SECOND DIVISION
|
MACTAN- Petitioners,
- versus - MILAGROS
URGELLO,
Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 162288 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and
VELSCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: April 4, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Respondent, Milagros Urgello, was the
owner of Lot No. 913-E of the Banilad Estate in
Sometime in the 1950s, the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) filed a complaint before the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu to expropriate Lot No. 913-E-3 for the projected expansion of the
The case reached the Court of Appeals
in which, on joint motion of the parties, a judgment based on a compromise
agreement was rendered on P3,105.00,
subject to the resolutory condition that in the event that the Republic of the P3,105.00.[4]
Respondent thus executed a Conditional Deed of
Sale incorporating the resolutory condition, which deed was annotated on respondent’s
TCT No. 10873.[5]
It appears that on
On August 2, 1983, the Bureau of Air
Transportation (BAT) by which the CAA was later known, and the Bureau of
Equipment of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the BAT was to lease several parcels of land,
including Lot No. 913-E-3, to MPWH for
25 years to be used as the site of the latter’s Seventh Regional Base Shop
Complex.[7]
The MPWH soon started building fences
along the perimeters of Lot No. 913-E-3.[8]
After the dismantling of the hangars
and taxiways from the
Respondent thus filed on June 5, 1983
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a Complaint for Injunction with
Damages against the BAT and the G.M. Tiongco Construction Company (Tiongco
Construction), docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-3908. Tiongco Construction in turn impleaded the MPWH
as third-party defendant.[10]
Subsequently, respondent, by letter
of P3,105.00.[11] The BAT received the draft, but it did not reconvey
the lot, prompting respondent to file on
In the meantime or on
Branch 6 of the Cebu RTC later rendered
judgment[14] in
Civil Case No. CEB-4115 (respondent’s Complaint for Reconveyance of Lot
No. 913-E-3), by Decision of January
3, 1989, holding that the resolutory condition stipulated in the Compromise Agreement
forged between the then CAA and respondent ─ basis of the July 27, 1964
judgment of the Court of Appeals ─
had taken place. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
Wherefore,
judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Bureau of Air Transportation to reconvey to the plaintiff
Milagros E. Urgello that parcel of land, Lot No. 913-E-3, subject of the conditional Deed of Sale, after payment [sic] by the latter of the sum of P3,105.00 as repurchase price. The plaintiff’s claim for damages as well as
the defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed.
No costs.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On
On July 31, 1990, Republic Act No. 6958,[17] the
Charter of herein petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA), was signed into law.
On
1. DPWH
obligates itself to immediately demolish
at its own expense the concrete
wall which it built traversing plaintiff’s
x x x x
2. Plaintiff
hereby agrees to sell and DPWH agrees to purchase Lot No. 913-E[-4]
. . . covering an area of One Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine (1,199) square
meters of plaintiff’s lot, particularly Lot
No. 913-E-4-A, at the agreed price of Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00)
per square meter or a total of Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Three
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P779,350.00).
x x x x
3. It is
understood that DPWH and ATO will comply with the Decision rendered on
4. In view
of the Decision of January 3, 1989, plaintiff agrees to sell and the DPWH
agrees to purchase Lot [No.] 913-E-3
consisting of One Thousand Thirty Five (1,035) square meters at the agreed
price of Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00) per square meter or for the
total amount of Six Hundred Seventy Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Pesos (P672,750.00).
5. To avert future litigations, the parties hereby waive all their respective demands, claims, counterclaims, and third-party claims against one another with respect to the matters treated in this Agreement.
6. The
DPWH hereby agrees to withdraw its complaint for eminent domain [covering
Lot No. 913-E-4, among other lots] filed
against plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4541 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XVII,
On
Respondent, relying on the
Manifestation in open court of Atty. Agustino Hermoso of the DPWH Regional Office
about the availability of funds already appropriated for her properties, demanded
the payment for Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and
913-E-4, and the demolition of the
concrete wall around Lot No. 913-E-2,
as agreed upon in the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement.[21] The
DPWH ignored respondent’s demands, however, prompting her to file on
The DPWH having failed to comply with
its undertakings under the
herein petitioners DPWH and ATO,[27]
docketed as CEB-19418, the subject of
the present petition, praying that judgment be rendered
1. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to immediately reconvey to plaintiff Milagros A. Urgello:
a. Lot No. 913-E-4-A without any condition;
b. Lot No. 913-E-3 upon plaintiff’s payment [sic]
to the defendants of the sum of P3,105.00 as repurchase price;
2. Directing defendant DPWH to immediately demolish at its own expense the concrete wall which it built traversing plaintiff’s Lot No. 913-E-2 and Emerald Street, Lahug, Cebu City, which has obstructed plaintiff’s access to her other properties;
3. Enjoining defendants to solidarily pay plaintiff reasonable rent for their unlawful occupation of Lot No. 913-E-3 since 1950 and of Lot No. 913-E-4-A since 1990 which deprived plaintiff of any beneficial enjoyment thereof;
4. Alternatively,
requiring defendants to solidarily and immediately pay plaintiff the
amount of P1,452,100.00 (plus interest computed at 12% per annum from
1990) by way of just compensation for
5. Commanding defendants to solidarily pay plaintiff:
c.
