THIRD DIVISION
SAMSON CHING, G.R. No.
141181
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
CLARITA NICDAO
and
HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the
Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching of
the Decision[1] dated P20,950,000.00.
Factual and
Procedural Antecedents
On
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22, committed as follows:
That on or about P20,000,000.00]
in payment of her obligation with complainant Samson T.Y. Ching, the said
accused knowing fully well that at the time she issued the said check she did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in
full of the said check upon presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds and
notwithstanding receipt of notice of such dishonor the said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to
pay the value of the said check in the amount of [P20,000,000.00] or to make
arrangement with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the same within
five (5) banking days after receiving the said notice, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Samson T.Y. Ching in the aforementioned amount of
[P20,000,000.00], Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Dinalupihan,
(Sgd.) SAMSON T.Y. CHING
Complainant
The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9433 up to 9443 involving the
following details:
Check
No. Amount
Date Private Reason
for
Complainant the Dishonor
002524[2] P 20,000,000
008856[3] 150,000
012142[4] 100,000
004531[5] 50,000
002254[6] 100,000
008875[7] 100,000
008936[8] 50,000
002273[9] 50,000
008948[10] 150,000
008935[11] 100,000
010377[12] 100,000
At
about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for
violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said
to be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14)
checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to
Nuguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were filed with the same
MCTC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471.
At her
arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of “not guilty” to all the
charges. A joint trial was then
conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471.
For the
prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner Ching and Imelda
Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were
presented to prove the charges against respondent Nicdao. On
direct-examination,[13]
petitioner Ching preliminarily identified each of the eleven (11) Hermosa
Savings & Loan Bank (HSLB) checks that were allegedly issued to him by
respondent Nicdao amounting to P20,950,000.00. He identified the signatures appearing on the
checks as those of respondent Nicdao. He
recognized her signatures because respondent Nicdao allegedly signed the checks
in his presence. When petitioner Ching
presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank, HSLB, for
being “DAIF” or “drawn against insufficient funds.”
Petitioner
Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by respondent Nicdao as
security for the loans that she obtained from him. Their transaction began sometime in October
1995 when respondent Nicdao, proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together
with her husband, approached him to borrow money in order for them to settle
their financial obligations. They agreed that respondent Nicdao would leave the
checks undated and that she would pay the loans within one year. However, when petitioner Ching went to see
her after the lapse of one year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly
said that she had no cash.
Petitioner
Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao several times more but
every time, she would tell him that she had no money. Then in September 1997, respondent Nicdao
allegedly got mad at him for being insistent and challenged him about seeing
each other in court. Because of
respondent Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay her obligations, on
On
cross-examination,[14]
petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a salesman of the La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Manufacturing for almost ten (10) years already. As such, he delivered the goods and had a
warehouse. He received salary and
commissions. He could not, however,
state his exact gross income. According
to him, it increased every year because of his business. He asserted that aside from being a salesman,
he was also in the business of extending loans to other people at an interest,
which varied depending on the person he was dealing with.
Petitioner Ching confirmed the
truthfulness of the allegations contained in the eleven (11) Informations that
he filed against respondent Nicdao. He
reiterated that, upon their agreement, the checks were all signed by respondent
Nicdao but she left them undated.
Petitioner Ching admitted that he was the one who wrote the date,
With respect to the P20,000,000.00
check (Check No. 002524), petitioner Ching explained that he wrote the date and
amount thereon when, upon his estimation, the money that he regularly lent to
respondent Nicdao beginning October 1995 reached the said sum. He likewise intimated that prior to 1995,
they had another transaction amounting to P1,200,000.00 and, as security
therefor, respondent Nicdao similarly issued in his favor checks in varying
amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00. When the said amount was fully paid,
petitioner Ching returned the checks to respondent Nicdao.
Petitioner Ching maintained that the
eleven (11) checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 pertained to
respondent Nicdao’s loan transactions with him beginning October 1995. He also mentioned an instance when respondent
Nicdao’s husband and daughter approached him at a casino to borrow money from
him. He lent them P300,000.00. According to petitioner Ching, since this
amount was also unpaid, he included it in the other amounts that respondent
Nicdao owed to him which totaled P20,000,000.00 and wrote the said
amount on one of respondent Nicdao’s blank checks that she delivered to him.
Petitioner Ching explained that from
October 1995 up to 1997, he regularly delivered money to respondent Nicdao, in
the amount of P1,000,000.00 until the total amount reached P20,000,000.00. He did not ask respondent Nicdao to
acknowledge receiving these amounts.
Petitioner Ching claimed that he was confident that he would be paid by
respondent Nicdao because he had in his possession her blank checks. On the other hand, the latter allegedly had
no cause to fear that he would fill up the checks with just any amount because
they had trust and confidence in each other.
When asked to produce the piece of paper on which he allegedly wrote the
amounts that he lent to respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not present
it; he reasoned that it was not with him at that time.
It was also averred by petitioner
Ching that respondent Nicdao confided to him that she told her daughter
Janette, who was married to a foreigner, that her debt to him was only between P3,000,000.00
and P5,000,000.00. Petitioner
Ching claimed that he offered to accompany respondent Nicdao to her daughter in
order that they could apprise her of the amount that she owed him. Respondent Nicdao refused for fear that it
would cause disharmony in the family.
She assured petitioner Ching, however, that he would be paid by her
daughter.
Petitioner Ching reiterated that
after the lapse of one (1) year from the time respondent Nicdao issued the
checks to him, he went to her several times to collect payment. In all these instances, she said that she had
no cash. Finally, in September 1997,
respondent Nicdao allegedly went to his house and told him that Janette was
only willing to pay him between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00
because, as far as her daughter was concerned, that was the only amount
borrowed from petitioner Ching. On
hearing this, petitioner Ching angrily told respondent Nicdao that she should
not have allowed her debt to reach P20,000,000.00 knowing that she would
not be able to pay the full amount.
