FIRST
DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 140985
Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
VICTORIANO
M. ABESAMIS,
Appellant. Promulgated:
August
28, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the
decision[1]
dated July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 21860 finding
accused-appellant Victoriano M. Abesamis guilty of murder and meting out the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to him.
This is a story of a game of billiards
with a tragic ending.
At around 6:00 p.m. of September 18,
1994, accused-appellant and his brother, Rodel Abesamis, were in the billiard
hall located at Cruz corner Pepin Streets in Sampaloc, Manila.
Accused-appellant played a game of billiards with Rogelio Mercado, Jr. called “rotation”
where the first player who garners 61 points wins the game. A P40 bet
was on the line. Ramon Villo stood as “spotter” for them.
Accused-appellant was ahead with 59
points when he pocketed the number 3 ball. Ramon erroneously scored it for
Rogelio. Aggrieved, accused-appellant protested. Matters got worse when Rogelio
suddenly rearranged the balls on the table and the game turned into a shouting
match between Rogelio and accused-appellant. Ramon tried to mediate but accused-appellant
vented his ire on him, sparking a heated argument.
Ramon decided to leave and proceeded to
go out of the hall. However, Rodel, accused-appellant’s brother, pursued him
and caught up with him in front of Andok’s lechon manok store a few
meters away. A fistfight between the two ensued. While the two were trading blows,
accused-appellant ran to a Ford Fiera[2] parked
nearby and got a foot-long butcher’s knife. He then rushed to where Ramon and Rodel
were fighting. He stabbed Ramon in the back. The victim turned around to face
accused-appellant but Rodel grabbed his hands and held them from behind.
Accused-appellant then stabbed Ramon two more times, one in the upper right
portion of the chest and another in the lower left portion of the chest. Thereafter,
accused-appellant and Rodel boarded the Ford Fiera and drove away.
Greatly weakened by the mortal wounds
inflicted on him, Ramon managed to take a few steps before slumping on the pavement.
His mother[3]
and brother[4] soon
arrived. He was brought to the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital but his wounds
were fatal and he was declared dead on arrival.
Dr. Manuel Lagonera[5]
performed an autopsy on Ramon’s cadaver. His report stated:
EXTERNAL
FINDINGS:
1.
Stab wound, right anterior thorax, 51 inches from heel,
5 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 20x6 cms., directed slightly downwards
backwards towards right lateral, transecting the sternum at the level of 1st
intercostal space, incising the upper lobe of the right lung, transecting the
right sub-clavian artery and ascending aorta. Depth – 11 cms.
2.
Stab wound, left lower anterior thorax, 43 ½ inches
from heel, 17 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 5x2 cms., directed upwards,
backwards towards midline, lacerating the diaphragm, and spleen. Depth – 13
cms.
3.
Stab wound, left lower posterior thorax, 41 inches from
heel[,] 10 cms. from posterior midline, incising the lower lobe of the left
lung. Depth – 10 cms.
INTERNAL
FINDINGS
1.
Injuries to organs and tissues as indicated in the
internal extensions of the stab wounds, with massive bleeding in the thoracic
and abdominal cavities.
2.
About one glassful of partially digested meaty
materials with slight alcoholic odor was recovered from the stomach.
CAUSE
OF DEATH
STAB
WOUNDS.[6]
An information[7]
for murder was filed against the brothers accused-appellant and Rodel in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41. It read:
That on or about September 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating…and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one RAMON VILLO y MANGALINDAN… thrice with a butcher’s knife,
hitting him on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.[8]
However, accused-appellant and his
brother remained at-large. Thus, the case was temporarily archived. It was reactivated
when accused-appellant was arrested on March 26, 1996.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. During the trial, he admitted stabbing Ramon with a butcher’s
knife but claimed that he did so only to defend himself. He claimed that when
he questioned the victim why ball number 3 was credited to Rogelio, he suddenly
cussed him and threatened to kill him. When he tried to leave the billiards
hall, Ramon blocked his way and tried to stab him with a balisong. He
evaded the thrust and ran outside to get a butcher’s knife from the Ford Fiera.
Ramon pursued him but he stood his ground. The victim tried to stab him again, this
time hitting him in the left arm. He fought back and stabbed Ramon several
times.
He then boarded the Ford Fiera and
drove towards España Street in Manila. He encountered heavy traffic along the
way and abandoned the vehicle somewhere in Forbes Street, Manila. He wanted to
surrender to the police but was advised by his relatives not to do so because Ramon’s
relatives might kill him. He then went to his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He
managed to elude arrest until March 26, 1996.
On April 1, 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision.[9] It
ruled that, while it was established that accused-appellant killed Ramon, the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of either evident premeditation or
treachery. Thus, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of homicide and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of eight years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000
as indemnity and P100,000 “for other damages”:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty of
Homicide and[,] with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law[,]
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor to fourteen (14) years[,] eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum and maximum respectively and to pay the heirs of
the victim the amount of P50,000.00 for the latter’s life and P100,000.00
for other damages, with legal interest from the time this decision has become
final until the same is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, accused-appellant’s
conviction was affirmed with modification by the CA.[11] It
ruled that the evidence sufficiently established that Ramon was killed with treachery:
he was first stabbed in the back while he was engaged in a fistfight with Rodel,
then twice in front when he turned around to face accused-appellant, with his
hands held behind him by Rodel. He was completely unaware and caught off-guard
when he suffered the first stab. He was defenseless when he was stabbed again.
