CONSOLACION
Q. AUSTRIA, G.R. No. 170080
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
CONSTANCIA
Q. LICHAUCO, VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
CONSUELO
Q. JALANDONI,
JOSE
ALBERTO L. QUINTOS,
RICARDO M. QUINTOS, JR., Promulgated:
AILEEN M. QUINTOS and
TYRONE M. QUINTOS,
Respondents.
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Tinga,
J.:
Petitioner Consolacion
Q. Austria assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 68591 dated June 21, 2005 and its
Resolution[2]
dated October 7, 2005, which respectively affirmed the decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, dated
February 14, 2000 and its order[4]
dated August 7, 2000, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The
facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni,
defendants Benedicto Quintos
and Antonio Quintos, and defendant-appellant Consolacion
The
above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate
area of six hundred sixty one (661) square meters located in Palanan,
The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the early part of 1996, they informed defendant-appellant of their desire to have the subject properties partitioned based on the percentage of each co-owner’s respective share.
A
realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by which the subject properties
could be physically partitioned among the co-owners. However, the
defendant-appellant
Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to partition the property, and the inability of the co-owners to mutually agree on an arrangement acceptable to all of them, on July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1485, against the defendant-appellant Austria and two other defendants namely Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as unwilling co-plaintiffs) for partition of the subject property.
Within
the period for filing an answer, the defendant-appellant
In
its order dated
Within
the prescriptive period, the defendant-appellant
Not
satisfied, the defendant-appellant
In
a Resolution dated
On
Subsequently,
on
Undaunted,
the defendant-appellant
In
a resolution dated
Still
not satisfied, on
In
its resolution dated
During the pendency of the defendant-appellant’s petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court, the plaintiffs-appellees filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142 where the main case is pending, a motion dated April 6, 1998 praying that a declaration of default be issued against all defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
In
an order dated
Notwithstanding
the order holding in abeyance the proceedings in the lower court, plaintiffs-appellees filed a Manifestation and Motion dated
While the motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant is still pending before the Court of Appeals, the lower court in its order dated July 6, 1999 declared the defendants in default, set the reception of ex-parte evidence, and commissioned the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the ex-parte evidence and to submit her corresponding report thereon as soon as the same is concluded.
On On
The
plaintiffs-appellees then presented their evidence ex-parte
on
The
assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the lower court on
A motion
for new trial was thereafter filed by the defendant-appellant
Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals which dismissed her petition and affirmed the trial court’s decision
but deleted the order that petitioner pay reasonable rental for her use of a
portion of the disputed properties. The
appellate court denied reconsideration.
In assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that her motion for new trial and appeal of
the judgment by default are valid remedies under the Rules of Court. She insists that the appellate court erred in
not reversing the declaration of default despite the fact that she questioned
the default order in the petition for review which she seasonably filed with
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also
contends that it was error for the trial court to allow the sale of the entire
property in dispute.
Respondents filed a Comment[6]
dated
A Reply to Comment[7] dated
Only two issues are raised in this
petition. The first issue pertains to
petitioner’s insistence that the judgment by default rendered by the trial
court, which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is a denial of
her day in court. The second issue
concerns the validity of the trial court’s decision alternatively ordering the
partition of the subject property or authorizing its sale.
A
defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a motion to set
aside the order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; (b) a
motion for new trial under Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the default was discovered
after judgment but while appeal is still available; (c) a petition for relief
under Rule 38 if judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an appeal
from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if no petition to set aside the
order of default has been resorted to.[8]
In
this case, petitioner did not move to set aside the order of default rendered
by the trial court but filed a motion for new trial after a decision had
already been rendered in the case. The
motion for new trial, however, was denied by the trial court for lack of
merit. She then appealed to the Court of
Appeals, assailing both the denial of her motion for new trial and the adverse
decision of the trial court.
Evidently, petitioner utilized the
appropriate remedies available to her. The
fact, however, that she availed of the proper remedies does not by itself
result in a judgment in her favor or the reversal of the assailed order and
decision of the trial court. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioner was declared in default
because of her adamant refusal to file an answer despite being required to do
so.
