FIRST DIVISION
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A. Rafael C. Dinglasan Jr., Petitioner, -
versus - HON. Court of Appeals, ET AL., Respondents. |
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G. R. No. 145420 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: September
19, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
New Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case[1]
on the ground of newly discovered evidence filed by A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who
was found guilty[2] of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law, by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case No.
21238.
On 17 August 1985, Elmyra
Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented by its
President, Dinglasan, and Antrom,
Inc. (Antrom), also represented by its President,
Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the parties
agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation
in favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in turn, will issue checks to
guarantee the payment of its obligations.
A few months after a number of financing
transactions were made, Elmyra’s indebtedness to Antrom reached the amount of P1,476,000.58.
As initial payment, Dinglasan
issued a Commercial Bank (drawee bank) Check No.
HO270451 with Antrom as payee, but postdated on P515,000.00. Upon
presentment for payment with the drawee bank,
however, the said check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Consequently,
on
That on or about the 3rd
day of October, 1985, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, well knowing that he has no sufficient funds in or
credit with the bank, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make out and issue Commercial Bank of Manila Check No. H0207451 dated October
3, 1985 in the amount of P515,000.00 in payment of his obligation to Antrom Inc., represented by Rosanna E. Velasco, but when
said check was presented to the bank for payment, the same was dishonored
and/or refused payment for reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds” and
accused, despite repeated demands and lapse of five (5) banking days from
notice thereof, failed and refused to make good the said check and/or to
deposit with the drawee bank the necessary amount to
cover the aforesaid check, to the damage and prejudice of the herein
complainant in the aforementioned amount of P515,000.00
On
WHEREFORE, finding accused
A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and, to indemnify ANTROM, INC., the sum of Five
Hundred Fifteen (sic) (P515,000.00) Pesos, at [the] legal rate of
interest from October 3, 1985, until the full amount of P515,000.0 is
fully paid.
Dinglasan, thereafter, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[5]
which was denied by the same court for lack of merit in an Order[6]
issued on
On
On
WHEREFORE, finding no
reversible error therefrom, the Decision now on appeal is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
Aggrieved,
the accused filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari[9]
questioning the
A Motion
for Reconsideration[11]
was then filed by Dinglasan on
Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the
same was merely noted without action by this Court in view of the En Banc
Resolution dated 7 April 1987 that no motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained. In a Resolution dated
The Resolution of this Court dated
By virtue
of the final and executory judgment rendered by this
Court in G.R. No. 137800, the prosecution, on
In an Order[15]
issued on
Alarmed, Dinglasan on
In her affidavit,[17]
Ma. Elena Dinglasan attested that she
was the Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra
for the period of 1985-1986. As such, she was in-charge of disbursing and
sourcing of corporation funds including the preparation of checks and approval
of vouchers supporting the disbursements. In the course of its business, the
affiant caused the issuance of Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 on P515,000.00, but postdated on P150,000.00
intended to cover a part of the amount of the bounced check. The Solidbank check,
together with its transmittal letter dated
Explaining why the said transmittal
letter dated
To corroborate the statements of Ma. Elena Dinglasan,
Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan on her part, narrated under oath that her late
husband used to bring some of Elmyra’s documents home
to work on at night and after her husband’s death in 1994, such documents were
kept inside a box and left somewhere in one corner of their house. It was only
when a minor renovation was made therein several years after her husband passed
away that she was able to chance upon the said documents again. The said documents were turned over to Dinglasan on
In contrast,
private respondent Antrom contends that the Petition
for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered evidence
should be dismissed on the ground that the same is procedurally and
substantially defective.[19]
Elaborating,
Antrom claims that under the Revised Rules of Court,
the Motion for New Trial should be filed at any time after the appeal from the
lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the appellate court
convicting the accused becomes final. The
judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 137800 dated
Moreover, Antrom continues, considering for the sake of argument that
the instant action was filed within the reglementary period, still, the
petition must fail for the requisites for newly discovered evidence as ground
for new trial were not satisfactorily complied with. Let it be noted that the
transmittal letter dated
Finally, Antrom stresses that, granting for the sake of argument,
that the petition at bar was filed on time and the alleged evidence is newly
discovered within the purview of the law, such evidence introduced and
admitted, nevertheless, would not exculpate Dinglasan
from liability. The gravamen
of the offense is the act of the drawer in making or issuing a check with the
full knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the amount. Such awareness was admitted by Dinglasan when he expressly requested Antrom
not to deposit the check without his explicit conformity in anticipation that
such check will be dishonored if presented for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check and
not the nonpayment of the obligation is punished by law because of its
deleterious effect on public interest.
