G.R. NO. 174153 – RAUL
L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, versus THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F. BALAIS, petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN
S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN
V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS,
INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA
WOMEN’S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE, JOJO
PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON,
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND AMADO GAT
INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND
PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ,
BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299 –
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.
Promulgated:
October
25, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God.
Caution should be exercised in choosing one’s battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one’s cause. In
its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly
the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy
man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, “nec
audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae
proxima sit,” meaning, “And those people should not be listened to
who keep on saying, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God,’ since the
riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.”[1]
Perhaps, it is by providence that the true
meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies –
that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their
“people’s initiative.”
History
has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and
oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God’s
imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the
same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people’s initiative is the “voice
of the people”
and, therefore, the “voice of God.” After a
thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with
his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of
God. It is against this kind of genius
that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are
undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People’s Initiative sought
to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for
prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, et al., entitled “Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa
and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding
members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.”[2] The case was docketed as G.R. No.
127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its
Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.” A majority of eight (8) Justices fully
concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One
(1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for
reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions.
One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion.
As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the
deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other
six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.[3]
A few months thereafter, or on
September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People’s Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections[4] on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed PIRMA’s
Petition
for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution “it
appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of
the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.”
Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its
ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the
different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination.
Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.
This time,
another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in
coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP),
have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A.
Sections 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be
vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as
may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative
districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must
have at least one member.
(2)
Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his
district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the
qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as
to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be
provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the
total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B.
Sections 1,
2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read,
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head
of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for
the program of government.
C.
For the
purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a
unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article
XVIII, entitled “Transitory Provisions,” which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President
shall serve until the expiration of their term at
(2)
In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of
the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume
all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall
be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however,
that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of
Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read
“Parliament;” that any and all references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,”
“Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the
“President” and/or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime
Minister.”
Section 3. Upon the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are
hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof,
in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral
Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of Representatives” and
“Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read “Parliament;” that any and all
references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,” “Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of
the House of Representatives” shall be changed to read as “Member(s) of
Parliament” and any and all references to the “President” and/or “Acting
President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of
these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members
of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have
qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2)
The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament
until
(3)
Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
(4)
Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization
and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an
interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members
thereof. The interim Prime Minister
shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities
as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.”
(2)
The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials.
The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform
the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper
right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as
follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of
Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government
from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in
government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the
orderly shift from one system to another?
On
Amend the Constitution.[5] Five (5) days thereafter,
they filed an Amended
Petition alleging that they are
filing the petition in their own behalf and
together with some 6.3 million
registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets
attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing
on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered
voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.
Several
organizations opposed the petition. [6]
In a
Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition,
citing as basis this Court’s ruling in Santiago,
permanently enjoining it “from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.”
Hence,
the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that
this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter
to
comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
Any
amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the
petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and
grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished
for contempt[7] of court
for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act
with grave abuse of
discretion
Without necessarily brushing
aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present
petition hinges on this singular issue -- did
the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino,
et al.’s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this
Court’s Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved,
still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of “grave abuse of discretion”
on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility.[8]
It need not be emphasized
that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts,
tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has
the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.[10] As a warning to lower court judges who
would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,[11] held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of
With
The maxim stare
decisis et non quieta movere translates “stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.”[15] As used in our jurisprudence, it means that “once this Court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same as in the earlier controversy.”[16]
There is considerable
literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad
one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of
the Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. ‘If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To
decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast;
it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence
to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are
to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[17]
That the doctrine of stare decisis
is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by
considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is
that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and
one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly
goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group
can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the
individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as
charged.[18]
Although
the doctrine of stare decisis does
not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, “It
is x
x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
considered anew, might be decided
differently by the current justices. This policy x x x ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability
and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e.,
that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.[19]
Accordingly, a party urging overruling a
precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly
proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature
and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with
other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their
task.
Santiago
v. COMELEC was decided
by this Court on
III
The proposed constitutional changes
constitute revisions and not mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1)
The
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2)
A
Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x
x. (Emphasis
supplied)
At the
outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can
directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under
these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction
between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform
process. This is not so under our
present Constitution. The distinction
between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system
of people’s initiative. Revisions
are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2,
Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is
recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank
you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of
the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies
the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The
people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held,
directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition
of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This
completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory
that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system
of initiative should be limited
to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few
questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With
pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question,
Commissioner Davide’s proposed amendment
on line I refers to “amendments.” Does
it not cover the word “revision” as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words “amendments” and “revision?”
