Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
himself, and as
Attorney-in-Fact
of ROSALIA G. TORRE,
PAQUITO
LETICIA G. MAESTRO and
CLARO
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
de
MINDO and LILIA RICO
MINANO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x-
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated
The present case originated from
a complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan,
Romblon by herein petitioners, in their capacity as
heirs of Juan Galicia (Juan), against Milagros Rico-Glori
(Milagros) and her tenants Dominador Musca and Alfonso Fallar, Jr. for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Annulment of Title, Documents and Other
Papers. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. OD-306.
In their Complaint, petitioners
contended that their predecessor, Juan, was the true and lawful owner of a
parcel of land situated in Concepcion Sur, Sta. Maria, Romblon known as
Lot No. 139 and containing an area of 5.5329 hectares, the same having been
declared in his name under various tax declarations the latest of which being
Tax Declaration No. 0037, Series of 1994; after years of possession of the said
land, Juan was driven away from the property through force by the heirs of a
certain Ines Ramirez (Ines),
one of whom is defendant Milagros; because of poverty and lack of knowledge,
Juan was not able to assert his right to the said property but he informed his
children that they own the above-described parcel of land; and the continuous
possession of the property by Milagros and her co-defendants, tenants has
further deprived herein petitioners of their right over the same.
Defendants denied the allegations
of petitioners in their complaint asserting that Juan was not the owner and
never took possession of the disputed lot. They also contended that the subject property
was part of a larger parcel of land which was acquired by Ines,
Milagros’s predecessor-in-interest in 1947 from a
certain Juan Galicha who is a different person from
Juan Galicia.
During the scheduled pre-trial
conference on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
1. Declaring plaintiffs as the true and absolute owner of the property subject of the case and particularly described in paragraph II of the complaint;
2. Affirming and confirming the validity and legality of plaintiffs’ ownership over the property;
3. Ordering defendants to vacate the land adverted to in paragraph II of the complaint;
4. For the defendants to respect plaintiffs' peaceful possession and ownership of the land aforesaid; and
5. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On
In its Order of
Meanwhile, the defendants in Civil
Case No. OD-306 filed an appeal with the CA. Their Notice of Appeal was filed on
Subsequently, the trial court issued a
writ of execution dated
On
On
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 2, 1997 and Writ of Execution dated March 3, 2000 of Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution[5]
dated
Hence, the instant petition for review
based on the following assignment of errors:
1. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION DATED 2 DECEMBER 1997 AND WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED 3 MARCH 2000 OF BRANCH 82 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ODIONGAN, ROMBLON FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF PETITIONERS (NOW RESPONDENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE), A DECISION NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
2. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
ON THE GROUND OF ESTOPPEL ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS IN CA-G.R. SP. NO.
58834.[6]
As to their first
assigned error, petitioners invoke the principle that jurisdiction over the
person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority. Applying
this rule in the present case, petitioners argue that by filing their Motion
for Leave to Intervene in the RTC, herein respondents voluntarily submitted
themselves to the authority of the trial court, hence placing themselves under
its jurisdiction; that by filing the said Motion, they recognized the authority
of the court to hear and decide not only their Motion but the case itself; and that
by acting on their Motion, the court actually exercised jurisdiction over the
persons of petitioners.
With respect to their second assigned
error, petitioners contend that by respondents’ voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court they are already estopped
in denying the authority of the court which they invoked when they filed their
Motion. Petitioners also contend that
respondents had several opportunities to raise the issue of the court’s lack of
jurisdiction over their persons but they remained silent and did not pursue the
remedies available to them for an unreasonable length of time; hence, they are
now barred by laches from questioning the court’s
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, respondents counter
that the CA did not err in setting aside the trial court's decision on the
ground that defendants, as indispensable parties, were not joined in the
complaint. Respondents argue that the CA
correctly held that when an indispensable party is not before the court then
the action should be dismissed because the absence of such indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act not only as against him but even as against those present.
Respondents also aver that even
assuming that herein petitioners were the true owners of the subject land, they
have lost such ownership by extinctive prescription because respondents and
their predecessors had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the subject
lot for more than 40 years. As such,
they had become the owners thereof by acquisitive prescription.
The petition lacks merit but the CA
Decision will have to be modified in the interest of substantial justice and
for the orderly administration of justice, as will be shown forthwith.
