THIRD DIVISION
|
JOEL
B. DE JESUS, Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, INC., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 151158
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August
17, 2007 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner
Joel B. De Jesus appeals by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the September 28, 2001 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58241, and the December 12, 2001
Resolution[2]
denying its reconsideration.
On
De Jesus was then hired as 4th
Engineer by POMI, for and in behalf of its principal Celtic Pacific Ship Management
Ltd. (Celtic), on board the ocean-going vessel M/V Author on
De Jesus departed from the
De Jesus was repatriated to the
POMI,
on the other hand, had a different story.
According to POMI, De Jesus committed misrepresentation when he
concealed in his medical history that he suffered from ulcer two (2) years ago;
that he breached his employment contract when he brought on board his medicines
for ulcer without the ship captain’s permission; and that De Jesus admitted having
deliberately brought pieces of Cimetidine for fear that his ulcer might recur
on board. POMI posited that De Jesus was validly discharged, and ultimately
prayed for the denial of the claims. [9]
By
Decision[10] of
The Labor Arbiter, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of complainant and
against the [respondent] ordering the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the
sum of US$2,735.15 as unpaid salaries and medical allowance for 59 days or its
present peso equivalent in the sum of P118,705.51 plus another sum of P5,000.00
as medical benefits or reimbursement of medical expenses of complainant.
SO ORDERED.[11]
POMI
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), claiming that there
was prima facie abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter in
granting the claims of De Jesus. The
NLRC granted the appeal. It found De Jesus guilty of unauthorized possession of
medicines on board M/V Author, justifying his discharge. Likewise, it denied the claim for medical
and sickness allowance, stating that a relapse of ulcer was not work- related,
as the illness already existed when De Jesus applied with POMI, but the former
intentionally concealed it so he could be hired. Such misrepresentation
disqualified De Jesus from claiming employment benefits under the contract. Finally, the NLRC sustained POMI in applying
De Jesus’ unpaid salaries to the cost of his repatriation.[12]
Hence, it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is totally
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one [is] entered DISMISSING the instant case
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
De Jesus’
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Resolution[14]
of
In its Decision[15]
of
De Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16]
but the Court of Appeals denied it on
Aggrieved by the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, De Jesus comes to this Court positing these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHALL (sic)
BE AWARDED HIS UNPAID SALARIES, MEDICAL ALLOWANCE AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
II
WHETHER PETITIONER SHALL (sic) BEAR THE COST OF HIS REPATRIATION.[18]
It is a settled rule that under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised before this
Court. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts,
and this applies with greater force in labor cases.[19] However, factual issues may be considered and
resolved when the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter
are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,[20]
as in this case.
De Jesus insists on reimbursement for
his medical expenses and entitlement to sickness allowance and his unpaid
salaries. POMI, on the other hand,
counters that De Jesus committed misrepresentation and breach of contract. The
Labor Arbiter lent credence to De Jesus’ posture and granted his claims, but
the NLRC and Court of Appeals reversed the Arbiter’s findings. Thus, a review
of the records of the case, with an assessment of the facts, is necessary.
The evidence shows that De Jesus
previously suffered from ulcer but he ticked “NO” in his medical history. De Jesus, therefore, committed
misrepresentation. Nonetheless, he passed
the pre-employment medical examination, was reported fit to work, and was
suffered to work on board M/V Author for more than two (2) months, until his
repatriation on June 19, 1997.
The rule is that an ailment
contracted even prior to his employment, does not detract from the
compensability of the disease. It is not
required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits incident thereto.
It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small measure, to
the development of the disease.[21]
In this case, POMI failed to rebut De
Jesus’ claim that he was required to work even during mealtime and that the
meals served on board did not fit the dietary preference of the Filipinos. Such plight took a toll on De Jesus’ health
and surely contributed, even in a slight degree, to the relapse of his illness.
In
OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[22]
this Court, in granting similar claims, held:
Labor contracts are
impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor
of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going
vessels. Despite his misrepresentation, Arbit underwent and passed the required
pre-medical examination, was declared fit to work, and was suffered to work by
petitioner. Upon repatriation, he complied with the required post-employment
medical examination.