The Solicitor General, representing the People of
the
For the
resolution of this Court are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE INS
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR R
The
pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 124 – Procedure in the Court of Appeals.
Section 14. Motion
for New Trial. – At any time after the appeal from the lower court
has been perfected and before the judgment
of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the latter
may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to
his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Explicit from the above stated rule
that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the
appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.
While Dinglasan
agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petition should be filed
before the finality of the judgment convicting the appellant, he, however
argues that judgment attains finality only upon the receipt of the order or
resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.
Dinglasan’s
argument is without merit.
Let it be
recalled that Dinglasan’s Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration was denied by this Court as the subject
matter thereof is a prohibited pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration
was merely noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc Resolution dated
Rule 52. –
Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2. Second
Motion for Reconsideration. – No second motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the same party shall
be entertained.
This prohibition is justified by
public policy which demands that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts must become final at some definitive date fixed by law.[23]
To
rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the
resolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration would result
to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or
resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order
that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging
the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to
forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of
filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also
unjust to the winning party.
It
bears stressing further that on
Rule 51. -
Judgment.
“Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. – If no
appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered
by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the
date of its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such
judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
After the judgment or final
resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be laid to
rest. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land.[24]
Very
clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of
the Case on
The
finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend
on the convenience of the party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the
purpose of the rule on completeness of service, which is to place the date of
receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes beyond the power of the party
being served to determine at his pleasure.[25]
Dinglasan further asseverates that this
petition was belatedly made because the evidence sought to be admitted were not
available at the time the instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly,
he claims that this evidence falls within the purview of newly discovered
evidence as contemplated by law.
The
pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds
for a new trial. — The court
shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b)
That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which
if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
The requisites for newly
discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will
probably change the judgment.[26]
These
standards, also known as the “Berry Rule,”
trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry v. State of Georgia[27] where the Supreme
Court of Georgia held:
Applications for new trial
on account of newly discovered evidence, are not
favored by the Courts. x x x
Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of
authority, viz;
that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial.
2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence
that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material
that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th.
That it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in
relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced,
or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be
granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or
credit of a witness.
These
guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety
of motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
It should
be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has
complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.[28]
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred
evidence is in fact a “newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence.” The
question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects:
a temporal one, i.e.,
when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive
one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.[29]
Applying
the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists,
and the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan
and Encarnacion Vda.
De Dinglasan attest, that
the transmittal letter dated
In CA-G.R.
CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court already considered that transmittal
letter dated
It appears, however, that in accused-appellant’s
letter dated October 10, 1986, (Exhibit
“B”) no mention was made of the two (2) manager’s checks, considering that at
least one of the two (2), both dated October 8, 1988 (pp. 2-3, Records) was
allegedly given to private complainant on the said date (pp. 69-70, Ibid.). Instead a proposal wherein payment
in kind or dacion en pago was
offered by accused-appellant. Also,
the trial court correctly noted that, “x x x accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He will not part of more than one million
pesos, in the form of manager’s checks, as replacement of a check that bounced,
without any supporting document.” (p. 8, Decision, Criminal
Case No. 21238).
We are in
accord with the findings of the lower court that there is no evidence
establishing that accused-appellant asked for the return of the Combank Check in the same way that the PTB Check had been
returned, other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said check
had been considered cancelled (p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check had already bounced. (p. 10, Brief for
Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd that accused-appellant would
replace the Combank Check with an amount more than
the P515,000.00, if the whole indebtedness was
still subject to final liquidation. As evidenced by the voucher (Exhibit “5”)
accused-appellant issued Combank Check in exchange
for PTB Check. Hence, it is quite quizzical why accused-appellant did not ask
for the return of the Combank check after having
issued two (2) manager’s check.[30] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Verily, the
claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought
to be presented in this case was recently discovered is a falsity. It is a desperate attempt to mislead this
Court to give due course to a cause that has long been lost. Dinglasan appeals
for the compassion of this Court but never did so in good faith. It is contrary to human experience to have
overlooked an evidence which was decisively claimed to
have such significance that might probably change the judgment.
The records
are very clear. The transmittal letter dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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Chief Justice |
[1]
[2]
[3] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and B.A. Adefuin dela Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 171-183.
[9] Rollo of G.R. No. 137800.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Records, Vol. II, pp. 135-447.
[15]
[16] Rollo, pp. 4-36.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 163, 173 (1997).
[24] Sacdalan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128967,
[25] Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 655, 665 (1999).
[26] Lumanog v. Salazar, Jr., 417 Phil. 209, 217 (2001).
[27] 10
[28] Custodio v.
[29]
[30] Rollo,
pp. 180-181.