THIRD
DIVISION
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Petitioner, - versus
- ROMEO Z. RUPISAN and RODOLFO Z.
RUPISAN, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 167620 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79405 dated 10 November 2004 granting
the petition of the herein respondents Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan
and the Resolution[2] dated
1 April 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner
Carolina B. Villena.
The factual antecedents are:
The late Nicomedes T. Rupisan was first married to
Felicidad Zamora. Their union bore five
children namely: Consuelo, Erlinda, Alejandro, Rodolfo, and Romeo. Rodolfo and Romeo are the respondents in this
petition. Upon the death of Felicidad in 1949,[3] Nicomedes married Maria Rosario de Castro (Maria Rosario) on
A parcel of land (Lot 3 of
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-180944, being a portion of Lot 3-A-2-B (LRC)
Psd-140722, LRC Record No. 19405), situated in Poblacion,
Municipality of Alcala, Province of Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by P9,600.00 as per
Tax Dec. No. 6599 of Alcala.[4]
(a) A parcel of residential land (Lot 1,
Plan Psu-79891), situated in Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an
area of two hundred ninety-two (292) square meters and covered by TCT No. 1037
of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, issued to the names of Nicomedes and
Ma.
(b) A parcel of land (
As to the above properties, Nicomedes
and Maria Rosario apparently executed an Agreement on Separation of Conjugal
Properties[6]
which reads:
I. MAIN MOTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT. Because of the absence of descendant, WE the undersigned spouses have adopted this AGREEMENT, in order to provide a Guidance and to prevent any possible misunderstanding and litigation between the surviving Spouse and the Heirs and successors of the predeceased Spouse. WE HOPE that the Courts of Justice will give legal value to these Agreements.
x x x x
V. The parcel of land in No. 2 SECTION A, including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Husband.
VI. The parcels of lands (Lot No. 1 and Lot No. 3) in SECTION B, including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Wife.[7]
On
On
On
Respondents
Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan, sons by the first marriage
of Nicomedes, filed Civil Case No. A-2106 for
Partition, Annulment of title/documents and/or Recovery of possession/ownership
and damages.[12] On the other hand, petitioner filed Special
Proceedings No. A-1278 for the probate of the will of Maria Rosario in her
capacity as devisee of the deceased, Maria Rosario.[13] Both cases were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Alaminos, City Pangasinan, Branch 54. The cases were consolidated on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Allowing and granting the probate of the Holographic Will of Maria Rosario Braganza De Castro Rupisan (Spl. Proc. Case No. A-1278) and a certificate of its allowance to be attached to the Holographic Will is accordingly hereby issued, attested by the seal of this Court, pursuant to and in consideration with Section 13, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and which must be duly recorded with the Office of the Clerk of Court, as well as in the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan;
2. Dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. A-2106 for utter lack of merit, and
3. Ordering plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-2106 to jointly and
solidarily pay defendant moral damages in the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P200,000.00); the reduced sum of exemplary damages in the amount of
SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), including attorney’s fees and costs
of litigation in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).[14]
Respondents,
through counsel Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo (Atty. Guillermo), filed a Notice
of Appeal dated
On
To emphasize the point, if it is true indeed that the plaintiff received through counsel on October 2, 2002, the Decision of this Honorable Court, then he has (sic) up to October 17, 2002 within which to perfect the appeal in Civil Case No. 2106 which is the timely filing of the Notice of Appeal, together with the payment to the Clerk of Court of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
x x x x
However, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. 1278, considering that Rule 141 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: “where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from notice of judgment or final order” and in which case therefore, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the Notice of Appeal is deemed perfected except for the approval of the Record on Appeal.
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. A-2106, not having been perfected within the time provided for by law in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, the said appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.[18]
Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
During the January 20, 2003 hearing which are for purposes of approval of the record on appeal and to determine whether such record on appeal filed by the oppositor in Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278 is in order and whether or not the other matters treated in the Opposition to the Motion for Approval of the Record on Appeal filed by petitioner are impressed with merit, the following facts surfaced, to wit:
1. That on
2. The aforesaid pleading was received and
docketed in this court on
3. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid withdrawal, the aforesaid counsel, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, submitted and filed with this Court, without the conformity of oppositor, Romeo Rupisan, a “Notice of Appeal” dated October 5, 2002 in the above-consolidated cases and which was received by this Court on October 9, 2002;
4. In the meantime, on
5. Subsequently on
6. Thereafter, on
x x x x
Verily, this Court has not acted on Atty. Guillermo’s Withdrawal of Appearance dated October 4, 2002 and received by this court on November 12, 2002 considering that same is not a motion and he prayed that his Withdrawal of Appearance be just noted by the court while the Notice of Appeal dated November 5, 2002 was received by this Court on October 9, 2002. Thus, it appears that with reference to date, the Withdrawal of Appearance came ahead before the Notice of Appeal. However, with respect to the filing, the Notice of Appeal was filed ahead than the Withdrawal of Appearance.
