Republic of the
Supreme Court
PACIFIC
BASIN SECURITIES CO., |
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G.R. No. 143972 |
INC., |
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Petitioner, |
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- versus - |
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ORIENTAL PETROLEUM and |
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MINERALS CORP. and |
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EQUITABLE BANKING CORP., |
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Respondents. |
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ORIENTAL PETROLEUM and |
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G.R. No. 144056 |
MINERALS CORP., EQUITABLE |
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BANKING CORP. and ROBERT |
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COYIUTO, JR., |
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Petitioners, |
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- versus - |
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PACIFIC
BASIN SECURITIES CO., |
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INC., |
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Respondent. |
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PACIFIC
BASIN SECURITIES CO., |
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G.R. No. 144631 |
INC., |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., |
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Chairperson, |
ORIENTAL PETROLEUM and |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
MINERALS CORP. , EQUITABLE |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
BANKING CORP., ROBERTO |
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NACHURA, and |
COYIUTO and ETHELWOLDO |
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REYES, JJ. |
FERNANDEZ, |
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Respondents. |
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Promulgated: |
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August 31, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
By Resolution dated
The facts of the case are undisputed:
On P17,727,000.00 or P.05750
per share.[5] The shares were listed and traded in the Makati Stock Exchange.
The OPMC shares turned out to be
owned by Piedras Petroleum Mining Corporation (Piedras Petroleum), a sequestered company controlled by the
nominees of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). PCGG sent a letter dated
The requests were left unheeded. EBC informed FRMSC that it cannot effect the
transfer of the OPMC s hares to Pacific Basin on the following grounds: first,
that the endorser of the stock certificate, a certain Mr. Clemente
Madarang, was not among the authorized signatories of
Piedras Petroleum; and second, there was no
board resolution from Piedras Petroleum which
authorized the sale of the OPMC shares.[7]
FRMSC complied with the requirements
imposed by EBC and consequently renewed its demand for the transfer of the OPMC
shares to
Hence, on
In their Answer,[11] OPMC
and EBC claimed that the government’s title over the subject OPMC shares was
based on the cession made by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto,
an associate of former President Ferdinand Marcos, in exchange for immunity
from prosecution and suit by the government for allegedly amassing ill-gotten
wealth. According to OPMC and EBC, item
no. 6 of the annex to the Compromise Agreement executed between the government
(through PCGG) and Mr. Benedicto shows that part of
the assets to be turned over by Mr. Benedicto to the
government were all of the OPMC shares owned by Piedras
Petroleum. The Court, however, in G.R.
Nos. 108368, 108548-49, and 108550 issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the enforcement of the Compromise Agreement. Thus, OPMC and EBC maintained that the basis
for PCGG’s claim of title over the OPMC shares
disappeared as the effectivity of the supposed cession
made by Mr. Benedicto is suspended.
OPMC and EBC also argued that even on
the assumption that the government has a valid and effective title over the
subject OPMC shares, the sale by Piedras Petroleum to
Pacific Basin was void as there was no showing that Piedras
Petroleum complied with the legal requirements for the disposition of
government owned assets as embodied in Proclamation No. 50, as amended, and
related rules and regulations on the matter.
The non-holding of a public bidding for the sale of the shares was
allegedly a blatant violation of the said law.
The Securities and Exchange Commission Hearing
Officer[12] ruled in
favor of P20,000,000.00 representing actual damages; P300,000.00
representing exemplary damages; P300,000.00 representing attorney’s
fees; and P50,000.00 for the cost and expenses of the suit.
On
In
CA-G.R. SP No. 54442, OPMC and EBC contend that the SEC erred in holding that
the sale of publicly listed shares of stock through the stock market is
tantamount to a public bidding and that they are ministerially
bound to record said shares in their stock and transfer book.[15]
On
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[18]
upon learning the January 26, 2000 Decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54442,
I.
the court of appeals committed grave error
when it sustained the SEC’s en banc decision which deleted the award of
actual and compensatory damages in favor of the petitioner. there is clear and convincing evidence established through the unrebutted
testimony of petitioner’s expert witness that petitioner was deprived of actual
profits in the amount of around twenty million pesos (p20,000,000.00) x x x
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
AWARD THE PETITIONER EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AS FOUND BY THE SEC HEARING OFFICER WHO
CONDUCTED ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND HAD OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE
PARTIES’ EVIDENCE AND THEIR WITNESSES.
RESPONDENTS’ MANIFEST BAD FAITH AND MALICIOUS REFUSAL TO REGISTER THE
PURCHASE OF THE SHARES DESPITE LACK OF REASONABLE OR JUSTIFIABLE GROUND ENTITLE
THE PETITIONER TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. x x x
OPMC and EBC are also before the
Court in a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 144056, questioning the CA Decision, thus:
I.
