SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL G.R. No. 153721
RAILWAYS,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
MARIO
RUSTIA, CARLOS RUSTIA,
ROSARIO
RUSTIA y RAMIREZ,
EMILIANO
EUSEBIO, JR. and
MARIA
VICTORIA EUSEBIO,*
Respondents. Promulgated:
September
15, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I
S I O N
CORONA, J.:
At
bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65170 dated November 20, 2001 and its
resolution[2] dated
May 22, 2002, which affirmed the order of the trial court dated July 28, 2000.
Respondents were co-owners of two
parcels of land located in San Jose, Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1938 or almost 70 years ago, the
predecessor of petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR), the Manila
Railroad Company, took possession of about 6,685 sq. m. of said lots to build
railroad tracks for its trains. No expropriation suit was ever initiated,
however. Neither was just compensation ever paid.
When petitioner PNR refused respondents’
demands for payment of just compensation, the latter asked that the subject
properties be replaced, to no avail. It was only when respondents sought
assistance from the Ombudsman that petitioner offered to settle the monetary
claim; however, the offer turned out to be inadequate and unsatisfactory.
In 1996, respondents filed a
complaint[3] for
payment of just compensation and damages against petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, of San Fernando, Pampanga.
At
the trial presided over by Judge Edgar Y. Chua, petitioner admitted that it
took possession of the subject properties without filing an expropriation suit.
Thus, the sole question that remained for the trial court’s resolution was how
much petitioner owed respondents as just compensation.
Respondents
(plaintiffs in the RTC) claimed that the fair market value of the properties
was P250 per sq. m. Petitioner (defendant there), on the other hand,
insisted that, based on the estimate of a reputable appraisal company, the
subject land was worth only P7 per sq. m. and thus, its total liability
to respondents amounted to only P46,795.
On March 7, 2000, the trial court
ordered petitioner to pay respondents the
sum of P46,795, with 12% p.a. interest
from 1938 (the year
the properties were taken) to the
date of full payment, plus P20,000 as attorney’s fees.[4]
Petitioner
filed a partial motion for reconsideration (MR) while respondents filed their own
MR with “advance notice of appeal.”
Petitioner argued in its MR that the
interest rate should not be 12% p.a. but 6% p.a. since what was involved was
payment of just compensation and not payment of a loan or forbearance of money.
It also sought the decrease of the award of attorney’s fees from P20,000
to P5,000.
Respondents, on the other hand,
contended in their MR that the trial court erred in sustaining petitioner’s unreasonably
low appraisal of the properties. According to them, the trial court adopted
petitioner’s estimate of the properties’ fair market value without any evidence
presented to support it. In the MR, respondents sought the following reliefs: (1) payment of P2,691,514.70 for the two
parcels of land; (2) payment of P70,125 as proceeds from the sale of palay from said parcels of land; (3) payment of P20,000
as attorney’s fees and (4) P50,000 for moral and exemplary damages.
Respondents also prayed that their
“advance notice of appeal” be deemed as having been filed simultaneously with the
MR in the event the latter was denied. Later, respondents sought the inhibition
of Judge Chua for alleged manifest bias and partiality in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner opposed respondents’ MR
with “advance notice of appeal” and their motion to inhibit Judge Chua. It
contended that the filing of the “advance notice of appeal” divested the trial
court of its jurisdiction to act on both motions. It also argued that the MR
was a mere scrap of paper since the notice of hearing therein was addressed to the clerk
of court and not to its
counsel, and that it did not include
any explanation why personal service was not made on it.
Judge Chua inhibited himself from the
case. The MRs of both parties were re-raffled to
Judge Carmelita S. Gutierrez-Fruelda.
On July 28, 2000, Judge Fruelda dismissed petitioner’s MR for having been filed out
of time. On the other hand, she granted respondents’ MR and ruled that the
technical infirmities therein were not fatal to render it a mere scrap of
paper. She reconsidered the earlier decision of Judge Chua and ordered
petitioner pay to respondents:
1.
[t]he amount of P2,691,514.70 as the value of
the two (2) parcels of land with a total area of 6,215 [6,685] sq. meters,
taken by [petitioner] from [respondents];
2.
[t]he amount of P65,450.00 as the proceeds from
the sale of palay from [the] said parcels of land;
3.
[t]he amount of P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation;
4.
[t]he amount of P50,000.00 for moral and
exemplary damages.[5]
On September 5, 2000, petitioner
filed its MR of the above order. Respondents opposed petitioner’s MR and prayed
for the issuance of a writ of execution. On May 15, 2001, Judge Fruelda issued the following order:
WHEREFORE,
all the foregoing considered:
1.
The Motion for Reconsideration, dated September 5,
2000, having been filed out of time and being pro forma is hereby
denied;
2.
Finding that the order, dated July 28, 2000, as final
and executory; and
3.
Granting the prayer in the opposition…and issuing a
writ of execution to carry out the dispositive
portion of the Order, dated July 28, 2000.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
Via a petition for certiorari,
petitioner elevated the case to the CA which, in a decision dated November 20,
2001, partially granted the petition and set aside the trial court’s order. The
CA found that petitioner’s MR dated September 5, 2000 was actually filed on
time and that it was not pro forma.
