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RUFINA CHUA,
Petitioner, -versus- THE COURT
OF APPEALS and WILFRED N. CHIOK, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
140842 Present: pUNO, CJ., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is a Petition for Certiorari[1] assailing
the Resolutions dated
In 1989,
Rufina Chua, petitioner, met Wilfred Chiok, respondent, who represented himself
as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market.
He encouraged petitioner to
invest her money in stocks, requesting her to designate him as her stockbroker.
On respondent’s prodding, she agreed.
For
several years, respondent acted as petitioner’s stockbroker. She
made profits out of their transactions, prompting her to trust respondent in
handling her stock investments.
In 1995,
respondent encouraged petitioner to purchase shares in bulk as this will
increase her earnings. Hence, in June
1995, she entrusted to him the amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose
of buying shares of stocks in bulk. Petitioner
deposited P7,100,000.00 in respondent’s account and personally gave him
the remaining P2,463,900.00.
Thereupon, he told petitioner to wait for one week. A week elapsed and respondent advised her to
wait for another week. Then, there was
no more news from respondent. Finally,
when petitioner was able to contact him, respondent admitted that he spent the
money. At any rate, he issued two
checks as payment but when petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the
checks were dishonored for insufficient funds.
In a
letter dated
Petitioner
then came to know that respondent was not a licensed stockbroker but only a
telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc.
Immediately, she caused the filing of an information for estafa against
him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165,
During
the arraignment, respondent, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
Trial ensued.
Respondent denied the charge against
him. He testified that he was not an
employee of Bernard Securities, Inc.; that he buys and sells U.S. dollars and
that petitioner used to buy dollars from him; that what actually existed
between them was an unregistered partnership; and that he received the amount
of P9,563,900.00 as her investment in their partnership.
After
the prosecution and the defense had presented their respective evidence, the
trial court set the promulgation of
judgment on P9,563,900.00 with
interest at the legal rate computed from
On the
same day,
On
Meanwhile,
or on
Consequently,
on
On
The following day, or on
June 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ preliminary injunction assailing the trial
court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail.
The petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 53340.
On
However, the Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated
On September 20, 1999, after hearing respondent’s application for
injunction, the appellate court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding
that the latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his
appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and
that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is
merely conjectural.
Petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated
Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari.
Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent.
Private respondent counters that the
petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, the petition
for certiorari with prayer for
a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 53340) is not the proper recourse in assailing
the trial court’s May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[3] provides:
SEC.
5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court,
Should the court grant the
application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of
the bondsman.
If
the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or ON MOTION OF ANY PARTY, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.[4] (Underscoring supplied)
It is
clear from the last paragraph of the above provision that private respondent’s appropriate
remedy against the trial court’s May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail
is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion
to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23309 he himself initiated. Such
motion is an incident in his appeal.[5] The filing of a separate petition via
a special civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order
before the appellate court is proscribed.[6] Such independent special civil action
obviously contravenes the rule against multiplicity of suits and constitutes
forum shopping. Hence, the Court of
Appeals erred in not dismissing outright respondent’s petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53340. The basic rule is
that such petition may only be availed of when “there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[7]
Secondly, the assailed September 20, 1999
Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting
respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft
of any factual or legal basis. To be
entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be
protected; and (2) the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right.[8]
The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail
pending his appeal from the trial court’s judgment. His
conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the
cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d)
and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above.
Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of
judgment on
At this
point, we stress that when respondent did not appear during the promulgation of
judgment on
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
x x x
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. x x x.
In case the accused fails to
appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, THE
PROMULGATION SHALL BE MADE BY RECORDING THE JUDGMENT IN THE CRIMINAL DOCKET and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to
appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He
shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if
he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that the rule
authorizing the promulgation of judgment in
absentia is intended to obviate the situation in the past where the
judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate
the promulgation of judgment.[11] As mentioned earlier, the trial court should
have promulgated the judgment in absentia
on
Since respondent has not shown any
right to be protected, the second requisite for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is obviously absent.
As such, the Court of Appeals clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed Resolution of
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Resolutions dated
Costs against respondent.
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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Chief Justice
[1] Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] Per Associate Justice Omar U. Amin and
concurred in by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña (both retired) and Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio,
Jr., Rollo, pp. 371-388.
[3] Effective
[4] These provisions are substantially similar to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[5] Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, volume two, seventh revised edition (1995), p. 339.
[8] Philippine National Bank v. Timbol, G.R. No. 157535, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 163; Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 315; Rualo v. Pitargue, G.R. No. 140284, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 121.
[10] These provisions are substantially similar to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[11] The rule is also intended to enable the offended party to enforce the civil liability ex delicto which the court may have awarded, as its enforcement may only be possible after promulgation of the judgment (People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 411, 427, citing Florendo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110886, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 325; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. two, 7th revised ed., pp. 450-451).