SECOND DIVISION
JOSE CALISAY, G.R. No. 153411
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
EVANGELINA RABANZO- TINGA, and
TEODORO, represented by her VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Attorney-in-Fact MELODY
TEODORO-YANEZA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
August 17, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45
assails the Decision dated
The antecedents follow.
On
However, when petitioner retired from government service in 1997, he used his retirement pay to open a bakery business at the front part of the house, undertaking renovations for that purpose, without respondent’s prior consent.[5] Respondent asked petitioner to pay rentals but the latter refused. In November of 1997, petitioner was summoned to a dialogue with respondent’s husband. The meeting resulted in an agreement which petitioners signed wherein he undertook to vacate the premises by the end of the year. When petitioner still did not vacate the property at the end of the year, at the instance of respondent, barangay conciliation proceedings were conducted, but to no avail. In the following year, respondent filed the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Respondent attached several documents to her complaint, including the 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale that established her dominion over the lot and the real property tax receipts that evidenced her payment of the corresponding real property taxes over the property.[6]
On
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adjudicates
Lot No. 1062 pro indiviso and in equal shares to Rosendo Kalisay,
widower, and Pampilo Tobias, single, both of legal age, Filipinos, and
residents of Sta. Cruz,
After this decision shall have become final,
let the decree of registration of title be issued in accordance with law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner however alleged that despite the Decision, issued just a few months before the outbreak of the Pacific phase of World War II, the corresponding title was never issued. The property has since remained unregistered, as certified by the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioner
further alleged that he was the son of Rosendo Kalisay, who died intestate
sometime in 1946. Accordingly, he and his sister, Candelaria Calisay, succeeded
to the share of their father to one-half (½) of
Petitioner claimed that it was only around 1997, or after he had been asked to vacate the premises, that he was forced to verify the status of Lot No. 1062 at the Municipal Hall, at which point he first encountered the 1941 CFI decision. He executed a sworn statement recounting such discovery.[9]
The parties submitted their respective position papers before the MTC, as required under the Rules on Summary Procedure. Among the documents attached by respondent to her position paper was a certification issued by the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, stating that the name of Rosendo Calisay did not appear in the list of registered owners of real properties located in Sta. Cruz.
On
Accordingly,
the MTC ordered petitioner to vacate the subject property and to pay monthly
rentals at the rate of P4,000.00 beginning January of 1998, as well as attorney’s
fees in the amount of P18,000.00.
Petitioner
appealed the MTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sta. Cruz, which
on
Aggrieved,
respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari[14]
with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC decision. The petition was granted
in a decision dated
With respect to the 1941 CFI decision in Cadastral Case No. 44, the Court of Appeals had this to say:
On the other hand, except for the alleged
decision of the then Court of First Instance, no evidence on record would
support respondent Calisay’s claim of ownership over the subject property. As a matter of fact, a copy of the decision relied
upon by private respondent is not even made part of the record. It was error
for the appellate court to rule in favor of private respondent on the basis
merely of the said decision. Assuming
that said decision is legally valid and existing, said decision, however, does
not automatically transfer ownership thereof in favor of Pamfilo Tobias and
Rosendo Calisay. Acts of ownership must likewise be performed by them such as
obtaining title thereto in their names and acquiring possession over the property. However, none of these were obtained under
the circumstances in the case of Rosendo Calisay who has not titled the
property in his name nor took possession over the same. Neither did Rosendo Calisay declare the same
for taxation purposes. If Rosendo Calisay
was a co-owner of the subject property, the normal thing for him to do would be
to protect his interest by actively participating with Pamfilo Tobias in
matters affecting the subject property.
The record is bereft of any participation on the part of private
respondent’s predecessor in exercising acts of ownership which would include
possession of the subject property. If,
indeed, respondent’s predecessor had an interest over the property, why was
respondent not informed of such interest?
How come the discovery was made only in 1997. It bears stressing that the discovery of the
alleged co-ownership of respondent’s predecessor over the property happened at
the time that respondent was being asked to surrender possession thereof in
favor of petitioner. The decision was
allegedly made in 1941 and why was its existence revealed only in 1997 when the
dispute commenced? These questions cast
doubt on private respondent’s claim of ownership on the property. Further to this is the certification issued
by the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Cruz attesting that the name of
Rosendo Calisay does not appear in the list of registered owners of real
properties located in the said municipality.[16]
After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[17]
was denied by the Court of Appeals on
We favor the result reached by the MTC and the Court of Appeals.
