SECOND
DIVISION
REMINGTON
INDUSTRIAL SALES G.R. Nos. 169295-96
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
versus -
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
Promulgated:
ERLINDA
CASTANEDA,
Respondent. November 20,
2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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D E C I S I
O N
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1] filed by Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation to reverse and set aside the Decision[2] of
the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and 68477,
dated January 31, 2005, which dismissed petitioner’s consolidated petitions for
certiorari, and its subsequent
Resolution,[3] dated
August 11, 2005, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent
facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The
present controversy began when private respondent, Erlinda Castaneda
(“Erlinda”) instituted on
Erlinda
alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook with a salary of Php 4,000.00 for
Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading business; that she worked for
six (6) days a week, starting as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the
marketing and would end at around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the employees,
if not all, had left the company premises; that she continuously worked with
Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when
Remington transferred to a new site in
Edsa, Caloocan City. She averred that
she reported for work at the new site in
Remington
denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally.
It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular employee;
Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s
business of trading in construction or hardware materials, steel plates and
wire rope products. It also contended
that contrary to Erlinda’s allegations that the (sic) she worked for eight (8)
hours a day, Erlinda’s duty was merely to cook lunch and “merienda”, after
which her time was hers to spend as she pleased. Remington also maintained that it did not
exercise any degree of control and/or supervision over Erlinda’s work as her
only concern was to ensure that the employees’ lunch and “merienda” were
available and served at the designated time.
Remington likewise belied Erlinda’s assertion that her work extended
beyond
In a
Decision[4]
dated January 19, 1999, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled
that the respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service of Antonio
Tan, finding that her work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in
the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, which
operated as a trading company, and that the latter did not exercise control
over her functions. On the issue of
illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the respondent who
refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred
office and that, therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.
Upon appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a Decision,[5] dated
We
are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that complainant is a domestic
helper of the family of Antonio Tan.
There was no allegation by respondent that complainant had ever worked
in the residence of Mr. Tan. What is
clear from the facts narrated by the parties is that complainant continuously
did her job as a cook in the office of respondent serving the needed food for
lunch and merienda of the employees.
Thus, her work as cook inured not for the benefit of the family members
of Mr. Tan but solely for the individual employees of respondent.
Complainant
as an employee of respondent company is even bolstered by no less than the
certification dated
Complainant’s
work schedule and being paid a monthly salary of P4,000.00 are clear
indication that she is a company employee who had been employed to cater to the
food needed by the employees which were being provided by respondent to form part
of the benefit granted them.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, we believe that there is more reason to believe that complainant was not dismissed because allegedly she was the one who refused to work in the new office of respondent. However, complainant’s refusal to join the workforce due to poor eyesight could not be considered abandonment of work or voluntary resignation from employment.
Under the Labor Code as amended, an employee who reaches the age of sixty years old (60 years) has the option to retire or to separate from the service with payment of separation pay/retirement benefit.
In this case, we notice that complainant was already 60 years old at the time she filed the complaint praying for separation pay or retirement benefit and some money claims.
Based
on Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended, complainant is entitled to be paid
her separation pay/retirement benefit equivalent to one-half (1/2) month for
every year of service. The amount of
separation pay would be based on the prescribed minimum wage at the time of
dismissal since she was then underpaid.
In as much as complainant is underpaid of her wages, it behooves that
she should be paid her salary differential for the last three years prior to
separation/retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby, SET ASIDE, and a new one
is hereby entered ordering respondents to pay complainant the following:
1. Salary
differential - P12,021.12 2. Service
Incentive Leave Pay -
2,650.00 3. 13th Month Pay differential
- 1,001.76 4. Separation Pay/retirement benefit - 36,075.00
Total - P51,747.88
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner
moved to reconsider this decision but the NLRC denied the motion. This denial of its motion prompted petitioner
to file a Petition for Certiorari[6] with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 64577, on May 4, 2001, imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in (1)
reversing in toto the decision of the
labor arbiter, and (2) awarding in favor of respondent salary differential, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay differential and separation
benefits in the total sum of P51,747.88.
