G.R. No. 174153 - RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174299 - MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE
A. Q. SAGUISAG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe
Promulgated:
October 25, 2006
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“It is a Constitution we are expounding…”[1]
– Chief Justice John Marshall
DISSENTING
OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is not a fight
over molehills. At the crux of the
controversy is the critical understanding of the first and foremost of
our constitutional principles — “the
This is a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed
by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together
with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their
signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the date of
the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution
in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, a flashback of the
proceedings of yesteryears. In
1996, the
Movement for People’s Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people’s
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin,
filed with the COMELEC on
The Delfin Petition stated
that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people and would
be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance of the
COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and time
therefor and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC
issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over
the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the petition for
initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing
the municipal election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to
assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates
and time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a
hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On
Pending resolution of the
case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a
signature drive for people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
On
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient
law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it
should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of
Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to
forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on
Eight (8) members of the
Court,
namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida
Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima,
Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.
While all the members of the
Court who participated in the deliberation[6]
agreed that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required
signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo,
Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban,
held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to implement the people’s right
to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other
hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of
whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law
on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A.
6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the
Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court’s decision.
After deliberating on the
motions for reconsideration, six (6)[7] of the
eight (8) majority members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was
inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima
submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R.A.
6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the
Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief
Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and
Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members,
namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and
Panganiban voted to grant the same.
Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for
judicial adjudication. The motions for
reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or
reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.[8]
On
Do
you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance
to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that
both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of
six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective
government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice,
amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA
Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus
and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its
petition for initiative. PIRMA argued
that the Court’s decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from
acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the
deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no
identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling
in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and
certiorari in its resolution dated
The
Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition
filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on
March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The
Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its
ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this
issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted
that there was no need to take it up.
Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of
said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that
purpose. Five (5) other members of the
Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ.,
opined that there was a need for such a re-examination x x x x[9]
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice)
Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on
the ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later,
another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of
government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of
the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On
A.
Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1.
(1) The legislative and executive
powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as
many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per
district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must
have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a
resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be
elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years
without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list
system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to
twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary
districts.
B. Sections
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to
read, as follows:
Section 1.
There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a
Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves.
He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the
purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a
unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article
XVIII, entitled “Transitory Provisions,” which shall read, as follows:
Section 1.
(1) The incumbent President and
Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
(2) In case
of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President
and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon
the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall
be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government;
provided, however, that any and all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,”
“House of Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read
“Parliament;” that any and all references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,”
“Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to
read as “Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President”
and/or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 3. Upon
the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby
deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be
inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
however, that any all references therein to “Congress,” “Senate,” “House of
Representatives” and “Houses of Congress” shall be changed to read
“Parliament;” that any and all references therein to “Member(s) of Congress,”
“Senator(s)” or “Member(s) of the House of Representatives” shall be changed to
read as “Member(s) of Parliament” and any and all references to the “President”
and or “Acting President” shall be changed to read “Prime Minister.”
Section 4.
(1) There shall exist, upon the
ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of
the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The
incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until
(3) Senators
whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
(4) Within
forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy.
Section 5.
(1) The incumbent President, who
is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim
Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote
of the members thereof. The interim
Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent
President.”
(2) The
interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all
local government officials. The duly
elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers,
duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration
of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.[10]
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets,
on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed
amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles
VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the
present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in
government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the
orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were
distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations and
volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for initiative
containing the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and
multi-sectoral groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that
it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24, 25 and
26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to
the Constitution. Thereafter, they
circulated the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were
then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on
the voters’ registration record. Upon
completion of the verification process, the respective local election
officers issued certifications to attest that the signature sheets have
been verified. The verified signature
sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the
counting of the signatures.
On
August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with
the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled “In
the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People’s
Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral
Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI
and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the
Presidential to the Parliamentary System.”
They filed an Amended Petition on
As basis for the filing of
their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c),
together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for
the people’s exercise of the power. Hence,
petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:
1.
Finding the petition
to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2.
Directing the
publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation;
and
3.
Calling a
plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after
the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow
the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective
oppositions to the petition for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc.,
Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa,
Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.,
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña III,
Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada,
and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja,
and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical
Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of
Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald
Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma.
Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
On
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due
course to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago ruling
of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court
en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and final voting on
10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act No. 6735 as
inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic
Act No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the COMELEC provide for sufficient
details and authority for the exercise of people’s initiative, thus, existing
laws taken together are adequate and complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing to
give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an express
constitutional mandate and disregarding and contravening the will of the
people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law,
respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the sovereign people and must
accordingly act on the petition for initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give the
people the power to propose amendments and the people themselves are now giving
vibrant life to this constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments
is a political question which shall be determined solely by the sovereign
people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the
petition for initiative duly verified by the election officers, the people have
chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign power.
B.
The
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs.
COMELEC only applies to the Delfin petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not
other statements in the body of the decision that governs the rights in
controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to
act or perform a duty mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the
initiative for plebiscite.[12]
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc.,
Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa,
Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.;
Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela
Women’s Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo
Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal,
Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy
Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana
Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and
Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective
Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution
Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate
of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also
filed their respective motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of
the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat,
Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted
to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention.
