FIRST DIVISION
|
SPOUSES EUGENIO & VICENTA REYES, Petitioners, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. OSCAR P. BARRIENTOS, as Judge, RTC,
Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 82, and RAMIL, JESUS, MELCHOR, JOSEPH and ERWIN, all
surnamed VOLUNTAD,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 150722 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, * AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: August 17, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated 31 July 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62100,
as reiterated in its Resolution of 26 October 2001, affirming the (1) Order
dated 9 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, Malolos,
Bulacan which dismissed the petitioners’ Petition
for Relief from Judgment in Civil Case No. 142-M-93 for having been filed
out of time and for petitioners’ lack of legal personality to file the petition;
and (2) Order dated 25 October 2000, denying the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Undisputed, the facts, as summarized
by the CA in the decision under review, follow:
Private respondents Voluntad obtained a loan
from the Rural Bank of Pandi, Bulacan secured by a mortgage over one-half of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 25073 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
registered in the name of Carmen Voluntad and Maria Voluntad,
predecessors-in-interest of herein private respondents. The Voluntads failed to pay the loan and the
bank foreclosed the mortgage. The
property was sold at public auction with the bank as the highest bidder. Three months later, without the knowledge of
the Voluntads, the bank assigned its right over the property to Spouses
Magtanggol and Corazon Dizon.
The Voluntads then filed the herein Petition
for Redemption docketed as Civil Case
No. 142-M-93 and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 25073.
The notice of lis pendens was
carried over to TCT No. T-166332-M now in the name of Magtanggol and Corazon
Dizon who in turn, sold the property to petitioner Spouses Vicenta and Eugenio
Reyes while under litigation.
The case was decided in favor of the
Voluntads by the public respondent on 8 December 1995, directing the Dizon
Spouses to render a true and correct accounting of the financial obligations of
the petitioners to the bank and allowing the Voluntads to exercise their right
of redemption over the one-half undivided portion of the land for the amount of
P124,762.04.
Subsequently a petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus was filed by the
Voluntads relative to the denial of a writ of execution sought against the
transferees of the land, herein petitioner Spouses Reyes. On
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Order of the trial court which denied Petitioners’ Motion
for a Second Alias Writ of Execution against Respondent Spouses Eugenio and
Vicenta Reyes is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the
trial court for the immediate issuance of a Second Alias Writ of Execution
against Respondents Eugenio and Vicenta Reyes for the enforcement of the final
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case
142-M-93, allowing petitioners, Delfin Voluntad and the heirs of Luz Voluntad
to exercise their Right of Repurchase the property covered by TCT No. T-178105
presently registered in the name of Respondent-Spouses Eugenio and Vicenta
Reyes. xxx.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in its Resolution dated
Contending that they were not given their day
in court as they were never impleaded as party-defendants in the herein Civil
Case No. 142-M-93, and that their inability to intervene in the proceedings
therein was due to excusable negligence, petitioner Reyes filed the subject
Petition for Relief from Judgment on 21 June 2000.
On
a)
The
Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed out of time; and
b)
Petitioners
have no legal personality to file the Petition for Relief from Judgment.
On
From
the adverse actions of the respondent judge, herein petitioners went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari, thereat
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62100,
arguing that the respondent judge’s orders dated 9 August 2000 and 25 October
2000, which respectively dismissed their petition for relief from judgment in
Civil Case No. 142-M-93 and denied their motion for reconsideration, were
issued in grave abuse of discretion.
In
the herein assailed Decision dated
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
DISMISSED
and the assailed Orders are AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Explains
the CA in its assailed Decision of
xxx. We agree with the lower court that the
sixty-day period commenced, at the latest, on 30 May 1997, the date when
petitioners received an Order from this Court directing them to comment on the
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by the Voluntads docketed as CA-GR
SP No. 44141 entitled ‘Delfin Voluntad, et al vs. Hon. Oscar Barrientos, et al,
to which a copy of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 142-M-93 had been attached.
That period expired on
On the other hand, the six-month period is
reckoned from the date of entry of the Order issued by the public respondent in
Civil Case No. 142-M-93 on
With
their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its resolution
of
The simple issue is when shall the
60-day and the six months period for filing petition for relief be reckoned for
a party not included in the original judgment but later bound by the judgment
by a higher Court on certiorari?
We DENY.
The time for filing a petition for
relief from judgment is stated in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 3. Time
for filing petition; contents and verification. − A petition provided
for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be.
In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines,[2] the
Court has had the occasion to reiterate:
Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) sixty (60) days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. Strict compliance with these periods stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it were, a petition for relief is actually the “last chance” given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And failure to avail of such “last chance” within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners contend, however, that
the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that the petition for
relief from judgment should have been filed within sixty (60) days from the
time they (petitioners) learned of the decision dated 8 December 1995 and within
six (6) months after such judgment was entered by the lower court, is absurd as
it was a legal impossibility to expect them (petitioners) to question the decision
dated 8 December 1995 which the trial court initially refused to enforce
against them. They, therefore, posit that not until this Court ruled on
Petitioners are wrong.
At the outset, the Court took notice
that petitioners did not question the fact that the period of six (6) months after
entry of the RTC judgment in Civil Case No. 142-M-93 had already expired when
they filed the subject petition for relief. We have ruled in Quelnan that the sixty 60-day period
from knowledge of the decision against which relief is sought, and the 6-month
period from entry of judgment must
concur, otherwise the petition will be deemed filed out of time. On this score alone, the petition may be
instantly denied.
However, for the purpose of settling
the issue squarely raised in the instant petition, the Court will discuss
further.
It should be noted that the 60-day
period from knowledge of the decision,
and the 6-month period from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and uninterruptible. We have also time and again held that because
relief from a final and executory judgment is really more of an exception than
a rule due to its equitable character and nature, strict compliance with these
periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must always be observed.
Seemingly, petitioners have presented
a genuinely novel issue as to when the 60-day period should commence in their
peculiar case where, initially, the RTC did not consider its 8 December 1995
decision binding and enforceable against them notwithstanding the fact that
they bought and acquired the property subject of the litigation in Civil Case
No. 142-M-93 during the pendency of the said case, but eventually, this Court,
in G.R. No. 132294, ruled that they
(petitioners), being transferees pendente
lite, are deemed buyers in mala fide
and “stand exactly in the shoes of the transferor and is bound by any judgment
or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor.”[3]
We cannot agree with the petitioners’
thesis that the 60-day period may only be reckoned from their receipt on
How can we explain the apparent
absurdity which petitioners assert when they claimed that they cannot be
expected to question the
For sure, we cannot agree with the
petitioner’s submission that the commencement of the 60-day period within which
to file a petition for relief from judgment should be made subjectively dependent
upon any erroneous belief on the part of
any party litigant or even by the mistaken ruling of the RTC in this case that
a certain judgment or decision is not binding upon a party who is undisputedly
a transferee pendente lite, as here. Otherwise,
the objectivity in the application of the rules, specially in jurisdictional
matters as reglementary period, will gravely suffer. Independently of what the petitioners believe,
the 60-day period as provided for by the Rules had commenced on the day that
they learned of the 8 December 1995 RTC decision on 30 May 1997, when
petitioners received an order from the CA directing them to comment on the
petition for certiorari and mandamus in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44141, to which order,
to stress, a copy of the 8 December 1995 RTC decision was attached. The Court sees no absurdity or legal
impossibility for requiring the petitioners to avail of the remedy of relief
from judgment within 60 days from learning about the 8 December 1995 RTC
decision although they believe that they are not bound by said decision, because
the Rules and corresponding jurisprudence on transferees pendente lite have the full force and effect of
law upon them. Dura lex sed lex. The
Court could not rule otherwise.
Given the reality that the petition
for relief in Civil Case No. 142-M-93 was filed beyond the 60-day period from
the time petitioners learned of the 8 December 1995 decision, and likewise
beyond the 6-month period from entry of judgment in said case, we rule and so
hold that the CA committed no reversible error in not finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he dismissed, in his Order
of 9 August 2000, the subject petition for relief from judgment.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant recourse is DENIED.
Costs
against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
(No part)
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* No part.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (now ret.) and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring; rollo, pp. 12-21.
[2] G.R. No. 138500,
[3] Voluntad v. Dizon, G.R. No. 132294,