Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
JERRYBELLE L. BUNSAY, G.R.
NO. 153188
PRUDENCIO
L. PERONO,
MA.
CORAZON NINI C. GAMO,
MARY
JOY S. ELERIO, JENELYN
A.
ALAYON, GENALYN DIANA D.
MATTUS,
JACQUELINE O. JERMEO,
DANTE
RAMOS, VIRGILIO CORPUS,
MELISSA
S. GEVA, EDGARDO S.
PAJARO,
ANALIE G. SALUTA,
EDWIN
D. AMAGO, ELVIRA A.
LEBRILLO,
ARC R. CATOLICO,
EPHRAIM
VERGARA, RICHIE
ALVAREZ,
Petitioners,*
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES,
JJ.
CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION
and CITY
OF
Respondents.** August 14, 2007
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari assailing the February 22, 2002 Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69134, dismissing petitioners’
appeal from Resolution No. 02-0016 dated January 3, 2002 of public respondent
Civil Service Commission (CSC); and the CA Resolution[2]
dated April 16, 2002, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as stated by the CSC.[3]
Petitioners
are among the 59 employees whose promotional appointments to various positions
in the local government of
However,
as said Resolutions did not provide for payment of backwages
to the 59 appointees, 22[7]
of them filed with the CSC a request for back pay.[8]
Their request was denied by the CSC in Resolution No.
01-0872[9]
dated
WHEREFORE, the request of Arsenio U. Selomandin, Jr., Jerrybelle L. Bunsay, Prudencio L. Perono, Richie A. Alvarez, Nini C. Gamo, Elmer A. Alegada, May Joy
S. Elerio, Jenelyn A. Alayon, Genalyn Diana D. Mattus, Jacqueline O. Jermeo,
Ariel B. Marapo, Dante C. Ramos, Melissa S. Geva, Glenda R. Espuerta, Isaac
L. Tipsay, Jr., Leonora D. Diaz, Jeah
A. Oppura, Edgardo S. Pajaro, Analie G. Saluta, Virgilio U. Corpus and
Edwin D. Amago is hereby denied.[10]
With the exception of Ariel B. Marapo, the above-mentioned appointees filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and were joined by Arc Catolico, Amy Guanzon, Elvira Lebrillo, and
Ephraim Vergara,[11]
who were also parties to the appeal with the CSC regarding the approval of
their promotional appointments. The CSC
partially granted the Motion for Reconsideration in Resolution No. 02-0016
dated
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED IN PART. Accordingly, Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 01-0872 dated
1. Alegada, Espuerta, Tipsay, Jr., Diaz, Guanzon and Oppura are entitled to receive backwages from the date of the issuance of their appointments until the final approval thereof by the Commission;
2. Selomandin, Jr., Bunsay, Lopez, Geva, Vergara, Catolico and Saluta are entitled to receive backwages on the basis of the Daily Time Record presented;
3. Since there was no evidence submitted to prove that Perono, Alvarez, Gamo, Elerio, Mattus, Jermeo, Pajaro and Ramos are entitled to receive backwages, the request is denied;
4. The backwages of Alayon, Amago and Lebrillo for the determined period were already received by them; and
5.
The right of Corpuz to claim backwages
cannot be ascertained for lack of
evidence.[12]
Herein petitioners are the 17
employees[13]
whose claims for backwages were partly or wholly denied. They
filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court but their petition was dismissed in the
February 22, 2002 CA Resolution assailed herein, which states:
Upon a perusal of the present petition, We note that the same suffers from the following infirmities, to wit:
1. Copy of CSC Resolution No. 01-0872 dated May 3, 2001 as well as the copy of the motion for reconsideration thereof are nowhere appended thereto; (Sec. 6, par. (c), Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended); and
2. Absence of the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Strict compliance with this rule is mandated. (Vide: Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661);
and for which, We hereby RESOLVED to DISMISS this petition outright.
SO ORDERED.[14]
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] and supplied the required documents;[16]
still, the CA denied their motion in the questioned Resolution of
Petitioners took the present recourse
on the following grounds:
I.
The Court of Appeals denied justice to petitioners and gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed petitioners’ appeal based on minor and harmless technical grounds, thereby denying them the right and opportunity to have their case determined on the merits free from constraints of technicalities.
II.
The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not passing upon the merits of the petition for review thereby denying petitioners of just and valid relief and in hypothetically affirming the no work no pay principle adopted by Respondent Commission which served as a basis of the latter in granting of different reliefs to petitioners which is not only discriminatory but likewise violative of the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection of laws.[18]
The City of
The petition is meritorious.
