FIRST
DIVISION
HILARIO
P. SORIANO, G.R. No. 167743
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus
- PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
OMBUDSMAN
SIMEON V. CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
MARCELO,
HON. PLARIDEL
OSCAR J. BOHOL, Graft
Investigation Officer II, and Promulgated:
RAMON
R. GARCIA,
Respondents. November 22, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85319 dated
On P5,728,000.70.[3]
Soriano filed a complaint for perjury
against Hirang with the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor. Soriano claimed that the statement of Hirang in
his affidavit is totally untrue and a deliberate falsehood because PDIC, or any
of its authorized representatives, made no reservation whatsoever concerning
the claim for reimbursement when the lease contracts were pre-terminated. Soriano relied on the letter of Deputy Receiver
Mauricia Manzanares to one of the lessors, attached to the complaint as Annex
“D” thereof. The complaint was docketed
as I.S. No. 01J-43460.[4] The case was assigned to Assistant City
Prosecutor Joel Lucasan.
Soriano likewise filed a complaint
for libel against Nazareno. He alleged therein
that Nazareno uttered malicious and libelous statements when he was interviewed
by a reporter of Business World on P10.5 million
RBSM loan was used by affiliate Coconut Rural Bank in Batangas, and that some
other estafa cases for P100 million
were also filed by the DOJ in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[5] The case was docketed as I.S. No. 01H-32904.
Thereafter, Soriano filed a third criminal
complaint in the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor for violation of Articles
183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code against Zenaida A. Cabais, the
comptroller appointed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to oversee the
operations of RBSM, particularly the proper utilization of emergency loans
extended to it by the BSP. The complaint
alleged that Cabais submitted an affidavit in support of the Monetary Board in
the petition filed by RBSM against BSP with the CA. It further alleged that Cabais made a false
statement in the said affidavit when she stated that, before RBSM declared a
bank holiday, it paid Force Collect Professional Solution, Inc. and Sure
Collect Professional Solution, Inc., which are allegedly owned by Soriano and
other RBSM officers, P5.3 million and P5.75 million, respectively,
without any supporting documents as payment of 25% collection fee. Soriano averred that this statement is not
correct as the manager’s checks for the said amounts were, in fact, withheld
and no payment was made to the two corporations.[6] The case, docketed as I.S. No. 00D-18089, was
assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Anabel Magabilin.
On
On
A perusal of the subject article shows that they are true and fair reports on a matter of public interest. It must be noted that when respondent Nazareno was interviewed by the reporter, Ms. Yap, he just mentioned facts which the public was entitled to know because complainant Soriano headed a bank that dealt with the public. These are matters of public interests and concerns of which the citizenry has the right to be informed especially when it affects the integrity of the banking system. Being a matter of public interest, the alleged defamatory articles are protected by the mantle of privilege communication, which does away with presumption of malice. The privilege character of the news article in question stems from constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press.
Moreover,
malice in fact has not been shown in the case at bar. Respondent was not
prompted by ill will or spite. He merely makes a disclosure of facts and not an
imputation affecting character.[10]
City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia
approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Corpuz and the criminal complaint was
therefore dismissed.[11] Soriano filed a petition for review of the
resolution with the DOJ.
On the other hand, in I.S. No.
00D-18089, Assistant City Prosecutor Anabel D. Magabilin recommended that the
complaint against Cabais be dismissed for lack of probable cause. However, City Prosecutor Garcia merely
recommended to the Ombudsman the approval of Prosecutor Magabilin’s findings. In a March 4, 2002 Indorsement,[12]
he forwarded the records of the said complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman
upon his finding that Cabais was a public officer and that the complaint
imputed against her was related to the performance of her duties.
On
Soriano likewise relied on Section 4(8),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which
provides that, upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his
resolution to the designated authorities for appropriate action; and that no
information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.[14] Soriano alleged that Hirang and Nazareno
committed the crime charged against them in relation to their office; hence, respondent
Garcia should not have dismissed the Hirang and Nazareno complaints without the
written authority or approval of the Deputy Ombudsman.
