LORENZO MA. D.G. AGUILAR, G.R. No. 172062
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
BURGER MACHINE HOLDINGS
CORPORATION, OSCAR E.
RODRIGUEZ and MELCHOR V. Promulgated:
DE JESUS, JR.,
Respondents. October 30, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the December 20, 2005 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87910 which declared that petitioner
Lorenzo Ma. D.G. Aguilar was not constructively dismissed; and which set aside
the May 27, 2003[2] Decision of the Labor
Arbiter as well as the May 25, 2004 Resolution[3] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) both holding that petitioner was
constructively dismissed.
The facts show that respondent Burger Machine Holdings Corporation
(Burger Machine) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of food
service. Respondents Caesar B.
Rodriguez, Fe Esperanza S. Rodriguez, and Melchor V. De Jesus, Jr., (De Jesus) are
Burger Machine’s Chairperson, President, and Vice-President, respectively.
On
On
On October 9, 2001, however, Burger Machine released the results of the
audit of BMNC’s operation showing that petitioner had not complied with the
company’s purchasing system policy manual and that he made several purchases,
the amounts of which were beyond his authority to approve.[6] In reply thereto, petitioner attributed the lapses
in the approval of purchases to the lack of information on the standard operating
procedures of the company.
On
At the end of the year 2001, petitioner did not receive his 14th
month pay bonus of P35,000.00 while the amount of P15,291.00 representing the alleged
unauthorized expenses was deducted from his salary.
On
Considering that my accomplishments and contribution to the
company have been acknowledged by my superiors, and my colleagues as well, it
is a puzzle to me why Sir [De Jesus] – in a series of dialogues I have had with
him since September 2001 – conveyed, reiterated, and insisted that I resign
under your strict and unbending personal instructions. This turn of events have caused me and my whole
family: many sleepless night, anxiety, stress, and tremendous pressure. Today, tragedy struck my whole family when my
wife lost our fourth child, a baby daughter, five-months on the way to
maternity. I have, however, continued to
give my best and undivided service and commitment to my job and to the company,
in spite of the constant fear that at anytime, I may have to leave my job
against my will.[11]
After the turn over of BMNC, petitioner went on an approved leave of
absence. On
On
On
On
In its decision dated May 27, 2003, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
petitioner was constructively dismissed and that respondent corporate officials
of Burger Machine are solidarily liable with the latter for petitioner’s monetary
awards. The dispositive portion thereof,
reads:
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
finding complainant to have been illegally dismissed albeit
constructively. Consequently, he should
be reinstated immediately as Profit [Center] Manager and paid by respondent[s]
in solidum, his backwages, which as of
In addition respondents, are solidarily ordered to pay
complainant,
a) His 14th
month pay for 2002;
b) P500,000.00
as moral damages[;]
c) P350,000.00
as exemplary damages; and
d) 10% of the
money awards for and as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The foregoing decision was affirmed by the NLRC in its resolution dated
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the petition is GRANTED and the
Decision dated May 27, 2003 of the Labor Arbiter, the [Resolution] dated May
25, 2004, and the Resolution dated September 17, 2004 of the NLRC are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Private respondent’s
Complaint for constructive dismissal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, the instant petition.
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner was constructively
dismissed.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Constructive
dismissal exists as an involuntary
resignation on the part of the employee due to the harsh, hostile and
unfavorable conditions set by the employer.
In other words, it is an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear
as if it were not. In fact, the employee who is constructively dismissed may be
allowed to keep on coming to work. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. It
is brought about where there is clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer and this becomes unbearable to the employee. The law recognizes and resolves this
situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and interests
from the coercive acts of the employer. Whereas valid termination by the
employee under Art. 285 of the Labor Code contemplates such act to be voluntary, an employee who is forced to relinquish the position held through
the employer’s unfair or unreasonable acts is deemed to have been illegally
terminated or discharged, as such the termination is implied to be involuntary.[17]
In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden
of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for
valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be
considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that
such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee. Failure of the employer to overcome this burden of proof, the
employee’s transfer shall no doubt be tantamount to constructive dismissal.[18]
In the instant case, Burger Machine failed to discharge this
burden. The labor tribunals below
correctly found that the combination of the harsh actions of respondents rendered
the employment condition of petitioner hostile and unbearable for the following
reasons: First, in the March 7,
2002 Memorandum of De Jesus, no reason was stated why petitioner was directed
to turn over BMNC to Centino. While the due process required by law is applied to dismissal
cases, the same is also applicable to the instant controversy because it
affects the status and right of petitioner to security of tenure.[19] Note that the same Memorandum did not inform
petitioner of his next assignment thereby placing him in a floating
status. Burger Machine belatedly claimed in its position paper that petitioner was
relieved of his position because of gross inefficiency. If this is the case, the action of
respondents was thus punitive in nature.
With more reason therefore that the ground for the turn over should be stated
in the Memorandum to apprise him of the cause of such punitive action. This omission of the company is a trespass
not only of petitioner’s due process rights but also of the basic respect and
professional courtesy due him as an employee.
Second, petitioner repeatedly claimed[20]
that respondent De Jesus was insisting on his resignation, yet the latter never
denied said allegation in his November 26, 2002 affidavit.[21] This only lends credence to the claim of
petitioner that the constant pressure of De Jesus for him to quit his job
rendered his employment with Burger Machine unbearable.