Petitioner Ching identified the
demand letter that he and Nuguid sent to respondent Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her
about depositing her checks on his account because she already made that
statement about seeing him in court.
Again, he admitted writing the date,
Another witness presented by the
prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an employee of HSLB. On direct-examination,[15]
she testified that she worked as a checking account bookkeeper/teller of the
bank. As such, she received the checks that were drawn against the bank and
verified if they were funded. On P300.00
was left in respondent Nicdao’s checking account and P645.83 in her
savings account. On even date, her
account with the bank was considered inactive.
On cross-examination,[16]
Yandoc stated anew that respondent Nicdao’s checks bounced on
For its part, the defense proffered
the testimonies of respondent Nicdao, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct-examination,[17]
respondent Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she
had borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total amount of
P22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao
admitted, however, that she had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only for P2,100,000.00
and the same was already fully paid. As
proof of such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the said
demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of
petitioner Ching.
In addition, respondent Nicdao also
presented and identified several cigarette wrappers[18]
at the back of which appeared computations. She explained that Nuguid went to the grocery
store everyday to collect interest payments.
The principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day.
Nuguid allegedly wrote the payments for the daily interests at the back of the
cigarette wrappers that she gave to respondent Nicdao.
The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00
was allegedly delivered by Nuguid to respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00
and P150,000.00. Respondent
Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Ching that prior to 1995, they had
another transaction.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00
check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but
denied that she issued the same to petitioner Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise
admitted that the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts and payee
thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, who were
employees of Vignette Superstore and authorized by her to do so.
Respondent Nicdao clarified that,
except for the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10) checks were
handed to Nuguid on different occasions.
Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest
payments. Respondent Nicdao said that
she purposely left the checks undated because she would still have to notify
Nuguid if she already had the money to fund the checks.
Respondent Nicdao denied ever
confiding to petitioner Ching that she was afraid that her daughter would get
mad if she found out about the amount that she owed him. What allegedly transpired was that when she
already had the money to pay them (presumably referring to petitioner Ching and
Nuguid), she went to them to retrieve her checks. However, petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused
to return the checks claiming that she (respondent Nicdao) still owed them
money. She demanded that they show her
the checks in order that she would know the exact amount of her debt, but they
refused. It was at this point that she got angry and dared them to go to court.
After the said incident, respondent
Nicdao was surprised to be notified by HSLB that her check in the amount of P20,000,000.00
was just presented to the bank for payment. She claimed that it was only then
that she remembered that sometime in 1995, she was informed by her employee
that one of her checks was missing. At
that time, she did not let it bother her thinking that it would eventually
surface when presented to the bank.
Respondent Nicdao could not explain
how the said check came into petitioner Ching’s possession. She explained that she kept her checks in an
ordinary cash box together with a stapler and the cigarette wrappers that
contained Nuguid’s computations. Her saleslady had access to this box. Respondent Nicdao averred that it was Nuguid
who offered to give her a loan as she would allegedly need money to manage
Vignette Superstore. Nuguid used to run
the said store before respondent Nicdao’s daughter bought it from Nuguid’s
family, its previous owner. According to
respondent Nicdao, it was Nuguid who regularly delivered the cash to respondent
Nicdao or, if she was not at the grocery store, to her saleslady. Respondent Nicdao denied any knowledge that
the money loaned to her by Nuguid belonged to petitioner Ching.
At the continuation of her
direct-examination,[19]
respondent Nicdao said that she never dealt with petitioner Ching because it
was Nuguid who went to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest
payments. When shown the P20,000,000.00
check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but she
denied issuing it as a blank check to petitioner Ching. On the other hand, with respect to the other
ten (10) checks, she also admitted that the signatures thereon were hers and
that the amounts thereon were written by either Josie Nicdao or Melanie
Tolentino, her employees whom she authorized to do so. With respect to the payee, it was purposely
left blank allegedly upon instruction of Nuguid who said that she would use the
checks to pay someone else.
On cross-examination,[20]
respondent Nicdao explained that Josie Nicdao and Melanie Tolentino were
caretakers of the grocery store and that they manned it when she was not
there. She likewise confirmed that she
authorized them to write the amounts on the checks after she had affixed her
signature thereon. She stressed,
however, that the P20,000,000.00 check was the one that was reported to
her as lost or missing by her saleslady sometime in 1995. She never reported the matter to the bank
because she was confident that it would just surface when it would be presented
for payment.
Again, respondent Nicdao identified
the cigarette wrappers which indicated the daily payments she had made to
Nuguid. The latter allegedly went to
the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Further, the figures at the back of the
cigarette wrappers were written by Nuguid. Respondent Nicdao asserted that she
recognized her handwriting because Nuguid sometimes wrote them in her
presence. Respondent Nicdao maintained
that she had already paid Nuguid the amount of P1,200,000.00 as
evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft which she gave to the latter and
which was subsequently negotiated and deposited in petitioner Ching’s
account. In connection thereto,
respondent Nicdao refuted the prosecution’s allegation that the demand draft
was payment for a previous transaction that she had with petitioner Ching. She clarified that the payments that Nuguid
collected from her everyday were only for the interests due. She did not ask Nuguid to make written acknowledgements
of her payments.
Melanie Tolentino was presented to
corroborate the testimony of respondent Nicdao.
On direct-examination,[21]
Tolentino stated that she worked at the Vignette Superstore and she knew Nuguid
because her employer, respondent Nicdao, used to borrow money from her. She knew petitioner Ching only by name and
that he was the “husband” of Nuguid.
As an employee of the grocery store,
Tolentino stated that she acted as its caretaker and was entrusted with the
custody of respondent Nicdao’s personal checks.
Tolentino identified her own handwriting on some of the checks
especially with respect to the amounts and figures written thereon. She said that Nuguid instructed her to leave
the space for the payee blank as she would use the checks to pay someone else. Tolentino added that she could not recall
respondent Nicdao issuing a check to petitioner Ching in the amount of P20,000,000.00. She confirmed that they lost a check sometime
in 1995. When informed about it, respondent
Nicdao told her that the check could have been issued to someone else, and that
it would just surface when presented to the bank.