Under
the beneficent provisions of the Contract, it is enough that the work has
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in
bringing about his death. Strict proof of causation is not required.[23]
De Jesus’ misrepresentation cannot,
therefore, be made basis by POMI for the denial of his claims under the
contract.
Apparently realizing the folly of the
denial grounded solely on the employee’s misrepresentation, POMI then asserted
that De Jesus breached his employment contract.
It alleged that De Jesus was caught in possession of several pieces of
Cimetidine, without the ship captain’s permission, and that therefore, he was
discharged for a just cause.
Indeed, possession of medicines on
board without the ship captain’s permission was a violation of the Standard
Employment Contract Addendum and would entitle POMI to dismiss the erring crew
member but only after compliance with the procedure provided in the contract.[24] Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels supplies the disciplinary
procedure against an erring seafarer:
SECTION 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES:
The Master shall furnish the seafarer with the
following disciplinary procedure against an erring seafarer:
A. The master shall furnish the seafarer with
a written notice containing the following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in
Section 31 of this Contract.
2. Date, time and place for a formal
investigation of the charges against the seafarer concerned.
B. The Master or his authorized
representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer
the opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. An entry on the investigation shall be
entered into the ship’s logbook.
C. If after the investigation or hearing, the
Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master shall
issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, which
copies shall be furnished to the Philippine Agent.
D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected
by the master without furnishing the seafarer with notice of dismissal if doing
so will prejudice the safety of the crew or the vessel. This information shall be entered in the
ship’s logbook. The Master shall send a
complete report to the manning agency substantiated by the witnesses,
testimonies and any other documents in support thereof.
In this case, there was no showing that
Celtic complied with the foregoing procedure, thus, casting a serious doubt on
the validity of De Jesus’ discharge.
Likewise, neither the ship’s logbook
nor the report sent to POMI as Celtic’s manning agent was presented in the
proceedings a quo to establish
the breach committed by De Jesus.
The pieces of evidence submitted before the Labor Arbiter in support of
De Jesus’ discharge zeroed in on the alleged misrepresentation, which, as
mentioned, cannot be a valid basis for the denial of De Jesus’ claims.
Settled is the rule that in
termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause. The case of the employer must stand or
fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's defense.[25] In this case, no convincing proof was offered
to prove POMI’s allegation. All that we
have is its self-serving assertion that De Jesus violated his employment
contract. There is no proof that the prescribed disciplinary procedure was
followed. We, therefore, agree with the
Labor Arbiter’s finding that POMI utterly failed to establish its claim of valid
dismissal. Accordingly, the NLRC and
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the said finding.
It
is clear from the records that De Jesus disembarked for a medical reason. Hence, the cost of De Jesus’ repatriation
should be borne by Celtic and POMI, pursuant to the provisions of Section 20(B)(4)
of the Standard Employment Contract:
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment. The employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
The
cost of repatriation should not be deducted from De Jesus’ unpaid salaries of
US$911.00.
Likewise,
records show that De Jesus immediately reported to POMI for post-employment
medical examination and treatment, but the latter adamantly refused to extend
him medical assistance. He was constrained to seek medical attention from
Bataan Doctor’s Hospital at his own expense.
Celtic and POMI should, therefore, reimburse De Jesus for his medical
expenses.
Finally, De Jesus is
entitled to his sickness allowance for fifty-nine (59) days from
x x
x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR
ILLNESS
x x
x x
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for
medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to
his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the above benefits x x x.
In fine, we affirm the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision granting De Jesus’ claims for unpaid salary of US$911.00, sickness
allowance for fifty-nine (59) days, and reimbursement of his medical expenses.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58241, and its Resolution
dated December 21, 2001, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 165-174.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153031,
[20] Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Franco,
G.R. No. 148195,
[21] Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 376 Phil. 738, 747 (1999); More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 646, 654 (1999).
[22] G.R. No. 159146,
[23]
[24]
[25] PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 19.