Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
RESURRECCION
OBRA, G.R. No. 149125
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
SPS.
VICTORIANO BADUA &
MYRNA BADUA, SPS. JUANITO
BALTORES & FLORDELIZA
BALTORES, SPS. ISABELO Promulgated:
BADUA & PRESCILA BADUA,
SPS. JOSE BALANON &
SHIRLEY BALANON, SPS.
BADUA and SPS. LEONCIO
BADUA & JUVY BADUA,
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
An order of execution must conform to
the terms of the dispositive portion of the decision. A court that issues an order of execution in
contravention of its final judgment exceeds its jurisdiction and renders its
order invalid.
The Case
The
present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the annulment of
the March 20, 2001[1] and June
20, 2001[2]
Orders of the San Fernando City, La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29
in Civil Case No. 5033, directing petitioner Obra to demolish the fence she
constructed on the southern portion of her property which blocked a portion of respondents’
right-of-way.
The Facts
The case arose from a Complaint for
Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents against Anacleto and Resurreccion
Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta Badua in Civil Case
No. 5033 entitled Sps. Victoriano Badua
and Myrna Badua, et al. v. Sps. Anacleto Obra and Resurreccion Obra, et al.
before the RTC. Defendant Anacleto Obra
was the husband of petitioner.
Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot
commonly owned by them and covered by Tax Declaration No. 93-01900281 under
Cadastral Lot No. 5518 situated in Galongen, Bacnotan, La Union, were located
west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the national highway was
a pathway traversing the northern portion of petitioner’s property and the
southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was more than one meter wide and
sixteen meters long. They claimed that
this pathway had been established as early as 1955. In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed
a fence on the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents’
access to the national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the
fence, but petitioner refused.
In her Answer, petitioner averred
that respondents had not established any easement of right-of-way either by law
or agreement. She claimed that
respondents failed to satisfy the requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650
of the Civil Code in order to establish an easement of right-of-way on the
northern portion of her property.
Moreover, she alleged that respondents had another access as ingress and
egress to the public road other than the one traversing her property.
The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed
to file an answer; consequently, they were declared in default.
On
It
must be noted that the “new” pathway used by respondents, however, traversed
the southern portion of petitioner’s property.
Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her
lot, which again restricted the use of respondents’ “new” pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioner’s
action, respondents filed on
On
Clarifying
its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001 Order, held
that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioner’s representation
that she was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her property
as an alternative pathway. Since the
southern portion was an “agreed pathway,”[7]
petitioner could not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered petitioner
to remove the fence blocking the passage.
Hence,
we have this petition.
The Issue
Petitioner
assigns a lone issue for the consideration of the Court:
Whether or not the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a property not the subject of a pending case (particularly Civil Case No. 5033).[8]
Essentially, petitioner questions the
propriety of the trial court’s issuance of an order clarifying its final and
executory decision and effectively establishing an easement on petitioner’s
property without proper adjudication.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition
is impressed with merit.
Dispositive Portion of a Decision
Controlling
The controversy of this petition
stemmed from the alleged conflict between the body of the trial court’s July 7,
2000 Decision and its dispositive portion.
Respondents aver that notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case No.
5033, the body of the Decision evidently established an easement on the
southern portion of petitioner’s property.
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the trial court’s reference
to the “new” pathway was merely a declaration of its existence and not
necessarily a creation of an easement of right-of-way.
We agree with petitioner’s
postulation.
The resolution of the court in a
given issue embodied in the fallo or
dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties.[9] Thus, where there is a conflict between the fallo and the ratio decidendi or body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule
rests on the theory that the fallo is
the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing.[10] The rule applies when the dispositive part of
a final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal, and can wholly
be given effect without need of interpretation or construction.[11]
In the case at bench, the decretal
portion of the July 7, 2000 Decision is plain and clear—“[w]herefore, in view
of the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed.” When a court rules that the case or complaint
is dismissed, then it is concluded that the cause of action embodied in the
allegations of the initiatory pleading has no merit or basis, and the prayer is
consequently denied.