Thus, the appellate court found accused-appellant guilty of murder, sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua and certified the case to this Court for
review:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of
the Court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the Appellant is hereby found guilty of “Murder”
qualified by treachery defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby meted the penalty of “RECLUSION PERPETUA.”
However, considering the penalty imposed on the Appellant, the Court hereby
certifies this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate review.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to elevate all records
of this case, including documentary and testimonial evidence, to the Supreme
Court for appropriate review.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Accused-appellant faults the
appellate court for (1) disregarding his claim that he was only acting in
self-defense when he inflicted the mortal wounds on Ramon and (2) finding that
the killing was attended by treachery.
In a letter dated June 12, 2007,
Julio Arciaga, assistant director for prisons and security of the Bureau of
Corrections, informed the Court that accused-appellant was granted parole by
the Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) on March 5, 2003 and released from the
custody of the Bureau of Corrections on March 20, 2003.[13]
We are thus confronted with the
following issues:
1.
whether
the grant of parole rendered this case moot;
2.
whether
accused-appellant only acted in self-defense and
3.
whether
the victim was killed with treachery.
The appeal has no merit.
Accused-Appellant’s Release on Parole Did Not
Render the Case Moot
The appeal was not mooted by
accused-appellant’s release on parole. His release only meant that, according
to the Board, he had already served the minimum penalty imposed on him[14]
and that he was “fitted by his training for release, that there [was]
reasonable probability that [he would] live and remain at liberty without
violating the law and that such release [would] not be incompatible with the
welfare of society.”[15]
Should he violate the conditions of his parole, accused-appellant may be
ordered rearrested, to serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence.[16]
Parole refers to the conditional
release of an offender from a correctional institution after he serves the
minimum term of his prison sentence.[17]
The grant thereof does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender.
Parole is not one of the modes of totally extinguishing criminal liability under
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.[18] Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius.
Similarly, accused-appellant’s
release on parole did not extinguish his civil liability.[19]
Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. – Except in case
of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article,[20] the
offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting
from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he
has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights,
or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon
commutation of sentence or any other reason. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellant’s civil
liability subsists despite his release on parole.
Moreover, the grant of parole would be
improvident if the CA decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua were to be
affirmed by this Court. In such a case, the determination of the Board that
accused-appellant would have already served the minimum penalty imposed on him
would turn out to be erroneous. Worse, in basing its determination of
accused-appellant’s eligibility for parole on the penalty imposed in the RTC
decision, the Board effectively ignored the decision of the CA.
Furthermore, the Board violated its
own rules disqualifying from parole those convicted of an offense punished with
reclusion perpetua.[21]
Thus, the Board should be warned in no uncertain terms for acting ultra
vires, carelessly disregarding the CA decision and improvidently granting
parole to accused-appellant.
We will now proceed to consider the
merits of the appeal.
Accused-Appellant Did
Not Act In Self-Defense
He who admits killing or fatally injuring
another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of his victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove the
elements thereof clearly and convincingly.[22]
While all three elements must concur,
self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim.[23]
If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully
pleaded.[24] Here,
both the trial and appellate courts found that there was no unlawful aggression
on Ramon’s part and that, in fact, it was accused-appellant who was the
unlawful aggressor. Thus, accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense cannot
stand.
The nature, number and location of
the wounds sustained by the victim disprove accused-appellant’s claim of
self-defense.[25] On this
account, the appellate court correctly ruled that the accused-appellant’s
version that he fought face to face with the victim was inconsistent with the
fatal stab wound at the victim’s back. Moreover, the wounds inflicted by
accused-appellant on the victim indicated a determined effort to kill and not
merely to defend.[26]
Accused-appellant’s failure to
surrender, his escape to Laguna and hiding for more than a year until his
eventual capture and arrest also contradicted his claim that he acted in
self-defense. Flight is indicative of guilt.
Furthermore, whether or not
accused-appellant acted in self-defense is a question of fact. It is a matter
that is properly addressed to the trial court, not to this Court. In fact, the
trial and appellate courts amply evaluated and carefully considered the issue.
Their identical conclusions were based on competent evidence. There is
therefore no reason to disturb their findings.
Treachery Attended the
Killing of the Victim
According to the CA, Ramon was defenseless
when accused-appellant stabbed him in the back. And he was completely at the
mercy of accused-appellant when he was repeatedly stabbed in front while Rodel
was holding his hands from behind. Thus, the CA ruled that Ramon was killed
with treachery.
We agree.
