EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
ROQUE G. GARALDE,
Appellant. Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
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D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court for review is the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01387 which affirmed in
toto the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 95, Quezon City (Special Criminal
Court) in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58657-58 convicting appellant Roque G. Garalde[3]
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention.
On September 9, 1994, Roque G. Garalde and Alma Tan Garalde were charged with Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition), as amended, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 79.[4] The case was docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-94-58657. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of August
1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control the
following, to wit: 1) two (2) M16
rifles, one of which bearing serial no. RP146697 and the other has a defaced
serial number; 2) two (2) rifle grenades; and 3) one hundred twenty five (125)
rounds of ammunitions of M16 rifle, without first having obtained the proper
license therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
They were also charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention together with Kil Patrick Ibero and several unidentified persons before the same court, docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-94-58658. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about August 9, 1994 in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there by means of force, violence against and
intimidation of person and at gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap, carry away and detain Paolo Bellosillo (13 years old), John Bellosillo
(8 years old), and Niño Bellosillo (11 years old), who are minors, and Dianita
Bebita, Janidy Dumagpi and Antonio Paquera against their will and consent, thus
depriving them of their liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for their
release, which, after payment thereof in the amount of P410,000.00 and two sets
of jewelry, the kidnapped victims were released, and the accused divided the
ransom money among themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the afore-named
victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Alma Tan Garalde and Kil Patrick Ibero were tried before
Branch 79 and were subsequently convicted.
Their conviction was affirmed in toto by this Court on
Appellant Garalde
was tried separately, inasmuch as when he was arrested, the trial of the case
against his co-accused was almost finished. He pleaded “not guilty” when
arraigned, and the prosecution presented its evidence. However, in view of the subsequent conviction of
accused Alma Tan Garalde and Kil Patrick Ibero on
The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dianita Bebita, Kathryn
Bellosillo, Paolo Bellosillo, Supt. Michael Ray Aquino and SPO1 Berlin
Cayabat. The evidence for the People is summed
up as follows:
At around
Meantime, that
same day (
Kathryn did as instructed and inquired if the boys (Bellosillo children) were in school, and she was told that they did not hear the early morning mass. She then requested the principal to keep the matter to himself, and to personally check if the boys were in their respective classrooms. After she was told that the boys were not there, Kathryn immediately went home, called her husband and told him what happened. Her husband told her not to panic, and that he would call General Panfilo Lacson, then the head of Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). A surveillance team was formed to assist the Bellosillos.[18]
In the evening
of P410,000.00
cash, plus jewelry valued at P80,000.00.[20]
On
Dianita was
released in the early morning of
At around
As instructed,
Dianita drove the van to the
The children,
together with Paquera, were finally released on
Paolo Bellosillo testified that he saw the appellant on the following occasions: on the day they were kidnapped before he took the driver’s seat and before they were blindfolded;[37] when the appellant interviewed him about his family, their jobs and the amount they were earning;[38] when he was awakened by someone who was pulling his right foot;[39] when his tummy was aching;[40] and one afternoon, while he was lying down and he was able to see through his blindfold.[41]
Meantime, PACC
operatives led by Supt. Michael Ray Aquino had been conducting surveillance
operations. His group saw the actual pay-off, but since the children were not
released at the time, the culprits could not be immediately arrested. The PACC
agents were later able to apprehend Nelson Lopez, Kil Patrick Ibero and Alma
Tan Garalde, whom the victims positively identified as the culprits. The three
were subsequently charged. The appellant,
however, was apprehended only on
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant opted not to testify. He instead presented Police Major Wilfredo Reyes, then the Chief for Intelligence of Task Force Habagat, and was likewise one of the team leaders in the surveillance operations conducted during the negotiation phase and the payoff.[43] Reyes testified that he did not encounter the name of the appellant during the surveillance operation.[44] The witness also testified that he was informed through radio that the actual payoff was made inside the UP Diliman Compound.[45]
In its Decision[46]
dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-94-58657, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused on the ground that the firearms and ammunitions (Exhs. “F” to “J-2”) are inadmissible in evidence, the Court finds the accused Roque Garalde y Gadbilao, NOT GUILTY of the offense of Violation of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 or for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and hereby ACQUITS him; and
2.
