Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
FRANCISCO L. BAYLOSIS, SR., G.R. No. 152119
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent.
August 14, 2007
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D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 assailing the December 5, 2001 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23225, which denied petitioner’s
Motion for New Trial which was premised on the grounds that the amount
misappropriated had been reduced to only PhP 21,981.71 and petitioner wants to
change his plea to that of guilty.
Likewise assailed is the
The Facts
An
Information was filed against petitioner Baylosis for the crime of estafa
before the Cebu City Regional Trial Court (RTC), which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-18920. It reads as follows:
That
in, about and during the period from February 1990 to March 5, 1990 in
Poblacion, Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of
confidence or unfaithfulness, being the custodian/warehouse supervisor of
PCPPI, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own use and benefit the amount of One Hundred Eighteen Thousand
One Hundred Eighty One & 71/100 (P118,181.71) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
to the damage and prejudice of the Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Incorporated in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
During arraignment, a plea of NOT
GUILTY was entered. Trial ensued in absentia as the accused, being out on
bail, did not appear during trial. The
prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: (1) Ricardo Tabasa, Warehouse
Operations Manager of Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI); and (2)
Leopoldo Abella, PCPPI’s Route Manager assigned in the area of Carcar, Cebu.[5]
The
testimony of prosecution witness Tabasa consisted of the summary of events
which led to the discovery of the said misappropriation. He testified that
being the Warehouse Operations Manager, he was tasked to monitor and see to it
that all rules, regulations, and policies of the company are implemented by
petitioner, the Warehouse Supervisor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, was in charge of collecting remittances
from salesmen, depositing them in a bank or converting them into money orders
or bank drafts the following bank day, and immediately remitting them to the
PCPPI’s plant in
Witness
Tabasa recollected that on
Soon
after the confession made by petitioner, a cash count and physical inventory
were conducted in the presence of two witnesses. It turned out that the shortage was in the
total amount of PhP 118,181.71, which covered the cash sales collection and the
physical inventory. These results were
all contained in cash count and physical inventory sheets which the accused
acknowledged and signed, and even added the notation that the money was used to
“put to special projects for following-up of land title.”[8]
A
demand was made on petitioner to produce the deficient amount. He failed to return said amount; thus,
resulting in his preventive suspension and the conduct of an administrative
investigation against him. The
investigation was rescheduled to several dates due to his non-appearance
despite notice. He was dismissed from service
as a result of the investigation and based on the documentary evidence that
were submitted, and was served a notice of termination.[9]
On
the other hand, prosecution witness Abella’s testimony merely corroborated
Tabasa’s testimony. He stated that petitioner voluntarily signed the cash count
sheet and further claimed that petitioner voluntarily admitted to the
misappropriation.[10]
Petitioner
having jumped bail and his counsel manifesting to the court to have the case
submitted for decision resulted in petitioner’s waiver of the right to submit
evidence.[11] On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the
accused, FRANCISCO BAYLOSIS, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principal of
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized in Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, under subdivision No. 1, par. (b), and after applying the indeterminate
sentence law, [condemns] the said accused to suffer a prison term of SEVEN (7)
YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as Minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS OR RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as Maximum, and to [indemnify] the Pepsi Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. the amount of P118, 181.71, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
Decision, but the trial court denied it.
Petitioner
then filed his Notice of Appeal.[13]
Thereafter, a Motion for New Trial[14]
was filed by petitioner Baylosis with the CA.
In his motion, he begged the CA to consider the affidavit of a certain
Zenaida C. Aya-ay, the Credit and Collection Manager of PCPPI. Said affidavit
stated that the accused had a remaining balance of only PhP 21,981.71 which he
owed PCPPI. He prayed before the CA to
remand the case to the RTC for new trial, and that he be allowed to change his
previous plea of not guilty to guilty.
On
Petitioner’s
Hence,
this petition is before us.
