G.R. No.
174153 RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B.
AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No.
174299 MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO
UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,
respondents.
Promulgated:
x -
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- - - - - - - - - -x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am
convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition
before it. The proposals of petitioners
incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the
respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August
25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the
COMELEC a petition entitled IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
THROUGH A PEOPLES INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND
PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO
THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. The case was
docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their
petition in their own behalf and together with those who have affixed their
signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens,
residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at
least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all
the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of peoples initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that (T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right, the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,[1] are sufficient enabling details for the peoples exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
x x x x
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has
the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition for
initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.[2]
Petitioners incorporated in their
petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the
1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
On
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an empty right, and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the
case to this Court on a petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In support
of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter
alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLES INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE
C.
THE PERMANENT
INJUNCTION ISSUED IN
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.[3]
Petitioners
Failed to Allege and
Demonstrate
All the Essential
Facts To
Establish the Right
to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set
out in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x[4]
The Court has invariably defined
grave abuse of discretion, thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.[5]
There is thus grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.[6] The only question involved is jurisdiction,
either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari
is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment.[7] An error of judgment is one in which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible
only by an appeal.[8]
In the present case, it appears from
the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for
initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.[9] In said case, the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for
initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for
the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty
for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the
petition for initiative as capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely
followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Courts ruling in
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is
considered as finally settled. The
inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and
must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or
judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to
any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or
in any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and
settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme
Court
.
The principles above stated are, we think,
conclusively established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would
inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into
conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable
mischief and confusion. Besides, any
rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme
Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to
the principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.[14]
At this point,
it is well to recall the factual context of
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned;
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300[15] invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The
Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of
signatures of registered voters.
The Court
concluded in
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on
The Court
reiterated its ruling in
The opinion of
the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no
basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution
dated
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:
The
Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition
filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on
March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Court
next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second
issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the
Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ.,
voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second
issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely,
Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.[18]
(Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSGs attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Courts decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.[19]
The pronouncement in the body of the decision
in Santiago permanently enjoining the
COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system is thus as much a part of the Courts decision as
its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature
of an in rem judgment barring any and
all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course
to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
conformably with the Courts ruling in Santiago
did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle
of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to
find the COMELEC to
have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the
ruling of this Court in Santiago
would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.[20] This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.[21]
Petitioners
Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of
Discretion on
the COMELEC
Based on the
Minority
Opinion in
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Courts declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,[22] or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,[23] while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977.[24] In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the peoples right to directly propose constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of Representatives,[25] have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for Peoples Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa Loi P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for Peoples Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Peoples Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for Peoples Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate
and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern
the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people
directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening
event, i.e., passage of a law to implement
the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution,
that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the
Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of
stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other
government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to its
own ruling.
Contrary to
the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law
cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose
it the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned and therefore the
same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Courts composition.[26] Indeed, it is vital that there be stability
in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample
consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined
principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the
expounders of it.[27]
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly
transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled Transitory
Provisions, which shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of Representatives and House of Congress, Senator[s] or Member[s] of the House of Representatives and House of Congress shall be changed to read Parliament; that any and all references therein to Member[s] of the House of Representatives shall be changed to read as Member[s] of Parliament and any and all references to the President and or Acting President shall be changed to read Prime Minister.
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of Representatives and Houses of Congress shall be changed to read Parliament; that any and all references therein to Member[s] of Congress, Senator[s] or Member[s] of the House of Parliament and any and all references to the President and of Acting President shall be changed to read Prime Minister.
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in
2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.
(2)
The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President,
as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall
initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from
among themselves.] The duly-elected
Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term
of the incumbent President and Vice President.[28]
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU
APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?[29]
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
It can be
readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures
for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers
of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms amendment and revision
and provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of
the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two
concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez,
the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions,
explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, amendment. However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms amendment or revision when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous or notorious Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between amendment and revision of an existing Constitution: Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.[30]
Further, the
framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term revision in Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve
the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the
constitutional convention. Stated in
another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be
undertaken through the system of initiative.
Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by
Congress or by a constitutional convention.
It is
significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative
was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution.[31]
However,
after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed
to remove the provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and,
instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the
provision on initiative from the other traditional modes of changing the
Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to
amendments to the Constitution. It was
emphasized that the system of initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x[32]
The
intention to exclude revision of the Constitution as a mode that may be
undertaken through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by
Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas
Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In
other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the
process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply
to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.[33]
Then
Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the
clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado
Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My
first question: Commissioner Davides proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
amendments. Does it not cover the word
revision as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words amendments and revision?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because amendments and revision should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to amendments not revision.[34]
After
several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of
Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and
2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(4) A constitutional convention.
