THIRD DIVISION
FROILAN
DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 156965
ANGEL
MARCELO and
NICASIO
MAGBITANG, Present:
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS,
OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT,
and
the MUNICIPALITY OF Promulgated:
BALIUAG,
BULACAN,
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
On
appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure are the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55710. The Decision affirmed the Resolution
dated
The
following factual antecedents are matters of record.
Petitioners
Froilan De Guzman, Angel Marcelo and Nicasio Magbitang were among the tenants
of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Pagala, Baliuag, Bulacan. The land, measuring
six (6) hectares, was formerly owned by the Vergel De Dios family. Sometime in
1979, respondent Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan (municipality) sought the
expropriation of the land before the now defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, the municipality and
petitioners entered into a compromise agreement, whereby petitioners
irrevocably withdrew their opposition to the expropriation of the land in
consideration of the payment of a disturbance compensation of P25,000.00
per hectare or P2.50 per square meter. Petitioners also waived “all
claims and demands” against the municipality. The Court of Agrarian Relations
approved said compromise agreement in its decisions dated
From
the records, it can be gathered that the municipality eventually acquired ownership
of the land through expropriation but allowed petitioners to continue
cultivating their lots pending the construction of the Baliuag Wholesale
Complex Market. For this arrangement, petitioners remitted rentals to the municipal
treasurer. Despite the lapse of several years, construction of the market did
not push through. This prompted petitioners, who had continually occupied and
cultivated the land, to file in 1996 a petition with the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) of Baliuag, praying that the land be placed under the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) in accordance with Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[4]
Following
the filing of their petition for CARP coverage before the MARO, petitioners
filed a complaint on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Board finds the plaintiffs a [sic] bona-fide farmer[-]beneficiaries
of agrarian reform[.] [A]ccordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Directing the the [sic] respondent, Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan[,]
represented by Honorable Mayor Edilberto Tengco and all other persons acting in
their behalf to permanently cease and desist from dumping garbage in the
premises in question;
2.
Directing the respondent to maintain petitioners in peaceful possession over
the disputed property.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
On
Undaunted,
petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which prayed
for the reversal of the Order of 1 July 1999 issued by the Office of the President
on the grounds that the land remained agricultural and that the Office of the
President erred in relying upon the certification issued by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) classifying the land as commercial. They also
argued that under the provisions of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20, series
of 1992, the conversion of the land for non-agricultural purposes was
disallowed.
On
Hence,
the instant petition, imputing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SUBJECT
LANDHOLDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED BY OPERATION LAND TRANSFER PURSUANT TO
P.D. NO. 27 DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE LANDOWNER TO CARRY OUT ITS CONVERSION FROM
AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
UPHOLD (sic) THE RECLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE PROVISIONS OF THE O.P. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 20 SERIES OF 1992 WHICH CLEARLY PROVIDES THE NON NEGOTIABILITY OF IRRIGATED
PRIME AGRICULTURAL LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES.[9]
Essentially,
the main issue to be resolved is whether the subject land can be reclassified
to agricultural after the purpose of its conversion to a non-agricultural land had
not materialized.
Petitioners
contend that despite the conversion of the land for a commercial purpose, they
have remained tenants of the land devoting it for agricultural production.
Though the earlier tenancy relationship had been terminated upon the payment of
disturbance compensation pursuant to the 1979 compromise agreement, petitioners
posit that a tenancy relationship was created anew between them and the municipality
when the latter allowed petitioners to cultivate the land after the
expropriation proceeding.
The
petition has no merit.
Under
Section 3(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), an agricultural land refers to land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined therein and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
“Agricultural lands” are only those lands which are “arable and suitable
agricultural lands” and “do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands.”[10]
In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform,[11]
it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural
uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR.
This rule has been reiterated in a number of subsequent cases. Despite claims
that the areas have been devoted for agricultural production, the Court has
upheld the “non-agricultural” classification made by the NHA over housing and resettlements
projects,[12] zoning
ordinances passed by local government units classifying residential areas,[13]
and certifications over watershed areas issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).[14]
The DAR itself has recognized the
prospective application of R.A. No. 6657, insofar as it provides under Section
3(c) thereof that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity
of the CARL are not covered by the CARL. Thus, DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1990 provides:
Agricultural land refers to those devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in R.A. [No.] 6657 and not classified as
mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,
commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis
supplied.}
That the subject land had been
reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural is not disputed. The records
reveal that as early as 1980, the municipality had passed a zoning ordinance
which identified the subject land as the site of the wholesale market complex. As
per certification issued by the HLURB, the land is within the zoning plan
approved by the National Coordinating Council for Town Planning, Housing and
Zoning.
Petitioners also theorize that they
earned a vested right over the land when a tenancy relationship was established
anew between them and the municipality subsequent to the latter’s acquisition
of the land. In support of this theory, petitioners cite minutes of meetings
and resolutions passed by the municipality’s Sanggunian, purportedly
indicating the municipality’s recognition of their status as tenants of the
subject landholding.
Petitioners’ theory does not persuade
the Court.
A segment of the minutes of the
meeting of the municipality’s Sanggunian dated
Tumindig din at namahayag ang ating Punong Bayan Kgg.