While the petition was pending with
the Court of Appeals, the NLRC rendered another Decision[7] in
the same case on
On
Evidence
in support of complainant’s having actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration
within the reglementary period having been sufficiently established, a
determination of its merits is thus, in order.
On the
merits, the NLRC found respondent’s motion for reconsideration meritorious
leading to the issuance of its second decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision dated November 23, 2000, is MODIFIED by
increasing the award of retirement pay due the complainant in the total amount
of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 50/100 (P62,437.50). All other monetary relief so adjudged therein
are maintained and likewise made payable to the complainant.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner
challenged the second decision of the NLRC, including the resolution denying
its motion for reconsideration, through a second Petition for Certiorari[8]
filed with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68477 and dated
January 8, 2002, this time imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in (1) issuing the second
decision despite losing its jurisdiction due to the pendency of the first
petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, and (2) assuming it still had jurisdiction to issue the
second decision notwithstanding the pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, that
its second decision has no basis in law since respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, which was made the basis of the second decision, was not filed
under oath in violation of Section 14, Rule VII[9] of
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and that it contained no certification
as to why respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not decided on time as
also required by Section 10, Rule VI[10]
and Section 15, Rule VII[11]
of the aforementioned rules.
Upon petitioner’s motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the
consolidation of the two (2) petitions, on January 24, 2002, pursuant to
Section 7, par. b(3), Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Appeals. It summarized the principal issues raised in
the consolidated petitions as follows:
1.
Whether
respondent is petitioner’s regular employee or a domestic helper;
2. Whether
respondent was illegally dismissed; and
3.
Whether the
second NLRC decision promulgated during the pendency of the first petition for certiorari has basis in law.
On
On the first
issue, it upheld the ruling of the NLRC that respondent was a regular employee
of the petitioner since the former worked at the company premises and catered not
only to the personal comfort and enjoyment of Mr. Tan and his family, but also to
that of the employees of the latter. It
agreed that petitioner enjoys the prerogative to control respondent’s conduct
in undertaking her assigned work, particularly the nature and situs of her work
in relation to the petitioner’s workforce, thereby establishing the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between them.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, it ruled that respondent
has attained the status of a regular employee in her service with the
company. It noted that the NLRC found
that no less than the company’s corporate secretary certified that respondent
is a bonafide company employee and that she had a fixed schedule and
routine of work and was paid a monthly salary of P4,000.00; that she
served with petitioner for 15 years starting in 1983, buying and cooking food
served to company employees at lunch and merienda; and that this work
was usually necessary and desirable in the regular business of the petitioner. It held that as a regular employee, she
enjoys the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure and that
petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that her dismissal on
Finally, on
petitioner’s other arguments relating to the alleged irregularity of the second
NLRC decision, i.e., the fact that
respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not under oath and had no
certification explaining why it was not resolved within the prescribed period,
it held that such violations relate to procedural and non-jurisdictional
matters that cannot assume primacy over the substantive merits of the case and
that they do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction that would nullify the second NLRC decision.
The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s contention that the NLRC lost its jurisdiction to
issue the second decision when it received the order indicating the Court of
Appeals’ initial action on the first petition for certiorari that it filed. It
ruled that the NLRC’s action of issuing a decision in installments was not
prohibited by its own rules and that the need for a second decision was
justified by the fact that respondent’s own motion for reconsideration remained
unresolved in the first decision.
Furthermore, it held that under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court,[12] the
filing of a petition for certiorari does
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding with the case.
From this
decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
Hence, the
present petition for review.
The petitioner
raises the following errors of law: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the NLRC’s ruling that the respondent was petitioner’s regular employee and not
a domestic helper; (2) the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner
was guilty of illegal dismissal; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred when it
held that the issuance of the second NLRC decision is proper.
The petition
must fail. We affirm that respondent was
a regular employee of the petitioner and that the latter was guilty of illegal
dismissal.
