THIRD
DIVISION
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LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO
YALUNG, and ATTY. ROY MANUEL VILLASOR, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 164459 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., CHICO-NAZARIO,
and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: April 24, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and
set aside: (1) The Decision,[1] dated
16 September 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73463 entitled, Limitless Potentials, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel
D. Victorio, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 141, Crisostomo Yalung, and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor,
which dismissed herein petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure for lack of merit, and (2) The Resolution,[2]
dated 8 July 2004, of the appellate court in the same case which denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration because the issues and arguments raised therein had
already been passed upon and judiciously resolved in the Decision dated 16 September 2003.
The
controversy of this case stemmed from the following facts:
On
P60,000.00 per month plus Value Added Tax (VAT). It was agreed, among other things, that Digital
will make a three-month deposit in the following manner, to wit: (a) P60,000.00 plus VAT upon the signing of the contract, and (b) P120,000.00
plus VAT upon completion of the billboard.
Digital complied with the aforesaid agreement.
The
billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons. In view thereof, the contract between Digital
and the petitioner was considered terminated.
Digital demanded for the return of their rental deposit for two months,
but the petitioner refused to do so claiming that the loss of the billboard was
due to force majeure and that any
cause of action should be directed against the responsible persons. Thus, on
On 18 June 1997, consistent with its
defense against Digital’s Complaint, petitioner filed a Third–Party Complaint[4]
against Macgraphics Carranz International Corporation (Macgraphics) and herein
private respondents Bishop Crisostomo Yalung (Bishop Yalung) and Atty. Roy
Manuel Villasor (Atty. Villasor) alleging that it had entered into a contract
of lease with Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM), as represented by the
private respondents, over a space inside San Carlos Manor Seminary in Guadalupe
Viejo, Makati City, where petitioner erected the subject billboard. Petitioner further averred that despite its
full compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease contract, herein
private respondents, together with their cohorts, maliciously dismantled and
destroyed the subject billboard and prevented its men from reconstructing
it. Thereafter, petitioner learned that Macgraphics
had “cajoled and induced” RCAM, through the private respondents, to destroy the
subject billboard to enable Macgraphics to erect its own billboard and
advertising signs. Thus, by way of
affirmative defenses, petitioner claimed that: (a) the destruction of the
subject billboard was not of its own making and beyond its control, and (b)
Digital’s cause of action, if any, should be directed against the private
respondents and Macgraphics. Hence,
petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor and to hold private
respondents liable for the following: (a) moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
(b) exemplary, temperate and nominal damages amounting to P300,000.00;
(c) P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees; (d) P50,000.00 as litigation expenses;
and (e) costs of suit, allegedly suffered or incurred by it because of the willful
destruction of the billboard by the private respondents.
In response, private respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforesaid Third-Party Complaint based on the
following grounds: (1) litis pendentia; (2) lack of cause of
action; (3) forum shopping; and (4) lack of privity of contract. The MeTC, in an Order dated
On 9 December 1997, private
respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for Preliminary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The RTC issued an Order on P10,000.00. Thus, the MeTC was enjoined from hearing the
Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170.
The pertinent portion of the aforesaid Order reads, as follows:
When
the application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
was heard this afternoon, [herein petitioner] who did not file comment on the
petition appeared thru counsel Emmanuel Magnaye. It was brought out to the attention of this
Court that respondent judge is poised on pursuing the hearing of the case
before her despite the pendency of this petition. It appeared that the case was set by
respondent judge for hearing ex-parte
for the reception of [herein petitioner’s] evidence on
Upon consideration of the allegations in the petition and the oral manifestations and admissions of both parties, this Court hereby resolves to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in order to preserve the status quo as well as not to render the issue herein raised moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the motion for preliminary injunction is granted. Accordingly, upon the filing by [herein private respondents] of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining respondent judge, or her successor, from hearing the [T]hird [P]arty [C]omplaint against [herein private respondents] in Civil Case No. 55170 until further orders from this Court.[8]
Subsequently, however, the RTC
rendered a Decision[9] on
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on
Costs against [herein private respondents].[11]
Disgruntled, private respondents
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order[12]
dated
Petitioner filed its Motion for
Judgment Against the Bond, and in compliance with the directive of the RTC, the
petitioner filed a pleading[13]
specifying its claims, thus: (a) attorney’s fees in the sum of P74,
375.00; and (b) moral damages for the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
The
RTC, in its Order dated
Aggrieved, the petitioner moved for
the reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, which was also denied by the RTC in
its Order dated
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals assailing
the Orders of the RTC dated
On
On
I. The dismissal of the petition and dissolution of the injunction amount to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully or improvidently obtained.