MR. DAVIDE: No,
it does not, because “amendments” and “revision” should be covered by Section
1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to “amendments” not “revision”
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[20]
Considering
that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is
imperative to examine whether petitioners’ proposed changes partake of the
nature of amendments, not revisions.
The petition
for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et
al. sought to amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3
and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly,
the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from
bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the
Petitioners
contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence,
within the coverage of a “people’s initiative.”
I
disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as
follows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one
or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention
of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document,
or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the
document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.[21]
Obviously, both "revision"
and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be
based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly
v. Laing,[22]
the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and
"amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the
charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an
essential difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities
which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished
by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve
statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.[23]
However, as in
In summary, it would seem that any major
change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a “revision”
and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although,
at first glance, petitioners’ proposed changes appear to cover isolated and
specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that
the proposed changes will alter the very
structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will
have a “domino effect” or, more appropriately, “ripple effect” on other provisions of the Constitution.
At this
juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect
changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend any
section in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would “be complete within itself, relate to one
subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the
Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish
its purpose.”[25] This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a
parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of
separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing
for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the
Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect
support of the Parliament, as expressed through a “vote of confidence.” To my mind, this doctrine of separation of
powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change
affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,[26] the California Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be
effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the
shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere
amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in
The proposal here to amend Section I of
Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature
affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a
change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the
nation, except one, since the earliest days.
It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic
in the American form of government.
It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government
in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would
even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
Thirdly, the
proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments,
especially, with the inclusion of the following “omnibus provision”:
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly
transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary
form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled “Transitory
Provisions” which shall read, as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3
and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all
other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform
to a unicameral Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .
x x x x x x x x x
Section 4.
(1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification
of these amendments, the Interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
The above provisions will necessarily
result in a “ripple effect” on the other provisions of the Constitution to make
them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of
government. With one sweeping stroke,
these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of
the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered
by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a
constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling,
thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and
many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected,
replaced or repealed. It purports
only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the
omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that “If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the
constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such
section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such
conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such
measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution
would be be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed
upon by a constitutional convention.[28]
Undoubtedly,
the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only
affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions
which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the
alteration of our form of government.
The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are
connected or “interlocked” with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly,
it has been held that: “If the changes attempted are so sweeping
that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is
plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and
this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under
Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed.”[29]
I therefore conclude that since the
proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they
cannot be the subject of an initiative.
On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to
simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long
deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, is practicality. In other
words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now,
is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional
structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates
ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions
which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a
Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying
debate. And while the deliberations
proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized
body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final
judgment. Careful debate is important
because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight
unseen.[30]
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement
the People’s initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Section 2. Amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a
self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its
implementation. Thus, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However,
as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in
The
passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No.
6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed
a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding
so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A.
No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A.
No. 6735 is replete with references to
the right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history
of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear
intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the people’s
initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches
by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people’s
initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications
are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735
leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the
Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives
on national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed,
logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation,[31] however,
as regards initiative on the
Constitution, the law merely:
(a) mentions the word “Constitution” in Section 2;[32]
(b) defines “initiative on the Constitution” and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;[33]
(c) speaks
of “plebiscite” as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;[34]
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as
to the number of voters who should sign the petition;[35]
and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.[36]
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does
not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished.
This is not the enabling law
contemplated by the Constitution. As
pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law
Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of
Congress providing for a complete and
adequate process for people’s
initiative, such as:
· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;
· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;
· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional district;
· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;
· Signature stations to be provided for;
· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were obtained;
·
Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any
protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC
and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
None of
the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating
its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
vi
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does
not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No.
6735
I shall
discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and
inseparable. The determination of
whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in
behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they have complied with the
provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To
reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)
The
mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and
categorical. For a people’s initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be
present:
1.
It is “the people” themselves who must “directly
propose” “amendments” to the
Constitution;
2.
The proposed amendments must be contained
in “a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters;” and
3.
The required
minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters “must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters” of “every legislative
district.”
In this
case, however, the above requisites are not
present.
The
petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the “Verification/Certification
with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping” contained in their petition, they
alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in
their personal capacity as registered voters “and as representatives” of the supposed 6.3 million registered
voters. This goes to show that the
questioned petition was not
initiated directly by the 6.3
million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, as required by Section 2.
Moreover, nowhere in the petition
itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3
million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were
affixed therein “as representatives”
of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for
people’s initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the
petition “as representatives” of the
alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is
constitutionally proscribed. To
repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall
be “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters.”