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
d.
Actual damages of P100,000.00;
e.
Attorney’s fees of P300,000.00;
6. Affording plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.[28] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In its
Answer,[29] petitioner
DPWH questioned respondent’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and to serve
upon the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of the complaint, and the jurisdiction
of the trial court.
As for petitioner
ATO, it posited in its Answer[30] that
only the DPWH should be held liable for non-compliance with the Compromise
Agreement dated
. . . [T]his Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 is, as cited by plaintiff[-herein respondent] in paragraph 20 of her complaint, the one [which was] entered into by and between her and defendants DPWH and ATO in Civil Cases Nos. 3908 (RTC Br. VI), 4115 (RTC Br. VI) and 4541 (RTC Br. VII) involving Lot Nos. 913-E-2, 913-E-3, and 913-E-4-A, and whatever is the reason behind co-defendant DPWH’s neglect or failure to undertake what it assumed as its sole obligation under this Compromise Agreement, which is all that has given rise to the present suit, defendant ATO is not privy to it, has no knowledge about it and should not be made to answer for it;
. . . [T]he obligation of defendant ATO under the Compromise
Agreement dated 17 January 1990, above cited, ceased when, in that same
document, . . . co-defendant [DPWH] assumed as its sole obligation the
following: 1) to demolish at its own expense a concrete
wall which it built traversing plaintiff’s Lot No. 913-[E]-2 and Emerald Street to provide access to plaintiff’s properties;
and 2) to unconditionally pay plaintiff for the lots sold by plaintiff to the
former, to wit: P779, 350.00 as
payment for Lot No. 913-E-4-A (1,199
sq. m.); and P672,750.00 – as payment for Lot No. 913-E-3 (1035 sq. m.);
x x x x
. .
. [F]or plaintiff[-herein respondent] to
pursue her old cases against defendant after the parties in those cases covered
by the Court-approved Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 are supposed
to have already waived all their respective demands, claims, counterclaims and
third-party claims is for her to drag all the defendants there into an
absurdity: the revival of those
demands, claims, counterclaims and third-party claims so needless when all
plaintiff needs to do is focus her attention on the one party defendant which
reneged on what it assumed as its sole obligation under the same compromise
agreement.[31] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In
support of its claim, the ATO argued that:
. . . ATO Mactan, as now established and constituted, is one of the nine (9) airport cluster centers or area offices of defendant Air Transportation Office created and established pursuant to DOTC Department Order No. 92-569 dated January 21, 1992, and was actually established only sometime January 1993, some two years, more or less, after the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was formally and officially constituted on December 18, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958 (the MCIAA charter);
. . . [B]y virtue of RA 6958, MCIAA became the airport operating authority in Cebu, to the exclusion of defendant ATO, and the role of defendant ATO in Cebu has since been confined only to the operation and maintenance of air-traffic-service and air-navigation-service facilities at Mactan International Airport, although it does exercise a separate role in supervising the management, operation and maintenance of the following satellite airports: Dumaguete Airport in Negros Oriental, Tagbilaran Airport and Ubay Airport in Bohol and Siquijor Airport in Siquijor;[32]
x x x x
. .