Judicial
policy dictates that courts ensure the full adjudication of the merits of an
appeal. Cases should be determined on the merits, after giving full opportunity
to all parties for the ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections.[22] As the Court expounded in Aguam v. Court of Appeals,[23] it is
more prudent for a court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal
to attain the ends of justice.
Petitioners are deserving of such
indulgence. On motion for
reconsideration, they supplied the deficiencies of their petition and offered a
plausible explanation for their earlier lapse.
Their effort constituted
substantial compliance with the requirement that relevant or pertinent
documents be submitted along with the petition, and called for the relaxation
of procedural rules;[24] more so when they have already
prevailed in the main case before public respondent, which approved their
promotional appointments. To rebuff their claim for backwages
on a technicality would be to take with the left hand what the right hand has
given. In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,[25]
the respondent's tardy and deficient appeal was given due course to
afford her full redress from
her wrongful dismissal and to serve the broader
interests of justice.
The CA in the instant case would have
served the ends of justice had it
reinstated petitioners' appeal and resolved the petition on the merits. In
dismissing the petition, the CA committed a grave reversible error.
The principal issue that remains
unanswered is whether petitioners are entitled to payment of backwages. If in the affirmative, the next question is:
what is the exact amount that each of the petitioners is entitled to? To resolve the latter
question will require assessment of the evidence presented before the CSC; or,
if necessary, the reception of further evidence before the CA which is within its
competence under Section 9, second part of paragraph (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.[26]
Instead of outrightly
remanding the case to the CA for the determination of the factual questions to
avert further delay as well as for the guidance of the parties and the CA, the
Court will resolve the principal issue, as it involves a pure question of law.
When public respondent first denied the claims for backwages of all the 22 appointees, including petitioners,
it stringently applied the policy of “no work, no pay,” thus:
The Commission finds no legal basis to grant the
request for back salaries. It is a well-settled principle that compensation is
paid only for services actually or constructively rendered. Considering
that no evidence was submitted by Selomandin, Jr., et
al., Vergara, et al., and Maculada,
et al., that they rendered service to the government from the time the
appointments were issued to them until approval of said appointments, granting
them backwages would in effect be unjustly enriching
them at the expense of taxpayer's money.
It
should be noted that an appointee is entitled to receive salaries for the
position to which he was appointed to without awaiting for the approval of said
appointment by the Commission provided he assumed the duties of said position
(CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998). In the case at bar, while Selomandin, et al. were appointed by former Mayor Leonardia, they did not actually assume and discharge the
functions of their respective offices. The general proposition is that a public
official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.
As you work, so shall you earn.[27]
It
reconsidered the foregoing resolution only in favor of those appointees who presented
evidence that they rendered actual service pending their appeal.
Petitioners impugn the foregoing
ruling of public respondent on the ground that it violates the equal protection
clause. They contend that the ruling in Cristobal
v. Melchor[28]
that an employee wrongfully dismissed should not be subject to the policy
of “no work, no pay” be applied also to them, for they were prevented from
reporting for work when their appointments were disapproved. Hence, as their
inability to work was due to a factor beyond their control, they should be
entitled to backwages even without evidence that they
rendered service from the time their appointments were disapproved by the
CSC-Field Office to the time public respondent set aside the disapproval.[29]
In the alternative, they argue that if payment of backwages
must be based on evidence, the service
records they presented should be considered sufficient already, for contrary to
the finding of public respondent, there are actually no gaps in their periods
of service, because the effectivity of their
appointments were made to retroact to the date of issuance of those appointments.[30]
Petitioners
are mistaken.
The
rules on payment of backwages to employees who are reinstated after having been wrongfully
dismissed or suspended are clear-cut . Backwages are due said employees, provided that their
reinstatement is based on an express finding that they did not commit the
imputed offense, and that their dismissal or suspension was illegal.[31]
The amount of backwages
that may be awarded to them shall be based on their salaries accruing from the
time of their dismissal until their actual reinstatement, for a period not
exceeding five years.[32] It
need not depend on actual services rendered, for they are excused for their
inability to work during the period of their illegal dismissal or suspension.[33] In short, they are not subject to the policy of “no work, no
pay,” for they were unlawfully prevented from rendering work.[34]
A
different set of rules governs payment of backwages
to appointees awaiting approval of their
appointment.
Section
10, Rule V of the CSC Omnibus Rules (Omnibus Rules) Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292,[35]
provides:
Section 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance.
Thus, to be entitled to initial
compensation, said appointees must prove that they were issued appointments and
have assumed the position to which they were appointed.[36]
The best evidence of this would be the copies of their appointments duly
issued in accordance with Section 4,[37]
Rule IV of the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel Actions
(Omnibus Rules on Appointment) and transmitted to the CSC for attestation[38]
and the certificates of their assumption of office and their daily time records
or service records.