Soriano averred that respondent acted
unlawfully in authorizing the dismissal of the complaints against Hirang and
Nazareno instead of endorsing the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman,
together with the recommendations for dismissal, in the same way that the Cabais
case was endorsed. He insisted that the special
treatment of the Nazareno and Hirang cases, which resulted in their dismissal
without having been reviewed by the Office of the Ombudsman, was uncalled for.[15]
The Office of the Ombudsman docketed
the criminal aspect of the complaint as OMB-C-C-02-0416-G, and the
administrative aspect as OMB-C-A-02-0287-G.
In his Counter-Affidavit,[16] respondent
declared that although Nazareno was a public officer (being the President and
Chief Executive Officer of PDIC, a government-owned or controlled corporation),
since the offense of libel for which he was charged does not appear to have
been committed in relation to his office, it is the regular courts,
particularly the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, that has jurisdiction over the
case. The Business World interview was
his personal and private undertaking which was not related to the performance
of his duty as PDIC President and Chief Executive Officer. Hence, respondent retained the authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation of a complaint conformably with OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001, Series of 1995 which reads, thus:
(2) Unless the OMBUDSMAN under his
constitutional mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses NOT IN
RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by the REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated
and prosecuted by the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR, which shall
rule thereon with finality.[17]
He cannot be faulted for the dismissal
of the Hirang case because the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor was
approved by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla. Under Office Order No. 24 which he issued on
Respondent further averred that
perjury is within the trial jurisdiction of the MeTC. The final disposition of the said case, which
includes the determination of whether or not it should be endorsed to the
Office of the Ombudsman, is vested with Prosecutor Sulla. He explained that he ordered the indorsement
of the case against Cabais to the Ombudsman for final disposition because Cabais,
being the comptroller appointed by the BSP to oversee the operations of the
RBSM while the latter was under receivership, was a public officer. Hence, his actions in the Hirang, Nazareno
and Cabais cases cannot be considered as unlawful, irregular or inconsistent or
in total disregard of established procedure.
Respondent averred that even if he erred in his actions on said cases,
said error cannot be made the basis of a criminal or administrative action
especially in the absence of any allegation, much less any evidence, showing
that such disposition was done out of certain extraneous consideration other
than plain appreciation of the evidence on hand. The remedy of complainant was to file a
motion for the reconsideration of his resolutions in the said cases and/or
appeal to the DOJ which he, in fact, did.
Respondent pointed out that, on
After due proceedings, the Ombudsman,
through Graft Investigator Plaridel Oscar J. Bohol, dismissed the
administrative complaint against respondent Garcia on
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the instant administrative case against
RAMON R. GARCIA, City Prosecutor of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila, with address at Room 208,
SO
ORDERED.[21]
The Ombudsman held that Soriano’s
complaint was premature. It is not
within the province of its administrative disciplinary jurisdiction to review
the quasi-judicial findings and decisions of government officials such as the
City Prosecutor of Manila. If
complainant was dissatisfied with such findings of the City Prosecutor, his
remedy was to move for reconsideration or file a petition for review with the
DOJ, the proper office mandated by law to review the resolutions of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The
Ombudsman noted that, on
Moreover, Section 20(1) of R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Office of the Ombudsman may
not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that the complainant has an adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body.