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The final
text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial
differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures
and their respective fields of application.
Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a
mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments
not to a revision thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for amendment and revision as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,[35] the controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.[36]
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.[37]
Amendment of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or purpose.[39]
On the other
hand, the term revision was explained by the said US appellate court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new constitution.[40]
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded on the
distinction between the two terms thus:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document or of provisions of the document (which have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document) to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of amendments means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity of amendments![41]
Given that revision
necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on the
Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system
of initiative. It should be recalled
that it took the framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2,
1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as
described by the venerable Justice Cecilia Mu๑oz Palma, the President of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, gradually and painstakingly took shape
through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating
debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life.[42]
Evidently, the framers of
the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner, be a
product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of
initiative where the people would directly propose amendments to the
Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a
deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The
Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles
upon which the government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign
powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is to be confided and
the manner in which it is to be exercised.[43] The Philippines has followed the American
constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument,
under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.[44]
The
Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An
overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or
76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2, 1987.[45] In expressing that will, the Filipino people
have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended
and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law
the particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any
course which disregards that express will is a direct violation of the
fundamental law.[46]
Further,
these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the
validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such
provisions have been complied with, such question presents for consideration
and determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only tribunals
vested with power under the Constitution to determine such question.[47]
Earlier, it was mentioned
that Article XVII, by the use of the terms amendment and revision, clearly
makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two
procedures and their respective fields of application. On this point, the case
of McFadden v. Jordan[48] is instructive. In that case, a purported initiative
amendment (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State Constitution of
California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for
ratification, was sought to be enjoined.
The proposed measure, denominated as California Bill of Rights,
comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or
substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California State
Constitution and add at least four new topics.
Among the likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative
and judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation system
and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also included diverse
matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of
California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for
ratification because it was not an amendment but a revision which could
only be proposed by a convention. It
held that from an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation
to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the
proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision,
rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State
Constitution specifies (Article XVIII ง2 thereof) that it may be revised by
means of constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by
initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the electorate
for ratification must be enjoined.
As
piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation required (between amendment and revision) is not
merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and
between their respective fields of application.
Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory
construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application,
not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be
understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of
application appropriate to its procedure.[49]
Provisions regulating the time and
mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves they
must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great
facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on
the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force
needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker
is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to
reconcile the requisites for progress with the requisites for safety.[50]
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of
Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory
provisions. However, as will be shown
shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other
numerous provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the
specific powers of Congress and the President.
These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the
Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be
affected or altered thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that no public officer shall accept, without the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress measures to minimize election spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization registered under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system;
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as Congress may provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development councils x x x;
- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous region as well as the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the regional consultative commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-President, etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials including the President, Vice-President, etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning agency to be headed by the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form private corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in educational institutions;
- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official communication;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new national anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by the President in times of war or national emergency declared by Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the President on indigenous cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system of initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The
foregoing enumeration negates the claim that the big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected.[51] Petitioners proposition, while purportedly seeking
to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing transitory
provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous
articles and sections thereof. More than
the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners
proposition is apparent from the qualitative
effects it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary
of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict
sense, refers to a consideration of the entire
constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular
provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.[52]
For clarity and accuracy, however,
it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sincos more comprehensive
differentiation of the terms:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.[53]
A change in
the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary,
following the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it
will involve alteration of different portions of the entire document and may
result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of
it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions.
More importantly, such shift
in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change the basic
plan and substance of the present Constitution.
The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides
governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative,
executive and judicial. Legislative
power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter them at
discretion. Executive power, vested in
the President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see that
the laws are duly executed and enforced.
Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the
power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what
has been done or omitted under it. This
separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards
against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a
unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is
dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative
powers. Essentially, the President
becomes a mere symbolic head of State while the Prime Minister becomes the
head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the
members of the Parliament. The
Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government,
does not have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of
confidence of the Parliament. Under
this form of government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering
the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to
mention that the Constitutions basic plan and substance of a tripartite system
of government and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same
would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion
than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than
an amendment or such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed.[54] As has been shown, the effect of the adoption
of the petitioners proposition, rather than to within the lines of the
original instrument constitute an improvement or better carry out the purpose
for which it was framed, is to substantially alter the purpose and to attain
objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast.[55]
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners contention that
any change less than a total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of
absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where
the question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of
demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision.[56]
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that
a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought
to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided
herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;
and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not
more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof
requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits
and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the election registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICERS CERTIFICATION[57]
THIS IS
TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in
this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the 2nd
Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on
the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on Amendments
to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide
resident of the said Barangays and
correspond to the names found in the official list of registered voters of the
Commission on Elections and/or voters affidavit and/or voters identification
cards.
