SECOND DIVISION
DELFIN ESPINOCILLA, JR., JOSEFINA ALCID, ROSITA
PALOMER, HENRY ASEJO, JAIME DIAZ, MARTIN BALIGUAS, BELEN PEREZ, JOAN
BONCALES, IMELDA GOGOLIN, VICTOR RAÑON, LILIA GIL, NERISSA JAYUMA, SILVESTRE
AALA, NIDA URBANO, SUSANA NERI, GAVINA COLINDO, CONSTANTINO MURALLO, JULIE
GOGOLIN, RICARDO BENABISE, CORAZON ORCOSE AND NARLITO GUTIERRES, Petitioners, - versus - BAGONG TANYAG HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,
REMEDIOS BICO, ALFONSO IGNACIO, GLORIA MISTERIO, SALVACION PORAS, RHOBBY
ACOSTA, ADELA GIRAY, EDMON BANSE, VIOLETA ALBA, SOFRANIO MANGAMPO, NAVARRO
ABBARIENTOS, ZACARIAS ARZAGA, RODRIGO PICART, and LIVINO TORINO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 151019 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: August 9, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent
corporation, the Bagong Tanyag Homeowners’
Association, Inc. (BATAHAI), was in 1989 incorporated to enable the occupants of
the land owned by Fortune Development Corporation, Guillermo Tantuco, and
Daniel Ignacio and located in Bagong Tanyag, Taguig to purchase the respective
lots they were occupying under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Respondents
Remedios Bico, Alfonso Ignacio, Gloria Misterio, Salvacion Poras, Rhobby Acosta,
Adela Giray, Edmon Banse, Violeta Alba, Sofranio Mangampo,
Navarro Abbarientos, Zacarias Arzaga, Rodrigo Picart, and Livino Torino were,
at the time material to the case, officers and directors of BATAHAI, while
petitioners were former members thereof.
Under
the CMP, BATAHAI could obtain a loan from NHMFC to purchase the land from its
owners and subdivide it among its member-beneficiaries, subject to the
supervision and guidance of the National Housing Administration (NHA).[1] In turn, each member-beneficiary would pay
amortizations of the loan to BATAHAI.
The
BATAHAI Code of Policies (the Code) named as first priority beneficiaries the
owners of houses or structures that were part of the census survey conducted in
October 1984 in Bagong Tanyag and who were members of BATAHAI.
The Code
named as second priority beneficiaries members of BATAHAI who were part of the
census survey as lessees or rent-free occupants (“nangungupahan na may
bayad, nakikitira, o nakikisama”) of houses or structures in Bagong
Tanyag.
Under
the Code, each beneficiary is entitled to only one lot,[2] that on which his or her house or
structure stands, “structure” and “house” being defined as follows:
1. ESTRAKTURA – pasilidad na ginawa para sa
kanlungan at tirahan ng tao, kasama ang palikuran.
2. BAHAY – isang parisukat na kabahayan na
tinitirahan ng namamahay.[3]
Petitioners,
however, wanted to claim the vacant lots adjacent to theirs on which vacant
lots they planted crops or put up fences and other improvements.[4]
On
A.
Para
sa mga empleyado (may pormal na hanapbuhay)
1. Certificate of Employment and Compensation (CEC)
2. Income Tax Returns para sa taong 1988
3. Residence Certificate or Sedula (1990)
4. Policy contract para sa mga miyembro ng GSIS/Certificate of
Remittances (sa loob ng 12 buwan) at xerox copy ng ID para
sa miyembro ng GSIS
5. Marriage Contract
B.
Para sa mga self-employed
(tindera, labandera, driver, negosyante, atbp.)
1. Affidavit
of Income
2. Residence
Certificate o sedula (1990)
3. Marriage
Contract[5]
In the meantime, a geodetic engineer,
assisted by respondents, conducted a “structural survey” of the houses or
structures in Bagong Tanyag to determine the actual lot sizes as well as the
rightful owners of houses or structures standing thereon. Lots on which no houses or structures were
built were considered open areas available for distribution to secondary
beneficiaries.
Following the conduct of the “structural
survey,” it was recommended that some houses or structures would be relocated to
make way for the construction of roads under a schematic plan selected by a
majority of the BATAHAI members.[6]
Petitioners, who had laid claim on
vacant lots beside those they were occupying, objected to the reduction of the number
of lots they were applying for, rejected the option of assigning the adjacent vacant
lots to their nearest relatives, and refused to submit the documents-requirements
of the NHMFC.
From the
On
On
NHA personnel in fact visited
recalcitrant BATAHAI members, reminding them to comply with the requirements.[12]
Respondents later issued Resolution No.
24 on
Petitioners were thus prompted to file
on
In their complaint, petitioners alleged
that respondents subdivided the lots which they have been occupying since 1978
without their knowledge and consent, reassigned the lots without observing due
process of law, omitted or deleted their names from the January 3, 1993
certified list of prospective beneficiaries, and unlawfully replaced three BATAHAI
directors.