In
case of disapproval of their appointments, payment of their compensation is
subject to these further provisions of Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules on
Appointment:
Section. 3. When an appointment is disapproved, the services of the appointee shall be immediately terminated, unless a motion for reconsideration or appeal is seasonably filed.
Services rendered by a person for the duration of his disapproved appointment shall not be credited as government service for whatever purpose.
If the appointment
was disapproved on grounds which do not constitute violation of civil service
law, such as failure of the appointee to meet the Qualification Standards (QS)
prescribed for the position, the same is considered effective until disapproved
by the Commission or any of its regional or field offices. The appointee is
meanwhile entitled to payment of salaries from the government.
If a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the disapproval is seasonably filed with the proper office, the appointment is still considered to be effective. The disapproval becomes final only after the same is affirmed by the Commission. (Emphasis added)
It
is the second set of rules, specifically paragraphs 3 and 4, Section 3, Rule VI
of the Omnibus Rules on Appointment, which apply to petitioners. Their
employment was not terminated; their appointments were merely disapproved by
the CSC-Field Office. Even then, their appointments remained effective pending
appeal with the CSC. They should therefore be entitled to payment of salaries
accruing from the date of issuance of their appointments to the date of the
disapproval thereof; and, as they had filed a timely motion for reconsideration
or appeal, from the date of initial disapproval of their appointments to the
date that these are finally disapproved or approved by the CSC, provided that
petitioners are able to establish
the conditions set forth in
Section 10, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules; and additionally, they can show that
they actually discharged the functions of their office while awaiting the
outcome of their motion for reconsideration or appeal.[39]
In short, given that their
appointments remained effective despite initial disapproval by the CSC Regional
Office, there was no obstacle to
petitioners continuing to render public service; thus, there is no reason for
them not to be subject to the policy of “no work, no pay.”
The
foregoing separate rules do not necessarily lead to an uneven treatment of claimants for backwages. There are material differences in their
circumstances which necessitate the operation of distinct rules. For one who is
prevented from rendering work, it would be absurd to demand evidence of actual
services rendered. For one who is not prevented from performing work, it is
only fair to require such evidence.
The
equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality among persons; it merely
requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions be treated
alike, both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.[40]
This
brings the Court to the corollary question:
whether petitioners sufficiently proved that they rendered work as would
entitle them to back pay. This question
being purely evidentiary, the findings of public respondent on the matter are
ordinarily binding.[41]
It
is the finding of public respondent that petitioners Bunsay,
Geva, Catolico, Vergara, and Saluta are entitled to backwages but only for the number of days that they
actually rendered work prior to the
On
appeal to the CA, however, it would appear that, with the exception of
petitioners Alvarez and Ramos, petitioners submitted certified true copies of
personnel service records[45] issued by their respective offices,
which may indicate that they rendered work continuously from the issuance of
their appointments to
the approval thereof on
As
it came to pass, the CA was not able to consider the foregoing evidence for it
merely dismissed the
petition outright.
The
Court is also tempted to disregard such evidence, belatedly submitted as it was.[46] However, the Court is set on giving true
meaning to the policy of “no work, no pay.” It cannot now simply ignore the
service records of petitioners, which may show that these rank and file
employees actually performed work during the periods in question, and should
somehow be compensated for their efforts. To recall our ruling in Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,[47]
To
prevent respondent from claiming backwages would
leave incomplete the redress of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her
and amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her employer or whoever was
accountable to reinstate her. A too-rigid application of the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of Court will
not be given premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader
interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case
under consideration.[48]
It
is therefore settled that petitioners are entitled to back pay based on actual
services rendered. However, the exact amount due each of them will have to be
determined based on available evidence, and on any additional evidence the CA
may require to address
factual questions, such as the following:
1. Upon initial disapproval of petitioners'
appointments, were the latter reverted to their original positions and paid
their corresponding salaries?
2. While it is not disputed that partial
payments were already received by petitioners Amago, Alayon and Lebrillo, were the
other petitioners also paid their salaries from the time of the disapproval of
their appointments by the CSC Regional Office to the time public respondent
reversed the CSC Regional Office and approved their appointments?
3. Do the entries in the service records of petitioners bearing the remarks “disapproved appointment,”[49]
“w/ pending appeal CSC,”[50]
“pending case”[51] or no effective appointment[52] mean
that petitioners did not render work during said periods?
4. With respect to petitioners whose service
records show that they began rendering work only upon the approval of their
appointments by public respondent,[53] does this imply that they did not render work prior
to said date?
