PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE G.R. No. 143688
TELEPHONE
COMPANY,
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
BELINDA D. BUNA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated
The facts of the case
are as follows.
Respondent Belinda D.
Buna was an employee of petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT). She last held the position of Service
Representative in the PLDT Business Office in
Sometime in 1995, a certain
Engr. Danilo Castillano complained about unauthorized overseas calls amounting
to P40,000.00 involving his telephone line with number 847-5330. Upon investigation by the PLDT Quality Control
and Inspection Division (QCID), it was established that Castillano’s phone line
was originally denominated as 833-2661 under the name of Olivia L. Eduarte. It was supposed to be inactive since its
disconnection on
When asked about the
alleged letter request, Eduarte denied having written the same and maintained
that the signature therein is not hers.[5]
For his part, Castillano admitted that
he purchased the “rights” over the subject phone subscription for P40,000.00
from a certain “Chito,” an employee of PLDT.[6]
He subsequently identified “Chito” as Ramoncito
Buna, respondent’s husband and a former
employee of PLDT. On
In her explanation,[8]
respondent admitted that she processed the request and recommended the approval
of the transfer of the subscription to Castillano on the basis of Eduarte’s alleged
letter request dated
However, Castillano
subsequently submitted a certification[11]
dated
In view of this, PLDT
sent a Notice[12] of
termination of respondent’s services effective
Respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for back wages, benefits, damages
and attorney’s fees against PLDT. After
due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora rendered a Decision[13]
finding respondent’s dismissal legal and justified, thus, her complaint was
dismissed for lack of merit.
Buna appealed to the
NLRC which affirmed the dismissal in a Decision[14]
dated
Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was denied; hence, she filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The petition was initially denied due course[15]
on grounds that the motion for reconsideration was filed before the NLRC only
on
However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the petition for certiorari was given due course.
On
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and
the writ prayed for GRANTED. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated May 25, 1998 and its Order dated
October 12, 1998 in NLRC-NCR CA No. 013470-97 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Co. is hereby ordered
to reinstate petitioner Belinda D. Buna to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and to pay her full back wages, inclusive of allowances, other
benefits and privileges or their monetary equivalent computed from the time her
compensation was withheld from her up to the time of actual reinstatement.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.[16]
PLDT’s
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the instant petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN GRANTING BUNA’S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION WHICH HAD ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE MANDATORY PERIODS NOT ONLY ONCE BUT TWICE.[17]
PLDT claims that the Court
of Appeals no longer had jurisdiction to entertain respondent Buna’s petition
since the latter failed to seasonably file the motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC Decision within the 10-day reglementary period. PLDT asserts that even assuming that the
remedy of filing a special civil action of certiorari was available to
respondent, it will not prosper because it was also filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. PLDT avers that the
Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals is null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
Respondent maintains
that she had no participation in the irregular transfer of Eduardo’s
subscription to Castillano. She contends
that the charge against her is merely a ruse and an attempt by PLDT to evade
the payment of the benefits due her in the form of redundancy pay.
The petition is
impressed with merit.
Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court clearly states that in order to avail of the special civil
action of certiorari, one
must be left with no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, to wit:
SECTION
1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
A motion for
reconsideration of an assailed decision is deemed a plain and adequate remedy
expressly available under the law.[18] The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action of
certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its
error, if any.[19] Failure to file a motion for reconsideration
with the NLRC before availing of the special civil action of certiorari is
a fatal infirmity.[20]
This rule is subject to certain recognized
exceptions, to wit:
a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
c) where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
petition is perishable;
d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f) where, in a criminal case, relief from
an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable;
g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h) where the proceeding was ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.[21]
None of these exceptions
are present in the instant case. As
such, respondent’s failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the NLRC rendered such decision final and executory. Consequently, recourse to the Court of
Appeals was no longer feasible or available.
Respondent received the
NLRC Decision on
At any rate, even on the
merits, respondent’s cause must fail. In
finding that respondent was illegally dismissed, the Court of Appeals ruled
that although PLDT may have proven that there was an irregularity in the
transfer of the subject phone line, it failed to establish that respondent had
something to do with it.
We do not agree.
Respondent was dismissed
from employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, as a valid
ground for dismissal, must be substantiated by evidence. Respondent is not a mere rank-and-file
employee but a confidential employee. In
fact, her position as a Service Representative is classified as “High Priority.”
