Republic of the
Supreme Court
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GO KE CHONG, JR., |
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G.R. No. 153791 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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MARIANO M. CHAN, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, questioning the Decision[1] of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, San
Fernando, La Union, dated April 1, 2002, which dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry with damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and the Order[2] dated
May 22, 2002 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Go Ke
Chong, Jr. filed a Complaint
for Forcible Entry with Damages and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against
respondent Mariano M. Chan on February 20, 2001 before the MTCC of San Fernando, La
Union, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 3720, claiming
that on March 21 to 22, 2000, respondent’s men
illegally fenced off Lot No. 553, located along the National
Road of Brgy. IV San Fernando City, covering an area
of 110 sq m, and demolished the building and improvements constructed by
petitioner thereon, depriving him of lawful physical possession thereof.[3] He claims that he is the lawfully
declared owner and possessor of Lot No. 553 by
virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership/Possession dated
Respondent on the other hand asserts in his
Answer that he inherited from his father, Leoncio
Chan, the 538-sq m lot, of which the herein disputed property is
part;[5] in 1987
he and petitioner entered into a lease contract over the property; and when
respondent no longer wanted to renew the lease, petitioner, in a desperate
attempt to keep the property, surreptitiously executed an Affidavit of
Ownership/Possession claiming ownership over a portion of the leased property;[6]
respondent subsequently filed a case for Illegal Detainer
against petitioner in March 1998 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Branch 2,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6285, and judgment was rendered on September 30,
1998, ordering petitioner to vacate the property and demolish the building
therein; the RTC affirmed the said decision and a writ of execution was issued
on March 16, 2000.[7] In moving for the dismissal of
the complaint, respondent also pointed out that there is another action for
quieting of title and cancellation of tax declaration pending between the
parties.[8]
The MTCC conducted a hearing on the
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, and on
On
In the above-entitled case, the issue involved is not
merely on question of actual or material possession but also the validity and
nullity of the affidavit of ownership and possession of the disputed
property. The present case is thus
converted from a forcible entry suit to one that is not capable of pecuniary
estimation and this only be addressed to the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court [sic]. x x x In fact, defendant Mariano Chan had filed an action against the
plaintiff Go Ke Chong, Jr.
for Quieting of Title and cancellation of tax declaration pending before the
Regional Trial Court of La Union, Branch 29 entitled Mariano Chan vs. Go Ke Chong, Jr. and docketed as
Civil Case No. 6453. (citations omitted)
IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING this case for
lack of jurisdiction.
No
moral or exemplary damages is hereby awarded to both of the parties.
The
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in this case is hereby
revoked. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner’s Urgent
Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied by the MTCC on
Petitioner now comes before this Court
claiming that the assailed Decision and Order of
the MTCC “present questions of law and the issue of misapprehension of facts;”[13] thus:
I
IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED
APRIL 1, 2002, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN SIMPLY
ADOPTING THE BASELESS AND MISLEADING ALLEGATION OF RESPONDENT THAT PETITIONER'S
AFFIDAVIT OF OWNERSHIP/POSSESSIONSHIP [sic] DATED JANUARY 15, 1998 OVER LOT 553 IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE, AND UPON WHICH BASIS THE COURT A QUO CONVERTED
THE INSTANT FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE TO ONE THAT IS NOT CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY
ESTIMATION AND, THUS, DISMISSED THE SAID CASE FOR “LACK OF JURISDICTION”.
RESPONDENT'S SAID ALLEGATION IS UNPROVEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
II.
IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED
APRIL 1, 2002, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
RESOLVING THE RELEVANT AND SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITIONER'S
POSITION PAPER WHICH, WHEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE UNEQUIVOCABLY CONVINCED THE COURT A QUO TO RENDER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III.
IN THE APPEALED ORDER DATED
MAY 22, 2002, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT “PLAINTIFF (PETITIONER) WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE PRIOR POSSESSION DE
FACTO” OF LOT 553 IN ITS DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (OF THE DECISION DATED APRIL 1, 2002) AND PETITIONER'S REPLY
(TO DEFENDANT'S COMMENT DATED MAY 10, 2002) FOR “LACK OF MERIT.”
IV.
IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED
APRIL 1, 2002 AND ORDER DATED MAY 22, 2002, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DELVING INTO ISSUES OF RESPONDENT'S OWNERSHIP OVER HIS
INHERITED PROPERTY (LOT 555-A) WHICH ARE LEFT TO BE BETTER APPRECIATED AND
CONSIDERED BY THE PROPER COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OVER IT, PARTICULARLY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 29 OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL REGION UNDER CIVIL CASE
NO. 6453 ENTITLED “MARIANO CHAN VS. GO KE CHONG, JR. ET AL.” FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE, ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF TAX DECLARATION, DAMAGES.”
V.
IN THE APPEALED DECISION DATED
A) JUDICIALLY DECLARING THAT “THE OWNERSHIP AND
POSSESSIONSHIP [sic] OF PETITIONER OVER
LOT 553 STARTED ONLY ON JANUARY 15, 1998 WHILE RESPONDENT AND HIS FAMILY WAS
ALREADY THE OWNER AND POSSESSOR OF BOTH LOT 555-A AND LOT 553 SINCE 1947.”