The amended complaint filed by
respondents in Civil Case No. 5033 revealed that their cause of action was the
recognition of their easement of right-of-way of “more than one (1) meter wide
and more than sixteen (16) meters in length [which] traversed the northern portion of the property of
defendants spouses Anacleto Obra and Resurreccion Obra.”[12] As prayer, respondents asked for the
demolition of the concrete fence constructed by petitioner and her spouse,
Anacleto, that closed the pathway on the northern portion of Obra’s lot; the
declaration of right-of-way over said area in favor of respondents; and the
payment of damages and attorney’s fees.
When the RTC dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it ruled
that respondents had no cause of action against petitioner and her husband,
Anacleto, because they failed to satisfy one of the four requisites for the entitlement
of a right-of-way, namely—that the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway. The trial court took note of the fact that
the new pathway which incidentally traversed the southern portion of
petitioner’s lot is an adequate outlet to a public highway. While its body mentioned the existence of an
alternative pathway located south of petitioner’s lot, such was made only to
emphasize that respondents failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement
of right-of-way. As held by the trial
court:
The insistence of the
plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore without basis considering
that there is another outlet adequate enough as an access route for them in
their passage to the public highway and the alleged inconvenience cannot be a
ground for the opening of said old pathway.
x x x x
In fine, plaintiffs were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an easement of right of way; failing to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway.[13]
Apparently,
no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of this “new”
pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the Court on petitioner’s
property in Civil Case No. 5033. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the
southern portion had no basis.
The
parties and even the trial court were confined to the averments of the
complaint, and the answer and the issues joined by the major pleadings. It could not be disputed by respondents that
there was no mention at all of any right-of-way on the southern portion of
petitioner’s lot in the complaint nor any claim or prayer for the declaration
of respondents’ entitlement to a right-of-way over the said area. Thus, there was no joinder of issue on this
matter and, therefore, the dismissal of the case cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be construed to encompass any grant of right-of-way to respondents
relating to the southern portion owned by petitioner.
More
importantly, the case was dismissed by the RTC, meaning no relief was granted
by the court to respondents. Granting arguendo that the issue on the
entitlement to respondents of a right-of-way over the southern portion was
likewise raised and was implicit from the pleadings; nevertheless, respondents,
by the dismissal of the case, were not granted any affirmative relief by the
trial court. As such, the trial court
clearly erred in issuing the
Moreover,
the construction of the fence on the southern portion was done by petitioner
after the rendition and finality of the
Lastly,
the assailed
No Voluntary Easement of Right-of-Way
The trial court, seemingly aware that
it did not determine the legality of an easement of right-of-way over the
pathway located south of petitioner’s property, nevertheless, concluded that
the said passage was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way which
petitioner should respect.
The trial court was in error.
It is a settled doctrine that a
decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and unalterable.[14] Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend,
modify, or alter a final judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it. Any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for
that purpose.[15]
To
recapitulate, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033 meant that no easement was
ever established on petitioner’s property.
However, the trial court, by issuing its March 20, 2001 Order directing
petitioner to remove the fence that limited respondents’ passage, effectively
created a right-of-way on petitioner’s property in favor of respondents
allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the parties. This
directive was in contravention of its
Granting
for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of right-of-way,
subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and
material to the issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in Civil Case
No. 5033, still, the conclusion that there was an agreed or voluntary easement
of right-of-way had no basis. The
records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any agreement executed by the
parties on the claimed right-of-way.
Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed
upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper
indemnity. The evidence is not ample
enough to support the conclusion that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way
over the southern portion.
More
so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it
should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real
estate, and ordinarily must be in writing.[16] No written instrument on this agreement was
adduced by respondents.
In
the light of the foregoing considerations, the assailed
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p.
16; issued by Judge Robert T. Cawed.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357,
[10]
[11] Suntay
v. Suntay, G.R. No. 132524,
[12] Rollo, p. 23.
[13] Supra note 3, at 31.
[14] Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772,
[15] Torres v. Sison, G.R. No. 119811,
[16] 25 Am. Jur. 2d §20, pp. 431-432.