Before going
into the substantive merits of the present controversy, we shall first resolve
the propriety of the issuance of the second NLRC decision.
The
petitioner contends that the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, upon
which the second NLRC decision was based, was not under oath and did not
contain a certification as to why it was not decided on time as required under the
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.[13] Furthermore, the former also raises for the
first time the contention that respondent’s motion was filed beyond the ten
(10)-calendar day period required under the same Rules,[14]
since the latter received a copy of the first NLRC decision on
We do not
agree.
It is
well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor
cases.[15]
Labor cases must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial
merits of the controversy.[16] Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice.[17] Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided.[18]
This Court
has consistently held that the requirement of verification is formal, and not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is merely
a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does
not necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.[19]
The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking
or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[20]
Anent the
argument that respondent’s motion for reconsideration, on which the NLRC’s
second decision was based, was filed out of time, such issue was only brought
up for the first time in the instant petition where no new issues may be raised
by a party in his pleadings without offending the right to due process of the
opposing party.
Nonetheless, the
petitioner asserts that the respondent received a copy of the NLRC’s first
decision on
This
contention must fail.
Under Article
223[22]
of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from the receipt thereof by the parties.
While it is
an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and
failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory, it is equally settled that the NLRC may disregard the procedural
lapse where there is an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of
the appeal.[23] Among
the acceptable reasons recognized by this Court are (a) counsel's reliance on
the footnote of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that "the
aggrieved party may appeal. . . within ten (10) working days";[24] (b) fundamental consideration of substantial
justice;[25] (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or
of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting
separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision;[26]
and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits[27]
or the amount and the issue involved.[28]
We hold that
the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in accordance with substantial
justice, call for a liberalization of the application of this rule. Notably, respondent’s last day for filing her
motion for reconsideration fell on
Finally, as
to petitioner’s argument that the NLRC had already lost its jurisdiction to
decide the case when it filed its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals upon the denial of its motion
for reconsideration, suffice it to state that under Section 7 of Rule 65[30]
of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. Thus, the mere pendency of a special civil
action for certiorari, in connection
with a pending case in a lower court, does not interrupt the course of the
latter if there is no writ of injunction.[31] Clearly, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing its second decision which
modified the first, especially since it failed to consider the respondent’s
motion for reconsideration when it issued its first decision.
Having resolved
the procedural matters, we shall now delve into the merits of the petition to
determine whether respondent is a domestic helper or a regular employee of the
petitioner, and whether the latter is guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner relies
heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr. Antonio Tan and contends that
respondent is the latter’s domestic helper and not a regular employee of the
company since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct personality from the
petitioner. It maintains that it did not
exercise control and supervision over her functions; and that it operates as a
trading company and does not engage in the restaurant business, and therefore
respondent’s work as a cook, which was not usually necessary or desirable to
its usual line of business or trade, could not make her its regular employee.
This
contention fails to impress.
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC,[32]
this Court held that a
househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular employee
of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows:
“The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.”
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps.
xxx xxx xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in
its position paper[33]
that respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook and
prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of
respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his
family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely
within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in
the Apex Mining case. That she works within company premises, and
that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his
family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of control
over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
Moreover,
it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's
business, then the person performing such work could not be considered an employee
of the latter. The determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is defined by law according to
the facts of each case, regardless of the nature of the activities involved.[34] Indeed, it would be the height of injustice
if we were to hold that despite the fact that respondent was made to cook lunch
and merienda for the petitioner’s employees, which work ultimately
redounded to the benefit of the petitioner corporation, she was merely a
domestic worker of the family of Mr. Tan.
We
note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that no less
than the company’s corporate secretary has certified that respondent is a bonafide
company employee;[35]
she had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly salary of P4,000.00;[36]
she served with the company for 15 years starting in 1983, buying and cooking
food served to company employees at lunch and merienda, and that this
service was a regular feature of employment with the company.[37]
Indubitably,
the Court of Appeals, as well as the NLRC, correctly held that based on the
given circumstances, the respondent is a regular employee of the petitioner.