Accused-appellant perpetrated the
killing in such a manner that there was absolutely no risk to himself arising
from the defense which the victim might have made. Ramon was unarmed, had his
back turned to accused-appellant and was fighting with another person when
stabbed in different parts of the body. He was caught totally by surprise and did
not even have a chinaman’s chance to survive the attack. As we ruled in People
v. Fabrigas, Jr.:[27]
Treachery is
present where the assailant stabbed the victim while the latter was grappling
with another thus, rendering him practically helpless and unable to put up
any defense. (emphasis supplied)
The Award of “Other
Damages” Was Improper
The trial court correctly awarded P50,000
to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity for his death. This did not need any
evidence or proof of damages. However, the award of P100,000 “for other
damages” was wrong.
Under the law, there are various
kinds of damages.[28]
They differ as to the necessity of proof of pecuniary loss, the purpose of and grounds
for their award and the need for stipulation. Thus, the rule is that, in every
case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of damages and make a
finding thereon in the body of the decision.[29]
Nonetheless, every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[30]
Hence, this Court may go through the records to determine the civil liability
of accused-appellant. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding opens the
entire case for review.[31] This
includes a review of the indemnity and damages involved.[32]
The award of actual damages is proper
only if the actual amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty.[33] It
should be supported by receipts.[34]
While the victim’s mother, Lolita Villo, testified that she incurred expenses
in connection with the victim’s death (e.g., funeral and burial
expenses), she failed to substantiate her claim. Thus, actual or compensatory
damages cannot be awarded.
Current jurisprudence, however,
allows the grant of P25,000 as temperate damages when it appears that
the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss but the award thereof cannot be
established with certainty.[35]
Thus, Lolita may be given P25,000 as temperate damages. She is also entitled
to an award of P50,000 moral damages for the mental anguish and distress
she suffered for the death of her son.[36]
Exemplary damages are not warranted because no aggravating circumstance
attended the crime.
Accordingly, the decision dated July
30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21860 finding
accused-appellant Victoriano M. Abesamis guilty of murder, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and affirming the trial court’s
order for him to pay the heirs of Ramon Villo P50,000 as civil indemnity
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that he is ordered to pay said
heirs P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as temperate damages.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the costs of suit.
The grant of parole to
accused-appellant by the Board of Pardons and Parole is hereby declared NULL
and VOID for lack of legal and factual basis. Accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to be REARRESTED immediately to forthwith serve the remaining
period of his sentence.
The members of the Board of Pardons
and Parole are hereby WARNED to never again disregard its rules and the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (who subsequently became a member of the Supreme Court, now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad-Santos, Jr. (retired) and Mariano M. Umali (retired) of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. CA rollo, pp. 121-142.
[2] The vehicle was owned by Cesar Tapia, accused-appellant’s brother-in-law. Accused-appellant used it in going to the billiards hall.
[3] Lolita
Villon.
[4] Ronaldo
Villon.
[5] A
medico-legal officer.
[6] RTC records, p. 62.
[7] Id., pp. 1-2.
[8] Id.
[9] Penned by Judge Rodolfo A. Ponferrada. Id., pp. 247-256.
[10] Id., p. 256.
[11] Decision dated July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21860, supra note 1.
[12] Id.
[13] Rollo, p. 42.
[14] Section 5, Act No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as “The Indeterminate Sentence Law.”
[15] Id.
[16] See Section 8, Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[17] Rules on Parole dated March 7, 2006.
[18] ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
[19] Under Article 112 of the Revised Penal Code, civil liability is extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of civil law. In this connection, Article 1231 of the Civil Code provides that obligations are extinguished by the following: (1) payment or performance, (2) loss of the thing due, (3) condonation or remission of the debt, (4) confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, (5) compensation, (6) novation, (7) annulment, (8) fulfillment of the resolutory condition and (9) prescription.
[20] Please see immediately preceding note.
[21] Section 15(a), part IV of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Pardons and Parole dated November 26, 2002 (the rules on parole applicable at the time accused-appellant was granted parole) provided:
IV. PAROLE
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 15. Disqualification for Parole – The following prisoners shall not be granted parole:
a. Those convicted of an offense punished with Death penalty, reclusion perpetua or Life
Imprisonment;
x x x x x x x x x
[22] People
v. de la Cruz, G.R. No. 139970, 06 June 2002, 383 SCRA 250.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41061, 16 July 1990, 187 SCRA 484.
[26] People v. Pateo, G.R. No. 156786, 03 June 2004, 430 SCRA 609.
[27] 330 Phil. 137 (1996) citing People v. Lingatong, G.R. No. 34019, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 424.
[28] Under Article 2197 of the Civil Code, damages may be (a) actual or compensatory, (b) moral, (c) nominal, (d) temperate or moderate, (e) liquidated or (f) exemplary or corrective.
[29] People v. Masagnay, G.R. No. 137364, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 572.
[30] Article 100, Revised Penal Code.
[31] See People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006, 499 SCRA 64.
[32] People v. Rabanillo, 367 Phil. 114 (1999).
[33] People v. Masagnay, supra.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] TSN, July 18, 1996, p. 18.