R. No. 171017,
[27]
[28] People v. Comiling,
G.R. No. 140405, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 698, 716; Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 163866, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 483; People v. Gusmo, 467 Phil. 199, 219 (2004);
People v. Dimacuha,
467 Phil. 342, 351 (2004); People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 620,
640.
[29] Lee v. People, G.R. No. 157781,
[30] Filadams Pharma, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 468.
[31] Lee v. People, supra note 29 at 267.
[32] Article 1356 of the New Civil Code;
[33] Lee v. People, supra note 29 at 267.
[34] Filadams Pharma, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 30 at 468.
[35] Lee v. People, supra notes 29 at 266-267; Filadams Pharma, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, id.
[36] II
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law (14th
Ed.), pp. 745-746;
[37] Prosecution’s
Evidence, Exh. A.
[38] Rollo, pp. 21-28.
[39] Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc, G.R. No.
151963,
[40] Ragudo v. Fabella Estate
Tenants Association, Inc., G.R. No. 146823,
[41] People v. Villanueva, 393
Phil. 898, 911 (2000).
[42] Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc, supra note
39.
[43] Ragudo v. Fabella Estate
Tenants Association, Inc., supra note 40.
[44] People v. Aguila,
supra note 26.
[45] TSN,
[46]
[47]
[48] Rollo, pp. 21-28.
[49] Cosme, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 149753,
[50]
[51] People v. Gabres,
335 Phil. 242, 257 (1997).
[52] Records, pp. 1-36; Exhibits A-F of the prosecution’s evidence.