Having determined that the respondent is petitioner’s regular
employee, we now proceed to ascertain the legality of her dismissal from
employment.
Petitioner
contends that there was abandonment on respondent’s part when she refused to
report for work when the corporation transferred to a new location in
On the other
hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was no
longer called for duty and that when she tried to report for work, she was told
that her services were no longer needed.
She contends that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or
authorized cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence rendering the
dismissal illegal.
We rule for
the respondent.
As a regular
employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279[38]
of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just[39]
or authorized[40] cause,
otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Abandonment
is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment.[41] It is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just
cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer.[42] For a valid finding of abandonment, these two
factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative
factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employee has no more intention to work.[43]
The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified.[44] This, the petitioner failed to do in the case
at bar.
Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it
was the respondent who quit her employment and refused to return to work,
greater stock may be taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of her
complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an
employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be
said to have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an
employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement
is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s
charge of abandonment.[45]
In
termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was illegal.[46] The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense.[47] If doubt exists between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter.[48]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 15-33; penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion, concurred in
by Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer R. De los Santos.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Annex “D,” id. at 50-60.
[9] Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, provides:
Section
14. Motions
for Reconsideration. – Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution
or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision
with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished within the
reglementary period the adverse party and provided further, that only one such
motion from the same party shall be entertained.
[10] Section 10, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, provides:
Section
10. Period
to Resolve Appeal. – The Commission shall resolve the appeal from the
decision, order of award of the Labor Arbiter and the Administrator within
twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the answer of the appellee or upon
the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by this Rules. In case of appeal from the decision of the
Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer, the same shall be
resolved within ten (10) calendar days.
[11] Section 15, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission provides:
Section 15. Period to Decide/Resolve Certification Thereto. – The Commission shall decide/resolve all cases/matters within the prescribed period.
In
the event that a case/matter has not been decided/resolved within the
prescribed period, the Chairman/Presiding Commissioners shall certify why the
decision/resolution has been issued within the said period and a copy thereof
served upon the parties.
[12] Section 7, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, provides:
Section
7. Expediting
proceedings; injunctive relief.—
The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
[13] Supra, notes 9, 10 and 11.
[14] Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 9.
[15] Havtor Management Phils., Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146336,
[16]
EDI
Staff Builders International, Inc. v. Magsino, G.R. No. 139430,
[17] Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 307.
[18] Solicitor General v. Metropolitan
[19] Shipside
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377,
[20] Villarica v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 96085, March 16, 1992, First Division, Minute Resolution.
[21] Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
[22] Article 223 of the Labor Code of the
Article 223. Appeal
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. xxx
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the answer of the appellee. The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
[23] Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831, 839.
[24] Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Lariosa, G.R. No. L-70479,
[25] Insular Life Assurance Co. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. L-74191, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 740, 746; see also
the Resolution therein of July 26, 1988; Blancaflor v. NLRC, G.R. No.
101013, February 2, 1993, 218 SCRA 366, 370-371.
[26] Olacao v. NLRC, G.R. No.
81390,
[27] Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76595, May 6, 1988, 161 SCRA 122, 130.
[28] City Fair Corp. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 95711,
[29] See Judy Philippines, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29,
1998, 289 SCRA 764; Aquino v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98108, September 3, 1993, 226 SCRA 81-82; Pacaña
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 83513, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 472.
[30] Supra note 13.
[31] Peza v. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-29749,
[32] G.R. No. 94951,
[33] CA rollo, p. 24.
[34] Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111501,
[35] Rollo,
p. 27.
[36]
[37]
[38] Article 279 of the Labor Code of the
Article
279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
[39] See Article 282 of the Labor
Code of the
[40] See Articles 283 and 284 of
the Labor Code of the
[41]
[42] Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative
II v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157603,
[43]
[44] C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 73521,
[45] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 146118, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 162; Lambo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111042, October 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 420.
[46] Solidbank Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 151026,
[47] PLDT v. Tiamson, G.R. Nos.
164684-85,
[48] Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 148766,