FIRST
DIVISION
ANGELA
DELA ROSA and G.R. No. 133882
CORAZON
MEDINA,
Petitioners,
Present:
-
versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
CALLEJO, SR., and
ORFELINA
D. ROLDAN,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LORNA
SAN DIEGO,
FLORDELIZA
D.
CATACUTAN,
NORMA Y.
LACUESTA, and ARSENIO Promulgated:
DULAY,
Respondents.
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- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 45560 affirming, on a petition for
review, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac in Civil Case
No. 8396, which in turn reversed on appeal the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6089 for unlawful detainer.
The Antecedents
The spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora
Mercado were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tarlac, Tarlac,
both covered by respective titles; the 261-square-meter lot was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7225, while the 772 sq. m. was covered by TCT
No. 7226.
Sometime in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed
a deed of sale[2] over the
properties in favor of the spouses Arsenio Dulay and P9,500.00 loan and executed a
real estate mortgage over the two lots as security therefor. On
The spouses Dulay forthwith took
possession of the lots, except a 500-square-meter portion which was then occupied
by Gideon dela
Sometime in 1982, the spouses Dulay made
demands on Gideon, Angela and Corazon to vacate the premises, as their three
daughters would be constructing their respective houses thereon. Gideon, Angela
and Corazon refused to do so, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana)
against them with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. The spouses Dulay alleged, inter alia, that they bought the lots from
the spouses Rivera in 1957; defendants occupied a 370-square-meter portion on
the western side, and were claiming ownership over one-half of the property, as
shown by their letter to plaintiffs appended to their complaint; and they needed
the property so that their daughters, who already had their respective
families, could build houses thereon. The
spouses Dulay prayed that defendants be evicted from the property and be
required to pay reasonable compensation for their use of the premises.[3] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6261.
In
their answer to the complaint, defendants alleged the following by way of
special and affirmative defenses: Gideon and his sister Asuncion contributed equally
to the purchase price of the property; plaintiffs secured a GSIS loan of P9,500.00,
out of which P6,500.00 was paid to the vendors; Gideon and Asuncion verbally
agreed that plaintiffs would be indicated as the sole vendees in the deed of
sale as they were the GSIS members; defendants had already paid their share of
the purchase price of the property as of 1978, except for the amount of P332.00;
and, insofar as the one-half portion on the western side of the property was
concerned, plaintiffs were trustees for defendants, who likewise owned the
same. Defendants interposed counterclaims for damages and prayed that the said one-half
portion be reconveyed to them.[4]
During
the trial, the spouses Dulay adduced in evidence the following: the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated
Defendants
spouses Dela Rosa adduced in evidence a small notebook containing therein an alleged
list of payments to the spouses Dulay of their share in the purchase price of
the property.[7] They presented an NBI Questioned Documents Expert
to prove the authenticity of the signature of Asuncion Dulay on one of the
receipts.[8] However,
On
ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE, there is no
doubt that the registered owners of the lots in question are the
plaintiffs-spouses Arsenio Dulay and
Defendants’ claim that they bought
from the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) portion of the lots in question is
untenable. Firstly, if it is true as
claimed by them that there was such an agreement to purchase from the
plaintiffs a portion of the lots in question, why did they not reduce [the] same
in writing? In fact, it’s the
defendants, particularly Gideon dela
Regarding Exhibit 6 and the alleged signature
of plaintiff
“However, the question signature was signed over a typewritten carbon or duplicate….”
