Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE G.R. No. 156182
INSURANCE
SYSTEM,
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
LUZVIMINDA
C. MECAYER,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
On
On
In
a letter[5] dated March 22, 2001, petitioner
found SPO2 Mecayer's death as due to a personal
grudge on the part of the suspect, SPO1 Bawar, which
was not work related and thus not compensable under P.D. No. 626.
Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a letter[6] dated
Respondent then filed an appeal with
the ECC. In a Decision[7] dated
The ECC found that there was no issue
on the matter of whether or not the contingency arose out of and in the course
of employment as indeed the contingency occurred during the covered employees’ tour of
duty and at the workplace. It, however, found
that the rule on compensability under Section 1(a), Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation is not absolute and subject to limitations as
provided under Section 1, Rule IV of the same Rule, i.e., no
compensation shall be allowed to the employee’s
dependents when the death was occasioned by his intoxication; that respondent
failed to adduce substantial evidence to refute the fact that her husband was
intoxicated at the time of the contingency; that her husband’s
intoxication might have emboldened him to engage in a heated argument with Mrs.
Bawar, the assailant’s wife,
which undoubtedly precipitated the shooting incident which caused his death;
that while the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, such applies only in case of doubt and when
there is substantial evidence that would reinforce respondent's claim which was
not present in this case.
Respondent then filed with the CA a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court alleging that it was erroneous for the
ECC to find that the death of
respondent’s husband was occasioned by his intoxication and therefore
not compensable.
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition for review is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
Employees Compensation Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring
petitioner Ma. Luzviminda C. Mecayer
entitled to the payment of the appropriate compensation benefits under P.D.
626, as amended, for the death of her husband SPO2 Jose P. Mecayer.
Let
this case be remanded to the Government Service and Insurance System for the
computation and payment of the compensation benefits to Ma. Luzviminda
C. Mecayer.[8]
The CA found no substantial evidence on
record to support the ECC finding that SPO2 Mecayer
was intoxicated at the time of the contingency; that nowhere even in
petitioner's letter denying respondent's claim was it shown that SPO2 Mecayer was actually intoxicated immediately before or
during the time of shooting as petitioner merely stated that SPO2 Mecayer’s death was by reason of a personal grudge, thus,
respondent never felt the need to refute the alleged intoxication of her
husband when she appealed the decision of petitioner to the ECC; that the ECC
swiftly concluded that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated when he was only in the process of
consuming a bottle of beer without any showing that he had drunk several
bottles of beer or any other liquor before the contingency; that as held in People v.
Apduhan, Jr.,[9]
intoxication means that the offender's
mental faculties must be affected by drunkenness; that the state of
intoxication must be proved considering that mere
drinking of liquor prior to the commission of the crime does not necessarily
produce a state of intoxication.
In the
absence of evidence proving SPO2 Mecayer's
intoxication and considering that the ECC had already declared in its decision
that the contingency occurred during the covered employee's tour of duty and at
the workplace, the CA reversed the ECC Decision.
Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated
Hence the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari raising
the following issue:
Whether or
not the Honorable Court of Appeals, in rendering its assailed Decision, setting
aside the subject ECC Decision, has disregarded the law and the well-settled
jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions that
for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of accident
“arising out of” and in the course of” the employment (Section 1, Rule III,
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 626, as amended.) and the State
Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to the employee or his
dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the
employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or
another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title (Art.
172, PD 626, as amended; Sec 1, Rule IV, Implementing Rules of P.D. 626, as amended).[11]
Petitioner contends that under P.D. No. 626, one
of the basic requirements for death to be compensable is that it must be
work-connected; that although respondent's husband met his death while he was
on duty and within the vicinity of his workplace, his death was not
work-connected as the killing appeared to be personal in nature; that it has
nothing to do with his military service, thus not arising out of or in the
course of employment; that while it may be true that his intoxication had not
yet affected his mental faculties, however, he was doing a prohibited act while
on duty which act provoked the events that led to his death; and that he was
not performing his official function at the time of his death.