Reynaldo S. del Rosario at sinabing sa kasulukuyan ay hindi pa naman kailangan ng Pamahalaang Bayan ang nasabing lupa ngunit
kung ito ay kakailangan na ay kinakailangang umalis sila dito
ng mahinusay, walang pasubali at maluwag sa kanilang kalooban, kung kaya’t iminungkahi niya na gumawa ng
isang nakasulat na kasunduan na
ang nakasaad ay kusang-loob
silang aalis sa nasabing lupa pagdating
ng panahon na ito ay kailanganin
na ng Pamahalaang
Bayan.[15]
The aforequoted minutes clearly show that
petitioners’ use and possession of the land was by mere tolerance of the municipality
and subject to the condition that petitioners would voluntarily vacate the land
when the need would arise. In the same minutes, the Sanggunian resolved
to authorize then Mayor Reynaldo S. del Rosario to enter into an agreement in
writing with petitioners concerning the latter’s temporary cultivation
of the land as hired labor.
As discussed earlier, the land had
ceased to be classified as agricultural when the municipality extended
petitioners’ occupation of the land. After the municipality acquired ownership
over the land through expropriation and passed the ordinance converting said
land into a commercial area, any transaction entered into by the municipality
involving the land was governed by the applicable civil law in relation to laws
on local government. At this point, agrarian laws no longer governed the
relationship between petitioners and the municipality. While it was not established
whether the relationship between petitioners and the municipality was that of a
lessor and lessee or that of an employer and laborer, as the supposed written
agreement was not offered in evidence, the fact remains that the subject land
had already been identified as commercial in the zoning ordinance.
Certainly, petitioners’ occupation of
the land, made possible as it was by the tolerance of the municipality, was
subject to its peremptory right to terminate. As absolute owner of the land,
the municipality is entitled to devote the land for purposes it deems
appropriate.
It is noteworthy that even prior to
its expropriation and reclassification, the land was never placed under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program. Although it appears that petitioners had
been tilling the land as tenants of the Vergel De Dios family, the municipality’s
predecessor-in-interest, the records do not show that petitioners had applied
for coverage of the land under the agrarian reform program. Before a claimant
becomes a qualified beneficiary of agrarian reform, the administrative process
for coverage under the CARP must be initiated. The mere fact of cultivating an
agricultural land does not ipso jure vest ownership right in favor of
the tiller. Since petitioners had not applied for CARP coverage prior to the
reclassification of the land to commercial, their occupation by mere tolerance
cannot ripen into absolute ownership.
Petitioners further argue that the municipality’s
failure to realize the commercial project operates to reinstate the original
status of the land as agricultural. In support of this theory, petitioners cite
Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, or the Agriculture Land Reform Code, unaware that the provision had been amended by
R.A. 6389, entitled, “An Act Amending Republic Act Numbered Thirty Eight
Hundred and Forty Four, As Amended, Otherwise Known As the Agricultural Land
Reform Code and For Other Purposes.”
Before its amendment, Section 36 (1),
R.A. No. 3844 provided:
Sec. 36. Possession
of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period
or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The
agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located,
into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided,
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights
under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and
leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which
case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings
are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or
fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith
and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions.
With the enactment of the amendatory
law, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the
agricultural land to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was
deleted. Section 36 (1), R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:
Sec. 36. Possession
of Landholding; Exceptions.– Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period
or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head
upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the
average of gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years;
x x x x[16]
The amendment is the Legislature’s recognition
that the optimal use of some lands may not necessarily be for agriculture.
Thus, discretion is vested on the appropriate government agencies to determine
the suitability of a land for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes. With the passage of the CARL, the conversion of agricultural lands to
non-agricultural uses was retained and the imposition on the landowner to
implement within a time frame the proposed non-agricultural use of the land was
done away with.
Moreover, in Pasong Bayabas
Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[17]
the Court declared categorically that the failure of the landowner therein to
complete the housing project did not have the effect of reverting the property to
its classification as agricultural land, although the order of conversion issued
by the then Minister of Agrarian Reform obliged the landowner to commence the
physical development of the housing project within one year from receipt of the
order of conversion.[18]
In said case, a vast tract of land claimed to be cultivated by its tenants
formed part of the subdivision plan of a housing project approved by the
National Planning Commission and Municipal Council of Carmona and subsequently
declared by the Provincial Board of Cavite as composite of the industrial areas
of Carmona, Dasmarińas, Silang and Trece Martirez. Because the reclassification
of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land took
place before the effectivity of the CARL, the Court held that Section 65 of
R.A. No. 6657 cannot be applied retroactively.[19]
More importantly, the Court in Pasong
Bayabas recognized the power of local government units to adopt zoning
ordinances, citing Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,[20]
to wit:
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local
Government Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the
National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs. The power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural lands reclassified is
not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Section 65 of
Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications by
the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously placed
under agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its award. It does
not apply to agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to
the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.[21]
Thus, the zoning ordinance passed by
the municipality sometime in 1980 reclassifying the subject land as commercial
and future site of a market complex operated to take away the “agricultural”
status of the subject property. Subsequent events cited by petitioners such as
their continuous tillage of the land and the non-commencement of the
construction of the market complex did not strip the land of its classification
as commercial.
Petitioners’ reliance on the
provisions of A.O. No. 20, series of 1992, issued by then President Fidel Ramos
is misplaced. A.O. No. 20, which sets forth the guidelines to be observed by
local government units and government agencies on agricultural land use
conversion, cannot be applied to the subject land for the reason that the land
had already been classified as commercial long before its issuance. Indeed, A.O.
No. 20 cannot be applied retroactively.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55710 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, pp. 28-39. Penned by Justice
Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by JJ. Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
Chairman, Tenth Division, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
[7]
[8]
[10]Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 103302, 12 August 1993, 225 SCRA 278, 283.
[13]Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142359, 25 May 2004, 429 SCRA 109; Junio v. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 173.
[20]Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning.