THIRD DIVISION
|
ERLINDA B. DANDOY,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, REY ANTHONY M. NARIA, Petitioners, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, and NERISSA LOPEZ, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 150089
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August
28, 2007 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The facts
of the case as found by the CA, are as follows:
Herein petitioner Erlinda Dandoy-Barboni
[also referred to as “Erlinda Dandoy” and “Barboni”], represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, Rey Anthony Naria, and the private respondent, Nerissa Lopez
[Lopez], were high school classmates in Zamboanga del Sur from 1970 to 1975. The latter is now a businesswoman with
various products as her stocks-in-trade which include jewelry. According to Lopez, the petitioner Dandoy on
November 13, 1996, bought a set of jewelry with a total value of P35,000.00
from her on cash basis, but the latter pleaded that she be allowed to buy the
items on credit, being a regular customer and friend of the former. Seller Lopez acceded to the request upon the
representation of the buyer that she will settle her account before enplaning
for P75,000.00. Sometime April, 1997, Lopez demanded payment
for the sets of jewelry but the buyer countered that she still had to wait for
the proceeds of the sale of her condominium in P30,000.00
and at the same time, bought two more sets of jewelry worth P230,000.00,
which increased the latter’s debt to P310,000.00. Four days after the partial payment, Lopez
went to the house of Barboni and again demanded payment but was assured that
the paper work for the sale of the Bicutan property was almost through and that
the payment for $1,000,000.00 would be out soon. Barboni then inquired about other jewelry for
sale and though apprehensive, Lopez showed the buyer a P1,000,000-worth
diamond marquise which the former borrowed for appraisal. After several days, Lopez returned to
retrieve the set but was told by the petitioner that she failed to have the
jewelry appraised. At the same instance,
the petitioner again bought two other pieces of jewelry valued at P60,000.00,
representing that it would be given to her sister. On
In her Answer, the petitioner manifested that
Lopez’s complaint is malicious and done in bad faith. The truth is that the petitioner never
intended to buy the jewelry but only wanted to help Lopez sell the goods. When not sold, the petitioner tried to return
the merchandise but the seller refused to accept the same and insisted that the
former pay for it upon the sale of her Bicutan property. Lopez obviously had the temerity to sue the
petitioner inspite of the latter’s benevolent assistance to the former for years. As counterclaim, the petitioner prayed that
the amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 per
month for lost interest as a result of the attachment of the Bicutan property,
attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 and a per appearance fee of P1,500.00
be adjudged in her favor.[4]
For failure
of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement during the preliminary
conference, trial on the merits ensued.
After Lopez
completed the presentation of her evidence, Dandoy, through counsel, moved for
the dismissal of the complaint by way of a Demurrer to Evidence. [5] Dandoy relied on the alleged admission of
Lopez that the payment for the jewelry will be made only after the sale of
Dandoy’s property situated at Bicutan.
Since the property had not yet been sold at the time of the filing of
the complaint (and even thereafter), the obligation was not yet due and
demandable; thus, the dismissal of the case was warranted.
In its
Order[6]
dated
Aggrieved,
Dandoy elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that
the RTC Orders be annulled, and the case be dismissed.
On
Petitioner
Dandoy now comes before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising the
following issues:
7.1. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE
CASE INSPITE OF THE GLARING EVIDENCE WHICH WARRANTS SUCH DISMISSAL;
7.2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
HAVE ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BEFORE IT BY WAY OF PETITIONER’S
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
7.3. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED SECTION 14, ARTICLE
VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
7.4. WHETHER OR NOT THE SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER IS SUFFICIENT TO CONFER THE POWER UNTO THE
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION.[10]
We
initially discuss the last of these issues and, thereafter the other three.
Dandoy
avers that the special power of attorney (SPA) she executed in favor of her
attorney-in-fact is sufficient authority for the latter to file the instant
petition notwithstanding the absence of any specific reference to the present
case.
We agree.
The SPA
executed by Dandoy grants to her attorney/s-in-fact, Marie Anne B. Barboni,
Atty. Julian R. Torcuator, Jr. and/or Mr. Rey Anthony M. Naria, the authority
to do and perform the following:
To file a petition for Certiorari and/or
Appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court with respect to the Decisions,
resolutions or orders issued or that may hereafter be issued x x x i) such
other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action; and to file
and/or execute such pleadings, motions, papers, and agreements, petitions,
appeal as may be necessary to prosecute the above cases and/or settle the same.[11]
Clearly, the authority granted to the
attorney/s-in-fact is not limited to the filing of the petition with the CA but
includes a pleading which may be subsequently filed before this Court. Dandoy’s intention to endow her
attorney/s-in-fact with such power is unmistakable from the language of the
SPA. The use of and/or between petition for
certiorari and appeal can
only mean that either or both courses of
action may be undertaken. Thus, after
Dandoy, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which proved unsuccessful, the same
attorney-in-fact could appeal the CA decision to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Besides, the last clause in the above-quoted
portion of the SPA amply indicates that Dandoy intended for the authority to continue
until the termination of the case.
Now, on to the other issues.
Petitioner
anchored her demurrer to evidence on Lopez’s alleged admission that payment of
the obligation shall be made only upon the sale of Dandoy’s property in Bicutan. With such admission, petitioner contends that
her debt had become an obligation with a period. And since the property had not yet been sold,
Lopez had no right to demand payment.
Thus, petitioner posits that the filing of the collection suit by Lopez
was premature, and the case should be dismissed.
We do not
agree.
Demurrer to
evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s
evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss,
which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[12]
A demurrer
to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts adduced and the applicable law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
Where the totality of plaintiff’s evidence, together with such
inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom, does not
warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be
sustained. A demurrer to evidence is
likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the
material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It
should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.[13]
Even with
Lopez’s admission, as claimed by the petitioner, the demurrer to evidence has
to be denied. As correctly held by the
CA, the respondent’s testimony on cross-examination cannot be considered separately
from her testimony on direct examination because the testimony of a witness is
weighed as a whole.[14]
On direct
examination,[15]
the respondent testified that she went to Bicutan because petitioner wanted to
pay her obligation from the proceeds of the sale of her Bicutan property. However, according to respondent, the
transaction did not push through and the petitioner promised to return the
items to the respondent. But the items
were never returned. On the other hand,
during her cross-examination,[16]
respondent answered in the affirmative when asked whether she acceded to the request
of the petitioner that the obligations be paid from the proceeds of the sale of
the Bicutan property, which at that time was not yet effected.[17] From this testimony, it appears that while
Lopez agreed that payment would come from the proceeds of the sale, she did not
necessarily bind herself to the commitment that the payment of the obligation
will be sourced solely from the sale of the Bicutan property. It is noteworthy
that, responding to an earlier demand for payment, petitioner promised to pay
out of the proceeds of the sale of her Ortigas condominium or Bicutan property.
Yet, on P30,000.00. Had the parties really intended that the
payment of the obligation be sourced only from the proceeds of the sale of
petitioner’s properties, no partial payment would have been made by the
petitioner. Moreover, prior to the
filing of the complaint, respondent demanded the payment of petitioner’s
obligation and the latter promised to pay within the day. Nowhere in the narration of facts is it shown
that she protested that her obligation was not yet due and demandable because
her Bicutan property was not yet sold. These acts of petitioner negate the claim that
her obligation is not yet due and demandable.
We also cannot
accept petitioner’s argument that her obligation is one with a period, that is,
her obligation arises only after the sale of the Bicutan property. An obligation with a period is one for the
fulfillment of which a day certain has been fixed. A day certain is understood to be that which
must necessarily come, although it may not be known when.[18] The sale of the Bicutan property cannot be characterized
as a day certain because the event, though future, is not sure to happen. Notwithstanding the representation made by
petitioner that there are many buyers, the fact remains that the property may
not be bought at all. At best, the sale
of the property may be considered a condition because it is a future and uncertain event as opposed to
a period which is future and certain. But if such a condition indeed exists, to be
sure, the same was not imposed upon the birth of the obligation. Neither was there any showing that there was
novation. Thus, the obligation cannot
even be denominated as one with a condition.
Accordingly,
on the basis of the respondent’s evidence alone, the existence of petitioner’s
obligation arising from the sale of the subject jewelry, was sufficiently
established. The obligation, as already
pointed out above, should be characterized as pure – as opposed to conditional
or one with a period – which is demandable at once upon its constitution. At the time the jewelry were received by the
petitioner, the contract of sale was consummated, and the corresponding
obligation to pay had arisen. It is,
therefore, gross error to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the trial
court for denying the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence.
Petitioner
likewise raises the RTC’s alleged violation of the Constitution due to the
failure of the court to recite its findings of facts and conclusions of law in
the questioned orders.
The Court
disagrees with the petitioner.
Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides: “No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.” Section 1, Rule 36
of the Rules of Court also requires that a judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case “shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.” This requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of
legal reasoning. A decision that does
not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached. It is precisely prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by
a higher tribunal.[19]
In the case
at bench, even only a cursory examination of the questioned Orders of the RTC will
show that there was sufficient compliance with the above requirements. The Court notes that petitioner’s demurrer to
evidence is founded on the alleged admission made by the respondent from which
an inference is sought to be drawn that the latter’s complaint was prematurely
filed. In denying the demurrer to
evidence, the trial court did not accept the petitioner’s conclusion and held
instead that “considering plaintiff’s (respondent herein) evidence which,
standing alone and in the absence of controverting evidence, affords sufficient
basis for a judgment in her favor, the Court is inclined to deny the demurrer
to evidence.”[20] Moreover, in the later order denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the court more than amply explained
the factual and legal basis for the denial.
It even quoted a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes as
basis for its conclusion in overruling the petitioner’s claim. Said discussion clearly complies with the
constitutional and statutory requisites.
Besides,
the requirement of specificity of rulings discussed above is stringently
applied only to judgments and final orders.
A liberal interpretation of this requirement,[21]
on the other hand, may be given to an order dismissing a demurrer to evidence
which has been consistently characterized by this Court as interlocutory.[22]
The assailed Orders neither terminated nor finally disposed of the case as they
still left something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided
on the merits.[23]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and
Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring; rollo, pp. 106-110.
[2] Rollo, p. 118.
[3] Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada; rollo, pp. 69 and 76-78.
[4] Rollo, pp. 106-107.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] The dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is hereby denied and accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 110.)
[9] Rollo, p. 118.
[10]
[11]
[12] Heirs
of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, G.R. No. 160832, October 27,
2006, 505 SCRA 665, 679.
[13]
[14] Rollo,
p. 77.
[15] The respondent’s testimony during
her direct examination reads:
Q: What did
she tell you, if any? When she called up
your house what did she tell you?
A: Please come
to the house because I have to talk some important matters to you. The buyer will be coming today and once the
property will be paid I’ll pay you in cash with my other balance.
x x x x
Q: Why were
you going to Bicutan?
A: Because she
told me she wants to pay me because the
buyer of the house will be coming that afternoon.
Q: x x x
(W)hat did you do then when you arrived at the house of the defendant?
A: She let us
wait for the buyer of her house and then “pinakilala n’ya ako doon sa buyer
niya, nag-usap sila. Sabi ng buyer niya,
ang asawa niya hindi dumaan sa Pilipinas at dumeretso sa
Q: After being
told this by the buyer, what did the defendant say? Ms. Witness?
A: If this
transaction will not push through, I will return the item.
Q: Did this
transaction push through? The sale of the Bicutan property?
A: No, it did
not push through.
Q: What
happened to the items?
A: She
promised to return the items on October 28 because the item is not in her
possession, it is in her wallet.
Q: After
committing to return the same on
A: She evaded
me and I cannot find her anymore. (
[16] Respondent’s testimony during her
cross-examination reads:
Q: x x x And then, it appears here in your
testimony on page 30 of the tsn that she was and I quote your answer: “She was assuring me that the property in P1 Million so that the same will
be paid including her previous balance with you with the proceeds of [the]
Bicutan property, am I correct? Is that
right?
A: Yes.
Q: To your knowledge, Madam Witness, up to this
time, was the Bicutan property sold?
A: No,
Excuse me. (
[17]
[18] Article 1193, New Civil Code.
[19] Report
on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court of Tambulig,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1573,
[20] Rollo,
p. 69.
[21] Malicdem
v.
[22] Choa
v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 182 (2000).
[23] Malicdem
v.