There are indisputable guiding principles in ejectment actions. Such actions, namely, actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, are designed as the appropriate judicial vehicles for the protection of the right of possession of real property. More than any other judicial remedy, the accion interdictal relies on dispatch to make it adequate. To expedite the hearing and adjudication of ejection suits they have long been made summary proceedings.[19]
Likewise, in an unlawful detainer case or accion desahucio, the defendant was originally in lawful possession, but such possession became illicit by virtue of the expiration or termination of his right to possess. The main issue involved is not title over the property, but the determination as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.[20]
Despite the abbreviated proceeding it ordains and the limited pleadings it allows, the Rules on Summary Procedure does not relax the rules on evidence. In fact, Section 14 of Rule 70 is emphatic that the affidavits required to be filed “shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.”
In the case at bar, while
the property remains unregistered, there seems to be no serious dispute that
respondent is entitled to and actually has possession of
What is disputed is whether petitioner was able to establish a right of possession under the aegis of the 1941 CFI Decision. Any inquiry into that issue will necessarily touch on the question of ownership, which the trial court hearing the unlawful detainer action may rule upon on a provisional basis, i.e., only for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.[21]
Unfortunately for petitioner, however, he failed to prove the existence of the 1941 decision in accordance with the rules of evidence in the first place. His problem had apparently arisen from his unwarranted assumption that the existence of the CFI Decision was an established fact just because he alleged it so in his Answer. In truth, it would be extremely difficult to prove such factual allegation in the course of summary proceedings, especially if the claim is disputed by the opposing party, as respondent has done.
The summary procedure in ejectment cases does not require, but dispenses with the standard trial on the merits which entails examination of the witnesses in open court. The pleadings filed in summary proceedings are limited to the complaints and the answers thereto,[22] as well as the position papers and affidavits submitted by the parties.[23] As noted earlier, expeditiousness is a key characteristic of summary proceedings, thus the correlative limitation in unlawful detainer cases is the recognition that any question concerning ownership will not be definitively settled in such proceedings.
We find that it would be virtually impossible for petitioner to have definitively established his right of possession through the 1941 CFI decision in the course of a summary proceeding in the subject unlawful detainer action. As is evident from petitioner’s position paper[24] before the MTC, there was no effort exerted to particularly establish the genuineness and authenticity of the 1941 CFI decision, for the arguments were presented therein as if the veracity of that decision was already a given, apparently unmindful of the fact that what petitioner had attached to his answer was a mere plain copy of the decision. There is no allegation, for example, that the attached copy of the CFI decision was duly certified as authentic by any proper
authority.[25] Note that the record of a public document may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record.[26]
It would have been different if respondent had, at the onset, conceded the existence and continued validity of the 1941 CFI decision, as well as the fact that petitioner was the heir of one of the prevailing parties therein, Rosendo Kalisay. Had that been the instance, the MTC would have been hard pressed to deny petitioner’s right to possession by virtue of his ownership over half of Lot No. 1602.
But since petitioner’s ownership was disputed, it would have been incumbent on him to establish the authenticity of the 1941 CFI decision, as well as his rights as heir of Rosendo Kalisay. Because of the limited nature of summary proceedings, we hold that this would be almost unrealizable in the proceedings below. In fact, we can assert as a general rule that in actions for unlawful detainer, when the defendant invokes a claim of ownership based on a decision in a land registration case that has yet to be enforced, such claim would be insufficient to establish the right to possession unless the adverse party concedes the existence and validity of the land registration decision, as well as to the rights of the defendant by virtue of such decision.
All told, we are satisfied
that respondent has sufficiently established her claim to possession over
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, concurred in by then Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Ruben Reyes and Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao. See rollo, pp. 158-168.
[2]Assisted by her spouse Conrado F. Teodoro, since deceased (see rollo, p. 72), and represented by their duly-designated attorney-in-fact Melody Teodoro-Yaneza, their eldest daughter. See id. at 32.
[19]The
first Rule on Summary Procedure on ejectment cases took effect on
[22]As well as the compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer. See Rules of Court, Rule 70, Secs. 4 and 13.
[25]The
photocopy of the decision which is attached to the present petition does bear a
mark that it is a “Certified True/Xerox Copy,” as identified by the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Sta. Cruz. Yet it is apparent the this
certification was issued in the context of certifying copies of the case record
before the RTC, the copy of the CFI decision having formed part of the case
records thereof. It does not appear as proof or certification that attests to
the genuineness of such decision having been rendered by the CFI of Laguna on
[26]Matugas v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 151944,
[27]As explained in Sta. Ana v. Menla, et. al., 111 Phil. 947 (1961), and subsequent decisions thereafter, see, e.g., Republic v. Nillas, G.R. No. 159595, 23 January 2007, the decision of a land registration court, if no corresponding decree of registration was issued by the Director of Lands, would remain enforceable and could still form the basis of the issuance of the decree according to the terms of the decision. The enforcement of such decision would not be barred either by prescription or laches. We explained in Sta. Ana:
We fail to understand the arguments of the
appellant in support of the above assignment [of error], except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for
this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable
time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person
of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been
in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the
Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
x x x There is nothing in the law
that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason is x x x that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does
not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice
the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. (