All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that
the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago
v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the
principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for
the authority and the details for the exercise of people’s initiative to amend
the Constitution; that the proposed
changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does not
meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; that it was not shown
that the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was
disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments
attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the verification process was done ex
parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for
initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity
to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court’s resolution of
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its
resolution denying the petition for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that
R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional provision on
initiative to amend the Constitution. It
invoked the permanent injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from
taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction
covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving
constitutional initiatives.
On
1. Whether
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present
Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the
proposal to amend the Constitution.
2. Whether
the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether
the Court’s decision in Santiago v.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether
the Court should re-examine the ruling in
5. Assuming
R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the
COMELEC have complied with its provisions.
5.1 Whether
the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.
5.2 Whether
the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.
6. Whether
the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution.
6.1 Whether
the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.
7. Whether
the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is a
political question to be determined solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether
the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the
following views to these issues as profiled:
I
Petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf
of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend
the Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend
that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the
instant petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition
for initiative.
The argument deserves scant
attention. The Constitution requires
that the petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered
voters therein. The petition for
initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by
voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of
the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures in the
signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the
filing thereof.[14]
There is thus no need for
the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to
authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize
Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before
this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65
read:
SECTION
1. Petition
for certiorari.—When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
SEC. 3.
Petition for mandamus.—When
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person
aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or
officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate
court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado,
as among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the
COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
II
The doctrine
of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.” The doctrine started with the English Courts.[15] Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.”[16] As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable;” (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.”[17]
The doctrine migrated to the
Indeed,
two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy’s observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.[25] Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis’ view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.”[26] In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.”[27] In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.”[28] This stance reflects both respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,[29] viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where[30] (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In
its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.[31] The most famous of these reversals is Brown
v. Board of Education[32]
which junked Plessy v.
An
examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show
that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning
prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the
following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and
its merits.[36]
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.[37] It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Following
these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar
the reexamination of Santiago. On
the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in
On
the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in
On
the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground
cannot be blinked away. The urgent need
to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to
compete in the new millennium is given.
The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - -
whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people’s
initiative. Petitioners claim that they
have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want to amend the
Constitution through people’s initiative and that their signatures have been
verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The
six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the
direct right of the people to amend the Constitution through an initiative
cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our sovereignty
and from whom all government authority emanates. New developments in our internal and external
social, economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of the
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735
will show that it is sufficient to implement the people’s initiative.
Let
us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people
through initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are
counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is
daylight luminous that Congress
intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to
propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent is palpable from the
following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to
the right of the people to initiate changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2.
Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines
“initiative” as “the power of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose,” and
“plebiscite” as “the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.”
It provides the
requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:
(1) That “(a) petition for an initiative
on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein;”[38]
and
(2) That “(i)nitiative on the Constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.”[39]
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which
provides that “(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved
by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite.”
Second. The legislative
history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use
it as the instrument to implement people’s initiative. No less than former Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill,
which was subsequently approved on
Third. The
sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator
Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized the
intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can propose amendments
to the Constitution. We quote his
relevant remarks:[41]
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the
committee, we wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which
later on may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out
the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary
legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed to
be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a
citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by
the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of
powers. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the
principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973
Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the
shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature and the
executive.
Transcending such changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution
that he
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to
govern is vested in its citizens participating through the right of suffrage
and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking
power is still preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize direct
action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a
practical recognition of what we refer to as people’s sovereign power. This is the recognition of a system of
initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides, and I quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the
1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved
legislative power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision
of the same article of the Constitution provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, or which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section
1 of Article VI which describes legislative power, there are reserved powers
given to the people. In Section 32, we
are specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum
and initiative. We are specifically
mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision
in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the
provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution
nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker,
are charged with the duty to implement the exercise by the people of the right
of initiative and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr.
Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay
apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum under
Philippine law has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative
and referendum is not new. In a very
limited extent, the system is provided for in our Local Government Code
today. On initiative, for instance,
Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to
initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the
sangguniang barangay. There are
variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of
all persons who have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six
months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read
the pertinent quotations but will just submit the same to the Secretary to be
incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same
principles are extensively applied by the Local Government Code as it is now
mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we
have ample examples of initiative and referendum similar to what is now
contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in
the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of the
states in the
In certain American states, the kind of
laws to which initiative and referendum applies is also without ay limitation,
except for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b)
of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill
– from the filing of the petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors – is
substantially similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among us who may have been
in the
Although an infant then in Philippine
political structure, initiative and referendum is a tried and tested system in
other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated
bills is patterned after American experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr.
Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our
colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections.
The constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative
and referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature show
itself indifferent to the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may
be timely, since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness,
to pass this bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would
not be an appropriate term to use at this time, and surely it is not the case
although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity of our
times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to
spur economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share
governmental power with the people.