The factual circumstances in the
cases of Heirs of Akut v. Court of Appeals[9]
and Ampeloquio v. Court of Appeals,[10]
cited by petitioner in pleading liberality, are markedly different
from this case. In Heirs of Akut, petitioners
were not able to file an answer within the reglementary
period because they failed to obtain the services of counsel on time and two of
the petitioners were then sick. In Ampeloquio, the trial court’s order denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss was mistakenly served upon one of its counsels on
record and not upon the lawyer in charge of the case. Consequently, the answer
was not filed on time. In both cases,
there was no indication that the failure to answer was intended to delay the
case.
In contrast, the facts of this case suggest
an intention on the part of petitioner to delay the proceedings. The complaint was first filed in 1997 but is
only now being finally laid to rest because of several procedural stumbling
blocks, including the elevation of the case to this Court on the issue of the
propriety of the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss, hurled
by petitioner one after the other.
Parenthetically, the appellate court
initially issued a temporary restraining order as an incident to the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner questioning the trial court’s order denying
her motion to dismiss but the restraining order was lifted after its 60-day
validity.[11] The expiration of the temporary restraining
order resulted in the running of the prescribed period to file an answer and
the continuation of the proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner’s obstinate refusal to file an
answer to the complaint despite these circumstances clearly justifies the
declaration of default by the trial court and its affirmation by the Court of
Appeals.
This case has crept, ever so slowly,
up the ladder of judicial process. While we are not dissuading parties from
availing of the judicial remedies outlined in the Rules of Court, they should
be cautioned to be judicious in availing of these remedies. After all, rules of
procedure are intended to be, not tools of delay, but of prompt and just
disposition of every party’s cause. Having
fully availed of, even exploited, these remedies, petitioner cannot feign
denial of her day in court. She has been
given every opportunity to fully ventilate her side.
Now, we turn to the second issue
raised by petitioner, i.e., the validity of the trial court’s decision alternatively
directing the partition of the subject properties or authorizing their sale to
a third party.
There are two stages in every action
for partition. The first phase is the
determination of whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is
proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a
co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a determination
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is
in order. In the latter case, the
parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by
proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon.[12]
The second phase commences when it
appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may
well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon,
and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their
just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.[13]
The proceedings in this case have
only reached the first phase. It must be
mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing partition leaves
something more to be done by the trial court for the complete disposition of
the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for
the determination of just compensation by the appointed commissioners, the
submission of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the
partition, it is considered a final order and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved thereby.[14]
There is no question that a
co-ownership exists between petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court was correct
in decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.[15]
However, the trial court went astray
when it also authorized the sale of the subject properties to a third party and
the division of the proceeds thereof. What makes this portion of the decision
all the more objectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned the
sale upon the price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein)
only, and adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to plaintiffs. The pertinent portion of the trial court’s disposition
states:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1) Directing
the partition (physical division) of the subject properties and all
improvements thereon among the co-owners in accordance with their respective
shares; or
2) Authorizing
the sale, conveyance or transfer of the above-described properties to a
third-party at such price and under such terms acceptable to plaintiffs and
thereafter, dividing the proceeds of said sale among them in accordance with
their proportionate interests.[16]
[Emphasis supplied.]
It is true that petitioner did not
assign this error on appeal resulting in the appellate court’s failure to rule
on the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simply
brush this issue aside considering that its resolution is necessary in arriving
at a just disposition of the case.[17] The rectification of the trial court’s
decision is accordingly in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN
PART. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 is REVERSED in
so far as it affirms the portion of the decision dated February 14, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which
authorizes the sale, conveyance or transfer of the properties subject of this
case and the division of the proceeds of said sale to respondents herein. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[8]
[12]Magculot-Aw v. Magculot,
G.R. No. 132518, 385 Phil. 720 (2000); Daffon v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 129017,