What we mean by that, Sir, is that
there is here a purported receipt with the body typewritten underlining below
the supposed signature Asuncion R. Dulay, it is a little surprising because if
a document is prepared in one occasion, then the body should be in ribbon
impression and the underlining should be in ribbon. The supposed typewritten body above the
signature is an original ribbon impression, that is, it is direct from the
typewritten with the ribbon striking the sheet of paper, the underlining,
however, on which the signature is signed is a carbon impression, that means it
is a duplicate impression. (pp. 8-9,
tsn., Oct. 30/85).[10]
The spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon
Medina appealed to the CA. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15455. On
The
spouses Dulay filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court which was
granted. The motion was recorded as UDK-10069. However, the spouses Dulay failed to file their
petition. Thus, on
In
the meantime, Gideon died. His wife Angela
and Corazon Medina continued residing in the property without paying any
rentals therefor. Asuncion Dulay passed
away on
In a letter dated October 2, 1995, Arsenio
and his children, through counsel, made demands on Corazon and Angela to vacate
the property within 30 days from receipt thereof, with a warning that failure
to do so would impel them to file the necessary legal action.[14] Nevertheless, they suggested a conference to
discuss the amicable settlement of the matter.
Corazon and Angela ignored the letter. This prompted Arsenio and his children
to file a complaint for eviction against Angela and Corazon in the Office of
the Barangay Captain. The parties did not arrive at a settlement,
and on
On
3. Plaintiffs are the co-owners of two adjoining parcels of residential land located at Tarlac, Tarlac, and more particularly described as follows:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29040
“A parcel of land (
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29041
“A parcel of land (Lot No. “3-B-2”
of the subdivision plan Psd-2284, being a portion of Lot No. “3-B,” plan
II-2977-Amd., G.L.R.O. Record No. 1955), situated in the Barrio of San Roque,
Copies of the transfer certificates
of title are attached as Annexes “A” and “B,” respectively. The total assessed value of said lands does
not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
4. Said
parcels of land were formerly owned by the spouses
5. The spouses Dulay bought said parcels of land sometime in 1957. Defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and are continuously occupying about five hundred (500) square meters, more or less, of said parcels of land. Defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said parcels of land since 1957 without paying any rent.
6. The occupation by defendants of said parcels of land were at the mere tolerance of the spouses Dulay and, thereafter, of the plaintiffs. Defendants have promised to vacate the premises if and when needed by the spouses Dulay and plaintiffs.
7. Demands were made on defendants to vacate the premises, which demands, however, were ignored and not heeded. Defendants refused and continues to refuse to vacate the premises. A copy of the final demand letters sent to Angela dela Rosa and Corazon Medina are attached as Annexes “D” and “E,” respectively.
8. In an attempt to arrive at an amicable settlement and in recognition of their being blood relatives, plaintiffs exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise with defendants. Defendants were invited to discuss and settle the matter amicably. Defendants, however, refused to meet and discuss any settlement and ignored the invitation extended by plaintiffs.
9. In compliance with Section 412 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) and as a further attempt to settle the dispute amicably, plaintiffs brought the matter to the lupong tagapamayapa of their barangay. Defendants, however, refused to discuss an amicable settlement. The certification to file action issued by the lupon chairman is attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex “F.”
10. Defendants
have been occupying and using the premises without paying any rent
therefor. The present reasonable rental
value of the premises is Fifty Pesos (P50.00) per month, which amount
defendants should be made to pay from September 1957 until possession is
restored to plaintiffs.
11. By
reason of the unjustifiable refusal to vacate and the unlawful detainer of the
subject property by defendants and all persons claiming rights under them,
plaintiffs were constrained to seek redress in court to protect their own
rights and interests, thereby causing them to incur litigation expenses in the
amount of not less than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), for which
amount the defendant should be made liable to plaintiffs.[16]
Plaintiffs
therein prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs most respectfully pray that, after trial, judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court in favor of plaintiffs and ordering as follows:
1. Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the premises;
2. Defendants
to pay all rental arrears at the monthly rate of P50.00 from September
1957 until possession is restored or a total of P23,000.00;
3. Defendants
to pay litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs pray for such other and
further reliefs just and equitable under the premises.[17]
The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6089.
In their answer, defendants reiterated
their allegations in their answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 6261 in the CFI of Tarlac.