With the legislative powers of the
President gone, we alone, together with the Senators when they are minded to
agree with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr.
Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr.
Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It means
that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration
and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are
three kinds of initiative. One is an
initiative to amend the Constitution. This can occur once every five
years. Another is an initiative to amend
statutes that we may have approved. Had
this bill been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an
overwhelming majority of the barangays in the
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a
petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
laws or ordinances. It comes from the
people and it must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and
allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to the power
of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the
power of the people to approve or reject something that Congress has already
approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the
municipalities or the barangays into two or three, we must first get the
consent of the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be petitioned by
the people if, for instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and
it is approved subsequently by the Senate.
If this bill had already become a law, then the people could petition
that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of Congress can be
appropriately approved or rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the
petition. As envisioned in the bill, the
initiative comes from the people, from registered voters of the country, by
presenting a proposition so that the people can then submit a petition, which
is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have been
citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay
elections. So the petition must be filed
in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort
to have direct democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr.
Speaker. It will not be all that easy to
have referendum or initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee report, we
are given certain limitations. For
instance, to exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10
percent of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters thereof,
shall sign a petition. These numbers,
Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air.
They are mandated by the Constitution.
There must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3
percent representing all districts. The
same requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and
applied to the different sections. So if
it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for a barangay,
there is a 10 percent or a certain number required of the voters of the
barangay. If it is for a district, there
is also a certain number required of all towns of the district that must seek
the petition. If it is for a province
then again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to the constitutional
mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be
supervised and shall be upon the call of the Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from
receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the
petition, publish the same and set the date of the referendum which shall not
be earlier than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by
the commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the
commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution requires that no bill
can be approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an
initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than two topics sought
to be approved and that cannot be allowed.
In fact, that is one of the prohibitions under this referendum and
initiative bill. When a matter under
initiative or referendum is approved by the required number of votes, Mr.
Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to enlarge
and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this
House, cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for initiative and
referendum. We should have done it in
1987 but that is past. Maybe we should
have done it in 1988 but that too had already passed, but it is only February
1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time this year at least to respond to the
need of our people to participate directly in the work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore
our colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee
Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the
prepared text of my speech, together with the footnotes since they contain many
references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced as part
of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the
sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:[42]
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need
to heed the clamor of the people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who
actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of whom are now
distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the population
feel increasingly that under the system, the people have the form but not the
reality or substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist approach
of their chosen Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their
lives. There have been complaints, not
altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their campaign promises
to the people once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional Commission deemed
it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly
in case their chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That
reserve power known as initiative is explicitly recognized in three articles
and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the
same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section
2. May I request that he explicit
provisions of these three articles and four sections be made part of my
sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are,
however, not self-executory. There is a need for an implementing law that will
give meaning and substance to the
process of initiative and referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to
representative democracy. It is needless to state that this bill when enacted
into law will probably open the door to strong competition of the people, like
pressure groups, vested interests, farmers’ group, labor groups, urban
dwellers, the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of
legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in
significance when we consider that through this bill we can hasten the
politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an
enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce better and more responsive
and acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would
give the parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented groups an
opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the
competition which they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a healthy one.
Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests dear to all
Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side’s competitive goals can still take
place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when
the distinguished Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation filed
our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill would
be approved early enough so that our people could immediately use the agrarian
reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy
agenda of the Committee on Local Government, it took sometime before the
committee could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at
magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my dear
colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal
and political consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore
respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to
give effect to this intent for the “[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as
legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as
revealed by its language, purpose and history.”[43]
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent,
the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that “x x x R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned” for the following
reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the
contents of the petition for initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative
on the Constitution.
To
say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle
the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution through
initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed
the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action. The fact
that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing
the people’s initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo,
the law is insufficient. What were omitted
were mere details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone
can and has determined. Implementing
details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its
rule-making power. Under Section 2(1),
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized
by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735
insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6)
justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional
changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and can be undertaken through
people’s initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of people’s initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through people’s initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:[44]
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision
of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
x
x x x x x x x x x x x
MS. AQUINO. In
which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as
a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We
would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting
to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given
to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner
(later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:[45]
MR. DAVIDE. x
x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a
proposal for amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x
x
MR. MAAMBONG.
My first question: Commissioner
Davide’s proposed amendment on line 1 refers to “amendment.” Does it cover the word “revision” as defined
by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
“amendments” and “revision?”
MR. DAVIDE. No,
it does not, because “amendments” and “revision” should be covered by Section
1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to “amendments” not “revision.”
Commissioner
(now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also
clarified this point[46] -
MR. OPLE. To more
closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to
“Amendments” “OR REVISIONS OF” to read:
“Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution.”
MR. AZCUNA. I
think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How
is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It
was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but
merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON.
Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I
remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO.
Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals,
petitioners will “change the very system of government from presidential to
parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral,”
among others. They allegedly seek other
major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per
district, a change in the period for a term of a Member of Parliament, the
removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a Prime Minister
who shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth.[47] In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that
“the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the political
structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the
government, the political rights of the people, and the modes by which
political rights may be exercised.”[48] They conclude that they are substantial
amendments which cannot be done through people’s initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that
only simple but not substantial amendments can be done through people’s
initiative.
With due
respect, I disagree. To start with, the words “simple”
and “substantial” are not subject to any accurate quantitative or
qualitative test. Obviously, relying on
the quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments
will result in some one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is
also arguable that petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of
the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), together with
the complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential
bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will
not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration
of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V
(Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X
(Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National
Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education,
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General
Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we
use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are “simple” or
“substantial.”
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to
determine whether the said changes are “simple” or “substantial”
as to amount to a revision of the Constitution.
The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should
contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty which
sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations
on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these
rights; the constitution of government which deals with the framework of
government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration and
defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which
prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising the constitution.[49] It is plain that the proposed changes will
basically affect only the constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed,
the proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature of our state as “x
x x a democratic and republican state.”[50] It is self-evident that a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less
democratic or any less republican in character.
Hence, neither will the
use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes
are “simple” or “substantial.”
For
this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or
qualitative test to determine whether an “amendment” is “simple” or “substantial.” Nor
did they provide that “substantial” amendments are beyond the power of the
people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional
distinction between “amendment” and “revision,” i.e., “amendment”
means change, including complex changes while “revision” means complete
change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries express this
traditional difference between “amendment” and “revision.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “amendment”
as “[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute,
constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made
by addition, deletion, or correction.”[51] Black’s also refers to “amendment” as “the
process of making such a revision.”[52] Revision, on the other hand, is defined
as “[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement.”[53] In parliamentary law, it is described as “[a]
general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire
document is open to amendment.”[54]
Similarly, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines “amendment” – as “[a] correction or revision of a writing to
correct errors or better to state its intended purpose”[55]
and “amendment of constitution” as “[a] process of proposing, passing, and
ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution.”[56] In contrast, “revision,” when
applied to a statute (or constitution), “contemplates the re-examination of the
same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the
substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule.”[57]
One of the most
authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of
intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the
Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the
Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference between
“amendment” and “revision.” He opined:
“the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration
of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change;
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or
to be altered in a constitution.”[58]
Our people
were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our
1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935
Constitution which included the conversion from a unicameral system to a
bicameral structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and
Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a four-year term with
one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together with the
complementary constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were
considered amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement
of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however, considered
a revision since the 1973 Constitution was “a completely new fundamental
charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.”[59] Among those adopted under the 1973
Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the presidential
system, with the leadership in
legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet;
the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the
two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system of
government; the enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of
age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and
other substantial requirements to widen the basis for the electorate and expand
democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service system, and
the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and
management of mass media; the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all
telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own
educational institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to
improve the conditions of the masses.[60]
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series
of significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant innovations introduced
in 1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in
place of the interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the
President the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever
the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that
in his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or
threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to
form part of the law of the land. In 1980,
the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the presidential system
with parliamentary features was installed.
The transfer of private land for use as residence to natural-born
citizens who had lost their citizenship was also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the
Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro
Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created
while the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social
housing programs were strengthened.[61] These substantial changes were simply
considered as mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the people’s right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose substantial amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and adopted it.[62] “Debates in the constitutional convention ‘are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law.’”[63] Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction between “amendment” and “revision.” For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,[64] that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and revision, thus:[65]
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one
term and that is, “amendment.” However,
the Committee finally agreed to use the terms – “amendment” or “revision” when
our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial
difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with
the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine,
particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,[66]
wherein he made the following distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of
an existing Constitution: “Revision” may involve a rewriting of the whole
Constitution. On the other hand, the act
of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts
or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The
1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the
proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the
Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
To further explain “revision,” former Justice Antonio, in his concurring
opinion, used an analogy – “When a house is completely demolished and another
is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered
house, or do you have a new house? Some
of the material contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms
may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have
altogether another or a new house.”[67]
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used
the word “revision,” they had in mind the “rewriting of the whole Constitution,”
or the “total overhaul of the Constitution.” Anything less is an “amendment” or
just “a change of specific provisions only,” the intention being “not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts
or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.”
Under this view, “substantial” amendments are still “amendments” and
thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with
certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the Commissioners on the difference between
“simple” and “substantial” amendments or whether “substantial” amendments
amounting to revision are covered by people’s initiative, it behooves us to
follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e.,
construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its
rationale well, viz:[68]
x x x the constitution does not derive
its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified
it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be
supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words
employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to
the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that
was the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less
conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case
it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are
endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussion and
deliberations of their representatives.
The history of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to
it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time of the
election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and
satisfactory as anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted
on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines,
to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great
principles of government – not to defeat them.[69] One of these great principles is the
sovereignty of the people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when
they adopted initiative as a mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as “the basic political
creed of the nation”[70]
as it “lays down the policies that government is bound to observe.”[71] Section 1, Article II of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly
provide that “the
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people
delegated to Congress or to a convention, the power to amend or revise our
fundamental law. History informs us
how this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution was abused
particularly during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed several
times to satisfy the power requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No.