In Crim. Case No. Q-94-58658, the Court finds the
accused, Roque Garalde y Gadbilao, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for the purpose of extorting ransom
(kidnapping for ransom) defined in and penalized by Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH. He is hereby ordered
to return to Mrs. Kathryn Bellosillo the amount of P490,000.00 with legal rate
of interest computed from the filing of the Information until fully paid and to
indemnify the parents of the three (3) Bellosillo children the amounts of P500,000.00,
as exemplary damages; and P500,000.00 as moral damages; and Dianita Bebita
the amounts of P100,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00,
as moral damages; and to pay the amount of P50,000.00, as attorney’s
fees.
The accused is ordered to pay the costs.
The firearms and ammunitions (Exhs “F” to “J-2”) are hereby forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the firearms and ammunitions to the Philippine National Police for proper disposition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[47]
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Paolo, who
positively identified the appellant as one of the abductors. According to the trial court, “minors do not
usually fabricate stories.” The trial court also relied on Dianita’s testimony.
On Major Reyes’ testimony that the appellant’s name never came up during the
operations, the trial court held that this was not sufficient to belie the
prosecution’s evidence. It pointed out that the witness could not remember all
the facts of the case; he was not involved in the actual operation; and he had
been detained at the
On the charge of violating Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8294, the trial court opined that one of the witnesses
for the application of the search warrant had no personal knowledge that
firearms and ammunitions were stored in the house where they were found. Even if the accused did not file any motion
to quash the search warrant, the court was not precluded from determining its
validity. Thus, on the ground that the requirements for the issuance of the
search warrant were not strictly complied with, the trial court ruled that the firearms
and ammunitions seized were inadmissible in evidence.
On appeal before the CA, appellant raised the following
errors:
THE TRAIL (SIC) COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT RELYING PRIMARILY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF TWO PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES ARE INCONSISTENT, INCREDULOUS AND REPLETE WITH INFIRMITIES.
THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF COMPETENT REPRESENTATION DURING THE TRIAL PROPER AND HENCE, WAS NOT ABLE TO PUT UP A PROPER AND VIABLE DEFENSE WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.[48]
On
The appellate court likewise found
unmeritorious the appellant’s allegation that he was deprived of his right to
due process upon the judge’s failure to issue compulsory processes to guarantee
the availability of the witnesses; the records show that subpoenas were issued as
prayed for by the appellant.[50] Lastly, the appellate court concluded that
the appellant was duly accorded the opportunity to testify on his behalf, but opted
not to do so.[51]
The Ruling
of the Court
We affirm the appellant’s conviction for
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
It is an established rule that factual
findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses and the probative weight thereof, as well as the conclusions of the
trial court based on its factual findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect, especially if affirmed by the CA. Unless it is shown that the trial court has
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances
which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case, appellate
courts are bound by the findings of facts of the trial court.[52]
Prosecution witnesses Paolo Bellosillo
and Dianita Bebita positively identified the appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. Their testimonies are categorical, credible and
straightforward.
Dianita
testified on the circumstances when she saw the appellant:
Atty. Cruz:
Q: Were you able to see the faces of these three males or these three persons who alighted from the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you first testified before this Honorable Court you had the occasion to identify one of these three persons namely the accused Kil Patrick Ibero, if you were to see again the other two of these three persons who alighted from the taxicab that morning would you be able to identify them, Miss Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, will you please carefully look at the people or among the audience in this courtroom this afternoon and tell the Court whether or not the two persons other than Kil Patrick Ibero who were among those who alighted from the taxicab that morning are here in this courtroom this afternoon?
A: Yes, sir, one.
Q: Will you please point to that person whom you recall as having been one of those who alighted from the taxicab that morning?
A: That one, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a person wearing eyeglasses who identified himself as Roque Garalde.
Atty. Perez:
May we just make a manifestation, Your Honor, that before this witness testified before this Honorable Court during the arraignment Roque Garalde was arraigned and at that time witness Dianita Bebita was inside the courtroom.
COURT:
Just cross-examine her.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: Are
you certain Miss witness, considering that
A: Yes, sir, I cannot forget his face.
x x x
Q: Do you recall Miss Witness at that point exactly what Mr. Roque Garalde was doing?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you tell the Court please exactly what you recall the accused Roque Garalde did at that particular time?
A: He was the one who went to the driver side, sir.
Q: Where was your driver situated or seated at that time, Miss Witness?
A: Left side, sir.
Q: And did he enter the van on that side, Miss Witness?