[g]overnment-owned property, even of [sic]
shares of stock which are publicly listed in a stock exchange, may be disposed
of only through a public bidding, that the sale of such shares if made in
violation of the public bidding requirement is not valid and that the
disposition of such shares through the normal operation of the stock exchange
does not satisfy the requirement of public bidding. x x x
II.
x x x the GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A
MATTER OF FACT THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS TO ASSESS ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF
THE RESPONDENT.
On the other hand, in CA-G.R. SP. No.
54456,
On
WHEREFORE,
foregoing premises considered, the appealed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[21]
I.
IT WAS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO RULE THAT PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO PROVE ITS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY DESPITE THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. EFFECTIVELY, THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REQUIRING ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, WHICH IS EVEN BEYOND PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS OR PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS. SINCE THIS CASE WAS ORIGINALLY ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE, THE PROOF REQUIRED IS MERELY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH PETITIONER HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TESTIMONY OF MS. VICKY CHAN, PETITIONER’S VICE-PRESIDENT, IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE ACTUAL DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY PETITIONER. THE TESTIMONY OF MS. CHAN WAS UNREBUTTED EVEN IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SEC. HER EXPERTISE IN STOCK BROKERAGE WAS ADMITTED AND NEVER QUESTIONED BY THE RESPONDENTS. x x x
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH, NOR IN WANTON, FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS OR OPPRESSIVE MANNER. x x x MOREOVER, THIS CASE AFFECTS THE EXPECTATION OF THE INVESTING PUBLIC ON THE MARKETABILITY OF THE SHARES LISTED AND TRADED IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE. AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE PUBLIC GOOD, RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
The petitions are without merit.
In
G.R. No. 144056, OPMC and EBC argue that the OPMC shares are government-owned and,
as government property, these can be disposed of only through public bidding. Hence, the sale by Piedras
Petroleum of the OPMC shares to
The argument is baseless.
Prior to the
The
Court elucidated on the power of the PCGG to issue sequestration orders in Bataan
Shipyard & Engineering Company, Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government.[22] The Court held:
By
the clear terms of the law, the power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed
to be “ill-gotten” means to place or cause to be placed under its possession or
control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and
records pertaining thereto may be found, including “business enterprises and
entities,”- for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or
dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the same- until it can
be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property
was in truth “ill- gotten,” i.e., acquired through or as a result of
improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the
Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust
enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State.
And this, too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other
jurisdictions. (Emphasis supplied)[23]
The
Court further held:
As thus described, sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover
are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment, or receivership. By attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a
defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or
lost intentionally or otherwise, pending the action. By receivership, property, real or personal,
which is subject of litigation, is placed in the possession and control of a
receiver appointed by the Court, who shall conserve it pending final
determination of the title or right of possession over it. x x x (Emphasis supplied)[24]
A
sequestration order is similar to the provisional remedy of Receivership under
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. The
PCGG may thus exercise only powers of administration over the property or
business sequestered or provisionally taken over so as to bring and defend
actions in its own name; receive rents; collect debts due; pay outstanding
debts; and generally do such other acts and things as may be necessary to
fulfill its mission as conservator and administrator.[25]
The PCGG, as a mere conservator, does
not automatically become the owner of a sequestered property in behalf of the
government. There must be a final
determination by the courts if the property is in fact “ill-gotten” and was
acquired by using government funds. Thus,
OPMC cannot conclusively claim that the subject shares are government property
by virtue of a sequestration order on Piedras
Petroleum. Such conclusion is non sequitur.
OPMC
and EBC insist that Proclamation No. 50[26] is
the law which should govern the sale of the OPMC shares to
Proclamation
No. 50 seeks to “[p]romote privatization through an
orderly, coordinated and efficient programs for the prompt disposition of the
large number of non-performing assets of the government financial institutions,
and certain government-owned or controlled corporations which have been found
unnecessary or inappropriate for the government sector to maintain.”
The term “assets” is defined under
Article I, Sec. 2, Par. 1, of Proclamation No. 50, as:
(i) receivables and other obligations due to government institutions under credit, lease, indemnity and other agreements together with all collateral security and other rights (including but not limited to rights in relation to shares of stock in corporations such as voting rights as well as rights to appoint directors of corporations or otherwise engage in the management thereof) granted to such institutions by contract or operation of law to secure or enforce the right of payment of such obligations;
(ii) real and personal property of any kind owned or held by government institutions, including shares of stock in corporations, obtained by such government institutions, whether directly or indirectly, through foreclosure or other means, in settlement of such obligations;
(iii) shares of stock and other investments held by government institutions; and
(iv) the government
institutions themselves, whether as parent or subsidiary corporations.