. [I]t is clear from the . . . provisions
of RA 6958 (the MCIAA Charter) that the judgment prayed for by plaintiff in her
complaint, including reconveyance by defendant ATO, jointly and severally with
co-defendant Department of Public Works and Highways, of Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4-A, cannot be done anymore insofar as defendant ATO is concerned,
at least not without the inclusion of MCIAA as a proper party, if it is not [sic], in fact, as defendant believes, an
indispensable party, since “all assets, powers, rights, interests and
privileges relating to airport works or airports” both at Mactan International
Airport and at the old Lahug Airport have already been assumed in ownership
and/or administration by MCIAA,
to the exclusion and substitution of defendant ATO, by virtue of MCIAA’s
authority and missions under RA 6958 creating it;[33] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent
later filed with leave and approval of the trial court an Amended Complaint[34] impleading herein petitioner MCIAA as a
party defendant[35]
and incorporating a prayer for the payment of rentals should reconveyance
of her properties (Lot Nos. 913-E-3
& 913-E-4-A) be denied.[36]
MCIAA,
in its Answer with Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint,[37]
raised the following defenses:
Plaintiff[-herein
respondent] merely seeks the enforcement of [the
As
can be gleaned from the complaint,
Granting
arguendo that defendant MCIAA assumed the obligations and liabilities of co-defendant
ATO by virtue of RA 6958, the only obligation of co-defendant ATO is to comply
with the Decision rendered on
By
Decision of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily reconvey P3,105.00 as it was paid already;
2. Ordering
the defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily return to plaintiff
3. Ordering
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay rentals on P20.00 square meter per
month from
4. Ordering
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4
at the rate of P20.00 per square
meter per month from
5. Directing defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily demolish the fence traversing Lot No. 913-E-2 at their own expense;
6. Ordering
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of P300,000.00.
No costs.[40] (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring
supplied)
In holding petitioners solidarily
liable, the trial court explained:
[T]his
Court hereby declares that the reconveyance of
Defendant DPWH is obliged to reconvey because as the evidence of the case would show, said defendant is the one presently in possession and occupation of the property being the lessee thereof by virtue of the questionable Memorandum of Agreement it entered into with BAT.
Defendant MCIAA is also obligated to reconvey on the ground that it is the legal custodian of the lot by virtue of R.A. 6958 creating the MCIAA and transferring to it all the assets of the Lahug Airport.
While
it may be seriously argued that based on the evidence on record, there was no
turnover of any facilities to defendant MCIAA yet, under the express
provision of Sec. 15 R.A. 6958, defendant MCIAA is constituted as the legal transferee of all facilities,
lands, buildings, and other properties of the Lahug Airport, a division of
ATO. It provides, “All existing
public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties,
movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the
airports…are hereby transferred to the Authority.” Construing the letter of
this provision, there is no denying that legally and technically, defendant MCIAA
is the present administrator-custodian of all the assets, facilities,
and properties (including Lot No. 913-E-3) of the
Moreover, upon the transfer to and acceptance by MCIAA of these assets, facilities, properties, etc., it likewise assumed the liabilities and obligations of ATO which includes the reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3 to its owner her resolutory condition [sic]. This assumption of liabilities and obligations of ATO is specifically provided in Section 17 of the same law, which says:
Sec. 17. Transfer of Liabilities and Debts. – Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the authority of the existing physical facilities, intangible assets and completed projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts, liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities concerned, intangible assets and completed project within the airports shall likewise be assumed by the authority.
The language of the aforecited provision is very clear, and there can never be doubt that MCIAA is obligated technically to reconvey plaintiff’s lot.
This Court likewise believes that defendant ATO has also an obligation (jointly and severally with the other defendants) to effect the reconveyance of the property to the plaintiff. This is anchored on the fact that considering that there was no turnover of any facilities, properties, lands, buildings, etc. by it to defendant MCIAA, defendant ATO is still the open exercising custody and administration over the properties.
On
the demand for the return of
As
shown in the records, the aforementioned lots were never included in the
expropriation proceedings over
Corollary
to this, the return of
To
recall, one of the provisions of the said compromise agreement was the sale
of P779,350.00.
However, as the evidence would show, the government did not pay the
said amount for unexplained reasons.
Said failure consequently abrogated the whole compromise agreement; and
there is now created an obligation on the part of the government to return the
property to its owner, plaintiff herein.
As
in the case of
For
the unauthorized use of
It is an undenial fact that the government has benefited from the use, occupation, and possession of these lots; while on the other hand, the plaintiff herein has suffered from the deprivation thereof. Again, if we are to live by the sway and dominance of justice, it would thus be equitable that plaintiff be compensated by the government in the form of rentals, at least, for after all, no one, not even the government, is exempted in the eyes of the law.
Payment of [the] rentals should be a joint and several obligation of all the defendants. . . .
The liability of defendant DPWH rests on the facts [sic] that it is the one which has been in possession and occupation of these properties. Whereas in the case of defendant ATO, said defendant through the then BAT was the one which illegally constructed the fence enclosing the properties. Besides, because it failed to turnover its facilities, properties, lands, buildings, etc. to defendant MCIAA, it is still the administrator and custodian of all these litigated lots.