A: Yes, sir, he was the one who drove the van.
x x x
Q: At that point Miss Witness, will you please tell the Honorable Court if you remember where you were seated inside the van?
A: On the front right side, sir.
Q: So you are saying Miss Witness, that prior to the entry of these men you were actually seated in front beside the driver Antonio Paquera?
Atty. Perez:
Objection, Your Honor, that would be leading.
Atty. Cruz:
No, Your Honor, I am only clarifying.
Atty. Perez:
But there is no testimony, Your Honor, because she said seated beside the driver so I was just asking her to clarify.
COURT:
Answer.
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
x x x
Q: Will you tell the Court if you remember what he was doing?
A: He was saying something, sir.
Q: Do you recall what words he uttered or what statements he made?
A: He said that they were going to ask 10 million from our employer if they can afford. He also said that they needed money and said that they needed money for their companions who were injured, sir.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: In the meantime Miss Witness if you know, will you tell the Honorable Court what the two other men aside from Garalde were doing inside your van while all of this was happening?
A: One of them came to the middle row where we were and was instructed by Garalde to blindfold us, sir.[53]
x x x
Q: Apart from your meeting with Roque Garalde on August 9, when were the other times that you saw him again, if you remember Miss Witness?
A: In the morning of August 9, 1994 when we were asked to alight the van and we were brought inside the house and on the fifth day when he saw me praying, sir, because I can peep through the bottom portion of the blindfold and in the late afternoons when he brought us food he removed my blindfold.
x x x
Q: Now, you mentioned that after five (5) days your blindfold was removed. Do you recall who exactly removed your blindfold?
A: Roque Garalde, sir.[54]
x x x
Atty. Cruz:
Q What other reason, was there, Ms. Witness?
A: He threatened me, sir, and he also told me that if the parents of the children will not give money then he will kill all of us.
Q: Who is this “he” that you are referring to, Ms. Witness?
A: Roque Garalde, sir.
Q: Why do you know, Ms. Witness, that it was Roque Garalde who threatened to kill you?
A: I know him because I have seen him several times, sir.
x x x
Q: Will you please tell the Court what these persons told you to relay to the parents of the children?
A: To give the money they were demanding, sir, because if not they will kill the children.
Q: Do you remember, Ms. Witness, who among the persons who kept you in captivity personally gave you this instruction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Court who this person was who gave you this instruction?
A: Roque Garalde, sir.[55]
Dianita’s testimony was further
strengthened by Paolo’s testimony:
Q: Did you get to see the faces of these three (3) men who alighted from the taxicab and forced themselves into your van?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: If you were to get to see again these three (3) men, today, would you be able to recognize them, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please look around about (sic) you in
the courtroom and please tell the
A: Sir, one of them is present here.
Q: Will
you please point to the
A: Sir that man at the second row wearing a yellow shirt.
(Witness pointing to a man who gave his name as Roque Garalde)
x x x
Q: Mr. Witness, do you recall what the participation is of this man that you pointed to, the accused Roque Garalde, after having forcibly entered your van for purposes of taking you?
A: He
was the one who drove the van and when he drove the van, he was also the one
who kept on shouting and made mura “putang ina.” He was the one who said, “Papatayin
namin kayo kapag hindi nagbayad ang parents ninyo.”
x x x
Q: How long, Mr. Witness, if you remember did it take between the time that the three men entered your van and the time that you were blindfolded by one of these three men?
A: One to three minutes, sir.
Q: And during that time did you get to see their faces well?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, Mr. Witness, you were taken or kidnapped that morning and before you were blindfolded, you got to see the faces of your kidnappers which included the accused Roque Garalde. Was that the last time that you got to see the accused Roque Garalde during your period of captivity?
A: No, sir.
Q: How long did you stay captive by these persons, Mr. Witness?
A: Nine (9) days, sir.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: In those nine (9) days, how many more times did you get to see the accused Roque Garalde, if you remember?
A: A lot of times, sir.
Q: Will
you tell the
A: When we were kept in the room at the safehouse, sir. It was nighttime then when he went inside the room, held my hand and interviewed me about my family, anong trabaho ng parents mo? How much are they earning? And he also kept making mura and when he spoke to me he had a gun at his waist, a evolver.
Q: This second meeting with Roque Garalde you claim happened at nighttime, was the place where you had this conversation with him lighted, Mr. Witness? Was there a light?
A: There was a light coming from the outside, sir.
