SECOND DIVISION
|
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by
its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R.
BENEDICTO, Petitioners, - versus - ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 170916 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: April
27, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review are
issuances of the Regional Trial Court (
In issue is one of law – whether a
complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages
arising after the act of dispossession had occurred.
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto
(petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon,
On
On
In a separate move, petitioners filed
in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for
damages against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No, 04-12284, alleging, inter alia,
x x x x
V
That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the plaintiffs, they had already been in open and continuous possession of the same parcel of land;
VI
As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs have continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said fishpond and since then, had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of the fishponds;
VII
That
the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation is at
least P300,000.00 more or less, while the yearly income of the
fishpond of plaintiff Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at
least P100,000.00 more or less, and the yearly income of the
fishpond of plaintiff Alberto Benedicto is at
least P100,000.00 more or less;
VIII
That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the blue guards from the Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
IX
That on succeeding days, defendant’s men continued their forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendant’s men. Religious icons were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
x x x x
XIII
That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states:
“Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and rules of the Court.”[9] (Underscoring supplied)
and praying for the following reliefs:
1)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation
the sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by
way of actual damages and such other amounts as proved during the
trial;
2)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P100,000.00 each as moral damages;
3)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
4)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to
reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of
appearance fees.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11]
petitioners’ complaint for damages on three grounds – litis pendentia, res
judicata and forum shopping.
By the assailed Order[12] of
Hence, the present petition for
review.
The only issue is whether, during the
pendency of their separate complaints for forcible
entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for
damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the
dispossession by respondent of the premises.
Petitioners meet the issue in the
affirmative. Respondents assert
otherwise.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)
The recoverable damages in forcible
entry and detainer cases thus refer to “rents” or “the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises” or “fair
rental value of the property” and attorney’s fees and costs.[13]
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14]
reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that may be
recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property:
Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x[15] (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied; citations omitted)
Other damages must thus be claimed in
an ordinary action.[16]
In asserting the negative of the
issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[17] In
this case, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed the leased premises from the lessee allegedly
pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was authorized to do so if the
lessee failed to pay monthly rentals. The
lessee filed a case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
On appeal by Progressive, the Court
of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying the motion to dismiss.
Progressive brought the case to this
Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, this Court reversed the lower courts’ ruling, it holding that
“all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only
the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and
costs therefrom.”
In other words, this Court held that “no claim for damages arising
out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be
filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.”[18] (Underscoring supplied)
In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of
the therein two complaints, thus:
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages–moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory–constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations –
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter “Subject Premises”) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately
after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises,
plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood Market
Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful
physical possession of the Subject Premises until
x x x x
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants’ resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants’ act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff.
x x x x
4.07 Considering that defendants’ act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous “Seafood Market Restaurant.”
x x x x
7. On
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally
possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million
improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the
damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The
actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and
taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at
public auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and without lawful
authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices
way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff
hereby attaches as Annex “B” the letter from defendants dated
x x x x
12. Defendant’s unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x[19] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Analyzing the two complaints, this
Court, still in Progressive, observed:
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
On
the other hand, the complaint for damages
prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and
exemplary damages of another P500,000.00;
(b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of
P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits;
and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased
premises by petitioner. Since
actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry
case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot
be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by
reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. x x x[20] (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting, however, that as
reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of
herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation
to their loss of possession of the premises.
It had to do with respondent’s alleged harvesting and carting away several
tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking
and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the
identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any
judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount
to res judicata in
the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be
invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.[21]
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a
forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than
the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees.[22]
Neither may forum-shopping justify a
dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a
final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in
the former.[23]
Petitioners’ filing of an independent
action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their
properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the
Orders dated
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 308-315.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo,
pp. 29-32.
[10] Records, p. 9.
[11]
[12]
[13] Herrera
v. Bollos, G.R. No. 138258,
[14] G.R. No. 141962,
[15]
[16] Felisilda
v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-60372,
[17] G.R. No. 123555,
[18]
[19] Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra, 649-652.
[20]
[21] Herrera, Remedial
Law I (2000 ed.), p. 313.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Vide
Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust
Company, G.R. No. 131247,