Obviously, the phrase “directly
proposed by the people” excludes any
person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of
registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people
the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Such
right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people’s
representative. Simply put, Section 2
does not recognize acts of
representation. For it is only “the people” (comprising the minimum of
12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people’s initiative. Necessarily,
it must fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should “hear” and “heed” “the people’s voice” is baseless and misleading. There is no people’s voice to be heard
and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado and
their allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado,
petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) “[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign
people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that
over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for
initiative is a purely political
question;” and (2) “[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution
is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the
determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under
the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit
of a political question.”
The “political question doctrine” was first enunciated by
the US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.[37]
Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the
appropriate institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the
US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that “the sovereignty in every State resides in
the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the
circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the political
power.” In other words, the responsibility of settling certain
constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of
the government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called “Dorr
Rebellion” in the State of
The
In Colgrove v. Green,[38]
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase “political thicket” to
describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political
questions which they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide.
In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a
narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois “as a political question and that the
invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create
an evil greater than that sought to be remedied.”
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter’s
“political thicket,” nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of
the term “political question.” Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,[39]
this Court ruled that properly, political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.” In Tañada and Macapagal v.
Cuenco,[40]
the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,[41]
this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr[42]
in determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial
in nature, to wit:
1)
there is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or
2)
there is a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
3)
there is the
sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
4)
there is the
sheer impossibility of the Court’s undertaking an independent resolution without
expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or
5)
there is an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or
6)
there exists the
potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
None
of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What
is at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover,
even assuming arguendo that the issues raised
before this Court are political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving
them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v.
Singson.[43] As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,[44] the present Constitution limits
resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have normally
and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.
CONCLUSION
In
fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view
that the so-called people’s initiative to amend our Constitution from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an
initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during
the oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who
affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the
Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were
not explained to all those registered voters.
Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners and their group
asked them to sign.
Let us
not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana
v. The Executive Secretary.[45] The
Court then ruled that “This being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect,” although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance
with the 1935 Constitution. The Court
concluded, among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens’
Assemblies “was and is null and void ab initio.” That was during martial law when perhaps
majority of the justices were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a
martial law regime. There is, therefore,
no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing
authority by the so-called people’s initiative for those who want to perpetuate
themselves in power.
At
this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present
government structure. Consequent1y, we
must not change it.
According
to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more
economical and more responsive government.
Is
there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be
elected as members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower
House continue to hold their respective positions with limitless terms?
Will
the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the
marginalized? Will it be able to provide
homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and
protection for the weak?
This
is a defining moment in our history. The
issue posed before us is crucial with transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve
this issue – shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are
duty bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people’s initiative?
Amending
the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the
future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people
elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes,
the voice of the people is the voice of God.
But under the circumstances in
this case, the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the
petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
[1] Works, Letter 164.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases_%28P%E2%80%93Z%29#endnote_ODoQ.
[2] G.R. No. 127325,
[3] Resolution dated
[4] G.R. No. 129754,
[5] Entitled “In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through
a People’s Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral
Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing
Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System.”
[6] Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L.
Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople,
and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal,
Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives
Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra,
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar,
Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L.
Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
[7] “Grounds for contempt
3. From the time the so-called People’s Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel
happened to be in the Senate on
x x x x x x x x x
3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from conceding that it is enjoined).
x x x x x x x x x
4. Respondents
Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner,
for their part, even issued widely-publicized written directives to the field,
[Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to
Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the
Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was
abetting implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.
[8] Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424,
[9] Supra.
[10] Development Bank of the
[12] Supra.
[13] Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco, G.R. No. 129754,
[14] G.R. No. 109645,
[15] Philippine
National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307,
citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary
(1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago
v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).
[16]
[17] Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.
[18] William K. Frankena,
Ethics, 2nd ed. (
[20]
[21] Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
[22] 242 N. W. 891 259
[23] State v.
[25] Adams
v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.
[26]
196 P.2d 787.
[27]
[28] Mc
Fadden v. Jordan, supra.
[29] Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104
So.2d 501, p. 505 (
[30] Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR
REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
[31] See Sections 8-12 for national initiative
and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and referendum.
[32] Section 2. Statement of Policy. – The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
[33] Section 3.
Definition of terms.-
x
x x
a.1.
Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
x
x x
[34] See Section 3(e).
[35] Section 5 (b) – A petition for an initiative
on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only
once every five (5) years thereafter.
x
x x
[36] Section 9 (b) – The proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
[37] 7 How (48
[38] 328
[39] 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
[40] 103 Phi. 1051 (1957).
[41] G.R. No. 35546,
[42] 369
[43] G.R.
No. 85344,
[44] G.R. No. 88211,
[45] Nos. L-36142, L-36164,
L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283,