6 was passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of
circumstances from above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime
through an extra constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the
people. A main reason for the
people’s revolution was the failure of the representatives of the people to
effectuate timely changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent
assembly or by calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted
in using this last peaceful process of constitutional change, the sovereign
people themselves took matters in their own hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973
Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the
1987 Constitution as it stressed the power of the people to act directly in their
capacity as sovereign people.
Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as representatives
of the people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution was
diminished for the spring cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: “the
MR. NOLLEDO. I
am putting the word “democratic” because of the provisions that we are now
adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall,
initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other
instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through
people’s organizations x x x x[73]
MR. OPLE.
x x x x The Committee added the word “democratic” to “republican,” and,
therefore, the first sentence states:
“The
May I know from the committee the reason for adding
the word “democratic” to “republican”?
The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were
content with “republican.” Was this done
merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x “democratic” was added because of
the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the Constitution
that we have approved related to recall, people’s organizations, initiative and
the like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in
certain circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE.
I thank the Commissioner. That is
a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid,
“democracy” here is understood as participatory democracy. [74] (emphasis
supplied)
The following exchange
between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento
and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of
the same import:[75]
MR. SARMIENTO.
When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to
representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation
under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words “republican state”
because “republican state” would refer to a democratic state where people
choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted
to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept “republican state,”
we are stressing the participation of the people x x x x So the word
“republican” will suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of
the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative,
referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of
republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word “democratic”
to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people
would act directly, and not through their representatives. (emphasis supplied)
Consistent with
the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative,
referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas
F. Ople who introduced the provision on people’s initiative said:[76]
MR. OPLE.
x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should
introduce an innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting
in the people and their organizations the right to formulate and propose
their own amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that
will be binding upon the government. It
is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for amending a
constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to know
that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the people and
that in the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or revision to
the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose
E. Suarez also
explained the people’s initiative as a safety valve, as a peaceful way for the
people to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the Marcos
government, viz:[77]
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing
this particular provision, but we are providing a channel for the expression of
the sovereign will of the people through this initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not
sufficient channel for expression of the will of the people, particularly in
the amendment or revision of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during the 20
years under the Marcos administration.
So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of speaking, is operating
under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the President as the case may be, and
the required number of votes could not be obtained, we would have to provide
for a safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a very
peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.
It
is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National
Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to call a
constitutional convention, the members thereof would not heed the people’s
desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing
for the implementation of what is now popularly known as people’s power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people’s initiative could avert a
revolution, viz:[78]
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the
Constitution could actually avert a revolution by providing a safety
valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution through pacific means.
This, in effect, operationalizes what political law authors call the
“prescription of sovereignty.” (emphasis
supplied)
The end
result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed
the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by
direct action or through initiative. To
that extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the
Constitution has to be adjusted downward.
Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be reminted
and now provides: “The legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Prescinding
from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through
initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution
turns sovereignty on its head. At
the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the
exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who
they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose “simple” but not
“substantial” amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in
its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law.[79] Legal sovereignty, he explained, is “the
possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party
endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not subject to law ‘for it is the
author and source of law.’ Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence.”[80]
To be sure, sovereignty or
popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people’s will over the
state which they themselves have created.
The state is created by and subject to the will of the people, who are
the source of all political power. Rightly,
we have ruled that “the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle
whose dimensions are buried in mysticism.
Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our
Constitutions. They knew that in its
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.”[81]
James Wilson, regarded by many as the
most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power
from which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not
considered with sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that,
in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x
x This opinion approaches a step nearer
to the truth, but does not reach it. The
truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power remains in the people. As our
constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to
our constitutions. Indeed the
superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess
over our constitution, control in act,
as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in
a democratic and republican state, only the people is sovereign - - - not the elected
President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which
is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of government. Only its
exercise may be delegated to any of them.
In our case, the people delegated to Congress the exercise of the
sovereign power to amend or revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this
power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign
people who delegated the power has no power to substantially amend the
Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign
people do not have this power to make substantial amendments to the
Constitution, what did it delegate to Congress?
How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially
amend the Constitution when by their sovereignty, all power emanates
from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo
to argue that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco
clinch the point:[83]
But although possession may not be
delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and agents of
the state which constitute its government, for it is only through this
instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However ample and complete this delegation
may be, it is nevertheless subject to withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the
Constitution is shared with the people.
We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of
the people to propose substantial amendments
to the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments will adversely
affect the interest of some members of Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public
weal to private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate
the power of the people to determine their destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the
people to exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and generously
construed in favor of the people.[84] Initiative and referendum powers must be
broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people.[85] We followed this orientation in
V
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that
“[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend
the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million
registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely
political question which is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable
Court’s power of judicial review.