She does not only screen and process
telephone applications but also recommend them for approval. She likewise handles the transfer of
subscriptions from existing clients to new applicants. Her job entails the observance of proper
company procedures relating to the evaluation and subsequent recommendation of
prospective clients to PLDT. Her
assessment of the fitness of such applicants is relied upon by PLDT in giving
its approval to the subscription applications which in turn results in a
client-provider relationship between PLDT and its subscribers. Thus, her job involves a high degree of
responsibility requiring a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the
part of PLDT.
Jurisprudence has
distinguished the treatment of managerial employees or employees occupying
positions of trust and confidence from that of rank-and-file personnel, insofar
as the application of the doctrine of trust and confidence is concerned. In Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[23]
the Court had occasion to explain as follows:
Thus,
with respect to rank-and file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground
for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in
question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the
employer will not be sufficient. But as
regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that
such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his
dismissal. Hence, in the case of
managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being
sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation
therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. (Emphasis supplied)
There is substantial
evidence showing that there was valid cause for PLDT to dismiss respondent’s
employment for loss of trust and confidence. By her own admission, she
processed the irregular transfer of phone subscription to Castillano on the
basis of a letter request from Eduarte, which proved to be a forgery.
In the sworn statement dated
Moreover, Castillano knew respondent’s husband and was in fact identified
by the latter as the one who sold to him the phone line for P40,000.00. The transfer was facilitated and completed
through respondent since the phone number was under her scope of authority.
As correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter and subsequently upheld by
the NLRC:
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that complainant
was involved in effecting the unauthorized transfer x x x. We take particular note of the fact that
the spurious letter request was in favor of someone known to her husband. To us, it is more than pure coincidence that
the beneficiary of complainant’s act of processing for approval the fake letter
request, would be someone known to her husband. Said Mr. Castillano, on the
other hand, has never denied having purchased the telephone line for P40,000,
a highly irregular transaction. And in the investigation at the QCID on P40,000. and in
order that the same could be transferred to the former, the fake letter request
of Ms. Eduarte was processed and recommended for approval by the complainant.
Clearly, the confluence of events point to the complainant as a necessary and
indispensable participant in a chain of irregularities intended to illegally
transfer a telephone from the original owner to Mr. Castillano, a friend of
complainant’s husband x x x.[24]
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, we find that loss of trust and confidence, as a
ground for termination, has been clearly established. In Azul v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank,[25]
we upheld the employee’s dismissal despite lack of proof of actual
participation in the anomalous activities because his actuations had sown in
his employer “the seed of mistrust and loss of confidence,” thus:
While,
indeed, it was not proved that he was the one who made the irregular entries on
the tickets, the fact that he did not lift a finger at all to determine who it
was is a sad reflection of his job. In fact, even if the petitioner had no
actual and direct participation in the alleged anomalies, his failure to detect
any anomaly in the passage tickets amounts to gross negligence and
incompetence, which are, likewise, justifiable grounds for his dismissal. Be
that as it may, to our mind, it is no longer necessary to prove the
petitioner’s direct participation in the irregularity, for what is material is
that his actuations were more than sufficient to sow in his employer the seed
of mistrust and loss of confidence.
The aforesaid ruling likewise applies to respondent because of her
questionable involvement in the manipulation of company records to facilitate
the transfer of a telephone line which was obtained through highly irregular
means. Her participation was essential to
the consummation of the anomalous transaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 28, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring respondent’s dismissal as unlawful and
the June 5, 2000 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 25, 1998 Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission affirming the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated April
21, 1997 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, and the October 12, 1998
Order denying the motion for reconsideration, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 55-59. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a
Member of this Court) and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (retired Member of this Court).
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] CA rollo, pp. 121-122.
[6]
[7] Records, p. 58.
[8] CA rollo, p. 108.
[9]
[10]
[11] Records, p. 61.
[12] CA rollo, p. 56.
[13]
[14]
[15] Rollo, p. 152.
[16]
[17]
[18] Madrigal
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August
11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 136.
[19] Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142133, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 229, 235.
[20] ABS-CBN
Employees
[21] Cruz,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 148544, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 643, 653.
[22] Tan
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998, 295 SCRA 755,
762.
[23] Supra at 654, citing Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
115491, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 76, 82-83.
[24] CA Records, pp. 13-14.
[25]
G.R. No. 172401, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 290, 298, citing Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R.
No. 148410, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 516, 530-531.