On
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
prayed of this
1. Ordering that an immediate temporary restraining order restraining the defendants from disturbing the possession of the Plaintiff over the property in question until the case is finally dissolved;
2. Declaring the Plaintiff as owner of the one-half (1/2) property in question, thereby reconveying the ownership thereof and cancelling the title;
3. Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P30,000.00
as attorney’s fee, plus P1,000.00 per hearing;
4. Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00
as acceptance fee, plus P20,000.00 as litigation expenses;
5. Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00
as exemplary damages;
6. Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00
as moral damages;
7. And
granting such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.[18]
On
Whether
or not Unlawful Detainer is proper in the premises considering the claim of
ownership by defendants from the beginning of these litigations sometime in
1982 followed by this case at bench.
Otherwise stated, is the occupation of the land in dispute by the
defendants by tolerance of plaintiffs.[19]
On
Arsenio
and his children appealed to the RTC. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8396. On June 25, 1997, it reversed the
decision of the MTC and ordered the eviction of defendants, holding that the
issue was the entitlement to the physical possession de facto of the property, an issue within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC;[22] in
contrast, the issue between the parties in Civil Case No. 6261 was possession de jure and not possession de facto. The RTC further declared that the spouses
Dulay had a torrens title over the property which was conclusive against the
whole world; as such, they were entitled to the possession of the property as
owners thereof. Citing the ruling of
this Court in Peran v. Espera,[23]
the RTC ruled that Corazon and Angela possessed the property for a considerable
length of time only through mere tolerance of plaintiffs.
Corazon and Angela moved to
reconsider the decision, which the RTC denied in an Order[24] dated
On
possession of the property by tolerance. In any case, their action was barred
by prescription and laches.
Angela and Corazon filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Angela
and Corazon, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, claiming that the CA erred
as follows:
I
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE AT BAR IS ONE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER, WHEN IT IS ONE OF RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION.
II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO TRUST CREATED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE PETITIONERS’ CLAIM HAS BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEE FOR RESPONDENTS.[25]
According
to petitioners, during the pre-trial in the MTC, the parties stipulated on the following
issues to be resolved by the court: whether or not the action for unlawful
detainer of respondents was proper considering that petitioners claimed
ownership over the property in their answer to the complaint; and whether
petitioners possessed the property by mere tolerance of respondents. Petitioners
insist that during the pre-trial conference, respondents admitted that they had
filed a complaint for recovery of possession of property against petitioners in
the CFI of Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6261.
Petitioners maintain that the
principal issue is one of ownership over the property and not merely whether or
not respondents, as plaintiffs, were entitled to possession de facto as the registered owners
thereof; hence, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the action of respondents.
Petitioners are of the view that the trial
court and the CA erred in declaring that there was no trust created over the
property. They maintain that there was a
verbal agreement between Gideon and his sister Asuncion that the property would
be purchased by them; that the purchase price thereof would be advanced by Asuncion;
that Asuncion would be indicated as the vendee in the deed of absolute sale to
enable her to secure a GSIS loan to pay for the property, with the concomitant agreement
that Gideon would pay one-half of the purchase price for the property; and that
the property will be titled in their name as trustees for the spouses Gideon
and Angela dela Rosa over one-half portion of the lots. They insist that they are not barred from
assailing the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the spouses Dulay by
the spouses Rivera. There is likewise no
factual and legal basis for the award of attorney’s fees.
In
their comment on the petition, respondents aver that the stay of petitioners in
the property after 1982 was by mere tolerance. The MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over their
action because it was filed within one year from petitioners’ last demand to
vacate the property. The CA correctly
ruled that no trust was created over the property, with petitioners as trustors
and respondents as trustees; whether a trust agreement was created is a
question of fact which cannot be raised in this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari.
In any event, petitioners’ claim of a
constructive trust was barred by prescription since more than ten years had
elapsed from the time the titles over the properties in favor of respondents were
issued on
Respondents further point out that
the MTC of Tarlac rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6154 dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription or laches; on April 6, 2000, the RTC
affirmed the decision on appeal; the CA affirmed
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58857 on February 14, 2002; and on January 22,
2003, this Court denied petitioners’ petition for review of the decision of the
CA in G.R. No. 155599.[26] Thus, the fact that no constructive trust existed
in favor of petitioners has been laid to rest by the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The
threshold issues are: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of
respondents (plaintiffs therein); (2) whether the CA erred in declaring that
there was no trust relationship between petitioners as trustors and respondents
as trustees; (3) whether the appellate court erred in ruling that the action of
petitioners to enforce the trust against respondents had prescribed; and (4)
whether respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees.
