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Petitioner, - versus - JUSTO
J. PARAS, Respondent. |
G. R. No. 147824 Present: Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, azcuna, and garcia, JJ. Promulgated:
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or
on
To substantiate her charges,
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of
After the wedding, she and Justo spent
one (1) week in
Justo
lived the life of a bachelor.[12] His usual routine was to spend time with his
“barkadas” until the wee hours of the
morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when
she sent for him during lunchtime.[13] He also failed to provide for their children’s
well-being.[14] Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose
was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family
who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was
electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his “barkadas.” He did not heed
her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit
of climbing the rooftop.[15]
To cope with the death of the children,
the entire family went to the
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an
illegitimate child was
the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal
house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a
baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased
daughter Cindy Rose Paras.[17]
As
expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met
He blamed the subsequent dissipation
of their assets from
the slump of
the price of
sugar and not to his alleged
profligacy.[21] Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were
able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store, establish their
gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in one
mortgage transaction. He maintained that
he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the bank’s authorized
employee.[22]
As to their marital relationship, he
noticed the change in
He did not abandon his family in the
He
spent for his children’s education. At
first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law
practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide
for their needs. He admitted though that
there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack
of income.[26]
What caused the inevitable family break-out
was
As to the charge of concubinage, he
alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law
Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his
daughter.
After trial or on
Justo
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim,
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in
respondent’s record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the
SO ORDERED.
On
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the
record – first, the income which
supported their children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties
and not singularly from Rosa’s industry; second,
Justo gave his share of the support to his children in the form of allowances,
albeit smaller than that derived from
the conjugal property; third, he was
booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election
and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality,
Justo’s alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The
Court of Appeals likewise held that
In his comment on the petition, Justo
asserts that the present case is a “new matter completely foreign and removed” from A.C. No.
5333; hence, the factual findings of
this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C.
No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.
The parties’ opposing contentions
lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No.
5333 are conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC
for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justo’s
alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether
the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part
of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I
Whether
the factual findings of this Court in
A.C.
No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Applying
these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we
assume Justo’s alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of
their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators
that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient
to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity.
These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married
person. While they may manifest the “gravity” of his alleged psychological
incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts
violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts
show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him
from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.[36]
The
Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the
Supreme Court in the disbarment case
appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellee’s falsification of
documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do
not conclusively establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to
presume the existence of such seeming depravities in appellee’s character in
our earlier judgment. However, as we
emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such eventualities is not
necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern
and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article 36.[37]
Clearly,
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. The
basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice
versa.[39] The
Court’s exposition in In re Almacen[40] is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
[they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa.[41] The
yardsticks for such roles are simply different.
This is why the disposition in a
disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. While
II
Whether a
remand of this case to the
RTC is necessary.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
III
Whether
the totality of evidence in the case
shows
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as
to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be
reminded of the State’s policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution
mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
This
State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in
Article 1 of the Family
Code which states
that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union,
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and
statutory law, this
Court has held
fast to the
position that any
doubt as to
the validity of
a marriage is to be
resolved in favor
of its validity.[52] Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that
not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in
nature and renders a person incapacitated
to comply with
the essential marital
obligations, the State
provides refuge to
the aggrieved spouse
under Article 36
of the Family
Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In
Molina,[53] the
Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
CANCIO C.
GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[2] Marcos
v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490,
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (retired) and Associate Justice Rebecca Guia-Salvador. Rollo, pp. 34-45.
[4]
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Records, p. 11.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26]
[27] Records, p. 12.
[28]
[29] RTC Decision,
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Supra, footnote 1.
[35] Court of Appeals’ Decision, rollo,
pp. 42-43.
[36]
[37] Court of Appeals Resolution, id., p. 71.
[38]
[39] Office of the Court Administrator v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370.
[40] No. L – 27654,
[41] See also Cojuangco v.
[42] Supra, footnote 1.
[43] Supra, footnote 2.
[44] G.R.
No. 109975,
[45] A.M. No. 01-11-10-SC.
[47] G.R. No. 152577,
[48] G.R.
No. 136921,
[49] G.R. No. 112019,
[50] Supra,
footnote 1.
[51] Supra, footnote 48.
[52] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[53] Supra, Footnote 1.
[54] Supra, footnote 49.
[55] G.R.
No. 151867,
[57] G.R. No. 143376,
[58] Supra, footnote 47.
[59] Supra, footnote 1.
[60] Supra, footnote 2, citing:
Article 68. The
husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Article 69. The
husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living
with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible
with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Article 70. The
spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said
income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties. (111a)
Article 71. The
management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
[61] Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to
compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the
respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner;
or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.