Q: And that light enable you to see the face of this person?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are certain that it was Roque Garalde who talked to you that night?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x
Q: You said earlier that you got to see Mr. Roque Garalde in the course of your captivity several other times. When was the third time that you got to see Mr. Garalde?
A: It was also nighttime when I was sleeping and I was waken up (sic) because there was someone who was pulling my right foot. My right foot was being tied and pulled.
x x x
Atty. Cruz: (Cont’d):
Q: Mr. Witness, it was the accused Roque Garalde who actually woke you up that evening by pulling your foot?
A: It was the other kidnapper, sir. Mr. Garalde was also there at that time. That kidnapper did not stop pulling my foot so I faced him and asked him to tell the other man to stop.
x x x
Q: Mr. Witness, when you first saw Mr. Garalde on August 9 when you were actually taken, how far were you from Mr. Garalde at that time?
A: In the Lite Ace van, sir, I was at the middle part of the Lite Ace.
Q: Around how many feet away was he from you?
A: It was close, sir.
x x x
Q: Mr. Witness, during the second time when you got to meet with Mr. Garalde, when you had this conversation about your parents, how far away was Garalde from you?
A: He was right in front of me, sir, and I was sitting in the middle.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: And you could clearly see his face?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This third time that you got to see Mr. Garalde, this foot-pulling incident, Mr. Witness, how far was Mr. Garalde away from you when that happened?
A: I was on the bed, sir, and he was just at the other bed.
Q: And how far are the two beds away from each other?
A: It’s just the other bed…about this far.
Atty. Cruz: Witness making motions showing just a few feet, Your
Honor.
x x x
Q: After that foot-pulling incident, was there ever a time that you got to see Mr. Roque Garalde in the place where you were kept captive again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you tell the Court when this happened if you remember?
A: It was the time when my tummy was really aching and I couldn’t take it anymore. I told my yaya and he heard it.
Q: When you say, “he heard it,” who are you referring to?
A: Mr. Garalde, sir.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: And what did he do, Mr. Witness, when he heard you complain about your tummy?
A: He said that “sisikmuraan kita kapag hindi tumigil ang sakit ng tummy mo.”
Q: And what was your reaction then, Mr. Witness?
A: I just kept quiet, sir, and I just made tiis na lang the pain of my tummy.
Q: And when that incident occurred, Mr. Witness, how far away was Mr. Garalde from you?
A: It was just near, sir, because we were in the room.
Q: Mr.
Witness, so you have testified before the
A: When I was lying down, it was around afternoon, sir. ‘Yong blindfold po namin nakalagay lang pero merong tissue paper so nakakakita ako sa ilalim. ‘yong driver po naming si Antonio Paquero nakahiga siya sa may cabinet. I saw him holding the plastic, white na upuan at ginanon sa driver. After seeing that, I just closed my eyes.
Q: What do you mean, Mr. Witness, when you said that plastic, white was “ginanon sa driver?”
A: By using the white plastic, he hit the driver, sir.
Atty. Cruz:
Q: Who is this “he” who hit the driver.
A: Mr. Garalde, sir.
Q: You were present when this happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far away was Mr. Garalde from you?
A: Around one (1) meter, sir.[56]
Appellant nevertheless
insists that the trial court should not have found him guilty of the crime
charged, since the testimonies of Dianita Bebita and Paolo Bellosillo are incredible,
inconsistent and replete with infirmities.
He points out the following flaws on the identification made by Dianita
and Paolo: (1) the PACC did not take pictures of him during the alleged surveillance
operations; [57] (2)
the investigators did not ask Dianita and Paolo for a description of the culprits
before his (appellant’s) picture was shown to them;[58]
(3) his arrest made the headlines in the tabloid, and the witnesses surely saw
his picture and “influenced” their identification;[59]
(4) Dianita was present during his arraignment;[60]
and (5) Paolo could have been coached because appellant was the only one
wearing a yellow shirt at the time.[61]
Appellant
likewise points out that the testimonies of Dianita and Paolo are inconsistent,
specifically when the captors sprayed something which made the victims dizzy; when
they were blindfolded; and the times when Paolo allegedly saw him.[62] Appellant insists that Paolo’s testimony is
flawed for being incredible: (1) he could not have seen through his blindfold
because the material used was brown packaging tape;[63]
(2) he could not have heard any conversation between him and Dianita
considering his distance from them;[64]
and (3) he could not have seen appellant since it was nighttime, and the
windows of the room were covered.[65]
Appellant also insists that contrary to Paolo’s testimony, he (appellant) could
not have interviewed the witness without his blindfold.