On
the first issue, we agree with the decision of the CA that the action of
respondents against petitioners was one for unlawful detainer, and that the MTC
had jurisdiction over the same. Indeed,
petitioners claimed ownership over one-half of the property in their answer to
the complaint and alleged that respondents were merely trustees thereof for
their benefit as trustors; and, during the pre-trial, respondents admitted
having filed their complaint for recovery of possession of real property (accion publiciana) against petitioners before
the CFI of Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6261. However, these did not
divest the MTC of its inceptial jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful
detainer of respondents.
It is settled jurisprudence that what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations
of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff
is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for.[27] The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal
over the nature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the court or upon a motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of the litigation.[28]
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through or
waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it conferred by the acquiescence
of the court. It is neither for the court
nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative
in character. Thus, the jurisdiction
over the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof is not affected by
the theories set up by defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.[29]
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691,
amending Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which was the law in effect
when respondents filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that “Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer; provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the
questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issues of possession.”
As
gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as plaintiffs below,
alleged that they were the owners of parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 29040
and 29041, hence, entitled to the possession of the property; petitioners (defendants
therein) and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied the said parcels of
land since 1957 without paying any rent; their possession over the property
continued even after the spouses Dulay purchased the property; and that their
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the spouses Dulay and,
after Asuncion died on June 26, 1995, by respondents; petitioners promised to
vacate the premises when respondents needed the property; demands were made by
respondents on October 2, 1995 for petitioners to vacate the property but the
latter refused, prompting an action to be filed in the Office of the Pangkat; and, on December 1, 1995, the Pangkat Secretary issued a certification
to file action. As gleaned from the
petitory portion of the complaint, respondents likewise prayed for the eviction
of petitioners from the property with a plea for judgment for reasonable
compensation for petitioners’ occupation of the premises. Respondents filed
their complaint on
It
is true that during the pre-trial, the MTC issued an order defining the issue
to be litigated by the parties – whether or not unlawful detainer is proper in
the premises considering defendants’ claim of ownership from 1982; otherwise
stated, whether petitioners’ occupation of the land in dispute was by mere
tolerance of respondents. As framed by
the MTC, the issue before it was basically one of physical or material
possession of the property, although petitioners raised ownership as an issue.
Thus, the MTC erred when it declared that, since defendants claimed ownership over
the property, it was divested of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
decide the case on its merits.
It
bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution,
independent of any claim of ownership by any party litigant, is: who is
entitled to the physical and material possession of the property involved? The mere fact that defendant raises the
defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings does not deprive the MTC
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where defendant raises the question
of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the
issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession. However, the disposition of
the issue of ownership is not final, as it may be the subject of separate proceeding
specifically brought to settle the issue.
Hence, the bare fact that petitioners, in their answer to the complaint,
raised the issue of whether they owned the property as trustors of a
constructive trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did not divest the
MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and decide the same on
its merits.[30]
Petitioners
were well aware that the issue of ownership over the property had to be
resolved in a proper action for the purpose, separate from and independent of
Civil Case No. 6089 in the MTC of Tarlac.
It is for this reason that petitioner Angela filed a complaint for
recovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title and damages against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 6154, wherein she prayed that
respondents, as defendants, be ordered to convey to her one-half portion of the
property. However, her claim was rejected by the trial court, which ordered the
complaint dismissed; the RTC likewise dismissed the case on appeal. In affirming this dismissal in CA-G.R. SP No.