II. The petitioner suffered damages by reason of the issuance of the injunction.
III.
The damages claimed by the petitioner are covered by
the injunction bond.
The Court of Appeals through a
Resolution dated
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner pointed out two basic legal
issues wherein the appellate court committed serious and reversible errors, to
wit:
I. Is malice or bad faith a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on the injunction bond?
II. Are attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the injunction covered by the injunction bond?
Petitioner argues that malice or lack
of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. The dissolution of the injunction, even if
the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the
injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction
immediately accrues to the defendant.
The petitioner maintains that the attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and
cost of delay by reason of the injunction are proper and valid items of damages
which can be claimed against the injunction bond. Hence, having proven through testimonial and
documentary evidence that it suffered damages because of the issuance of the
writ of injunction, and since malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
recovery on the injunction bond, petitioner asserts that it can properly collect
such damages on the said bond.
Private respondent Bishop Yalung on
the other hand, prays for the outright dismissal of the present Petition due to
the alleged failure of the petitioner to comply with the mandatory rule on
proper certification on non-forum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
According to him, it is not sufficient for Mr. Baterna to make the
undertaking that “I have not commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in the Supreme Court,
etc.” inasmuch as such undertaking should have been made by the principal
party, namely, the petitioner. He
underscores that the verification/disclaimer of forum shopping executed by Mr.
Baterna on behalf of the petitioner is legally defective for failure to
enumerate with particularity the multiple civil and criminal actions, which
were filed by him and the petitioner against the private respondents.
Private respondent Bishop Yalung also
avers that the petitioner is not entitled to collect damages on the injunction
bond filed before the court a quo.
Primarily, as the appellate court mentioned in its Decision, the preliminary
injunction was directed not against the petitioner but against the MeTC. The petitioner was not restrained from doing
any act. What was restrained was the
hearing of the Third-Party Complaint while the Petition for Certiorari was pending, “in order to
preserve the status quo and not to render the issue therein moot and academic.”[18] Also, the fact that the decision is favorable
to the party against whom the injunction was issued does not automatically
entitle the latter to recover damages on the bond. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that
it suffered damages because of the issuance of the writ of injunction.
Private respondent Atty. Villasor
shares the same argument as that of his co-respondent Bishop Yalung that it was
the MeTC which was enjoined and not herein petitioner. Private respondent Atty. Villasor further
alleged that in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari, the action is principally against any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions who has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, private respondents’ Petition for Certiorari before the RTC principally
pertains to the MeTC and not to herein petitioner. Additionally, private respondent Atty.
Villasor argues that it was petitioner who was benefited by such writ of
preliminary injunction, because the injunction left Digital unable to prosecute
Civil Case No. 55170 against herein petitioner.
Lastly, private respondent Atty. Villasor claims that petitioner did not
oppose their application for a writ of preliminary injunction at the hearing
wherein petitioner was duly represented by counsel.
Simply stated, the threshold issues
are:
I. Can petitioner recover damages from the injunction bond?
II.
Was petitioner able to substantiate the damages?
Quite apart from the above, there
appears to be another question concerning the alleged violation by the
petitioner of the mandatory rule on proper certification on non-forum shopping.
In the case at bar, petitioner
repeatedly argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
recovery on the injunction bond. In
answering this issue raised by petitioner, this Court must initially establish the
nature of the preliminary injunction, the purpose of the injunction bond, as
well as the manner of recovering damages on the said bond.