It held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it
declared the July 28, 2000 decision as final and executory,
and granted respondents’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Petitioner filed a partial MR of the
above decision, asking the CA to categorically annul the RTC order of July 28,
2000. Respondents, on the other hand, moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution. The CA denied both motions.[7]
Only petitioner came to us, faulting
the CA for not setting aside the trial court’s order of July 28, 2000 and for
not modifying its decision dated March 7, 2000.[8]
In support of this appeal, petitioner reiterates its
arguments in the lower courts that respondents’ MR with “advance notice of
appeal” was merely a scrap of paper because (1) the notice of hearing therein
was addressed to the trial court’s clerk of court (and not to its counsel) and
(2) there was no explanation as to why respondents did not personally serve the
MR on it. According to petitioner, the Rules mandate that a motion should be
addressed to all parties concerned (not to the clerk of court) and that parties
should explain why personal service is not possible, if that is in fact the
case.
The petition must fail.
The
records of this case reveal that the issues raised by petitioner became moot
when respondents filed in the RTC an “Amended Motion for Reconsideration and
Advance Notice of Appeal”[9] on May
22, 2000. The amended motion included a notice of hearing addressed to
petitioner’s counsel and a manifestation that the notice was served on said
counsel by registered mail due to the distance between counsels’ offices.[10] In its
assailed order of July 28, 2000, the trial court declared:
…“Amended Motion for Reconsideration and [with] Advance Notice of Appeal,” dated May 22, 2000, was received by the court on May 24, 2000. The “Amended Motion…” is the same as the “Motion for Reconsideration and [with] Advance Notice of Appeal” and the only amendment is that the Notice of Hearing is also addressed to the counsel of the defendant and the manifestation that the motion was served to the defendant, thru counsel, by registered mail considering the distance between the parties and their counsel, a copy of the Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Advance Notice of Appeal was sent to the defendant’s counsel by registered mail on May 22, 2000.[11]
At any
rate, even if respondents defaulted in amending or rectifying the procedural
lapse in their MR, we are still not disposed to uphold petitioner. While we have
ruled in some cases that a motion not directed to the parties is fatally
defective[12]
and that a motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rules 13[13] and 15[14] is a
worthless piece of paper, our pronouncements on these matters were not absolute because, in
a number of
cases,[15] we also
set aside technicality when necessary to render justice to the litigants.
In Fulgencio,
et al. v. NLRC,[16] we
refused to dismiss the case on the ground that petitioners did not explain why
they failed to personally serve their petition on private respondents. There,
we declared that technicalities should take a backseat to substantive rights,
not the other way around.
In Philippine Ports Authority v.
Sargasso Construction and Development Corporation,[17] we also
ruled that the rules of procedure are intended to serve, not override, justice.
Also, in Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines v. Celebrity Travel and Tours, Inc.,[18] we refused
to render obeisance to technicality as it would have placed justice in a straightjacket
and hampered its administration.
Based on our foregoing pronouncements,
we cannot stymie the cause of respondents on account of mere technicality.
Strong considerations of justice constrain us to strike down petitioner’s
arguments.
As the records of the case show,
petitioner took respondents’ properties without going through an expropriation
and, to this date after almost 70 years, has not paid the former owners a
single centavo of just compensation. Respondents have long been deprived of the
possession and enjoyment of their properties. To further delay payment of just
compensation, on the flimsy basis that technical requirements were allegedly not
complied with, is a blatant travesty of justice. The damage respondents will
suffer, if their claims were to be refused, is not at all commensurate to the
degree of thoughtlessness their counsel might have committed in failing to
conform initially to the procedures prescribed by the Rules.
In the
words of Justice Sherman Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor[19]:
…a
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys
the other. It is, rather a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by rapier’s thrust. Technicality, where it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65170 are AFFIRMED.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
* The Court of Appeals (CA) was impleaded as public respondent in this case. However, under Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the lower court or judges thereof need not be impleaded in petitions for review filed before this Court.
[1] Penned by then CA Presiding Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and concurred in by Justices Hilarion L. Aquino (retired) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 166-177.
[2] Resolved by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., as concurred in by Justices Hilarion L. Aquino (retired) and Amelita G. Tolentino, Former Second Division of the Court of Appelas; id., p. 198.
[3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 10952.
[4] Rollo, p. 52.
[5] Id., p. 79.
[6] Id., p. 121.
[7] CA Resolution dated 28 May 2002, id., p. 198.
[8] Supra note 4.
[9] Rollo, p. 316.
[10] The office of petitioner’s counsel is in Caloocan City while respondents’ is in San Fernando, Pampanga.
[11] Rollo, p. 74.
[12] Juan v. People, 379 Phil. 404 (1998); Del Castillo v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 57127, 5 August 1992, 212 SCRA 169.
[13] Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and other Papers.
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. ― Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
See also Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort, 379 Phil. 404 (2000).
[14] Motions; see also Juan v. People, supra.
[15] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 121 (2001); Lim Tong Lim v. Philippine Fishing Gear Industries, Inc., 376 Phil. 76 (1999); Obut v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40535, 30 April 1976, 70 SCRA 546; Basco v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 671 (2000).
[16] G.R. No. 141600, 12 September 2003, 411 SCRA 69.
[17] G.R. No. 146478, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 512.
[18] G.R. No. 155524, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA 356, quoting Obut v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[19] 16 Phil. 315 (1910).