Tolentino recounted that Nuguid came
to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments of the
loan. In some instances, upon respondent
Nicdao’s instruction, Tolentino handed to Nuguid checks that were already
signed by respondent Nicdao. Sometimes,
Tolentino would be the one to write the amount on the checks. Nuguid, in turn, wrote the amounts on pieces
of paper which were kept by respondent Nicdao.
On cross-examination,[22]
Tolentino confirmed that she was authorized by respondent Nicdao to fill up the
checks and hand them to Nuguid. The
latter came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Tolentino claimed that in 1995, in the course
of chronologically arranging respondent Nicdao’s check booklets, she noticed
that a check was missing. Respondent
Nicdao told her that perhaps she issued it to someone and that it would just
turn up in the bank. Tolentino was
certain that the missing check was the same one that petitioner Ching presented
to the bank for payment in the amount of P20,000,000.00.
Tolentino stated that she left the
employ of respondent Nicdao sometime in 1996.
After the checks were dishonored in October 1997, Tolentino got a call
from respondent Nicdao. After she was
shown a fax copy thereof, Tolentino confirmed that the P20,000,000.00
check was the same one that she reported as missing in 1995.
Jocelyn Nicdao also took the witness
stand to corroborate the testimony of the other defense witnesses. On direct-examination,[23]
she averred that she was a saleslady at the Vignette Superstore from August
1994 up to April 1998. She knew Nuguid
as well as petitioner Ching.
Jocelyn Nicdao further testified that
respondent Nicdao was indebted to Nuguid.
Jocelyn Nicdao used to fill up the checks of respondent Nicdao that had
already been signed by her and give them to Nuguid. The latter came to the
grocery store everyday to pick up the interest payments. Jocelyn Nicdao
identified the checks on which she wrote the amounts and, in some instances,
the name of Nuguid as payee. However, most of the time, Nuguid allegedly
instructed her to leave as blank the space for the payee.
Jocelyn Nicdao identified the
cigarette wrappers as the documents on which Nuguid acknowledged receipt of the
interest payments. She explained that
she was the one who wrote the minus entries and they represented the daily interest
payments received by Nuguid.
On cross-examination,[24]
Jocelyn Nicdao stated that she was a distant cousin of respondent Nicdao. She stopped working for her in 1998 because
she wanted to take a rest. Jocelyn
Nicdao reiterated that she handed the checks to Nuguid at the grocery store.
After due trial, on December 8, 1998,
the MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting
respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Ching’s
testimony that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in the total amount of
P20,950,000.00. Petitioner Ching
delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to
1997 until the sum reached P20,000,000.00. The MCTC also found that subsequent thereto,
respondent Nicdao still borrowed money from petitioner Ching. As security for these loans, respondent
Nicdao issued checks to petitioner Ching.
When the latter deposited the checks (eleven in all) on
The MCTC explained that the crime of
violation of BP 22 has the following elements: (a) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (c) subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.[25]
According to the MCTC, all the
foregoing elements are present in the case of respondent Nicdao’s issuance of
the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443. On the first element, respondent Nicdao was
found by the MCTC to have made, drawn and issued the checks. The fact that she did not personally write
the payee and date on the checks was not material considering that under
Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, “where the instrument
is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession
thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks
therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the
signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument
operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount x x
x.” Respondent Nicdao admitted that she
authorized her employees to provide the details on the checks after she had signed
them.
The MCTC disbelieved respondent
Nicdao’s claim that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she
lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary
prudence would dictate that a lost check would at least be immediately reported
to the bank to prevent its unauthorized endorsement or negotiation. Respondent Nicdao made no such report to the
bank. Even if the said check was indeed
lost, the MCTC faulted respondent Nicdao for being negligent in keeping the
checks that she had already signed in an unsecured box.
The MCTC further ruled that there was
no evidence to show that petitioner Ching was not a holder in due course as to
cause it (the MCTC) to believe that the said check was not issued to him. Respondent Nicdao’s admission of indebtedness
was sufficient to prove that there was consideration for the issuance of the
checks.
The second element was also found by
the MCTC to be present as it held that respondent Nicdao, as maker, drawer or
issuer, had knowledge that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the checks
upon their presentment.
As to the third element, the MCTC
established that the checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
being “DAIF” or drawn against insufficient funds. Stamped at the back of each check was the
annotation “DAIF.” The bank representative likewise testified to the fact of
dishonor.
Under the foregoing circumstances,
the MCTC declared that the conviction of respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a
worthless check was malum prohibitum;
hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee, once
dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and conviction of BP 22.[26] The decretal portion of the MCTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and
is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P20,950,000.00
plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint until the
total amount had been paid. The prayer
for moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is
likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every check
issued and which penalty shall be served successively.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Incidentally,
on
On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan,
Respondent
Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for review of the two
decisions of the RTC. The petition involving
the eleven (11) checks purportedly issued to petitioner Ching was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 (assigned to the 13th Division). On the other hand, the petition involving the
fourteen (14) checks purportedly issued to Nuguid was docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 23054 (originally assigned to the 7th Division but transferred
to the 6th Division). The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its respective comments on the said
petitions. Subsequently, the OSG filed
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 a motion for its consolidation with CA-G.R. CR No.
23054. The OSG prayed that CA-G.R. CR
No. 23055 pending before the 13th Division be transferred and
consolidated with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in accordance with the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Acting
on the motion for consolidation, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 issued a
Resolution dated
On
November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven
(11) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching. The decretal portion of the assailed CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
being meritorious, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated May 10, 1999,
of the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 5, Bataan,
affirming the decision dated December 8, 1998, of the First Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa,
SO
ORDERED.[28]
On
even date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above decision
has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of Judgments.
In
acquitting respondent Nicdao in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, the CA made the following
factual findings:
Petitioner [respondent herein] Clarita S. Nicdao, a middle-aged mother and housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd, who is married to a wealthy expatriate.