Rupisan
alleged on his Notice of Appeal that he received a copy of the Decision
rendered by this Court dated
Anent
Special Proceedings Case No. A-1278, the RTC disallowed the appeal thereon on
the ground that respondents did not comply with the requirements provided by
law. It said that aside from the fact
that the documents involved were not arranged in chronological order the same
also did not contained any data that will show the court that the appeal was
perfected on time. It added that neither
the Compliance dated
The
RTC declared that since no Notice of Appeal has effectively been filed even up
to the present, its decision dated
The
dispositive portion of the Order dated
WHEREFORE, for reasons above-stated,
including those stated in the Order of this court dated
Respondents
hastily filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which was given due course. A Decision
was rendered on
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the respondent court denying the notice of appeal filed by petitioners for late payment of docket fees are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court is directed to give due course to petitioners’ notice of appeal.[22]
The
Court of Appeals applied a liberal interpretation of the rules. It found the delay excusable as respondents
demonstrated their willingness to pay the docket fees as manifested in their immediate compliance with
the said requirement.[23]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] which
was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
The
following issues are for our resolution:
1. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP No. 79405 NOTWITHSTANDING RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS AGAINST THE JULY 16, 2003 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO.
2. CAN A LAWYER WHO WAS PRIORLY DISMISSED BY HIS CLIENT STILL INTERVENE IN THE CASE BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHOUT THE CONFORMITY OF HIS FORMER CLIENT? STATED DIFFERENTLY, IS THERE A VALID NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.
3. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS VALIDLY FILED, WERE RESPONDENTS IN THE PRESENT PETITION ABLE TO PERFECT THEIR APPEAL ON TIME AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PLACING THE SELF-SERVING AND GRATUITIOUS EXPLANATION OF RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THEIR DELAY IN THE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES, WITHIN THE REALM OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE LATE PAYMENT OF APPELLATE COURT DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.
5. WHAT IS THE LEGAL STANDING OR HOW SHOULD THE MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL TOGETHER WITH THE RECORD ON APPEAL FILED BY SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO BE TREATED IN THE ABSENCE OF A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL?[25]
Petitioner
faults respondents for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed
RTC order of
We
disagree.
The
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of
re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.[26]
Respondents
actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
It must be noted that the
In
any event, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before availing of the
remedy of certiorari is not always sine qua non.[27] The rules admit of certain exceptions.[28] The instant case is one of those. In this case, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless in the light of the declaration of the RTC that the Order of
We now proceed to resolve the second and fifth issues. Taken together, the question to be resolved
is: what is the effect of the withdrawal of Atty. Guillermo as respondents’
counsel of record on the Notice of Appeal [29] which
he had filed for both Civil Case No. A-2106 and Special Proceedings No. A-1278.
The
Rule regarding change of counsel is provided under Rule 138, Section 26 thereat.
It states:
SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. – An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
Admittedly,
Atty. Guillermo filed a Notice of Withdrawal on
The
next issue relates to docket fees, and the effect of the belated payment by the
respondents. The records show that on 2
October 2002, the respondents received a copy of the decision. They had up to 17 October 2002 to file a
Notice of Appeal and to pay the appropriate docket fees. It is not disputed that said docket fees were
paid only
Rule
41, Section 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
x x x x
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
The failure of
the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal under Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the same rule which states:
SECTION 1. x x x.
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41.
From
the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. This is so because a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the
correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the
case in court.
In
the case of Gegare v. Court of Appeals,[33] this
Court upheld the appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period despite a
notice from the Court of Appeals informing him that such fees had to be paid
within 15 days from receipt of such notice.
Denying petitioner’s plea for judicial leniency, we held that –
Also without merit, in our view, is petitioner’s plea for a liberal treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently held that payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas v. Commission on Elections [245 SCRA 702 (1995)], such payment is an essential requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over a case:
The payment of the full amount of
the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968];
In
Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,[34]
decided
We must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of this thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.”[35] (Emphasis supplied.)
Sure
enough, the foregoing jurisprudence truly blazed the trails for a liberal application
of the strict interpretation of the law.[36]
In
Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat,[37]
the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six days, but the late payment
was accepted because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by
immediately paying those fees. The Court
also took note of the importance of the issues in this case involving as it
does the entitlement or not of the respondents to properties involved.
Of
similar import is the ruling of the court in the case of Ginete v. Court of Appeals[38] where we held that aside from matters
of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the
rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that
should be considered are the following:
(1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits
of the case; (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Yambao
v. Court of Appeals[39] saw us again relaxing the Rules when
we declared therein that “the appellate court may extend the time for the
payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a
justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees
within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the
appellant.