58857 promulgated on
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioner’s complaint should be dismissed. This is so because petitioner miserably failed to establish her claim to the property. It must be stressed that while an implied trust may be established by parol evidence, such evidence must be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 603 [1999], at page 609). An implied trust cannot be made to rest on vague and inconclusive proof. (Ibid.)
Unfortunately for petitioner, the evidence she presented in her attempt to establish their so-called trust agreement is not sufficient or convincing. The list of dates and amounts written by her purportedly showing payments made to the late Asuncion dela Rosa Dulay cannot even be given credence as appreciation of such list can be equivocal (see Exhibit “H,” page 152, Original Records). The list was made in petitioner’s handwriting and there was no counter-signature made by Dulay showing acknowledgment of such listing. At best, the list can merely be appreciated as it is, a list, but definitely, it does not prove payments made on the purchase price of the ½ portion of the property.
Also, the Court notes the NBI’s
Questioned Documents Report No. 316-884 (dated Nov. 14, 1984) finding that the
signature of Asuncion Dulay in the receipt allegedly acknowledging partial
payment in the amount of P500.00 was signed over a typewritten carbon or
duplicate impression which is not part of the main entries in the receipt (see
Exhibit “7,” page 154, Original Records).
Such conclusion shows that the entries made on the receipt were not
written on a single occasion but rather separately executed. Thus, the Court cannot give any evidentiary
value on said receipt considering that its credibility is suspect.
Meanwhile, private respondents have
in their favor TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the name of the spouses Arsenio
Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (see Exhibits “1” and “2,” pages 181-182, Original
Records); the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1957 by the spouses Adriano
Rivera and Aurora Mercado (petitioner’s paternal grandparents) conveying the
entire property to the spouses Dulay for the price of P7,000 (see
Exhibit “3,” page 148, Original Records); the tax declaration receipts showing
tax payments made by private respondents on the property (see Exhibits “3” to
“3-b,” pages 183-185, Original Records); and the tax declaration of real
property for the year 1974 in the name of the spouses Dulay (see Exhibit “C” to
“C-1,” pages 150-151, Original Records).
All told, petitioner failed to
discharge that onus incumbent upon her to prove her claim over the property.[31]
Angela
assailed the decision of the CA in this Court in G.R. No. 155599, and this
Court resolved to deny the petition as follows:
G.R. No. 155599 (Angela dela
The
resolution of the Court became final and executory on
half of the property had been finally resolved by this Court in favor of
respondents; in fine, the validity of TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the names of
the spouses Dulay had been affirmed by the trial court, the MTC, the CA and
this Court. The claim of co-ownership of
petitioner Angela and possession over the western portion of the property thus have
no factual and legal basis.
We
agree with petitioners that the complaint of the spouses Dulay filed in 1982
docketed as Civil Case No. 6261 was one for recovery of possession of the
property (accion publiciana) and that
they likewise later filed a complaint with the MTC, on January 29, 1996,
for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 6089 instead of an accion publiciana. However, respondents
were not proscribed from filing a complaint for unlawful detainer five (5) or
six (6) years from the dismissal of their complaint for recovery of possession
of real property. The dismissal of respondents’
complaint in Civil Case No. 6261 by the CA was not based on the merits of the
case, but solely because it was premature on account of the failure to allege that
earnest efforts were made for the amicable settlement of the cases as required
by Article 222 of the New Civil Code.
The dismissal of the complaint was thus without prejudice.[34]
It
bears stressing that, after the Court declared in UDK-10069 on
We
agree with the contention of petitioners that for an action for unlawful
detainer based on possession by mere tolerance to prosper, the possession of
the property by defendant must be legal from the very beginning.[35] In
this case, petitioners’ possession of the property was tolerated by the former
owners, the spouses Rivera, and by the spouses Dulay after they purchased the
property. After all, Angela was the
granddaughter of Consolacion Rivera, the sister of Adriano Rivera, and Gideon
was the brother of
The
Court notes that the property was sold to respondents, and that it was titled
in their names (TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041).