The Issue
The
lone issue being raised by petitioner is whether the CA acted with grave abuse
of discretion in denying his Motion for New Trial filed under Section 14, Rule
124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as it amounted to a disregard of
the doctrine laid down by this Court in Jose
v. Court of Appeals,[18]
to the effect that “[c]haracteristically, a new trial has been described as a
new invention to temper the severity of a judgment x x x.”
The Court’s Ruling
The
petition must fail.
For
a newly discovered evidence to be appreciated as a ground for granting a motion
for new trial, it must fairly be shown that (1) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material,
not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of
such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.[19]
Petitioner
presented as a ground for its motion the testimony of Aya-ay, the Credit and
Collection Manager of PCPPI, who stated in an affidavit that his liability to
PCPPI had been cut down to a mere PhP 21,981.71. In denying the motion, the CA ruled in this
wise:
Perusal of the Affidavit executed by
Zenaida Aya-ay reveals that the alleged payments on August 27, 1998, October
26, 1998 and November 6, 1998 were all made after the rendition of the assailed
January 10, 1992 Decision. It is obvious
that the same cannot be executed, much less produced, during the trial since
the payments were made after judgment or after the fact. Hence, the same could hardly be classified as
newly discovered evidence.[20]
We agree.
In
granting a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence presented must be in actual existence and unknown to the party even if
a judgment had been rendered before.
This should be the case because otherwise, how could it be discovered
evidence when it did not in fact exist previously during trial? “Discovery” is
defined as “the act, process, or an instance of gaining knowledge of or
ascertaining the existence of something previously unknown or unrecognized.”[21]
The Court, in granting this remedial remedy, is well aware that more often than
not, newly discovered evidence is material evidence which would mean the
success or defeat of a party’s campaign, of which a party is oblivious during
trial, and grants him/her this second opportunity to prove his/her claim.
The CA, in denying
petitioner’s motion, observed the fact that the lone affidavit dealt with
statements made by Aya-ay, PCPPI’s Credit and Collection Manager, regarding the
payments made by petitioner of the amounts that he “borrowed” after the trial
court promulgated its
Further, petitioner cites Jose in support of his cause and argues
that he does not rely on newly discovered evidence but instead on substantial
justice bolstered by Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Power of appellate court on appeal.
– Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the appellate
court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the
penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of first
Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.[22]
He elucidates that he “does not seek to obtain, through a new
trial, reversal of his conviction of estafa, but only an opportunity for plea
bargaining which, it is submitted, can be more properly determined if said new
trial is actually conducted.”[23]
A review of the cited case reveals
that it does not stand toe to toe with the instant case. In said case, petitioner Jose was charged
with several crimes, but was convicted of illegal possession of explosives. In asking for a motion for new trial,
petitioner Jose posed the lone legal issue of
[whether the
appellate court committed] an error of law and gravely abused its discretion
when it denied [petitioner Jose’s] motion for new trial “for the reception of
(1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2)
the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and
Code Name ‘Safari’ (both documents are dated
The existence of said documents was
however unrevealed during the trial of his case so as to protect the identity
of petitioner Jose as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary. And it was only when he was convicted that
the “competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go
to jail for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence
concerning petitioner’s appointment x x x.”[25]
The Court, in justifying the grant of the new trial, stated
that a “new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity
of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice.”[26]
In said case, the circumstances brought up were “exceptional enough to warrant
a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his innocence of
the crime charged.”[27]
Petitioner,
on the other hand, brings before us the circumstance of his payment of the
misappropriated amount after a few years from his conviction by the trial
court. Said occasion, however, does not
count as extraordinary enough to warrant the grant of said motion. In addition, plea bargaining as a ground
already comes too late at this stage.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit,
and AFFIRM the
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-41.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Supra note 2.
[16] Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[17] Supra note 3.
[18]
No. L-38581,
[19] Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
96027-28,
[20] Supra note 2, at 7.
[21] Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 647 (1993).
[22]
Supra note 18, at 264-265.
[23] Supra note 1, at 23.
[24] Supra note 18, at 259.
[25]
[26]
[27]