Third, Burger Machine made an unauthorized[22]
deduction on petitioner’s salary representing the alleged expenses incurred
without authority. The burden of proving
that no such deduction was made lies with Burger Machine not only because it
has custody of the records that might establish the same, but also because as
an employer, it is placed in a position of a debtor who has the onus of establishing payment of the
employee’s salary in full and without deduction.[23] Hence, its bare denials cannot overcome the
contention of petitioner that such deductions were made.
Fourth, petitioner was subsequently appointed as Profit Center Manager
of the TFC but Burger Machine recalled said
appointment, again, without stating the reason therefor, and worse without
serving him any formal memorandum withdrawing the appointment.
Fifth, he was
offered an assignment in the NCR, specifically as Profit Center Manager of the
PD but not actually appointed as such. Burger Machine averred that petitioner was ordered to
report at the EDSA office in connection with his PD assignment. However, no such directive was contained in
the July 16, 2002 Memorandum of De Jesus, thus:
Effective today, 17 July 2002, and onwards, you are officially expected to report to the undersigned in EDSA office at 9:00 a.m. up to 6:00 p.m. As has been the Company policy, you shall be required to log in and log out in the required Managers’ records in order to get paid. All approval of leaves and official business must be with the required days/time of approval by the undersigned, not to mention, the need for supporting documents to justify the requests. Lastly, you shall be required to submit yourself to a medical examination by the Company Physician to attest your fitness for work.[24]
The foregoing
Memorandum is actually a transfer of petitioner to the EDSA office of Burger Machine which we find to be oppressive inasmuch as petitioner and his
family are residents of
If the underlying
reason for the posting of petitioner at the EDSA office of Burger Machine was
his series of request for leave of absences, then the proper recourse is to
make him explain for said absences and to impose the proper penalty if
necessary. It appears, however, that all
said requests for leave have valid bases, otherwise, they would not have been
approved by Burger Machine. This only
shows that the transfer of petitioner at the EDSA office was to pressure him
and to ultimately ease him out of the company.
The test of
constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give
up his position under the circumstances.
Based
on the factual considerations in the instant case, we hold that the hostile and
unreasonable working conditions of petitioner justified the finding of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively dismissed. Petitioner’s
performance may not have been exceptional as he ranked 14th in the quality food service control survey
for the 1st quarter of 2002.[27] But he was certainly
not grossly inefficient as Burger Machine pictured him to be. In fact, he received several citations and
was able to comply with the directive to reduce his shortages for the month of
November 2001. From all indications,
there is really no ground to dismiss petitioner for gross inefficiency. And, as Burger Machine saw it, the only way to
get rid of the latter was to constructively dismiss him.
The Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC’s findings that petitioner was constructively dismissed are binding on this Court[28]
especially so that the contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals was based on
the misapprehension of the factual antecedents of this case. The appellate court focused only on the
transfer of petitioner to the PD in the NCR without taking into consideration
the entire factual milieu of the controversy.
Had the Court of Appeals done so, it would have arrived at the same
conclusion as the labor tribunals below.
Anent the solidary
liability for the constructive dismissal of petitioner, the same cannot attach
with respect to respondents Caesar B. Rodriguez and Fe Esperanza B. Rodriguez,
Chairperson and President of Burger Machine, respectively, considering that no
substantial evidence was presented to prove their participation in the acts of
respondent De Jesus. It was only the
latter who pressured petitioner to relinquish his position and was the one responsible
for the issuance of the oppressive Memorandum transferring petitioner to the
EDSA office. Liability must likewise be
imputed to Burger Machine. The failure
to exercise proper diligence in the supervision of its employees, is ultimately
its responsibility.[29]
Petitioner
was properly awarded moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be recovered only where the
dismissal of the employee was tainted by bad faith or fraud,
or where it constituted an act oppressive to labor, and done
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy while exemplary
damages are recoverable only if the dismissal
was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner. These damages, however, are not intended to enrich petitioner and should
therefore be reduced to P50,000.00 each.[30]
The award of 14th
month pay must be deleted. Since the
payment thereof is not required by law, substantial evidence showing that
Burger Machine has the customary practice to give the same to its employees, is
necessary. This, petitioner failed to
satisfy.
The award of attorney’s fees is sustained based on Article 111 of the
Labor Code, Section 8, Rule VIII,
Book III of its Implementing Rules, and paragraph 7, Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. In actions
for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and thus
incurred expenses to protect his rights and interests, a maximum of ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary award by way of attorney’s fees is justifiable.
WHEREFORE, the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 51-67. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño
Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and
Magdangal M. De Leon.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R.
No. 150092,
[18]Philippine
Industrial Security Agency Corporation v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 149974,
[19] Blue
Dairy Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129843,
[20] Rollo, pp. 707, 709, and 726.
[21]
Records, pp. 120-123.
[22]
Article 113 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 113. Wage Deduction. – No
employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any
deduction from the wages of his employees, except:
(a)
In cases where the worker is insured with his
consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for
the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
(b)
For union dues, in cases where the right of the
worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or
authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and
(c)
In cases where the employer is authorized by law
or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor.
[23] Audion Electric Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 620, 632-633 (1999).
[24] Rollo, p. 270.
[25] Philippine
Industrial Security Agency Corporation v. Aguinaldo, supra note 18 at 236.
[26]
[27] Rollo, p. 284.
[28] Hda.
Dapdap I v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 348 Phil. 785, 790
(1998).
[29] Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, supra note 17.
[30] Norkis
Trading Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
168159, August 19, 2005, 467 SCRA 461, 473.