In
Go v. Tong,[40] reiterated
in Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor,[41]
it was held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment.[42]
In
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[43]
the Court stated that failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically
result in the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part
of the appellate court. And in
determining whether or not to dismiss an appeal on such ground, courts have
always been guided by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case.
In
Camposagrado v. Camposagrado,[44]
the case involved a deficiency in the payment of docket fees in the amount of
Five Pesos (P5.00). This Court
called for the liberal interpretation of the rules and gave due course to the appeal. In brief, the Court said that the failure to
pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate
court. A party’s failure to pay the
appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a
discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in
the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all
attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and ever prudently, never
capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.[45]
In
the subsequent case of Far Corporation v.
Magdaluyo,[46]
this Court, while reiterating that the payment of docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, in the same
vein, recognized that the existence of persuasive and weighty reasons call for
a relaxation of the rules.
In
La Salette College v. Pilotin,[47]
notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate
docket fees, we also recognized that its strict application is qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with
its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of
all attendant circumstances.
In
all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the
matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the
stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the
rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of
the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the
time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal
and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the
rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.[48]
In
the case at bar, respondents were delayed in the payment of docket fees for six
(6) days only. The reason advanced by
them was because of poverty. Evidently,
in the cases where the Supreme Court disallowed the late payment of docket
fees, the tardiness was for a significant period of time.[49] Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential
pronouncements, it will be extremely harsh for the Court to take a
lackadaisical attitude towards the cause of the respondents. We are convinced of the fastidiousness of the
Court of Appeals’ decision.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 69-80. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Noel G. Tijam concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 612.
[4]
[5] Rollo, p. 142.
[6] CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 665.
[7] Rollo, p. 142.
[8] CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 632.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp. 94-95.
[15] CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 621.
[16] The
RTC held:
In
Civil Case No. 2106, what was submitted before this Honorable Court was only a
Notice of Appeal, however, it was only on October 23, 2002, that an appeal fee
of Forty Eight Pesos (P48.00) covered by O.R. No. 15919947 and the
amount of Four Hundred Fifty Two Pesos (P452.00) covered by O.R. No.
1591854 and another amount of Twenty Pesos (P20.00) covered by O.R. No.
15918522 which were paid to the Clerk of Court, in the manner therefore that
the payment of appeal fees prescribed under Rule 41 Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court was after the expiry of the fifteen days period to perfect the appeal.
[17] The
RTC Order on this point reads:
However,
with respect to the appeal filed by the Oppositor in
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the appeal is considered seasonably filed
upon the timely filing of the Record of Appeal, inclusive of the required
appeal fees, but in accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court, let the records on appeal be submitted for consideration by the
Honorable Court for purposes of its approval.
Let there be a hearing on
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278 for the purpose of determining whether or
not there are incidents to be included in the record of appeal or there are
amendments thereto which the Court orders therefore the parties to appear on
December 18, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon for purposes of approval of
the record of appeal submitted by the Oppositor in
Special Proc. Case No. 1278.
[18] CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 51-52.
[19] Rollo, pp. 99-101.
[20] Sec. 6, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[21] Rollo, p. 101.
[22]
[23]
[24] CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 104.
[25] Rollo,
pp. 257-259. The new counsel of
respondents, Siguion Reyna Montecillo
& Ongsiako, filed its entry of appearance on
[26] Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corporation, G.R. No. 99047,
[27] Chas Realty and Development Corporation v. Talavera, 445 Phil. 43, 53 (2003).
[28] The recognized
exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie even without
filing a motion for reconsideration includes:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon by the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or public interest is involved. (Sevillana v. I.T. [International] Corp., supra note 26 at 462.)
[29] Rule 41, Section 9, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 9. – Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
[30] Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1184, 1194 (1997).
[31] Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 41, 52.
[32] Rinconanda Telephone Co., Inc. v. Buenviaje, G.R.
Nos. 49241-42,
[33] 358 Phil. 228 (1998).
[34] 386 Phil. 412 (2000).
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Supra note 36.
[39] Supra note 36.
[40] G.R. No. 151942,
[41] G.R. No. 140954,
[42] Go
v. Tong, supra note 40 at 567; Heirs
of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra note 41 at 475.
[43] G.R. No. 156278,
[44] G.R. No. 143195,
[45]
[46] G.R. No. 148739,
[47] 463 Phil. 785 (2003).
[48] Enriquez
v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303,
[49] See cases of La Salette College v. Pilotin, supra
note 47 at 387-388; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Barangay 24 of Legazpi
City v. Imperial, 393 Phil. 357 (2,000); Enriquez v. Enriquez, id; Far
Corporation v. Magdaluyo, supra note 46; Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr., G.R.
No. 148482, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 618.