ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA, G.R. No. 173290
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
-
versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
HON. JUDGE RALPH S. LEE of
Br. 83, MAYOR ANWAR BERUA
BALINDONG, LT.
COL. JALANDONI
COTA, MAYOR
AMER ODEN Promulgated:
BALINDONG
& ALI BALINDONG,
Respondents. November
20, 2006
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a
petition for indirect contempt in connection with respondents’ alleged defiance
of the December 16, 2004 Decision[1]
rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 159962, entitled Balindong v. Limbona, as well as the Resolutions[2]
dated June 6, August 15, and December 12, 2005.
The facts as stated in G.R. No. 159962 are as follows:
Investigating prosecutor Ringcar Pinote
conducted the preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the
private [respondents] for the offense of Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated
Murder. As a result, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12, charging [them] with the crime of
Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder.
The herein [private respondents] filed an
urgent motion for reinvestigation. In an Order dated
The said office issued a Resolution dated
The [petitioner] filed a petition for
review of the Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) under then Secretary Serafin Cuevas. In a Resolution dated
Subsequently, the venue was again
transferred from
On
In the meantime, x x x the venue of the
above cases [was] transferred from Cagayan de Oro to a Special Criminal Court
in
x x x Criminal Cases No. 2503 and No. 2573 were re-raffled
to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219 and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-01-99892 and Q-01-99893. Criminal Cases Nos. 2574 to 76 were re-raffled
to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-01-100542 to 44.
On
x x x x
Seeking to have Secretary Perez’s
x x x x
The petitioners thereupon filed the
present petition [G.R. No. 159462] for certiorari under Rule 45 before
this Court. x x x
[O]n
On December 16, 2004, the Court thru Associate Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario rendered a decision in G.R. No. 159962 affirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals and sustaining the Resolution of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) dated August 4, 1999 directing the filing of two
Informations for Murder with Attempted Murder, two Informations for Frustrated
Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder against all the private
respondents; as well as the December 1, 1999 and March 16, 2000 Resolutions of
the DOJ denying private respondents’ motions for reconsideration. The Court also directed the implementation of
the warrants of arrest issued against them.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of
Justice for its information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Private respondents’
motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied with finality in a
Resolution[5]
dated
The Court notes that [private respondents] have adduced no
substantial or cogent arguments to warrant a modification of our Decision. They
merely rehashed the arguments in their petition, which we have already passed
upon. Wherefore, the Motion for Reconsideration and its supplement thereto are
DENIED with FINALITY. NO FURTHER PLEADINGS WILL BE ENTERTAINED.
In view of the denial with finality of the Motion for
Reconsideration and acting on the clarificatory letter of Branch Clerk of Court
Edwin Paredes of Quezon City RTC, Branch 219, which we noted in our Resolution
dated
Unfazed,
respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification.[6]
In a
Resolution[7]
dated
x
x x (b) ADMONISH [private respondents] and their counsel to pay heed to the
directives of this Court and against misrepresenting the import of its rulings
and to desist from any further unauthorized pleadings UNDER PAIN OF CONTEMPT.
Meanwhile,
an Entry of Judgment[8]
was issued by the Court certifying that the aforesaid Decision rendered on
Due to the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Paneda of RTC-QC Branch 219, Criminal Case Nos.
Q-01-99892 and Q-01-99893 were re-raffled to RTC-QC Branch 100 presided by
Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob (Judge Jacob). On
Pursuant
thereto, Judge Jacob issued an Order dated January 4, 2006, denying private respondents’
motion for determination of probable cause/to dismiss/quash and ordered the
enforcement of the arrest warrants against them.[11] Thereafter, Judge Jacob inhibited[12]
herself from the aforesaid cases and the same were re-raffled to Branch 83 of
the trial court presided by respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee.
Private respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration[13] of
the
In the
meantime, petitioner secured copies of the arrest warrants in order to facilitate
respondents’ long overdue arrests and was dismayed to discover copies of such
warrants stamped “EXPIRED”.[15] Thus on
Hence, the
present recourse contending that private respondents are guilty of indirect
contempt for stubbornly filing motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases
and/or the re-determination of probable cause notwithstanding the Decision and
Resolution of the Court as to the proper charge against them.
Petitioner also
avers that respondent judge set aside this Court’s final Decision in G.R. No.
159962 by down-grading the offenses charged against respondents. His seeming indifference to look into the
highly suspicious act of stamping the warrants “EXPIRED” as well as his failure
to act on the prosecution’s Manifestation with Motion for the Issuance of the
Alias Warrants of Arrest as well as its subsequent Motion for Inhibition is an
affront to this Court as an institution.[18]
In their Comment, private respondents contend that while
there is no dispute that this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 159962 was final and
executory, it was not a decision on the merits but upon a mere technicality
from which not even the principle of res judicata has set in.[19] They insist that the phrase “with which to charge the accused”
found in the Decision clearly indicates that the issue of the appropriate
crimes with which to charge the accused was left unresolved by this Court. They argue that resolving said issue is a task
which lies with the trial court (Branch 83 in this case), as it involves
evidentiary matters.[20]
Respondents likewise maintain that the instant petition should be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds because indirect contempt proceedings involve a
full-blown trial which can only be had before the trial courts.[21]
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondents are
guilty of indirect contempt.