By Decision[15] of
On
appeal, the HIGC Appeals Board reversed the hearing officer’s findings and
declared valid the acts of respondents.[17]
The
Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the HIGC Appeals Board.[18] Hence, the present Petition for Review[19] which
faults the appellate court
. . . in not declaring the act of the respondents as contrary to the express mandate of Article XIII, Section 9 and 10 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and the laws passed in relation thereto, particularly Republic Act No. 7279[20] [and]
. . . in completely ignoring the findings of fact of the HIGC Hearing Officer to the effect that respondents failed to create and organize the required Arbitration Committee, as well as the Final Arbitration Committee (Adjudication Committee) which is the final arbiter of all disputes and controversies in the allocation of lots within the area of the CMP which issue was constantly raised by the petitioners in all stages by the proceedings but which was avoided by the HIGC Appeals Board and the Court of Appeals thereby causing denial of due process.[21]
The
petition fails.
The
resolution of the petition hinges on a determination of whether petitioners
were deprived of property without due process of law.
The
essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to
be heard.[22]
The
records of the case show that petitioners had had more than sufficient notice
and opportunity to be heard before they were delisted as prospective
beneficiaries.
Before
respondents issued the questioned
Even
after petitioners were delisted as beneficiaries, respondents set new deadlines
for petitioners to submit the requirements, sending each of them letters
reminding them of the consequences of non-compliance therewith.
Petitioners
argue, however, that the HIGC Hearing Officer found that they showed their
consistent interest to acquire the lots and pay the cost of acquisition to
BATAHAI as soon as the re-subdivided lots be reverted
to their original sizes.[23] They add that the BATAHAI should have created
an Arbitration Committee and that the NHMFC should have organized an
Adjudication Committee according to the amended by-laws of BATAHAI and the association’s
Code, which bodies should have heard their grievances to afford them due
process.
Petitioners’ arguments fail.
First, the “structural survey” which
triggered the controversy did not subdivide petitioners’ lots. By petitioner Delfin Espinocilla’s admission before
the HIGC Hearing Committee, the purpose of the “structural survey” was to
identify the actual structures owned by Bagong Tanyag settlers:
Q [Atty. Almo]: As a member of the BATAHAI, were you aware of any activities that the officers of the BATAHAI undertake [sic] in order that your occupancy of the lot may be properly known?
A [Delfin
Espinocilla]: Yes sir.
Q: What is this action does [sic] the BATAHAI undertake?
A: The structural survey submitted in April 1990 executed by Engineer Ponciano Miranda.
Q: When you said structural survey, what does this survey referred [sic] to?
A: Respective structural houses of the individual claimant.
x x x x
Q: What does this structural plan refer to?
A: To distinguished [sic] the actual structure of the respective beneficiaries sir.
Q: Will you be able to tell this Honorable Office about the particular purpose of this structural plan?
A:
Hearing Officer:
So you mean if there is the existing house, it shall be included in the structural plan?
A: Yes sir.
Hearing Officer:
So if you have no structure, you will not be included in the structural survey?
A: Yes sir.[24] (Italics and underscoring supplied)
Second, the records of the case show
that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the alleged subdivision
of their lots. Thus they brought up
their concerns to the Office of the President which, in turn, referred the same
to the NHA which passed upon them.[25]
At all events, the due process
guarantee cannot be invoked when no vested right has been acquired.[26] The period during which petitioners occupied the
lots, no matter how long,[27] did
not vest them with any right to claim ownership since it is a fundamental
principle of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of
license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running
of the period of acquisitive prescription.[28] It bears recalling that BATAHAI was formed
precisely to enable the Bagong Tanyag settlers, including petitioners, to
purchase the lots they were occupying.
Petitioners nevertheless invoke the
following social justice provisions of the Constitution:
Article XIII.
x x x x
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such programs the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
No
resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate
consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.
The invocation does not help their cause. Petitioners’ obstinancy in not complying with
the BATAHAI and NHMFC requirements had delayed the release of the loan to
BATAHAI[29]
to the detriment of the other BATAHAI members who, like petitioners, are also urban
poor dwellers but who complied with the requirements and even agreed to be
relocated in case the construction of roads for the common interest required the
demolition of their houses or structures.[30] To grant the petition would, instead of
promoting, defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] HIGC folder 1, pp. 121-128. (HIGC folders 1, 2, and 3 are paginated 500-1, 351-1, and 78-1, respectively).
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] HIGC records folder 1, p. 460.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] HIGC records folder 1, pp. 447-448.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] HIGC records folder 3, pp. 71-78.
[18] Decision of
[19] Rollo, pp. 51-76.
[20]
[21]
[22] Medenilla v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 93868,
[23] Rollo, p. 163.
[24] HIGC records folder 2, pp. 271-273.
[25] HIGC records folder 1, pp. 112-117, 247-252.
[26]
Vide Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay,
G.R. No. L-81188,
[27] The case filed before the HIGC pegs the start of the occupation at 1978 (HIGC records folder 1, p. 31) but the affidavits of the individual petitioners state different dates for each of them (HIGC records folder 1, pp. 160, 164, 167, 171, 175, 178, 182, 186, 190, 195, 198, 201, 204, 211, 215, 225, 231, 259, 271, 330, 352, 356.
[28] Bogo-Medellin
Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124699, July 31, 2003, 407
SCRA 518, 526-527. Vide Civil Code,
Article 1119: “Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by
mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of
possession.”
[29] Vide HIGC records folder 1, pp. 88, 143, 245-245 (both pages were inadvertently numbered “245”), 427, 448.
[30] HIGC records folder 1, pp. 81, 464.