Complainant [petitioner herein] Samson Ching is a Chinese national, who claimed he is a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
Emma Nuguid, complainant’s live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly connected with Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery store now known as the Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store, which was about to be foreclosed, to petitioner’s daughter, Janette Boyd. Since then, petitioner began managing said store. However, since petitioner could not always be at the Vignette Superstore to keep shop, she entrusted to her salesladies, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao, pre-signed checks, which were left blank as to amount and the payee, to cover for any delivery of merchandise sold at the store. The blank and personal checks were placed in a cash box at Vignette Superstore and were filled up by said salesladies upon instruction of petitioner as to amount, payee and date.
Soon thereafter, Emma Nuguid befriended petitioner and offered to lend money to the latter which could be used in running her newly acquired store. Nuguid represented to petitioner that as former manager of the Vignette Superstore, she knew that petitioner would be in need of credit to meet the daily expenses of running the business, particularly in the daily purchases of merchandise to be sold at the store. After Emma Nuguid succeeded in befriending petitioner, Nuguid was able to gain access to the Vignette Superstore where petitioner’s blank and pre-signed checks were kept.[29]
In
addition, the CA also made the finding that respondent Nicdao borrowed money
from Nuguid in the total amount of P2,100,000.00 secured by twenty-four
(24) checks drawn against respondent Nicdao’s account with HSLB. Upon Nuguid’s instruction, the checks given
by respondent Nicdao as security for the loans were left blank as to the payee
and the date. The loans consisted of (a)
P950,000.00 covered by ten (10) checks subject of the criminal
complaints filed by petitioner Ching (CA-G.R. CR No. 23055); and (b) P1,150,000.00
covered by fourteen (14) checks subject of the criminal complaints filed by
Nuguid (CA-G.R. CR No. 23054). The loans
totaled P2,100,000.00 and they were transacted between respondent Nicdao
and Nuguid only. Respondent Nicdao never
dealt with petitioner Ching.
Against
the foregoing factual findings, the CA declared that, based on the evidence,
respondent Nicdao had already fully paid the loans. In particular, the CA referred to the
Planters Bank demand draft in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which, by his
own admission, petitioner Ching had received. The appellate court debunked
petitioner Ching’s allegation that the said demand draft was payment for a
previous transaction. According to the
CA, petitioner Ching failed to adduce evidence to prove the existence of a
previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao.
Apart
from the demand draft, the CA also stated that respondent Nicdao made interest
payments on a daily basis to Nuguid as evidenced by the computations written at
the back of the cigarette wrappers.
Based on these computations, as of P5,780,000.00 payments to Nuguid for the interests alone. Adding up this amount and that of the
Planters Bank demand draft, the CA placed the payments made by respondent
Nicdao to Nuguid as already amounting to P6,980,000.00 for the principal
loan amount of only P2,100,000.00.
The
CA negated petitioner Ching’s contention that the payments as reflected at the
back of the cigarette wrappers could be applied only to the interests due. Since the transactions were not evidenced
by any document or writing, the CA ratiocinated that no interests could be
collected because, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, “no interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.”
The
CA gave credence to the testimony of respondent Nicdao that when she had fully
paid her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her checks. Nuguid, however, refused to return the checks
to respondent Nicdao. Instead, Nuguid
and petitioner Ching filled up the said checks to make it appear that: (a)
petitioner Ching was the payee in five checks; (b) the six checks were payable
to cash; (c) Nuguid was the payee in fourteen (14) checks. Petitioner Ching and Nuguid then put the date
With
the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations to
Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for violation
of BP 22. It was explained that to be
held liable under BP 22, it must be established, inter alia, that the check was made or drawn and issued to apply on
account or for value. According to the
CA, the word “account” refers to a pre-existing obligation, while “for value”
means an obligation incurred simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In
the case of respondent Nicdao’s checks, the pre-existing obligations secured by
them were already extinguished after full payment had been made by respondent
Nicdao to Nuguid. Obligations are
extinguished by, among others, payment.[30] The CA believed that when petitioner Ching
and Nuguid refused to return respondent Nicdao’s checks despite her total
payment of P6,980,000.00 for the loans secured by the checks, petitioner
Ching and Nuguid were using BP 22 to coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt
which she no longer owed them.
With
respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by
petitioner Ching’s claim that he delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to
respondent Nicdao until the amount reached P20,000,000.00 and, when she
refused to pay the same, he filled up the check, which she earlier delivered to
him as security for the loans, by writing thereon the said amount. In disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA
pointed out that, contrary to his assertion, he was never employed by the La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing per the letter of Susan Resurreccion,
Vice-President and Legal Counsel of the said company. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner Ching, he
did not own the house where he and Nuguid lived.
Moreover,
the CA characterized as incredible and contrary to human experience that
petitioner Ching would, as he claimed, deliver a total sum of P20,000,000.00
to respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof thereof, e.g., written acknowledgment that she
received the same. On the other hand, it
found plausible respondent Nicdao’s version of the story that the P20,000,000.00
check was the same one that was missing way back in 1995. The CA opined that this missing check
surfaced in the hands of petitioner Ching who, in cahoots with Nuguid, wrote
the amount P20,000,000.00 thereon and deposited it in his account. To the mind of the CA, the inference that the
check was stolen was anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. Specifically, Nuguid, as previous
manager/owner of the grocery store, had access thereto. Likewise applicable, according to the CA, was
the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article was
presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article.[31]
The
CA emphasized that the P20,000,000.00 check was never delivered by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching.
As such, the said check without the details as to the date, amount and
payee, was an incomplete and undelivered instrument when it was stolen and
ended up in petitioner Ching’s hands. On
this point, the CA applied Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law:
SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. – Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.
SEC. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
The
CA held that the P20,000,000.00 check was filled up by petitioner Ching
without respondent Nicdao’s authority.
Further, it was incomplete and undelivered. Hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any
right or interest therein and could
not assert any cause of action founded on the
stolen checks.[32]
Under these circumstances, the CA concluded that respondent could not be held
liable for violation of BP 22.