A preliminary injunction is a
provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action.[19] It is an order granted at any stage of an
action, prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, agency
or person to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act or
acts. A preliminary injunction, as the
term itself suggests, is merely temporary,
subject to the final disposition of the principal action.[20] It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, which is the last actual, peaceful, and
uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy,[21]
in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the
suit. Otherwise, if no preliminary
injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do the act
which the plaintiff is seeking the court to restrain. This will make ineffectual the final judgment
that the court may afterwards render in granting relief to the plaintiff.[22] The status
quo should be existing ante litem
motam, or at the time of the filing of the case. For this reason, a preliminary injunction
should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or
re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.[23]
The purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ,
the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:
(1)
a right in esse
or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2)
a violation of that right;
(3)
that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[24]
A preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not
explicitly exempted, files with the
court, where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued.[25] Thus, the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua
non for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a
security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought
not to have been granted. Its principal
purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of
the injunction,[26] and the bond is usually conditioned
accordingly.
The damages sustained as a result of
a wrongfully obtained injunction may be recovered upon the injunction bond
which is required to be deposited with court.[27] Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similarly applicable to preliminary
injunction,[28] has
outlined the procedure for the filing of a claim for damages against an
injunction bond. The aforesaid provision
of law pertinently provides:
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. - An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
Nothing
herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued
from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property
of the attaching party not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit
given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.[29]
Now,
it can be clearly gleaned that there is nothing from the aforequoted
provision of law which requires an enjoined party, who suffered damages by
reason of the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prove malice or lack of good
faith in the issuance thereof before he can recover damages against the
injunction bond. This Court was very
succinct in the case of Aquino v. Socorro,[30]
citing the case of Pacis v. Commission on
Elections,[31] thus:
Malice or lack of good faith is not an
element of recovery on the bond.
This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite would make
the filing of a bond a useless formality.
The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained
in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully
obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the
injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioner’s main
cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery upon
the bond.
We, therefore, agree with the petitioner
that indeed, malice or lack of good faith is not a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on
the injunction bond.
With
respect to the issue raised by the petitioner regarding the coverage of the
injunction bond, this Court finds it necessary to quote once again the
provision of Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, to wit:
Unless
exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued.
The
aforesaid provision of law clearly provides that the injunction bond is
answerable for all damages.
The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may
sustain no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
dissolved.[32] Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen
to account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or costs
and reasonable counsel’s fees, incurred or sustained by the latter in case it
is determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued.[33] Likewise, the posting of a bond in connection
with a preliminary injunction does not operate to relieve the party obtaining
an injunction from any and all responsibility for damages that the writ may
thereby cause. It merely gives
additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse
against either the applicant or his surety or against both.[34]
The
contention of the petitioner, thus, is tenable.
Attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and costs of delay can be recovered
from the injunction bond as long as it can be shown that said expenses were
sustained by the party seeking recovery by reason of the writ of preliminary
injunction, which was later on determined as not to have been validly issued
and that the party who applied for the said writ was not entitled thereto. The case of Aquino v. Socorro,[35]
citing the case of Pacis v. Commission on
Elections,[36] holds
that the dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in
good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully
obtained and a right of action on the injunction
bond immediately accrues. It is also
erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not entitled to
claim damages from the injunction bond simply because the preliminary
injunction was directed against the MeTC and not against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages
from the injunction because it has no interest or stake in the Petition pending
before it. Damage or loss is suffered by
the party whose right to pursue its case is suspended or delayed, which in this
case, is the petitioner. Upon issuance
of the writ of injunction, it is the petitioner who will stand to suffer
damages for the delay in the principal case because, had it not been for the
injunction, the petitioner would not have incurred additional expenses for attending
the separate hearings on the injunction, and the
As
to the second main issue in the present case, although we do recognize that the
petitioner had a right to recover damages
from the injunction bond, however, we agree in the findings of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the RTC, that the petitioner did not
sustain any damage by reason of the issuance of the writ of injunction. In the petitioner’s Motion for Judgment
Against the Bond,[37]
petitioner stated therein, thus:
5. There can be no serious debate that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary injunction, all at the instance of [herein private respondents], resulted in actual and pecuniary damages on the part of [herein petitioner] in the amount more than the value of the bond posted by [private respondents]. The attorney’s fees for expenses in litigation alone expended by [petitioner] to defend itself in this proceedings, not to mention other pecuniary damages, amounts to P10,000.00.[38]
In the case at bar, petitioner is
claiming attorney’s fees in the sum of P74,375.00 it allegedly paid to
defend itself in the main case for certiorari,
which it would not have spent had the private respondents not filed their
nuisance Petition and secured a writ of preliminary injunction. Likewise, by reason of the unfounded suit,
the good will of the petitioner was brought to bad light, hence, damaged.[39] It is noteworthy to mention that the
undertaking of the injunction bond is that it shall answer for all damages which the party to be
restrained may sustain by reason of the
injunction if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not
entitled thereto. Apparently, as the
appellate court pointed out in its Decision dated P74,375.00 as well as the moral damages for
the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00 were suffered by the
petitioner because of the issuance of the writ of injunction.