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which
the people and the people alone must resolve in their sovereign capacity.”[87] They argue that “[t]he power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the
sovereign people. Hence, the
determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under
the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit
of a ‘political question.’”[88]
The petitioners cannot be
sustained. This issue has long been
interred by Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:[89]
Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the
legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President
in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume
the power of a constituent assembly. Whether
the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments
is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would
merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare
whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President’s
authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for
submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the
latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
cycle. Is it not that the people
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure
for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, that
constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper
subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves – of course – who exercise no
power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e.,
before the submission to and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and
white the requirements for the exercise of the people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. The amendments must be
proposed by the people “upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.”[90] Compliance with these requirements is
clearly a justiciable and not a political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is
addressed to them and to them alone.
VI
Whether
the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of
fact which should first be resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative
as it allegedly lacks the required number of signatures under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. Said
provision requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at least
twelve per cent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors
contend that no proper verification of signatures was done in several
legislative districts. They assert that
mere verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without verifying
the signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their respective
legislative districts to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor
ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated
This
is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District,
Senate Minority Leader
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty.
Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First
District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that the Office of
the City Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the
signature sheets,[92] the
certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names of the
signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only
the names of the signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to
ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature
sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that
petitioners failed to obtain the signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of
registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First District of South Cotabato,
petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng
Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this Court a certification issued by
Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating
that the list of names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the
names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not
actually verified the signatures.[94]
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is
further bolstered by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of
similarly worded certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del
Sur[95]
and from
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the
verification conducted by the election officers sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on
the lack of verification in
This
is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as
appearing in the Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II,
Anent
thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662)
individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668)
individuals were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List of
Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.[98]
It was also shown that Atty.
Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the verification
process conducted in
Regarding
the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has
previously issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd
Districts of Davao City on
It
must be clarified that the
I
hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as
appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures
appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x [99]
Petitioner Aumentado also
submitted a copy of the certification dated
This
is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this
municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures
were submitted for verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be
legitimate voters as per official list of registered voters, which is
equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered voters of this
Municipality.[100]
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the
signatures in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud and
irregularities in the collection of signatures in
(1) No
notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned,
by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted
to it for “verification.” The camp of
Mayor Binay was able to witness the “verification process” only because of
their pro-active stance;
(2) In
District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for
verification. 36,219 alleged voters’ signatures (83% of the number of
signatures submitted) were rejected outright.
7,186 signatures allegedly “passed” COMELEC’s initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature
sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be
accounted for. Atty. Binay manually
counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word “OK” and 3,443 signatures marked
with a check, giving only 6,236 “apparently verified signatures.” Before the COMELEC officer issued the
Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not less than
55 letters of “signature withdrawal,” but no action was ever taken thereon;
(3) In
District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged voters’ signatures (80% of
those submitted) were rejected outright.
Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the COMELEC’s initial
scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon closer examination;
(4) In the
absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did not
know how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the camp of
Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not
know where to go for their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely “listened”
to their objections and other observations.
As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do
with the many “letters of signature withdrawal” submitted to it;
(5) Signatures
of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the Sigaw
ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even
a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There
are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A
Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature
Sheets.[101]
Also, there are allegations
that many of the signatories did not understand what they have signed as they
were merely misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these allegations are rulings that
a person who affixes his signature on a document raises the presumption that
the person so signing has knowledge of what the document contains. Courts have
recognized that there is great value in the stability of records, so to speak,
that no one should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless she
or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him.[102] In the same vein, we have held that a person
is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has signed.[103] But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it
cannot resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have
complied with the constitutional requirement that the petition for initiative
be signed by at least twelve per cent
(12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves
contentious facts. Its resolution
will require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC
according to its rules. During the
oral argument on this case, the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig
of its Law Department, admitted that it has not examined the documents
submitted by the petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well
as the documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim that the
required number of signatures has not been met.
The exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need
for further clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain
material facts.[104]
The only basis used by
the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court’s ruling
in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of
the form and substance of the petition.
I respectfully submit that this issue should be properly litigated
before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full opportunity to
prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition
for Initiative and its compliance with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on
initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by
the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the
Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.[105]
VII
COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino and Aumentado
petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado
petition, COMELEC relied on this Court’s ruling in Santiago
permanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Again,
I respectfully submit that COMELEC’s reliance on
Within
the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration. On
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected
cluster; another to think under fire – to think for action upon which great
interests depend.” So said Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the
holding of the majority that “R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation” and now to interpose my dissent thereto.
x x x
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as
adequately providing the legal basis for the exercise by the people of their
right to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for
initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution without the required names
and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the
thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of whether
the motion for reconsideration of the
The jurisprudence
that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled.
Thus, in the
In this light, we review our cases explicating the
disposition “affirmed by an equally divided Court.” On what was apparently the first occasion of
an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the
Court simply affirmed on the point of division without much discussion.
This
doctrine established in Neil has
not been overturned and has been cited with approval in a number of
subsequent cases,[112]
and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a
Minor Child,[113]
wherein a putative father sought to set aside a decree granting petition
for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the
requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),[114]
which lacked majority opinion supporting holding that an action
such as the putative father’s would be governed by the state’s one-year statute
of limitations, was not entitled to stare
decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a
common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the
state’s one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the
result only, and one justice dissented.
There was no “narrower” reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming
justices. The concurring justice
expressed no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with
the result, he reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue.[115]
The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state’s one-year statute of
limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the
standing issue.[116] Because a majority of the participating
justices in T.N.F. did
not agree on any one ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state
Supreme Court.
The
Supreme Court of Michigan likewise
ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis
does not apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of the
justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not authoritative
interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.[117]
In
State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,[118] the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on
the matter,[119] held
that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo
warranto suit without prejudice. The
Court held:
In a
cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared
unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with,
except by the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court
sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in
question or judicial relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.
Therefore
in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in
holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it
follows that the statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and
accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the
Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo warranto must be dismissed
without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (
Quo
warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the
court on question of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,[120] the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government’s decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative “precedent.”
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,[121]
the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit,
in holding that printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs’ lyrics,
but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement
of plaintiffs’ copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loew’s, Inc.,[122]
which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not binding upon
it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems
justified by reason as well as by authority, an affirmance by an equally
divided court is as between the parties, a conclusive determination and
adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not
having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or
in inferior courts.[123]
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,[124] the
Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed
the appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because two judges recused
themselves and the remaining members of the Court were so divided, it was
impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally
required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the
The same
rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,[126] an
affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive
determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of
law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that or
in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we
can safely conclude that the prevailing
doctrine is that, the affirmance by
an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as between
the parties and settles no issue of law;
the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight
or value. In other words, the decision only has res judicata and not stare
decisis effect. It is not conclusive
and binding upon other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Let
us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin Petition
in the
Plainly,
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the
basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the doctrine that
R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As
aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the
majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on the present
petitioners.
The Court’s dismissal of the
PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice
it to say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition
must be summarily dismissed:
First, it is barred by res
judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19
March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially
identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the
principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties
in the present petition. But plainly,
the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE’S
INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is
self-described as “a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites,
199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,” with “ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA” as among its “officers.”
In
The decision in
No amount of semantics may then shield herein
petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from
the operation of the principle of res
judicata, which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
adds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.[127]
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold
that all the elements of res judicata
are present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was
promulgated on
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to
the parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case
were not parties to the former case.
However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the
COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their
capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra,
another founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made
parties to the petition. In other words,
what petitioners did was to make it appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by
an entirely separate and distinct group by removing some of the parties
involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v. Sabido[128]-
A
party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply including additional parties in the
subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later case persons who
were parties in the previous suit. The
joining of new parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule
on res judicata if the party against
whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action;
otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by simply joining new
parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as
parties in the PIRMA petition but were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior
judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties
in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are
bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on
res judicata binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
“It
is a Constitution we are expounding” solemnly intoned the great Chief
Justice John Marshall of the
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all government authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.
This Court should always be in
lockstep with the people in the exercise of their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the
sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by
those who belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the Constitution as if
the people themselves are not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of
manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
Be it remembered
that a petition for people’s initiative that complies with the requirement that
it “must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein” is but the first step in a long journey
towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar
involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated by the
people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of
the debate. There will still be a last
step to the process of amendment which is the ratification of the proposal
by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a
majority of the people in the plebiscite will it become an amendment to the
Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie
the tongues of the people. It is the
people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our
Constitution.
The people’s
voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let
us hear them. Let us heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the people’s
sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon
nor too late to let the people speak.
IN VIEW
WHEREOF, I
vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on
Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for
Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf
and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the Commission
on Elections for further proceedings.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
[1] M’cCulloch v.
[2] Section 1, Article II, 1987
Constitution.
[3] 270 SCRA 106,
[4]
[5]
[6] Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not
take part in the deliberation as he was related to a co-petitioner and
co-counsel of petitioners.
[7] Justice Davide (ponente),
Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado,
Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan.
[8] Resolution dated
[9] People’s Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 129754,
[10] Amended Petition for Initiative, pp.
4-7.
[11] G.R. No. 127325,
[12] Petition, pp. 12-14.
[13] Advisory issued by Court, dated
[14] Exhibit “B,” Memorandum of
Petitioner Lambino.
[15] Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare
Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 Notre Dame Law Rev., 1911-1912, (May 2005).
[16] Ibid.
[17]
[18] Consovoy, The
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Consovoy, supra note 18, at 57.
[24]
[25]
[26] Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285
[27]
[28] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483
U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
[29] Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1922.
[30]
[31] Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare
Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist
Court, 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal, 335, 343 (Summer 1991).
[32] 347
[33] 163
[34] G.R.
No. 127882,
[35] G.R. No. 139465,
[36] Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1915.
[37] 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
[38] Section 5(b).
[39] Ibid.
[40] Santiago
v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at 145.
[41] 85
Record of the House of Representatives
140-142 (February 14, 1989).
[42] 85 Record of the house of representatives 142-143 (February 14, 1989).
[43] Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public
Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358.