Upon the other hand, the obligation of defendant MCIAA finds its basis in R.A. 6958, wherein under this law, specifically Sections 15 and 17 thereof, defendant MCIAA is supposed to be administering and managing all the facilities, lands, buildings, and other properties of defendant ATO. The fact that it has not received even a single property from defendant ATO does not relieve it from such obligation because the law (R.A. 6958) is quite specific. Besides, defendant MCIAA should be doing its job.
x x x x
On plaintiff’s demand for the abolition of the fence traversing her Lot No. 913-E-2, the Court hereby directs defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to jointly and severally demolish the same at their own expense.
The illegal construction of said fence has made the government a builder in bad faith under Article 450 of the Civil Code . . . .[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal,[42] the
Court of Appeals, by Decision[43]
dated
Hence, the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari[44] filed
by MCIAA, DPWH, and ATO positing that:
I. RESPONDENT’S MONEY CLAIM MUST BE FILED WITH THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA).
II. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO
RECONVEY
III. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO PAY RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE LOTS.
IV. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO
DEMOLISH THE FENCE TRAVERSING
It bears emphasis that in rendering
the appealed judgment, all that the trial court did was find petitioners liable,
providing the bases therefor.
Contrary to petitioners DPWH’s and
ATO’s undertakings in the
DPWH and the ATO should thus be held solidarily
liable to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3
to respondent and pay rentals therefore effective P3,105.00
purchase price.[46]
Since respondent’s cause of action
against the ATO with regard to Lot No. 913-E-3 refers to its retention of title thereto despite the occurrence
of the resolutory condition stipulated in the Conditional Deed of Sale, MCIAA’s
liability would depend on whether it is ATO’s successor-in-interest with
respect to the said lot. Both the trial
court and the appellate court held in the affirmative on the basis of Republic
Act 6958, Section 15 which reads:
SECTION 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. — All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interest and privileges relating to airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operation of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority: Provided, however, That the operational control of all equipment necessary for the operation of radio aids to air navigation, airways communication, the approach control office, and the area control center shall be retained by the Air Transportation Office. No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air Transportation Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the Authority. The Authority may assist in the maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment,
and of Section 17 which is requoted
for convenience, viz:
SECTION 17. Transfer of Liabilities and Debts. — Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the Authority of the existing physical facilities, intangible assets and completed projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts, liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities concerned in respect of such physical facilities, tangible assets and completed projects within the airports shall likewise be assumed by the Authority. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners claim, however, as
follows:
. . . The provision is clear that it is only upon the transfer to and acceptance by petitioner MCIAA of a particular physical facility or property that petitioner MCIAA will assume the obligations of petitioner ATO over the facility or property.
x x x x
[I]t
is only upon the transfer to and
acceptance by petitioner MCIAA of the lots can it be said that it assumed the
obligations of petitioner ATO over the lots.[47] (Underscoring
in the original; emphasis supplied)
To MCIAA, the phrase “upon transfer
to and acceptance by” means that a formal turnover to it of a particular
facility by the ATO and a formal acceptance by it are required before it
assumes the obligations of the ATO thereover.
It argues that since ATO never turned over Lot No. 913-E-3 to it, it cannot be compelled to
assume ATO’s obligation to reconvey the same.[48]
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6958
is clear, however, that upon its passage, all existing airport facilities and
other properties were thereby transferred to MCIAA, viz:
All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interest and privileges relating to airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operation of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority: (Emphasis supplied)
It is a settled rule in statutory
construction that
The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is [a] cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute’s clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[49]
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6958
must thus be read vis a viz Section
15 as well as the other provisions of the said law. In
The “airports” referred to [in Section 15] are the “Lahug Air Port” in Cebu City and the “Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu,” which belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO).
It
may be reasonable to assume that the term “lands” refer to “lands” in
This “transfer” is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner’s authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia, “the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports.” Hence the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question. . . . ”[51] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 6958 transferred
Lot No. 913-E-3 to MCIAA.
In another vein, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 6958 states:
Primary Purposes and Objectives ─ The [Mactan-Cebu International Airport] Authority shall principally undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City hereinafter collectively referred to as airports, and such other airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu. In addition, it shall have the following objectives:
(a) To encourage, promote, and develop international and domestic air traffic in the central Visayas and Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of international trade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communications in the country; and
(b) To upgrade the services and facilities of the airports and to formulate internationally acceptable standards of airport accommodation and service. (Emphasis supplied)
If formal transfer and acceptance of the assets mentioned in
Section 15 were needed before MCIAA could assume the obligations arising therefrom,
the “economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision”
of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport could be impeded by ATO
refusing to turn over, and by MCIAA refusing to accept such assets.