The Petitioner’s Case
As
mentioned earlier, the instant petition pertains and is limited solely to the
civil aspect of the case as petitioner Ching argues that notwithstanding
respondent Nicdao’s acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22,
she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored
checks in the aggregate sum of P20,950,000.00.
He
urges the Court to review the findings of facts made by the CA as they are
allegedly based on a misapprehension of facts and manifestly erroneous and
contradicted by the evidence. Further,
the CA’s factual findings are in conflict with those of the RTC and MCTC.
Petitioner
Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by
the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and
rule on her civil liability. He invokes
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which, prior to its
amendment, provided, in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil
action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97[33]
dated
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. x x x
Petitioner Ching theorizes that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 arising from the same act or omission of the
accused is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Moreover, under the above-quoted Circular,
the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the
corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the
dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.
In
seeking to enforce the alleged civil liability of respondent Nicdao, petitioner
Ching maintains that she had loan obligations to him totaling P20,950,000.00. The existence of the same is allegedly
established by his testimony before the MCTC.
Also, he asks the Court to take judicial notice that for a monetary loan
secured by a check, the check itself is the evidence of indebtedness.
He
insists that, contrary to her protestation, respondent Nicdao also transacted
with him, not only with Nuguid. Petitioner
Ching pointed out that during respondent Nicdao’s testimony, she referred to
her creditors in plural form, e.g.
“[I] told them, most checks that I
issued I will inform them if I have
money.” Even respondent Nicdao’s
employees allegedly knew him; they testified that Nuguid instructed them at
times to leave as blank the payee on the checks as they would be paid to
someone else, who turned out to be petitioner Ching.
It
was allegedly erroneous for the CA to hold that he had no capacity to lend P20,950,000.00
to respondent Nicdao. Petitioner Ching
clarified that what he meant when he testified before the MCTC was that he was
engaged in dealership with La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing, and not
merely its sales agent. He stresses that
he owns a warehouse and is also in the business of lending money. Further, the CA’s reasoning that he could not
possibly have lent P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao since petitioner
Ching and Nuguid did not own the house where they live, is allegedly non sequitur.
Petitioner Ching maintains that,
contrary to the CA’s finding, the Planters Bank demand draft for P1,200,000.00
was in payment for respondent Nicdao’s previous loan transaction with him. Apart from the P20,000,000.00 check,
the other ten (10) checks (totaling P950,000.00) were allegedly issued
by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching as security for the loans that she
obtained from him from 1995 to 1997.
The existence of another loan obligation prior to the said period was
allegedly established by the testimony of respondent Nicdao’s own witness,
Jocelyn Nicdao, who testified that when she started working in Vignette
Superstore in 1994, she noticed that respondent Nicdao was already indebted to
Nuguid.
Petitioner Ching also takes exception
to the CA’s ruling that the payments made by respondent Nicdao as reflected on
the computations at the back of the cigarette wrappers were for both the
principal loan and interests. He insists
that they were for the interests alone.
Even respondent Nicdao’s testimony allegedly showed that they were daily
interest payments. Petitioner Ching
further avers that the interest payments totaling P5,780,000.00 can only
mean that, contrary to respondent Nicdao’s claim, her loan obligations amounted
to much more than P2,100,000.00.
Further, she is allegedly estopped from questioning the interests
because she willingly paid the same.
Petitioner Ching also harps on
respondent Nicdao’s silence when she received his and Nuguid’s demand letter to
her. Through the said letter, they
notified her that the twenty-five (25) checks valued at P22,100,000.00
were dishonored by the HSLB, and that she had three days to settle her
ndebtedness with them, otherwise, face prosecution. Respondent Nicdao’s silence, i.e., her failure to deny or protest the
same by way of reply, vis-ŕ-vis the
demand letter, allegedly constitutes an admission of the statements contained
therein.
On the other hand, the MCTC’s
decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is allegedly based on the evidence on record;
it has been established that the checks were respondent Nicdao’s personal
checks, that the signatures thereon were hers and that she had issued them to
petitioner Ching. With respect to the P20,000,000.00
check, petitioner Ching assails the CA’s ruling that it was stolen and was
never delivered or issued by respondent Nicdao to him. The issue of the said
check being stolen was allegedly not raised during trial. Further, her failure to report the alleged
theft to the bank to stop payment of the said lost or missing check is
allegedly contrary to human experience.
Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdao’s defense of stolen or lost
check as incredible and, therefore, false.
Aside from the foregoing substantive
issues that he raised, petitioner Ching also faults the CA for not acting and
ordering the consolidation of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 with CA-G.R. CR No.
23054. He informs the Court that latter
case is still pending with the CA.
In fine, it is petitioner Ching’s
view that the CA gravely erred in disregarding the findings of the MCTC, as
affirmed by the RTC, and submits that there is more than sufficient
preponderant evidence to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to him in the
amount of P20,950,000.00. He thus
prays that the Court direct respondent Nicdao to pay him the said amount plus
12% interest per annum computed from the date of written demand until the total
amount is fully paid.
The Respondent’s Counter-Arguments
Respondent Nicdao urges the Court to
deny the petition. She posits
preliminarily that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action.
x x x x
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
According
to respondent Nicdao, the assailed CA decision has already made a finding to
the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability might arise did not exist. She refers to the ruling of the CA that the P20,000,000.00
check was stolen; hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest
over the said check and could not assert any cause of action founded on the
said check. Consequently, the CA held
that respondent Nicdao had no obligation to make good the stolen check and
cannot be held liable for violation of BP 22.
She also refers to the CA’s pronouncement relative to the ten (10) other
checks that they were not issued to apply on account or for value, considering
that the loan obligations secured by these checks had already been extinguished
by her full payment thereof.
To
respondent Nicdao’s mind, these pronouncements are equivalent to a finding that
the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The instant petition, which seeks to
enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly
already barred by the final and executory decision acquitting her.