[44] I
RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (
[45]
[46] v record,
constitutional commission 806 (
[47] Opposition-in-Intervention filed by
ONEVOICE, p. 39.
[48] Opposition-in-Intervention filed by
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30.
[49] Introduction to Political Science,
pp. 397-398.
[50] Section 1, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution.
[51] Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004).
[52] Ibid.
[53]
[54] Ibid.
[55] Third Edition, p. 67 (1969).
[56]
[57]
[58] Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 2nd ed., p. 46.
[59] Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice
Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, No. L-361432,
[60] J. M. Aruego, The
New Philippine Constitution Explained, iii-iv (1973).
[61] E. Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp.
422-425 (1984).
[62] N. Gonzales, Philippine Political Law 30 (1969 ed.).
[63] Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337
quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Alt. 220 (1886).
[64] L-36142,
[65] i record,
constitutional commission 373 (
[66] The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio.
[67] Javellana v. Executive Secretary,
supra note 64, citing Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327
(1946).
[68] T. M. Cooley, I A
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 143-144 (8th ed. 1927).
[69] H.C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law S. 47, p. 67 (2nd ed. 1897).
[70] V.
Sinco, supra note 58.
[71] Ibid.
[72] No.
L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948).
[73] IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
735 (
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79] Sinco, supra note 58, at 22.
[80]
[81] Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295,
[82] G.
Wood, The
Creation of the
[83] Sinco, supra note 58, at 29.
[84] State
v. Moore, 103
[85] Town
of
[86] G.R.
No. 125416,
[87] Memorandum
for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152.
[88]
[89] L-44640,
[90] Section
2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.
[91] Annex “3,”
Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors ONEVOICE, INC., et al.
[92] Certification dated April 21, 2006
issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Annex “B,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 20, 2006 issued by
Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Annex “C,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 26, 2006 issued by
Atty. Marlon S. Cascuejo, Annex “D,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor
Pimentel, et al.
[93] Annex “1,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor
Antonino.
[94] Annex “10-A,” Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.
[95] Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor
Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
[96] Annexes 30-31,
[97] Annexes 44-64,
[98] Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.
[99] Exhibit “E,” Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
[100] Annex “A,” Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.
[101] Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.
[102] Helvey
v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).
[103] BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins &
Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).
[104] ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
We printed 100 thousand of this petition last February and we
distributed to the different organizations that were volunteering to support us.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100 thousand of
these were printed?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
It could be more than that, Your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they can(?)
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, so you got 6.3 Million signatures, but you only printed 100
thousand. So you’re saying, how many did your friends print of the petition?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
I can no longer give a specific answer to that, Your Honor. I relied
only to the assurances of the people who are volunteering that they are going to
reproduce the signature sheets as well as the draft petition that we have given them, Your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Did you also show this amended petition to the people?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Your Honor, the amended petition reflects the copy of the original
petition that we circulated, because in the original petition that we filed before the COMELEC, we omitted a certain paragraph that is, Section 4 paragraph 3 which were part of the original petition that we circulated and so we have to correct that oversight because that is what we have circulated to the people and we have to correct that…
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
But you just stated now that what you circulated was the petition of
August 25, now you are changing your mind, you’re saying what you circulated was the petition of August 30, is that correct?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
In effect, yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but what you filed in the
COMELEC on August 25 was a different petition, that’s why you have to amend it?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor, that
we have omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our proposition.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, let’s be clear. What did you circulate when you gathered the
signatures, the August 25 which you said you circulated or the August 30?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Both the August 25 petition that included all the provisions, Your
Honor, and as amended on August 30. Because we have to include the one that
we have inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you printed
100 thousand copies?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
That was the original printed matter that we have circulated by the
month of February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
That is all you can assure us?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have asked some
friends, like
for example (like)
Mr. Liberato Laos to help me print out some more of this petition… (TSN,
[105] Section 2 (1), Article IX – C, 1987
Constitution.
[106] Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and
Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero,
Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo
P. Torres.
[107] Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S.
Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban.
[108] Justice Jose C. Vitug.
[109] Only fourteen (14) justices
participated in the deliberations as Justice Teodoro R. Padilla took no part on
account of his relationship with the lawyer of one of the parties.
[110] Citing conscience as ground.
[111] 409
[112] Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 97
[113] 40 P. 3d 886 (2006).
[114] 781 P. 2d 973 (
[115]
[116]
[117] Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d
98 (1976).
[118] 112
[119] Penned by Justice Whitfield, and
concurred in by Chief Justice Davis and Justice Terrell; Justices Ellis, Brown
and Buford are of the opinion that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933, is a special or
local law not duly advertised before its passage, as required by sections 20
and 21 of article 3 of the state Constitution, and therefore invalid. This evenly divided vote resulted in the
affirmance of the validity of the statute but did not constitute a binding
precedent on the Court.
[120] 62
[121] 329 F. 2d 541 (1964).
[122] 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir.
1956).
[123] Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218
[124] 331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975).
[125] Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108.
[126] Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas.
274.
[127] Maglalang
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 808, 811, 812;
Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118.
[128] No.
L-35440,
[129] Supra note 1.