Furthermore, this Court will not
delve into the sufficiency of evidence as to the existence and amount of
damages suffered by petitioner for it is already a question of fact. It is settled that the factual findings of
the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on the Supreme Court.[40] Although this rule is subject to exceptions,[41]
the present case does not fall into any of those exceptions which would have
allowed this Court to make its own determination of facts. This Court upholds the factual findings of
both the
Now, on the matter of proper certification on non-forum shopping.
The
requirement of a Certification on Non-Forum Shopping is contained in Rule 7,
Section 5, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that:
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with
the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
Private
respondent Bishop Yalung might have overlooked the Secretary’s Certificate[42]
attached to the petitioner’s Petition for Review, which authorized Mr. Baterna,
President of herein petitioner LPI, to represent the latter in this case. According to the Secretary’s Certificate, the
Board of Directors of petitioner LPI, at a special meeting held on
RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the corporation reiterates the authority of its President, Mr. Quirino B. Baterna, to represent the corporation in all cases by and/or against the corporation vis-à-vis the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila/Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Villasor/Digital Netwrok (sic) Communications and Computers, Inc., and/or MacGraphics Carranz International Corporation, to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 164459 to assert/protect LPI’s rights and interests in connection with C.A.-G.R. No. 73463, entitled “Limitless Potentials, Inc., vs. Hon. Manuel Victorio, et al.,” Honorable Court of Appeals, Manila.
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE,
that any and all acts of our President, concerning the above-referenced subject
matter are hereby affirmed, confirmed and ratified by the corporation for all
legal intents and purposes.[43]
Private
respondent Bishop Yalung further argued that Mr. Baterna failed to enumerate in
the Certification against Forum Shopping the multiple cases filed by him and
the petitioner against private respondents.
This is also erroneous.
Forum
shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[44] It
exists where the elements of litis
pendentia[45] are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata
in another.[46] It may be resorted to by a party against whom
an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to
seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil
action for certiorari.[47]
As
the
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 September 2003 and 8 July 2004,
respectively, affirming the Decision of the RTC dated 28 April 2000, denying
herein petitioner’s motion to recover damages against the injunction bond, are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES – SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Arturo D. Brion, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-39.
[2]
[3] Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
[4] Records, pp. 47-51.
[5] Penned by Judge Estela Perlas-Bernabe, Records, pp. 32-34.
[6]
[7] Penned by Judge Manuel D. Victorio; CA rollo, pp. 53-54.
[8]
[9] Penned by Judge Manuel D. Victorio; rollo, pp. 75-84.
[10] The correct date of issuance of the
Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction is
[11] Rollo, p. 84.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Candido V. Rivera, concurring; CA rollo, p. 119.
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 37.
[19] First Global Realty and Development Corporation v. San Agustin, 427 Phil. 593, 600 (2002).
[20] Dungog v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 675, 685 (2003).
[21] First
Global Realty and Development Corporation v. San Agustin, supra note 19.
[22] Dungog v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20.
[23]
Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 797, 809 (2002).
[24]
[25] Section 4(b), Rule 58, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[26]
[27] Aquino v. Socorro, 146 Phil. 396, 401 (1970).
[28] Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 641, 649 (1999).
[29] Rule 57, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[30] Aquino v. Socorro, supra note 27.
[31] 139 Phil. 519, 524-525 (1969).
[32] Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28.
[33]
[34] Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28.
[35] Supra note 27.
[36] Supra note 31.
[37] Rollo, pp. 86-89.
[38]
[39]
[40] Mindex
Resources Development v. Morillo, G.R. No. 138123,
[41] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion [Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322].
[42] Rollo, p. 29.
[43]
[44] Nordic
[45] For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
[46] Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
123686,
[47] Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788,
[48] Records, pp. 78-97.