In
any case, respondent Nicdao contends that the CA did not commit serious
misapprehension of facts when it found that the P20,000,000.00 check was
a stolen check and that she never made any transaction with petitioner
Ching. Moreover, the other ten (10)
checks were not issued to apply on account or for value. These findings are allegedly supported by
the evidence on record which consisted of the respective testimonies of the
defense witnesses to the effect that: respondent Nicdao had the practice of
leaving pre-signed checks placed inside an unsecured cash box in the Vignette
Superstore; the salesladies were given the authority to fill up the said checks
as to the amount, payee and date; Nuguid beguiled respondent Nicdao to obtain
loans from her; as security for the loans, respondent Nicdao issued checks to Nuguid; when the salesladies
gave the checks to Nuguid, she instructed them to leave blank the payee and
date; Nuguid had access to the grocery store; in 1995, one of the salesladies
reported that a check was missing; in 1997, when she had fully paid her loans
to Nuguid, respondent Nicdao tried to retrieve her checks but Nuguid and
petitioner Ching falsely told her that she still owed them money; they then
maliciously filled up the checks making it appear that petitioner Ching was the
payee in the five checks and the six others were payable to “cash”; and knowing
fully well that these checks were not funded because respondent Nicdao already
fully paid her loans, petitioner Ching and Nuguid deposited the checks and
caused them to be dishonored by HSLB.
It
is pointed out by respondent Nicdao that her testimony (that the P20,000,000.00
check was the same one that she lost sometime in 1995) was corroborated by the
respective testimonies of her employees.
Another indication that it was stolen was the fact that among all the
checks which ended up in the hands of petitioner Ching and Nuguid, only the P20,000,000.00
check was fully typewritten; the rest were invariably handwritten as to the
amounts, payee and date.
Respondent
Nicdao defends the CA’s conclusion that the P20,000,000.00 check was
stolen on the ground that an appeal in a criminal case throws open the whole
case to the appellate court’s scrutiny. In any event, she maintains that she
had been consistent in her theory of defense and merely relied on the
disputable presumption that the person in possession of a stolen article is
presumed to be the author of the theft.
Considering
that it was stolen, respondent Nicdao argues, the P20,000,000.00 check
was an incomplete and undelivered instrument in the hands of petitioner Ching
and he did not acquire any right or interest therein. Further, he cannot assert any cause of action
founded on the said stolen check. Accordingly,
petitioner Ching’s attempt to collect payment on the said check through the
instant petition must fail.
Respondent
Nicdao describes as downright incredible petitioner Ching’s testimony that she
owed him a total sum of P20,950,000.00 without any documentary proof of
the loan transactions. She submits that
it is contrary to human experience for loan transactions involving such huge
amounts of money to be devoid of any documentary proof. In relation thereto, respondent Nicdao
underscores that petitioner Ching lied about being employed as a salesman of La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing.
It is underscored that he has not adequately shown that he possessed the
financial capacity to lend such a huge amount to respondent Nicdao as he so
claimed.
Neither
could she be held liable for the ten (10) other checks (in the total amount of P950,000,000.00)
because as respondent Nicdao asseverates, she merely issued them to Nuguid as
security for her loans obtained from the latter beginning October 1995 up to
1997. As evidenced by the Planters Bank
demand draft in the amount of P1,200,000.00, she already made payment in
1996. The said demand draft was
negotiated to petitioner Ching’s account and he admitted receipt thereof. Respondent Nicdao belies his claim that the
demand draft was payment for a prior existing obligation. She asserts that petitioner Ching was unable
to present evidence of such a previous transaction.
In
addition to the Planters Bank demand draft, respondent Nicdao insists that
petitioner Ching received, through Nuguid, cash payments as evidenced by the computations
written at the back of the cigarette wrappers.
Nuguid went to the Vignette Superstore everyday to collect these
payments. The other defense witnesses corroborated this fact. Petitioner Ching
allegedly never disputed the accuracy of the accounts appearing on these
cigarette wrappers; nor did he dispute their authenticity and accuracy.
Based
on the foregoing evidence, the CA allegedly correctly held that, computing the
amount of the Planters Bank demand draft (P1,200,000.00) and those
reflected at the back of the cigarette wrappers (P5,780,000.00),
respondent Nicdao had already paid petitioner Ching and Nuguid a total sum of P6,980,000.00
for her loan obligations totaling only P950,000.00, as secured by the
ten (10) HSLB checks excluding the stolen P20,000,000.00 check.
Respondent
Nicdao rebuts petitioner Ching’s argument (that the daily payments were applied
to the interests), and claims that this is illegal. Petitioner Ching cannot insist that the daily
payments she made applied only to the interests on the loan obligations,
considering that there is admittedly no document evidencing these loans, hence,
no written stipulation for the payment of interests thereon. On this point, she invokes Article 1956 of
the Civil Code, which proscribes the collection of interest payments unless
expressly stipulated in writing.
Respondent
Nicdao emphasizes that the ten (10) other checks that she issued to Nuguid as
security for her loans had already been discharged upon her full payment
thereof. It is her belief that these
checks can no longer be used to coerce her to pay a debt that she does not owe.
On the CA’s failure to consolidate
CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054, respondent Nicdao proffers the
explanation that under the RIRCA, consolidation of the cases is not
mandatory. In fine, respondent
Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition as it failed to discharge the
burden of proving her civil liability with the required preponderance of
evidence. Moreover, the CA’s acquittal
of respondent Nicdao is premised on the finding that, apart from the stolen
check, the ten (10) other checks were not made to apply to a valid, due and
demandable obligation. This, in effect,
is a categorical ruling that the fact from which the civil liability of
respondent Nicdao may arise does not exist.