The said deed and titles support the right of respondents to the
material possession of the property.[37] Under all the circumstances and facts in this
case, petitioners’ claim, that they had the right to the material possession of
the property, has no factual and legal basis.
We quote with approval the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 45560:
Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time title was issued in their favor as registered owners. “An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of their right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.”
Second. “The age-old rule is that ‘the person who has
a torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof’.” Except for the claim that the title of
private respondents is not conclusive proof of ownership, petitioners have
shown no right to justify their continued possession of the subject premises.[38]
On
the issue of whether the RTC acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction in
awarding P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees in favor of respondents,
petitioners aver that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondents are
entitled to a maximum amount of only P20,000.00; hence, the RTC acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it awarded P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
as it is in excess of the maximum amount under the said Rules. Besides, petitioners aver, the amount of P50,000.00
is unjust and inequitable. Moreover, the
RTC ordered petitioners to pay attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 without
even supporting the award with its finding and citing legal provisions or case
law.
For
its part, the CA ruled that the award of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees under
the Rules on Summary Procedure does not apply in a case where the decision of
the MTC is appealed to the RTC. The
latter court may award an amount beyond the maximum amount of P20,000.00
under the Rules on Summary Procedure as attorney’s fees for the reason that, on
appeal in the RTC, the regular rules of civil procedure apply. According to the CA, there was factual and
legal basis for the award of P50,000.00 as respondents’ attorney’s fees:
Second. Decisional law states –
“There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems just and equitable, allow the recovery by the prevailing party of attorney’s fees. In determining the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of cases has provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate, thusly: a) the quantity and character of the services rendered; b) the labor, time and trouble involved; c) the nature and importance of the litigation; d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy; e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved; f) the responsibility imposed on counsel; g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service; h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer; i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services; j) the character of employment, whether casual or for established client; k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute; and l) the results secured.”
In view thereof, the award of attorney’s fees is justified. That is, in addition to the provisions of Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which reads –
“In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
x x x x
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;”
x x x x
considering that petitioners refused to vacate the subject premises despite demands by the private respondents.
Finally, the Supreme Court has explained –
“The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. x x x Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court.”
Thus, the award of the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney’s fees is justified
considering that the jurisdictional amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
under Section 1, paragraph (A), subparagraph (1) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure applies only to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.[39]
We
agree with the ruling of the CA. The ceiling
of P20,000.00 applies only in the MTC where the Rules on Summary
Procedure are applied. On appeal to the
RTC, the RTC may affirm, modify or even reverse the decision of the MTC; as
such, the RTC may increase the award for attorney’s fees in excess of P20,000.00
if there is factual basis therefor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
No part
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
* No part.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria, with Associate Justices Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (later appointed
Supreme Court Associate Justice, now retired) and Ramon A. Barcelona (retired),
concurring; rollo, pp. 108-118.
[2] CA rollo, p. 26.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 34-38.
[4]
[5] Exhibits “D,” “D-1” to “D-2.”
[6] Exhibits “C,” “F,” “F-1” to “F-2.”
[7] Exhibits “5” to “5-a.”
[8] Exhibit “F.”
[9] Rollo,
pp. 34-49.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 29-31.
[11] Rollo, pp. 50-55.
[12]
[13] CA rollo, p. 40.
[14] Rollo, p. 64.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo, pp. 55-56.
[19]
[20]
[21] Exhibits “1,” “2” and “3.”
[22] CA rollo, pp. 72-81.
[23] G.R.
No. L-57259,
[24] CA rollo, p. 90.
[25] Rollo, p. 16.
[26]
[27] Union Bank of the
[28] Heirs of Raphael Magpili v. De Jesus,
G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA 366.
[29] Ramos v. Stateland Investment Corporation,
G.R. No. 161973, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 726, 737-738, citing Oca v. Court of Appeals, 378 SCRA 642
(2002).
[30] Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650,
[31] Rollo, pp. 298-299.
[32]
[33]
[34] Section 5, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[35]
[36] Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra note
30.
[37] Boy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125088,
[38] Rollo, p. 116.
[39]