The subject OPMC shares do not fall
within the ambit of “assets,” as the term contemplates properties which are government-owned.
To repeat, the OPMC shares originally owned by Piedras
Petroleum, a sequestered corporation controlled by the nominees of PCGG, remain
to be privately owned until such time when the court declares that the subject
shares were acquired through government funds.
Even
on the assumption that the OPMC shares are government assets,
the Court finds that the sale of the subject shares through the stock exchange
is valid and binding, as there is no law which mandates that listed shares
which are owned by the government be sold only through public bidding.
As
conceded by both
This
Court held in Nicolas v. Court of Appeals[29]
that stock market trading is a technical and highly specialized institution
in the
Moreover,
even if the law indeed requires that the sale of the subject shares undergo
public bidding, the Court finds that sale through the stock exchange is already
a substantial compliance with the public bidding requirement. As correctly held by the CA:
[T]o the mind of the Court, the sale of the sale of shares through public stock exchange offers transparent and fair competition. Parenthetically, the pricing of shares of stock is a highly specialized field that is better left to the experts. It involves an inquiry into the earning potential, dividend history, business risks, capital structure, management, asset values of the company, prevailing business climate, political and economic conditions, and myriad other factors that bear on the valuation of shares.
x x x x
The Commission on Audit does not require public bidding of publicly listed shares of stock as the stock market determines the price of the share, hence, by analogy, the stock market itself can be considered as public bidding. x x x[30]
It is beyond dispute that OPMC holds
no unpaid claim against
Section
63 of the Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 63. x x x Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation x x x.
Clearly, the right of a transferee/ assignee to have stocks
transferred to his name is an inherent right flowing from his ownership of the
stocks.[31] The Court had ruled in Rural Bank of
Salinas, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[32]
that the corporation’s obligation to register is ministerial, citing Fletcher,
to wit:
In transferring stock, the secretary of a corporation acts in purely ministerial capacity, and does not try to decide the question of ownership.[33]
The duty of the corporation to transfer is a ministerial one and if it refuses to make such transaction without good cause, it may be compelled to do so by mandamus.[34]
The Court further held in Rural
Bank of Salinas that the only limitation imposed by Section 63 of the
Corporation Code is when the corporation holds any unpaid claim against the shares
intended to be transferred.[35]
Certificate of stock shall be issued to each holder of fully paid stock in numerical order from the stock certificate book, and shall be signed by the President and countersigned by the Secretary and sealed with the corporate seal. A record of each certificate issued shall be kept on the stub thereof and upon the stock register of the company. (Emphasis supplied)
The
Court agrees with and adopts the findings of the SEC Hearing Officer in his
Decision:[37]
[t]he rights of an
innocent purchaser of shares of stock cannot be prejudiced and has to be protected
especially when the purchase of the shares are coursed through the Stock Market
(in this case the
To rule otherwise would be froth with dangerous consequences. The investing public’s confidence in purchasing and investing in shares of stocks thru the Stock Market will erode and become a tedious and burdensome transaction for the buying or selling of shares of stock of publicly listed corporation. An investor who invests good money in shares in the stock market necessarily expects that the said shares will be registered in his name upon payment of the full value thereof.
Instead of building investor’s
confidence and encourage investment in publicly listed shares in the Stock
Market, every investor will have second thoughts in investing as they will be
purchasing shares in the stock market subject to a caveat that there is no
guaranty the shares they buy are good or transferable to his name. Thus, every potential investor, prior to his
purchase of shares of stock in the Stock Market will have to investigate each
and every share he intends to purchase to make sure that it is free from any
defect and that the said shares may be registered in his name after he
purchases the same.
In
G.R. No. 143972 and G.R. No. 144631,
As
to the issue on actual damages,
In
order that damages may be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party must be presented. Actual
or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and so
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend
upon competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy
and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded.[38]
The
court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect, but must
depend upon competent proof that actual damages have been actually suffered.[39] The testimonies should be viewed in light of
claimant’s self-interest and, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth.[40]
Based on the records, the claim of P20,000,000.00 is not supported by any documentary
evidence. We find that the bare
testimonial assertions of Ms. Vicky Chan are not adequate and competent proof
of the actual pecuniary loss allegedly suffered by
OPMC and EBC, however, cannot escape
liability. The Court awards
Temperate damages are included within
the context of compensatory damages. In
arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, courts are
guided by the ruling that there are cases where from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is
convinced that there has been such loss.[42]
The nature of stock market trading is
speculative where the value of a specific share may vary from time to time,
depending on several factors which may affect the market.