We rule in the affirmative.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, read:
Sec. 3. Indirect
contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x x
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court, x x x.
x x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x x
Contempt of court is
defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders,
but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice. Contempt of
court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect
or to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their witnesses during
litigation. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.[22]
The
charge must be filed before the court against which the indirect contempt was
committed.[23] Respondents’ contention that the
petition should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because indirect
contempt proceedings involve a full-blown trial which can only be had before
the trial court lacks merit. It is a
well-established rule that the power to determine the existence of contempt of
court rests exclusively with the court contemned.[24]
Section 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
clearly provides that:
Sec. 5. Where charge to be filed. – Where the charge
for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by
it, the charge may be filed with such court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, private respondents are guilty of indirect
contempt for filing the following:
(1) Urgent Motion
for Clarification of the dispositive portion of the
(2) Motion for
Determination of Probable Cause and/or Motion to Dismiss the Case and to Quash Warrant
of Arrest (with prayer for suspension of the enforcement of warrant of arrest
pending hearing) filed on September 1, 2005 before Branch 100 of the RTC of
Quezon City presided by Judge Christine Jacob;
(3) Motion for
Reconsideration of Judge Jacob’s January 4, 2006 Order denying their motion
dated September 1, 2005 filed on January 24, 2006;
(4) Motion to
Re-Determine the Existence or Non-Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even
Warrant Dismissal- Even of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and
Attempted Homicide filed before Branch 83 on
The December
16, 2004 Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 clearly sustained the filing
of two Informations for Murder with Attempted Murder, two Informations for Frustrated
Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder against private
respondents. The Court even directed the
implementation of the arrest warrants against them. This, notwithstanding, private respondents
filed a motion for determination of probable cause and/or the dismissal of the
case against them. Worse, this was done
after being admonished by the Court to pay heed to its directives under pain of
contempt.
With the finality of this Court’s Decision, all issues
relative to the determination of the proper offenses with which to charge private
respondents had been laid to rest. In continuing
to file pleadings and motions purportedly seeking for the clarification of the
proper charges against them, respondents merely rehashed their tired arguments
and unavailing assertions. They did not
only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of the aforesaid cases but
also willfully and deliberately flouted this Court’s directives with their stubborn
refusal to abide by our pronouncement and their incessant nit-picking of issues
already resolved with finality.
In granting
respondents’ motions for reconsideration and re-determination of probable
cause, and consequently down-grading the charges against respondents in his
Order dated May 12, 1006, Judge Lee contravened this Court’s directive in G.R.
No. 159962 and in the subject Resolutions. He impudently substituted his own judgment for
that of this Court. Had he thoroughly
reviewed the records of the case, it would have been impossible for him to
misread the import of said Decision and Resolutions.
In sum, we
find that private respondents’ persistent attempts to raise issues long since
laid to rest by a final and executory judgment constitute contumacious defiance
of the authority of this Court and impede the speedy administration of justice.[25]
Under
Section 7 of Rule 71, if the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment
not exceeding six months, or both.
In Alcantara
v. Ponce,[26]
this Court found the incessant filing by the respondents and their
counsels of pleadings and motions with the ultimate purpose of convincing the
Court to give due course to their petition despite its categorical and final
resolve to deny the same as constituting indirect contempt and ordered them to
pay a fine of P2,000.00 each.
In Heirs
of Trinidad De Leon v. Court of Appeals,[27]
we held that respondent corporation’s insistent filing of an action
for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages involving the same parcels of
land which this Court already decided with finality as constituting indirect
contempt and fined it in the amount of P10,000.00.
We
are well aware of the legal precept that the power of the court to punish
contemptuous acts should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. However, where
there is clear and contumacious defiance of, or refusal to obey this
Court's Decision, as in the instant case, we will not hesitate to exercise our
inherent power if only to maintain respect to this Court, for without which the
administration of justice may falter or fail.[28]
Under the circumstances attendant in the instant case, we
find the fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be meted upon each respondent
to be in order.
WHEREFORE,
private respondents Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, Mayor
Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Balindong and public respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83 are found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and ordered to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
each payable in full within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario and concurred in by
Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, and Dante O. Tinga; 447 SCRA 201.
[2] Rollo, pp. 36-37; 44 and 58.
[3] Supra note 1 at 202-207.
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Lu
Ym v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 169476, June 16, 2006, SC E-library.
[23] Igot
v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 150794, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 668, 674.
[24]
[25] Pacquing
v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 516, 523 (1982).
[26]
G.R. No. 131547, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 27, 48 & 60.
[27]
G.R. No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 101, 114 & 121.
[28]