MICHAEL C. GUY, G.R. No. 163707
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City and minors, KAREN
DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES
WEI, represented by their mother, Promulgated:
REMEDIOS OANES,
Respondents. September 15, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated
July 21, 2000[2] and July
17, 2003[3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss; and its
The
facts are as follows:
On
Private
respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children
of Sima Wei, who died intestate in
In
his Comment/Opposition,[7]
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no
debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents
should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a
Joint Motion to Dismiss[8] on
the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have been
signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have
executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section
5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In
a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,[9] petitioner
and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The
Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled
that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not
been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor
daughters. Thus, no renunciation of
right occurred. Applying a liberal
application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner’s objections
on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied. He filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the
Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner
argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification
against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by
Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from
any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality
to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove
their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175
of the Family Code.
Private
respondents contend that their counsel’s certification can be considered
substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and
that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions
of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1)
whether private respondents’ petition should be dismissed for failure to comply
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release
and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional
rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
proving their filiation.
The
petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed
by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of
the case. However, a liberal application
of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy
Chin v. Court of Appeals,[11] we ruled that while a petition may have
been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by
counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the
interest of substantial justice.[12] So it is in the present controversy where the
merits[13]
of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity
should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of
the rules.
As regards Remedios’ Release and
Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming
successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may
not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly
evince an intent to abandon a right.[14]
In this case, we find that there was
no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters “by
way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of
whatsoever nature and kind x x x against
the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.”[15] Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of
Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios
truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not
bar the latter’s claim. Article 1044 of
the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any
person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The
right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parents and guardians may not
therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property[16]
which must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized,
the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized
that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.[17]
In the present case, private
respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because
they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has
consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that
they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not
have such right. Hence, petitioner’s
invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private
respondents’ filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the
same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to
present evidence. Before the Family Code
took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate
children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART.
285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If
the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of
the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in
which either or both parents recognize the child.
In
this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of
the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo[18]
that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the
right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.[19]
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173
and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code,
provide:
ART.
172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In
the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
ART.
173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
The
action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
ART.
175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation
of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned,
the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime. However, if the action is
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution
of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by
private respondents in proving their filiation.
However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there
has been no reception of evidence yet. This
Court is not a trier of facts. Such
matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown
trial.
While the original action filed by
private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial
court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents’
filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the
status of each heir.[20] That the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint
is not new in our jurisprudence.[21] As held in Briz v. Briz:[22]
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The
conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we
have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled,
that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5;
Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil.,
249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742
affirming the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss; and its Resolution
dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 19-26. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and
Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
399 Phil. 442 (2000).
[12]
[13] Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552,
[14] Thomson v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 761, 778 (1998).
[15] Rollo, p. 44.
[16]
Tolentino, Civil Code of the
[17] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357
SCRA 249, 266.
[18]
424 Phil. 933 (2002).
[19]
[20] Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. Nos. L-41171, L-55000, L-62895,
L-63818 and L-65995,
[21] Tayag v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229,
[22]
43 Phil. 763, 768-769 (1922).