It is
further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters
for the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the
affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
IBRAHIM
M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective
verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly worded
as above-quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;[58]
Cotabato City (Special Province);[59]
Datu Odin
Sinsuat, Maguindanao;[60]
Matanog, Maguindanao;[61]
Parang, Maguindanao;[62]
Kabantalan, Maguindanao;[63] Upi, Maguinadano;[64]
Barira, Maguindanao;[65]
Sultan, Mastura;[66]
Ampatuan, Maguindanao;[67]
Buluan, Maguindanao;[68]
Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;[69] Datu Piang, Maguindanao;[70]
Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;[71]
Pagalungan, Maguindanao;[72]
Talayan, Maguindanao;[73]
Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;[74]
Mamasapano, Maguindanao;[75]
Talitay, Maguindanao;[76]
Guindulungan, Maguindanao;[77]
Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;[78]
Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;[79]
Pagagawan, Maguindanao;[80]
Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;[81] Indanan, Sulu;[82]
Jolo, Sulu;[83] Maimbung, Sulu;[84]
Hadji Panglima, Sulu;[85]
Pangutaran, Sulu;[86]
Parang, Sulu;[87]
Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;[88]
Luuk, Sulu;[89]
Panamao, Sulu;[90]
Pata, Sulu;[91]
Siasi, Sulu;[92]
Tapul, Sulu;[93]
Panglima Estino, Sulu;[94]
Lugus, Sulu;[95]
and Pandami, Sulu. [96]
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election registrar, and by no one else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by barangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied with and that their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.[97] This being the case, the Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases.[98]
It is argued
by petitioners that, assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC is correct in relying on Santiago
that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot
be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the peoples will. The fact that there is no enabling law should
not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of the
particles of sovereignty must not be set aside.
Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is
unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens
who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of a public duty
most especially when mandated by the Constitution.[99] However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court, for a petition for mandamus
to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial
act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of an official discretion nor judgment.[100]
To stress,
in a petition for mandamus,
petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.[101] In this case, petitioners failed to establish
their right to a writ of mandamus as
shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the
Case to the
COMELEC is Not
Authorized by
RA 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the
issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has complied with the
requisite number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein,
involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites the petitioners
claim that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-intervenors
have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not properly verified or were
not verified at all. Other
oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the signatories did not fully
understand what they have signed as they were misled into signing the signature
sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion,
the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its compliance with the
requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question
that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for
further proceedings.
To my mind,
the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former
statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether
full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on
a petition for initiative.
Section 41
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that [a]n initiative shall be
conducted under the control and supervision of the Commission in accordance
with Article III hereof. Pertinently,
Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said implementing rules provide as
follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. The Commission shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly,
following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to
conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against the
sufficiency of the petition for initiative.
Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to determine the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the
annexes submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its
face, insufficient in form and substance.
The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the
parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the
abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered
to do.
The Present Petition Presents a
Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions
refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government.[102] A political question has two aspects: (1)
those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some other
department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to
act.[103]
In his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo
v. De Venecia,[104] Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
explained the doctrine of political question vis-เ-vis the express mandate of the
present Constitution for the courts to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government:
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government . . . to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Even if the
present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of
purportedly more than six million registered voters who have signified their
assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a
justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution,
under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect
amendments thereto, or revision thereof.
The question, therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the
terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.[105]
In the
United States, in In re McConaughy,[106]
the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the petition
questioning the result of the general election holding that an examination of
the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the
authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratification of constitutional amendments.
The cases cited were Dayton v. St.
Paul,[107] Rice v. Palmer,[108]
Bott v. Wurtz,[109]
State v. Powell,[110]
among other cases.
There is no denying that the
Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.[111] However, I find to be tenuous the
asseveration that the argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in
its head. At the very least, the
submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct
sovereignty of the people.[112]
In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the
system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently
disregard the said provision.
I strongly
take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can
disregard the Constitution altogether.
Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory
that while indeed the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs
all legitimate authority; nonetheless, by the Constitution which they
establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their
own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people
as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law.[113] The Constitution, it should be remembered, is
the protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the
people against injury by the people.[114] This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word.[115]
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner and method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes the limitations under which the electors of the state may change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of form.[116]
The very
term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature.[117]
The
Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision
in Article XVII of the Constitution. The
Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the
Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not
easily trifled with. To be sure, by
having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed
that it is a good Constitution and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and worse.[118]
Indisputably,
the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have approached and grappled
with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the
present case, and have given to its consideration the earnest attention which
its importance demands. I have sought to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:[119]
it is for the protection
of minorities that constitutions are framed.
Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the protection of
majorities even against themselves. Constitutions
are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and
are designed to check
the surging passions
in times of
popular excitement. But if
courts could be
coerced by popular
majorities into a disregard of
their provisions, constitutions would
become mere ropes of sand, and there
would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can sustain no injury
from the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury
to republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would
inflict. That large and respectable
class of moral reformers which so justly demands the observance and enforcement
of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory step by a violation of the
constitution. How can it consistently
demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the
amendment. In the manner of a great
moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of
republican freedom. The young men coming
forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to venerate it;
those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may
suffer, whoever or whatever may be voted up or voted down, no sacrilegious
hand must be laid upon the constitution.[120]
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
[1] Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
[2] Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
[3] Petition, pp. 12-14.
[4] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.
[5] Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appears, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480.
[6] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
[7] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R. No. L-35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.
[8] People v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[9] G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
[10] Article 8, New Civil Code provides that [j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
[11] Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA 284.
[12] Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.
[13] 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
[14] Id. at 453.
[15] Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative in the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
[16] Supra note 10, p. 157.
[17] G.R. No. 129754.
[18] Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.
[19] Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
[20] Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
[21] Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
[22] Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Jr. fully concurred in the ponencia of Justice Davide.
[23] Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno, Ricardo J. Francisco, Jr. and Artemio V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice).
[24] The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six Justices, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan, voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six Justices, namely, Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Jr., Regino C. Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Torres inhibited from participation in the deliberations.
[25] House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress.
[26] See Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 480.
[27] London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898]
A.C. 375, cited in COOLEY, A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations 117-118.
[28] Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
[29] Id. at 7.
[30] I Records of the Constitutional Commission 373.
[31] Id. at 371.
[32] Id. at 386.
[33] Id. at 392.
[34] Id. at 402-403.
[35] No. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.
[36] Id. at 367.
[37] SINCO, Philippine Political Law 43-44.
[38] 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
[39] Id. at 330.
[40] Id.
[41] Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006.
[42] Introduction to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission.
[43] BLACK, Constitutional Law 1-2, citing 1 BOUV. INST. 9.
[44] SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.
[45] Proclamation No. 58, 83 O.G. No. 23, pp. 2703-2704, June 8, 1987.
[46] See McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97 (1909).
[47] Id.
[48] 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
[49] Id. at 798.
[50] Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).
[51] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 36.
[52] Id. at 39.
[53] Supra note 38.
[54] McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
[55] Id. at 799.
[56] Supra note 41.
[57] Annex 1363.
[58] Annex 1368.
[59] Annex 1369.
[60] Annex 1370.
[61] Annex 1371.
[62] Annex 1372.
[63] Annex 1374.
[64] Annex 1375.
[65] Annex 1376.
[66] Annex 1377.
[67] Annex 1378.
[68] Annex 1379.
[69] Annex 1380.
[70] Annex 1381.
[71] Annex 1382.
[72] Annex 1383.
[73] Annex 1385.
[74] Annex 1387.
[75] Annex 1388.
[76] Annex 1389.
[77] Annex 1391.
[78] Annex 1392.
[79] Annex 1393.
[80] Annex 1395.
[81] Annex 1396.
[82] Annex 1397.
[83] Annex 1398.
[84] Annex 1399.
[85] Annex 1400.
[86] Annex 1401.
[87] Annex 1402.
[88] Annex 1404.
[89] Annex 1405.
[90] Annex 1406.
[91] Annex 1407.
[92] Annex 1408.
[93] Annex 1409.
[94] Annex 1410.
[95] Annex 1411.
[96] Annex 1412.
[97] Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.
[98] See,
for example, Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA
508.
[99] Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394.
[100] Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No.
150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.
[101] Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.
[102] Ta๑ada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
[103] Id.
[104] G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.
[105] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 36.
[106] 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
[107] 22 Minn. 400 (1876).
[108] 96 S.W. 396 (1906).
[109] 63 N.J. Law 289.
[110] 77 Miss. 543 (1900).
[111] Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
[112] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.
[113] COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 56, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
[114] Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).
[115] ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT THE LAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
[116] McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).
[117] McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
[118] Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
[119] 15 N.W. 609 (1883).
[120] Id. at 630.