Given
the purely factual questions still to be resolved, the orderly administration
of justice behooves the reinstatement of the appeal with the CA for a complete
and definitive determination of the
exact amounts of back pay or differential pay due the individual petitioners.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I
F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* The caption of the Petition for Review filed with the Court named only two (2) petitioners. The other petitioners were not named in the body of the petition. However, the Verification and Certification attached to the Petition indicate that there are fifteen (15) other petitioners, namely: MA. CORAZON NINI C. GAMO, MARY JOY S. ELERIO, JENELYN A. ALAYON, GENALYN DIANA D. MATTUS, JACQUELINE O. JERMEO, DANTE RAMOS, VIRGILIO CORPUZ, MELISSA S. GEVA, EDGARDO S. PAJARO, ANALIE G. SALUTA, EDWIN D. AMAGO, ELVIRA A. LEBRILLO, ARC R. CATOLICO, EPHRAIM VERGARA, and RICHIE ALVAREZ.
** The Court of Appeals is named as respondent. The same should be deleted, as it is hereby deleted from the title of the petition, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with
Associate Justices Conchita Carpio
Morales (now Member of this Court) and Sergio L. Pestaño,
concurring; CA rollo,
p. 132.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Namely, Arsenio U. Selomandin, Jr., Jerrybelle L. Bunsay, Prudencio L. Perono, Richie A. Alvarez, Nini C. Gamo, Elmer A. Alegada, Mary Joy S. Elerio, Jenelyn A. Alayon, Genalyn Diana D. Mattus, Joemarie Lopez, Jacqueline O. Jermeo, Ariel B. Marapo, Dante C. Ramos, Melissa S. Geva, Glenda R. Espuerta, Isaac L. Tipsay, Jr., Leonora D. Diaz, Jeah A. Oppura, Edgardo S. Pajaro, Analie G. Saluta, Virgilio U. Corpus and Edwin D. Amago; id. at 146.
[8] CSC Resolution, id. at 146.
[9] For some reason, Joemarie Lopez, who was among the 22 employees who requested backpay, was not mentioned in the aforementioned dispositive portion of Resolution No. 01-0872. However, the Court notes that in the dispositive portion of the subsequent Resolution No. 02-0016 of the CSC, Joemarie Lopez was among those whose claims for back pay were granted.
[10]
[11] CSC Resolution, id. at 21.
[12]
[13] Eight did not appeal from Resolution No. 02-0016 namely, Arsenio U. Selomandin and Joemarie Lopez, whose claims for backwages were partly granted, and Elmer Alegada, Glenda R. Espuerta, Isaac L. Tipsay, Jr., Leonora D. Diaz, Amy Guanzon and Jeah A. Oppura, whose claims were granted.
[14]
[15]
[16] Certified true copy of CSC Resolution No. 010872 (Annex “A”) and Affidavit of Service and Written Explanation of Mode of Service (Annex “B”), id. at 142-143.
[17]
[18] Petition, rollo, p. 25.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Jaro v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 532, 548 (2002).
[23] 388 Phil. 587, 594 (2000).
[24] Padilla, Jr. v. Alipio, G.R. No. 156800, November 25,
2004, 444 SCRA 322, 327; Floren Hotel v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155264, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA
128, 142; Caingat v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154308, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 142, 147; Serrano
v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No.
151833, August 7, 2003, 455 SCRA 992, 998.
[25] 456 Phil. 273 (2003).
[26] Section 9. Jurisdiction. – x x x (3) x x x The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied)
[27] CSC Resolution, CA rollo, pp. 147-148.
[28] G.R. No. L-43203,
[29] Petition, rollo, pp 29-34.
[30]
[31] Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 278, 286; Philippine Coconut Authority v. Garrido, 424 Phil. 904, 910 (2002); Caniete v. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 389 Phil. 364, 370 (2000); Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 453, 464 (2000);
[32] Marohombsar v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 825, 836 (2000); Caniete v. Secretary of Education, supra note 31, at 368.
[33] Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, supra note 31.
[34] Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, supra note 25, at 299.
[35] Administrative
Code of 1987, effective
[36] Civil Service Commission v. Joson, G.R. No. 154674,
[37] Sec. 4. No official or employee shall be required to assume duty without being furnished with a copy of his appointment after it is issued by the appointing authority. The appointee shall acknowledge receipt of the appointment by signing on the duplicate and other copies of said appointment.
[38] Cabalitan v.
Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 162805,
[39] Civil Service Commission v. Joson, supra note 36.
[40] Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 206 (2003); Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 81, 100.
[41] Gonzales v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 156253,
[42] CSC Resolution, CA rollo, pp. 35-36.
[43]
[44]
[45] All marked Annex “B-3”, id. at 84-98.
[46] Bina v. Odena, G.R.
No. 163683,
[47] Supra note 25.
[48]
[49] CA rollo, p. 93.
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]