OPMC’s and EBC’s refusal
to record the transfer in the stock and transfer book and issuance of new
certificates of stock in the name of Pacific Basin prevented Pacific from
re-selling the subject shares in the market.
By this non-performance of a ministerial
function, the Court is convinced that
In lieu of actual damages, the Court
finds OPMC and EBC, Mr. Roberto Coyiuto and Ethelwoldo Fernandez (as president and corporate secretary
of OPMC respectively) liable for temperate damages, jointly and severally[43] in
the amount of P1,000,000.00.
The issue on exemplary damages
deserves scant consideration. Well
settled is the rule that although exemplary damages are not recoverable as a
matter of right, and although such damages may not be proved, it must first be
shown that the claimant is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before a court can favorably consider an award of exemplary damages.[44]
The Court found earlier that
Moreover, the Court agrees with the
findings of both the SEC en banc[45]
and the CA[46] when it
held that OPMC and EBC did not act in bad faith nor in
a wanton, fraudulent reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when they
refused to transfer the subject shares under
It
is true that both OPMC and EBC refused to transfer the subject OPMC shares in
the name of
It is axiomatic that good faith is
always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad
faith to sufficiently prove such allegation.
Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails.[48] In the case at bar, the burden of proving alleged
bad faith therefore was on
On the issue regarding the award of attorney’s fees, the Court finds
that it is justified. Attorney’s fees may be awarded inter alia when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interests or in any other case
where the court deems it just and equitable that the attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation be recovered.[49]
Here,
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 144056 is DENIED. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 143972 and
144631 are PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 2000 and August
18, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that Oriental
Petroleum and Minerals Corporation and Equitable Banking Corporation, Mr.
Roberto Coyiuto and Ethelwoldo
Fernandez (as president and corporate secretary of OPMC respectively) are ORDERED
to pay Pacific Basin Securities Co., Inc., jointly and severally, temperate
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
Costs against Oriental
Petroleum and Minerals Corporation and Equitable Banking Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo II (G.R. No.
144056), p.114.
[2] Entitled, “Pacific Basin Securities Inc., Petitioner versus Oriental Petroleum and Mineral Corp. and Mineral Corp. and Equitable Banking Corp., Respondents.”
[3] Entitled, “Oriental Petroleum and Mineral Corp., Equitable Banking Corp., and Robert Coyiuto, Jr., Petitioners versus Pacific Basin Securities Co., Inc., Respondent.”
[4] Entitled, “Pacific Basin Securities Inc., versus Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corp., Equitable Banking Corp., Roberto Coyiuto and Ethelwoldo Fernandez, Respondents.”
[5] Rollo III (G.R. No. 144631), p. 118
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo
I (G.R. No. 143972), pp. 217-226.
[12] SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa, Jr.
[13] Rollo
III (G.R. No. 144631), pp. 285-309.
[14]
[15] Rollo
II (G.R. No. 144056), p. 23.
[16] Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, ponente, with Associate Justices Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole,
concurring; id..
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, ponente, with
Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Hilarion
L. Aquino.
[21] Rollo III (G.R.
No. 144631), p.53.
[22] No. L-75885,
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Entitled, “Proclaiming and Launching A Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or Assets Thereof, and Creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust” (1986).
[27] www.pse.coom.ph (visited
[28] Memorandum for Brokers No. 149-2004 (2004).
[29] 351 Phil. 548, 559 (1998).
[30] Rollo
II (G.R. No. 144056), pp. 22-28.
[31] Rural Bank of
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Id
[36] Rollo
III (G.R. No. 144631), p. 118.
[37] Rollo
III (G.R. No. 144631), p. 285.
[38] Development
Bank of the
[39] Baliwag
Transit Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 762, 772 (1996) citing Fuentes,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 323 Phil.
508, 518 (1996).
[40] Marikina Auto Line
Transport Corporation v. People of the
[41] Article 2224, Civil Code provides: Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
[42] Pleno
v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56505,
[43] Section 31, Corporation Code provides: Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation x x x shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation x x x.
[44] Professional Academic Plans, Inc. v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. 148599, March 4, 2005, 453 SCRA 342, 359.
[45] Rollo III (G.R. No.
144631), p.99.
[46]
[47] Rollo
I (G.R. 143972), pp. 22-27.
[48] Andrade v.
Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 30, 43 (2001); Heirs of Severa
P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 764-765 (1998).
[49] Civil
Code of the