B) JUDICIALLY DECLARING THAT
C) FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT AND
IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT PETITIONER'S PROPERTY (LOT 553) IS DISTINCT AND SEPARATED
[sic] FROM RESPONDENT'S
LOT (LOT 555-A).[14]
Essentially, petitioner claims that his
complaint before the MTCC only concerns Lot No. 553 and
does not involve Lot No. 555-A owned by respondent
located at the north portion thereof; that on March
21 to 22, 2000, respondent in bad faith extended the fencing of Lot No. 555-A
beyond its southern boundary and by force, intimidation, threat, strategy and
stealth unlawfully entered Lot No. 553 and demolished petitioner’s
building thereon.[15] He also avers that the MTCC erred in
dismissing his complaint for forcible entry for “lack of
jurisdiction” based on respondent’s unsubstantiated and unproven
claim of ownership over Lot No. 553.[16] He then prays that the Decision dated April
1, 2002 and Order dated May 22, 2002 of the MTCC be reversed and set aside;
that a decision be rendered upholding his prior possession de facto over Lot No. 553 and
declaring the same to be distinct and separate from respondent’s
property, Lot No. 555-A; and that the instant case be remanded to the MTCC for a proper
trial and hearing on the merits.[17]
Respondent for his part avers that: the
issues raised by petitioner do not involve questions of law which are proper
for appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;[18] the lot
being claimed by petitioner is actually located within the property owned by
respondent;[19]
respondent previously filed an action for quieting of title and cancellation of
tax declaration involving Lot No. 553 against petitioner, and
considering that the issue of ownership of the property is already subject of
the case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the MTCC divested itself of
jurisdiction to resolve the same;[20]
petitioner’s claim of just title started only in 1998 and his possession over the
subject property has from the outset been in the concept of lessee and
thereafter been contested judicially.[21]
Petitioner filed a Reply.[22] Thereafter, both parties filed their
respective memoranda reiterating their claims.[23]
Herein petition should have been outrightly dismissed.
As the present petition delves
not only into the correctness of MTCC’s dismissal of
petitioner’s forcible entry case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but
also into the veracity of the respective factual claims of both parties, the same
clearly does not present pure questions of law that may be directly appealed to
this Court. This Court
may only take cognizance of appeals from decisions, final orders or resolutions
of trial courts which involve pure questions of law.
Under Sec. 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Court has the power to:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
x x x x
(e) All cases in
which only an error or question of law is involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court also provides that:
SECTION
1. Filing of petition with
Supreme Court. --- A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, judgments, final orders, or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA), the Sandiganbayan, the RTC
or similar courts, may be appealed to this Court, which appeal must involve
only questions of law and not of fact.[24]
Under the Rules
of Court, final orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC
exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former.[25] RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions
meanwhile are appealable to the CA either through an
ordinary appeal, if the case was originally decided by the RTC,[26] or a
petition for review under Rule 42 if the case was decided under the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction.[27]
In view however of the lapse of time
since the case was instituted and considering that orderly administration of
justice demands that the Court settle whatever legal error was committed below,
the Court shall settle the legal issue raised in the present case,
petitioner’s procedural faux pas notwithstanding.
Petitioner is
correct in claiming that the MTCC erred in dismissing his complaint
for forcible entry on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Court has already settled that even
when the issues of ownership and possession de facto are
intricately interwoven, such fact will not cause the dismissal of the case for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer based on
jurisdictional grounds.[28]
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, nonetheless, has the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the
sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.[29]
As the Court explained in Refugia v. Court of Appeals,[30]
[P]rior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership
in order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of
which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue
of possession was intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On
its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases
which likewise involve the issue of ownership. x x x.[31]
(Emphasis supplied)
In
the present case, the MTCC held in its
In
support thereof, it cited several decisions to wit: Dela Cruz v.
Court of Appeals,[33] Consignado v. Court of Appeals,[34] and
As explained by the Court in Refugia v. Court
of Appeals,[36] the
passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 has
spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper interpretation and
application thereof; i.e., there were several cases which held that the
jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the ejectment
case should be dismissed where the issue of possession cannot be resolved
without determining the issue of ownership, while there were also cases in which the
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to resolve the issue of
ownership pursuant to determining the issue of possession.[37]
To settle the matter, the Court then
expressly ruled that:
[B]y virtue of the express mandate set forth
in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the
question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment
case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete
adjudication of the issue of possession.[38]
As it now stands, therefore, the MTC
has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on forcible entry and unlawful detainer regardless of whether said cases involve questions
of ownership or even if the issue of possession cannot be determined without
resolving the question of ownership.[39]
This ruling however is subject to the
condition that the lower court’s adjudication of ownership in
the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is
merely provisional and the Court’s affirmance
of the lower court’s decision would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.[40]
Finding that the MTCC erred in
dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the MTCC for it
to rule on the merits of the complaint for forcible entry.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated April 1, 2002 and the Order dated May 22, 2002 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, San Fernando, La Union are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the case be
remanded to said court for proper resolution of Civil Case No. 3720 on
the merits.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Judge Eugenio A. Dacumos; rollo, pp. 48-70.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 1, 3-7.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Records, pp. 41, 123-124.
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
Barcenas
v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321,
[25] Rules of Court, Rule 40, Section 1.
[26] Supra note 24, at 606-607.
[27] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2(a).
[28]
[29] Tecson
v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 152978,
[30]
[31]
[32] Rollo, p. 69.
[33] 218 Phil. 492 (1984).
[34]
G.R. No. 87148,
[35]
G.R. No. L-19598,
[36] Supra note 29.
[37]
[38]
[39] Heirs of Basilisa Hernandez v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 166975, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 163, 169, citing Garcia v. Zosa, Jr., G.R. No. 138380, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 334, 336-337.
[40] See Tecson v. Gutierrez, supra note 29, at 788; Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 365; Garcia v. Zosa, Jr., supra note 39, at 337-338; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Manuel Abella, G.R. No. 143510, November 23, 2005, 476 SCRA 1, 9; see also Sec. 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.