We agree with the trial court and the
CA that these inconsistencies refer to minor details that do not affect the
credibility of witnesses or the probative weight of their testimonies. On the
contrary, minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen the credibility of
witnesses as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or
rehearsed. Even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and
make confused and inconsistent statements.[66] As held in People v. Alolod,[67]
cited in People v. Bulan:[68]
x x x Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed in the same manner and it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they disagree on the minor details and that there be contradictions in their testimonies. Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by flurry and excitement. The testimony of each witness should not be expected to be identical to and coinciding with each other. It is enough that the principal points covered by their testimonies are established although they do not dovetail in all details – which would even prove well-rehearsed and studied declarations …
Appellant
further points out that the deciding judge was only a substitute judge; by the
time the case was re-raffled to the deciding judge, Paolo and Dianita had
already finished their testimonies, hence, the deciding judge was not able to
observe their demeanor and deportment in court to be able to sufficiently gauge
their credibility.[69]
This, too,
is bereft of merit. The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the
judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses is not enough reason to
overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on their credibility. Though
ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the
reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the
predecessor judge has retired, died or has been reassigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that
the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and
do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. Besides, the judge who did not hear the
testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial. Such dependence does not violate substantive and
procedural due process. Indeed, the
correctness of the decision is not impaired by the fact alone that the writer
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, unless there
is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of factual
findings reached by him.[70]
Lastly, appellant claims that he was
deprived of the opportunity to present a proper defense which is tantamount to
a violation of his right to due process, as shown by the following: (1) he was
deprived of effective and competent legal representation;[71]
(2) he was denied of his right to have compulsory processes to guarantee the
availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf;[72]
and (3) he was not sufficiently apprised of the consequences of his refusal to
testify.[73]
We reiterate the following findings of
the appellate court: the trial court judge issued two subpoenas to Nelson Lopez
but the latter refused to sign; hence, a warrant for his arrest was issued;
another subpoena was issued against Serapio Moresca but the same could not be
served, thus, a bench warrant was issued against him; as to the subpoenas
issued to Janidy Dumagpi and Antonio Paquero, the same remained unserved
because they could not be located. In
view of the foregoing, the trial court indeed well performed its duties to
issue the corresponding compulsory processes to compel appellant’s witnesses to
attend the hearing.[74]
Moreover, the appellant was duly
accorded the opportunity to testify on his behalf. The appellant was informed (by the judge and
his own counsel) that in view of his refusal to testify on his behalf, the case
would be decided based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution.[75]
Yet, appellant still refused to testify.
Although the appellant’s silence and refusal to testify cannot be construed
as evidence of guilt, this Court has consistently held that the fact that an
accused never testified in his defense even in the face of accusations against
him goes against the principle that “the first impulse of an innocent man when
accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time.”[76]
Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any
private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall
have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any
serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person
kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Thus, for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.[77]
All of the above elements are attendant in the instant case: appellant is a private individual who, along with his cohorts, kidnapped the three Bellosillos, the driver and the yayas on August 9, 1994 by taking control of their vehicle and detaining them in a secluded place; three of the five kidnap victims were minors; ransom was demanded from the family of the Bellosillo children; and the victims were detained for nine (9) days.[78]
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim.[79]
Clearly, appellant demanded ransom in exchange for
the liberty of the victims, and, in fact received the same. The CA did not
therefore err in affirming the trial court’s imposition of the penalty of
death. However, in view of the enactment
of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346 on
In a criminal case, an appeal to the
Supreme Court throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of
the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment,
whether they are made the subject of assignment of error or not.[81] Hence, a review of the civil liabilities of
the appellant, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, is proper.
Appellant initially demanded P10,000,000.00
as ransom, but the Bellosillos were able to raise only P410,000.00 cash
and P80,000.00 worth of jewelries. This ransom was actually received by
the kidnappers. The trial court thus
properly awarded P490,000.00 as actual damages, plus legal interest from
the filing of the information until full payment.