In her Comment, respondent, citing Employees’
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals[12] and Hinoguin v. Employees’
Compensation Commission,[13] counters that
members of the national police like her husband are by the nature of their
functions technically on 24-hour duty a day except when they
are on vacation leave; that they are subject to call anytime and may be asked
by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining peace
and security of the community; that a soldier on active duty status is subject
to military discipline and law 24-hours a day and seven days a
week except when on vacation leave; that the facts reveal that her husband's
death occurred while he was on duty and at the workplace and did not fall under
the exception provided by jurisprudence; that ECC in its decision even agreed
that her husband's death was work-connected; that petitioner's contention that
her husband's death arose out of personal grudge and purely personal in nature
is purely speculative; that it was not correct for petitioner to contend that
her husband was doing a prohibited act while on duty thus totally disassociated
himself from the nature of his work since the intoxication was not proven.
Petitioner filed its Reply.
The parties submitted their respective
memoranda as required in our Resolution dated
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner denied respondent's
compensation claim on the ground that her husband’s death
was not work-related. While the
ECC affirmed the denial of such claim, it did so not on the same ground as that
of petitioner since the ECC found that the contingency occurred during SPO2 Mecayer's tour of duty and at the workplace but based on
its findings that his death was brought about by his intoxication. Thus, the CA no longer discussed
the matter of whether SPO2 Mecayer's death was
work-connected or not but focused on the ground of intoxication.
We find no reversible error committed
by CA in finding the death of SPO2 Mecayer
compensable.
For death to be compensable under P.D. No. 626, as
amended, Section 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation provides:
Section
1. Grounds - (a) For the injury
and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1)
The
employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2)
The
employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3)
If the
injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer.
It had been established that respondent’s
husband, a driver at the PNP Administration Division and
In Lentejas v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission,[15] we held
as compensable the death of Victorio Lentejas, a general foreman at the City Engineer’s
Office, who was on his way from Barangay Banti where he made inspections of work on the damaged seawall
when he was stabbed by reason of a personal grudge with his
assailant over a boundary lot dispute. We ruled:
In
other words, we do not think that the third person’s criminal intent should be
regarded as a supervening cause having the effect of nullifying the
circumstance that, when Victorio was attacked and
killed, he was where his work required him to be and
that he was then in the course of performing his official duties.[16]
We likewise agree with the CA that
there was no evidence to sustain the ECC findings that SPO2 Mecayer
was intoxicated at the time of his death and thus not compensable pursuant to
Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules of the Employees’
Compensation Commission, to wit:
Section 1. Limitation
— No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when the
injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following:
(1) his intoxication;
(2) his willful attention to injure or kill himself or another; or
(3) his notorious negligence.
The ECC failed to show how it arrived
at its finding that SPO2 Mecayer was intoxicated at
the time of the contingency. The
records show that SPO2 Mecayer and his companion were
in the process of consuming one bottle of beer each which is not a sufficient
basis to establish that SPO2 Mecayer had been
affected by such alcohol drink. Considering that his intoxication
had not been proven, ECC's finding that SPO2 Mecayer's intoxication might have emboldened him to engage
in a heated argument with the assailant's wife which triggered the assailant to
shoot him is a mere speculation with no supporting evidence.
In Nitura v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission,[17] we
struck down the ECC’s finding
that the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura
was not compensable since the deceased was drunk and acted with notorious
negligence, thus:
x x x it has been held that even if it could be shown that a person drank
intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a
defense to show that said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as
much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still
remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus, intoxication which does not
incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to
defeat the recovery of compensation, although intoxication may be a
contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was the proximate cause of death
or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who raises drunkenness as a
defense (Vda. de Yohanan v.
Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348 [1977]). While it may be admitted that the deceased
drank intoxicating liquor at the dance party, respondents ECC and GSIS have not
established that the state of drunkenness of the deceased is the proximate
cause of his death.
On
the other hand, notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere
or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act
of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules, orders,
and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no
intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life (Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation v. WCC, 105 SCRA ,75 [1981]) reiterating Paez
v. WCC, 7 SCRA 588 [1963]).[18]
WHEREFORE, the
petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, concurred in by Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Mario L. Guariña III; CA rollo, pp. 39-44.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Per Marcelino S. Alejo, Manager, id. at 24.
[6]
[7] Certified correct by Elmor D. Juridico, Executive Director, ECC, id. at 31-34.
[8] CA rollo, p. 43.
[9] 133 Phil. 786 (1968).
[10] CA rollo, p. 89
[11] Rollo, p. 18
[12] 327 Phil. 510 (1996).
[13]
G.R. No. 84307,
[14] CA rollo, p. 22.
[15] 274 Phil. 315 (1991).
[16]
[17] G.R. No. 89217,
[18] Id at 285-286.