It is
true that the allowance and disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court hearing the case.[7] However,
jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Court ruled
that a motion to intervene may be entertained or allowed even if filed after
judgment was rendered by the trial court, especially in cases where the intervenors are indispensable parties.[8]
In Pinlac
v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The rule on intervention,
like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court
fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has
allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court.[9]
Since it is not disputed that herein respondents are
compulsory heirs of Ines who stand to be affected by the
judgment of the trial court, the latter should have granted their
Motion to Intervene and should have admitted their Answer-in-Intervention.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there
can be no final determination of an action. As such, they
must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making
of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of
all necessary parties where possible and the joinder
of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being
a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.[10] It is precisely when an indispensable
party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed.[11] The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[12] The evident aim and intent of the Rules
regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary
parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between
the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons
who may be affected by the judgment.[13] A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where
there is want of indispensable parties.[14]
As
to the question of whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of herein respondents, the Court has held that the filing of motions
seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court.[15] Hence, in the present case, when respondents
filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene, attaching thereto their Answer-in-Intervention,
they have effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. But this circumstance did not cure the fatal
defect of non-inclusion of respondents as indispensable parties in the
complaint filed by petitioner. It must
be emphasized that respondents were not able to participate during the
pre-trial much less present evidence in support of their claims. In other words, the court acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of herein respondents only when they filed their
Motion for Leave to Intervene with the RTC. Prior to that, they were strangers
to Civil Case No. OD-306.
It
is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court.[16] In the present case, respondents and their
co-heirs are adversely affected by the judgment rendered by the trial court
considering their ostensible ownership of the property. It will be the height of inequity to declare
herein petitioners as owners of the disputed lot without giving respondents the
opportunity to present any evidence in support of their claim that the subject
property still forms part of the estate of their deceased predecessor and is
the subject of a pending action for partition among the compulsory heirs. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law.[17]
This Court held in Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company v. Alejo that:
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[18]
In the
absence of herein respondents and their co-heirs who are indispensable parties, the trial court had in the first place no authority to act on the case. Thus,
the judgment of the trial court was null and void due to lack of jurisdiction over indispensable parties.[19] The CA
correctly annulled the RTC Decision and writ of execution.
As to the timeliness of the petition for annulment of
judgment filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides
that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be
filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The
principle of laches or “stale demands” ordains that
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.[20]
There
is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.[21] The question
of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations.[22] It cannot be used to defeat justice or
perpetrate fraud and injustice.[23]
It is the better rule that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice would result.[24]
In
the present case, the
CA found no evidence to show when respondents acquired knowledge of the
complaint that petitioners filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court finds that herein
respondents' right to due process is the overriding consideration in allowing
them to intervene in Civil Case No. OD-306.
Petitioners
also fault herein respondents for their failure to avail of other remedies
before filing a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. Petitioners
cited the remedies enumerated by the RTC in its Order of
The settled
rule is that a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[25] Indeed, jurisprudence upholds the soundness of
an independent action to declare as null and void a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction as in this case.[26]
As a result of and in consonance with the
foregoing discussions, the complaint filed by herein petitioners with the trial
court should have been dismissed at the outset, in the absence of indispensable
parties.
Inevitably,
the following questions come to mind: what happens to the original defendants
who were declared as in default and judgment by default was rendered
against them? What happens to the final
and executory dismissal of the appeal of the defaulted
defendants by the CA?
It is an
accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
of future litigation.[27]
In
concurrence therewith, the Court makes the following observations:
To dismiss
the complaint of herein petitioners for non-inclusion of herein respondents as
indispensable parties, the former would have no other recourse but to file anew
a complaint against the latter and the original defendants. This would not be in keeping with the Court's
policy of promoting a just and inexpensive disposition of a case. It is best that the complaint remains which
is deemed amended by the admission of the Answer-in-Intervention of the
indispensable parties.
The trial court’s declaration of the
defendants as in default in Civil Case No. OD-306 for their failure to attend
the pre-trial conference and the consequent final and executory
judgment by default, are altogether void and of no effect considering that the
RTC acted without jurisdiction from the very beginning because of non-inclusion
of indispensable parties. The Court
reiterates the ruling in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company that void judgment
for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all; it cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation.[28]
Parties are reverted back to the stage
where all the defendants have filed their respective Answers.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION to the effect that the Regional
Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon,
Branch 82 is ordered to GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene of
respondents and their other co-heirs, ADMIT
their Answer-in-Intervention, MAINTAIN the Answer of original
defendants, and
from there to PROCEED with Civil Case No. OD-306 in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño, CA rollo, pp. 62-74.
[2] Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño, id. at 113.
[3] Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[4] CA rollo, p. 73.
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 14.
[7] Foster-Gallego
v. Galang, G.R. No. 130228,
[8] Pinlac
v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527, 534-536 (2003), citing Mago v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225, 234
(1999); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45168,
[9] Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, id. at 534.
[10] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 267 (1997).
[11]
[12]
[13] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 316 (2001).
[14]
[15] Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590,
[16] National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945,
[17] Id at 479.
[18] Supra note 13, at 318.
[19]
[20] Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 125837,
[21] Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Querimit, 424 Phil. 721, 732 (2002).
[22]
[23]
[24] Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 607, 616 (1999).
[25] Ancheta
v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370,
[26] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10, at 286.
[27] Munsayac-De Villa v. Court of Appeals, 460 Phil. 613, 624 (2003).
[28] Supra note 13, at 318.