Under Article 2219 (5) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal or arbitrary
detention or arrest. It has been established that the appellant and his cohorts
intentionally bumped the victims’ vehicle; they forcibly entered the van;
brought the victims to a safehouse; blindfolded them with packaging tapes;
threatened them; and demanded ransom in exchange for the victims’ freedom. The
victims therefore suffered physical and psychological trauma because of their
ordeal. There is thus sufficient basis
for the award of moral damages.[82]
Considering that the Bellosillo children were minors at the time of the
commission of the offense, moral damages amounting to P600,000.00
instead of P500,000.00 is proper, and another P100,000.00 for
Dianita Bebita.
It is an established rule that an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended
party to exemplary damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the New Civil
Code. There being a demand for ransom in
this case, and by way of example or correction, the three (3) Bellosillo
children and Dianita Bebita shall receive P100,000.00 each as award for exemplary
damages.[83]
In view of the previous conviction[84]
of Kil Patrick Ibero as principal and Alma Tan Garalde as accomplice, they
shall be held jointly and severally liable with appellant, with respect to the
actual, moral and exemplary damages awarded in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code.[85] However, as accomplice, Alma Tan Garalde
shall be solidarily liable only with respect to one-half of the total amount of
damages.[86]
We,
however, deem it proper to delete the P50,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as and by way of attorney’s fees, in view of its failure to state in the
body of the decision the legal basis therefor.
The power of courts to grant damages and attorney’s fees demands
factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation
or conjecture.[87]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Decision dated
Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, the appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The appellant and Kil Patrick Ibero are
sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, actual damages of P490,000.00
plus legal rate of interest from the filing
of information until full payment; moral damages of P200,000.00 each for
Paolo, John and Niño, all surnamed Bellosillo, and P100,000.00 for
Dianita Bebita; and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 for each of the
Bellosillo children and Dianita Bebita.
Alma Tan Garalde is held solidarily liable only with respect to one-half
of the foregoing awards. The award of attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED.
SO
ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MA.
ALICIA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
DANTE
O. TINGA
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate
Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-20.
[2] Penned by Judge Diosdado Madarang Peralta; CA rollo, pp.25-41.
[3] Also referred to in the records as “Roque Galarde,” “Roque Gallarde,” and “Roque Geralde.”
[4] Records, pp. 3-5.
[5]
[6]
[7] People v. Garalde, 401 Phil. 174 (2000). The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 79 of
In Accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to his Excellency, the President, for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[8] Records, pp. 144-145.
[9] Embodied
in an Order dated
[10] TSN,
[11]
TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15]
TSN,
[16]
[17]
[18] TSN,
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25]
[26] TSN,
[27]
[28] TSN,
[29] TSN,
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] TSN,
[35]
[36]
[37] TSN,
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] Rollo, p. 7, citing Decision [of the RTC], pp. 5-6.
[43] TSN,
[44] Id. at 387-388.
[45] Id. at 388-389.
[46] Supra note 2.
[47] CA rollo,
pp. 40-41.
[48]
[49] The fallo reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED (Rollo, p. 20).
[50] Rollo, p. 18.
[51]
[52] People v. Sades, G.R. No. 171087, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 716,724; People v. Bulan, G.R. No. 143404, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 550, 262; People v. Mittu, 388 Phil. 779, 789 (2000).
[53] TSN,
[54]
[55] TSN,
[56] TSN,
[57] CA rollo, p. 152.
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61] Id. at
154-155.
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66] People v. Sades, supra note 52, at 725-726; People v. Bulan, supra note 52, at 563-564.
[67] G.R.
Nos. 117506-07,
[68] Supra note 52, at 564.
[69] CA rollo, p. 162.
[70] People v. Tumulak, 448 Phil. 57, 67 (2003); Hugo v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 260, 269-270 (2002).
[71] CA rollo,
p. 163.
[72]
[73]
[74] Rollo,
p. 18.
[75]
[76] People
v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 144497,
[77] People
v. Ejandra,
G.R. No. 134203, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 364, 381-382; People v. Pagalasan,
452 Phil. 341, 362 (2003).
[78] Rollo,
pp. 16-17.
[79] People
v. Ejandra, supra. at 382.
[80] People
v. Mangitngit, supra; People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236,
[81] People v. Abulencia, 415 Phil. 731, 747 (2001).
[82] People
v.
[83] People
v.
[84] G.R.
No. 128622, supra note 7.
[85] Specifically Art. 110 thereof which provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally in solidum among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable.
x x x.
[86] People v. Bato, 401 Phil. 415, 430 (2000).
[87] People
v. Agsalog, G.R. No. 141087,