MCIAA is thus bound, as ATO’s successor-in-interest,
to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3. And it is solidarily liable with its co-petitioners
to pay rentals in arrears over the said lot.
In light of petitioners’ argument
that:
. . . While it is
true that R.A. 6958 was signed into law on
this Court fixes the
effectivity date of the said law to
MCIAA may not be solidarily liable
with DPWH and ATO, however, for the return of Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4 and for the payment of rentals thereon. These obligations of the DPWH and the ATO arose
from their illegal physical possession of the said lots up to the present. What Republic Act No. 6958 transferred from
the ATO to MCIAA are the properties owned or administered by the ATO,
not those physically possessed by the ATO.
Finally, since the acts and omissions
of the ATO and the DPWH are what compelled respondent to litigate, only they
should be held liable for the payment of attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is in PART GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court, is MODIFIED. As modified, the dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
1. Petitioners Department of Public Works and
Highways, Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority, and Air Transportation Office are ordered to solidarily
reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent;
2. Petitioners
DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO are ordered to solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-3 at the rate of P20 per square
meter per month from
3. Petitioner DPWH is ordered to demolish the
fence traversing Lot No. 913-E-2;
4. Petitioner DPWH is ordered to return to
respondent Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4;
5. Petitioner DPWH and ATO are ordered to solidarily
pay rentals on Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and
913-E-4, from January 1, 1985 up to
the present; and
6. Petitioners ATO and the DPWH are ordered to
solidarily pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Exhibits “A” and “A-2,” records, pp. 331-332.
[2] Exhibit “G,” id. at 355.
[3] Exhibit “B,” id. at 334-338.
[4]
[5] Exhibit “A-1,” id. at 331.
[6] Vide
Escaño v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-47207,
[7] Exhibit “D,” id. at 345-347; vide id. at 161-162.
[8]
[9] Exhibit “H,” id. at 359.
[10]
[11] Exhibit “E,” id. at 348.
[12] Exhibit “F,” id. at 349-354.
[13] Exhibit “I,” id. at 362-370.
[14] Exhibit “G,” id. at 355-358.
[15]
[16] Exhibit “W,” id. at 407.
[17] Exhibit “V,”
[18] Exhibit “J,” id. at 371-374.
[19]
[20] Exhibit “K,” id. at 375-377.
[21] Exhibits “L” & “M,” id. at 378-382.
[22] Exhibit “N,” id. at 383-388.
[23] Exhibit “O,” id. at 389-392.
[24] Exhibit “P,” id. at 393; vide Exhibits. “Q,” “R,” “S,”
“T,” and “U,” id. at 394-397.
[25]
[26] Sec. 6 of Rule 39 contemplates an action for revival of judgment. Thus it provides:
Execution by motion or by independent action. ─ A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
A
judgment based on a compromise is immediately final and executory, hence,
prescription runs from the date of rendition. (Jacinto
et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66478,
In
the case at bar, the judgment based on a compromise was rendered on
[27] Although the
present petition is captioned “
Plaintiff, by counsel, most respectfully states:
x x x x
2. That
defendant Republic of the
a) the
defendant Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), its
agency/instrumentality with principal office at Bonifacio Drive, Metro Manila
and its Regional Office at Salinas Drive, Lahug, Cebu City, where it maybe
served with summons and other court processes;
b) the defendant
Air Transportation Office (ATO) which is a functionary or branch of the
Philippine Government which formerly operated the Lahug Airport in Cebu City,
with principal office at Pasay City, Metro Manila, but with a Regional Office
at the Mactan International Airport, Lapu-lapu City, where it may be served
with summons and other court processes;
c) the defendant
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43] Penned by then Court of Appeals Presiding
Justice Cancio C. Garcia, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Renato C.
Dacudao and Danilo B. Pine; CA rollo, pp. 113-132.
[44] Rollo, pp. 9-25.
[45]
[46] Exhibit “E,” records, p. 348.
[47] Rollo, p.19.
[48] Vide
CA rollo, p. 48.
[49] Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., G.R.
No. 154674, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 773, 786.
[50] 330 Phil. 392 (1996).
[51]
[52] Rollo, p. 20.
[53] Exhibit “V,” records, pp. 400-406; Article 2, Civil Code provides: “Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”