The Court’s Rulings
The
petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled
to appeal the civil aspect of the case
within the reglementary period
It
is axiomatic that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.”[34] Under the pertinent provision of the Revised
Rules of Court, the civil action is generally impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. At the time of
petitioner Ching’s filing of the Informations against respondent Nicdao,
Section 1,[35] Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil
action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
x x x x
As
a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it
the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b)[36]
of the same Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It
is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state
“whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.”[37]
In
Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,[38]
the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based
on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code –
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of
acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People[39]
the consequences of an acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From
the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended
party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil
action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not
reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Following the long recognized rule
that “the appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available to the
offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the decision,” the
period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to the
accused.[40] With petitioner Ching’s timely filing of the
instant petition for review of the civil aspect of the CA’s decision, the Court
thus has the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability of
respondent Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal.
In
order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the judgment
of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of the three categories
enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera, to wit:
(a) where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required;
(b) where
the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) where
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted.
Salazar also
enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission
imputed to him.
For reasons that will be discussed
shortly, the Court holds that respondent Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable
to petitioner Ching.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao
likewise effectively extinguished her
civil liability
A
painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her
civil liability. There is simply no
basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
First,
the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable
doubt. Rather, it is based on the
finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00
check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent
Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such,
according to the CA, petitioner Ching “did not acquire any right or interest
over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said
check,”[41]
and that respondent Nicdao “has no obligation to make good the stolen check and
cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.”[42]
With
respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured
by these checks had already been extinguished after full payment had been made
by respondent Nicdao. In this
connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e., “that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account
or for value,” is not present.
Second,
in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly
liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the
CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by
respondent Nicdao vis-ŕ-vis her loan
obligations in this manner:
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at
the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting
totaling P5,780,000.00 and the P1,200,000.00 demand draft
received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner [respondent herein]
had already made payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her
loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at
bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).[43]
On
the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it
was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability
thereon as well.
Third, while petitioner Ching
attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s liability did not arise from or was
not based upon the criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan
obligations to him (ex contractu),
however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence
the existence of these unpaid loan obligations.
Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA
in its decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the act or omission from
which her civil liability may arise did not exist. On the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA
found as follows:
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and
undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the possession of complainant Ching who,
in cahoots with his paramour Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name
as payee and in the fantastic amount of P20,000,000.00, dated it October
6, 1997, and presented it to the bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other
checks, for payment. Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is
anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. The fact already established is
that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store, had access to said store.
Moreover, the possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason,
as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of
the stolen article is presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article
(People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA 664).
As previously shown, at the time
check no. 002524 was stolen, the said check was blank in its material aspect
(as to the name of payee, the amount of the check, and the date of the check),
but was already pre-signed by petitioner.
In fact, complainant Ching himself admitted that check no. 002524 in his
possession was a blank check (TSN,
Moreover, since it has been
established that check no. 002524 had been missing since 1995 (TSN,
x x x x
In the case of check no. 002524, it
is admitted by complainant Ching that said check in his possession was a blank
check and was subsequently completed by him alone without authority from
petitioner. Inasmuch as check no. 002524 was incomplete and undelivered in the
hands of complainant Ching, he did not acquire any right or interest therein
and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action founded on said stolen check
(Development Bank of the
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire any right or interest over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said check, petitioner has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[44]
Anent the other ten (10) checks, the
CA made the following findings:
Evidence sufficiently shows that the
loans secured by the ten (10) checks involved in the cases subject of this
petition had already been paid. It is not controverted that petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a demand
draft valued at P1,200,000 to pay for the loans guaranteed by said
checks and other checks issued to her. Samson Ching admitted having received
the demand draft which he deposited in his bank account. However, complainant
Samson Ching claimed that the said demand draft represents payment for a
previous obligation incurred by petitioner. However, complainant Ching failed
to adduce any evidence to prove the existence of the alleged obligation of the
petitioner prior to those secured by the subject checks.
Apart from the payment to Emma
Nuguid through said demand draft, it is also not disputed that petitioner made cash payments
to Emma Nuguid who collected the payments almost daily at the Vignette
Superstore. As of P5,780,000.00.
All of these cash payments were recorded at the back of cigarette cartons by
Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting, the authenticity and accuracy of which were
never denied by either complainant Ching or Emma Nuguid.
Clearly, adding the payments
recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own
handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and the P1,200,000.00 demand
draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner had already made
payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan in the total
amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00
(P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).[45]
Generally checks may constitute
evidence of indebtedness.[46] However, in view of the CA’s findings relating
to the eleven (11) checks - that the P20,000,000.00 was a stolen check
and the obligations secured by the other ten (10) checks had already been fully
paid by respondent Nicdao – they can no longer be given credence to establish
respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to petitioner Ching. Such civil liability, therefore, must be
established by preponderant evidence other than the discredited checks.
After
a careful examination of the records of the case,[47]
the Court holds that the existence of respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to
petitioner Ching in the amount of P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid
obligations to the latter has not been sufficiently established by preponderant
evidence. Petitioner Ching mainly relies on his testimony before the MCTC to
establish the existence of these unpaid obligations. In gist, he testified that from October 1995
up to 1997, respondent Nicdao obtained loans from him in the total amount of P20,950,000.00. As security for her obligations, she issued
eleven (11) checks which were invariably blank as to the date, amounts and
payee. When respondent Nicdao allegedly
refused to pay her obligations despite his due demand, petitioner filled up the
checks in his possession with the corresponding amounts and date and deposited
them in his account. They were
subsequently dishonored by the HSLB for being “DAIF” and petitioner Ching
accordingly filed the criminal complaints against respondent Nicdao for
violation of BP 22.
It
is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations – Et incumbit
probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis
probatio nulla sit (The proof lies
upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of things,
he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof).[48] In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or
“greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.[49] Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court
offers the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence:
SEC. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Unfortunately, petitioner Ching’s
testimony alone does not constitute preponderant evidence to establish
respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to him amounting to P20,950,000.00. Apart from the discredited checks, he failed
to adduce any other documentary evidence to prove that respondent Nicdao still has
unpaid obligations to him in the said amount.
Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof under our Rules.[50]
In
contrast, respondent Nicdao’s defense consisted in, among others, her
allegation that she had already paid her obligations to petitioner Ching
through Nuguid. In support thereof, she
presented the Planters Bank demand draft for P1,200,000.00. The said demand draft was negotiated to
petitioner Ching’s account and he admitted receipt of the value thereof. Petitioner Ching tried to controvert this by
claiming that it was payment for a previous transaction between him and respondent
Nicdao. However, other than his
self-serving claim, petitioner Ching did not proffer any documentary evidence
to prove the existence of the said previous transaction. Considering that the Planters Bank demand
draft was dated August 13, 1996, it is logical to conclude that, absent any
evidence to the contrary, it formed part of respondent Nicdao’s payment to
petitioner Ching on account of the loan obligations that she obtained from him
since October 1995.
Additionally, respondent Nicdao
submitted as evidence the cigarette wrappers at the back of which were written
the computations of the daily payments that she had made to Nuguid. The fact of the daily payments was corroborated
by the other witnesses for the defense, namely, Jocelyn Nicdao and Tolentino. As
found by the CA, based on these computations, respondent Nicdao had made a
total payment of P5,780,000.00 to Nuguid as of July 21, 1997.[51] Again, the payments made, as reflected at the
back of these cigarette wrappers, were not disputed by petitioner Ching. Hence, these payments as well as the amount
of the Planters Bank demand draft establish that respondent Nicdao already paid
the total amount of P6,980,000.00 to Nuguid and petitioner Ching.
The Court agrees with the CA that the
daily payments made by respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00
cannot be considered as interest payments only.
Even respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments that she made to
Nuguid were for the interests due. However,
as correctly ruled by the CA, no interests could be properly collected in the
loan transactions between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao because there
was no stipulation therefor in writing.
To reiterate, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, “no interest shall
be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.”
Neither could respondent Nicdao be
considered to be estopped from denying the validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that
is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.[52] Clearly, the collection of interests without
any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. Consequently, the daily payments made by
respondent Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 were properly considered by
the CA as applying to the principal amount of her loan obligations.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00
check, the defense of respondent Nicdao that it was stolen and that she never
issued or delivered the same to petitioner Ching was corroborated by the other
defense witnesses, namely, Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao.
All told, as between petitioner Ching
and respondent Nicdao, the requisite quantum of evidence - preponderance of
evidence - indubitably lies with respondent Nicdao. As earlier intimated, she cannot be held
civilly liable to petitioner Ching for her acquittal; under the circumstances which
have just been discussed lengthily, such acquittal carried with it the
extinction of her civil liability as well.
The CA committed no reversible error
in not consolidating CA-G.R. CR No.
23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No.
23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in the CA, the pertinent provision of the RIRCA
on consolidation of cases provided:
SEC. 7. Consolidation of Cases. – Whenever two or more allied cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated for study and report to a single Justice.
(a) At the instance of any party or Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report, and with the conformity of all the Justices concerned, the consolidation may be allowed when the cases to be consolidated involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.[53]
The
use of the word “may” denotes the permissive, not mandatory, nature of the
above provision, Thus, no grave error
could be imputed to the CA when it proceeded to render its decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23055, without consolidating it with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Petition is DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring; rollo, pp. 58-67.
[2] Criminal Case No. 9433.
[3] Criminal Case No. 9434.
[4] Criminal Case No. 9435.
[5] Criminal Case No. 9436.
[6] Criminal Case No. 9437.
[7] Criminal Case No. 9438.
[8] Criminal Case No. 9439.
[9] Criminal Case No. 9440.
[10] Criminal Case No. 9441.
[11] Criminal Case No. 9442.
[12] Criminal Case No. 9443.
[13] TSN,
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] Exhibits “7” to “14”. Also referred to as “cigarette cartons”.
[19] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] Citing Navarro
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90,
[26] Citing Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738,
[27] Rollo (Vol.
I), p. 80.
[28]
[29]
[30] Citing Civil Code, Art. 1231, par. 1.
[31] Citing People
v. Zafra, G.R. No. 110079,
[32] Citing Development
Bank of the
[33] Rules and Guidelines in the Filing and
Prosecution of Criminal Cases under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.
[34] Revised Penal Code, Article 100.
[35] In 2000, the Supreme Court amended the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Section 1, Rule 111 now reads in full:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such a reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
[36] As amended, Section 2, Rule 111 now reads:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
[37] Revised Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 2, last paragraph.
[38] 373 Phil. 150, 153 (1999).
[39] 458 Phil. 504, 515 (2003).
[40] Sanchez
v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 115308, November 15, 2005, 475
SCRA 97, 109 citing, among others, People
v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252 (1934); People
v. Rodriguez, 97 Phil. 349 (1955).
[41] CA
Decision, p. 9; rollo (Vol. I),
p. 66.
[42]
[43]
[44] CA
Decision, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 65-66.
[45]
[46] Go v.
Bacaron, G.R. No. 159048,
[47] Ordinarily, questions of facts are not taken up in a petition for review in certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court has been constrained to review the factual issues in this case, as they fall under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, in particular, the findings of the CA in this case are contrary to those of the MCTC and RTC. See, for example, Menchavez v. Teves, Jr., G.R. No. 153201, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 380, 395.
[48] Acabal
v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376,
[49] Republic
v. Orfinada, Sr., G.R No. 141145,
[50] Manzano v. Perez, Sr., 414 Phil. 728,
738 (2001).
[51]
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo (vol.
I), p. 62.
[52] Ouano
v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 690, 708 (2003).
[53] Rule 3 of the 1994 Revised IRCA. In the 2002 RIRCA, the pertinent provision (Section 3, Rule 3) on consolidation now reads:
SEC. 3. Consolidation of Cases. – When related
cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned
to one Justice.
(a) At
the instance of a party with notice to the other party; or at the instance of
the Justice to whom the case is assigned, and with the conformity of the
Justice to whom the cases shall be consolidated, upon notice to the parties,
consolidation may be allowed when the cases involve the same parties and/or
related questions of facts or law.