The Ombudsman opined that, unless there is a final determination by the
appropriate office that, indeed, respondent Garcia abused his position and/or
violated pertinent rules in issuing the questioned resolution, any
administrative complaint against respondent was premature.[22]
Soriano filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] which
was likewise denied on
Whether
or not public respondents gravely abused their discretion in rendering the
impugned Order exonerating respondent Ramon Garcia from any administrative
liability and the Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[25]
On
On
In this petition, Soriano as petitioner
avers that he is not asking the Office of the Ombudsman to review or reverse or
do any act relative to the resolutions of the Hirang and Nazareno complaints. He avers that what he is
questioning is respondent Garcia’s failure to comply with OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001[29]
which calls for the endorsement of said resolutions to the Office of the
Ombudsman for final action.[30]
Petitioner contends that respondent acted
in bad faith, or, at the very least, committed acts of irregularity from which
an inference of malice or bad faith could be made. He points out that Nazareno could not have had
access to said information and would not have disclosed such information
against Soriano if he was not the PDIC President. He, therefore, concludes that the impugned
remarks were made in relation to office or in the performance of public duties.[31]
Respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, point out that the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondent is final and immediately executory, and
unappealable. Nonetheless, they aver
that the ruling of the CA, that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Ombudsman when he dismissed the administrative case, was correct. They maintain that the factual findings of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary proceedings are entitled to great
respect and finality.[32]
The petition is without merit.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set
out in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[33]
The Court has invariably defined
“grave abuse of discretion” as follows:
x x x By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.[34]
Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.[35] The only question involved is jurisdiction,
either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari
is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment.[36] An error of judgment is one in which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible
only by an appeal.[37]
We
quote with approval the following discussion of the Ombudsman on its finding that
petitioner’s complaint was premature:
After a careful study of the records, we find no sufficient cause to warrant further proceeding in the instant administrative case. The complainant, by filing the instant administrative case, in effect, would like this Office to, among others, rule on the legality of the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No. 01J-43460 entitled “Soriano v. Hirang” and I.S. No. 01H-32904 entitled “Soriano v. Nazareno.”
It must be emphasized that it is not
within the province of this Office’s administrative disciplinary jurisdiction
to review the quasi-judicial findings and decisions of government
officials. If the complainant is
dissatisfied with the said findings, his remedy is to move for reconsideration,
and/or file a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, the proper
office mandated by law to review the resolutions of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. In fact, on
Besides, it may be pointed out that Section 20(1) of Republic Act 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides, thus:
“Section 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(1)
The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body x x x”
This is not to say, however, that
the herein complainant totally has no recourse to this Office. Should there be a final determination by the
appropriate office that, indeed, the herein respondent abused his position
and/or violated pertinent rules in issuing the questioned resolutions, the
complainant may very well file before this Office the appropriate complaint
against the latter. Until then,
therefore, the instant administrative complaint is premature.[38]
It
appears on record that, on
Verily, we are not inclined to impute any form of malice on the part of respondent. There is no sufficient overt acts performed by him from which we can deduce that he, in providing the information that became the basis of the subject news item, was motivated by personal ill-will, hatred, animosity, vengeance, resentment and aversion against complainant (see People v. Quemel, CA 02583-CR, March 18, 1964; People v. Dianelan, 13 CAR 34). These would have shown his malice or, at least, his intention to inflict ulterior and unjustifiable injury on complainant’s reputation, honor and credit (see People v. Canete, 38 Phil. 253). What constitutes libel is not only the defamatory matter but also the malicious attitude of the accused (Esteban v. Veneracion, et al., 16 CAR 1171).
On the basis of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official function and on evidence extant on
record, it readily appears that respondent narrated the information to the
reporter exactly as they are reflected on the records of PDIC. Even then, he relayed the information merely
in response to questions in an interview made by a reporter of a
newspaper. Besides, respondent, as head
of the PDIC, merely performed his legal duty to fully disclose to the public
all the transactions of his office involving public interest. Certainly, the information disclosed by
respondent is a matter of public concern where everyone has an interest. Since respondent merely discharged a legal
duty, the presumption of malice in a defamatory statement is necessarily
negated. His statements in this regard
are well within the mantle of protection of privileged communication. It now behooves upon complainant to show that
respondent had, in fact, acted with malice.
As stated above, it has not been shown that respondent had acted with
ill-motive in the publication of the subject news item.[39]
Earlier on
This resolves the petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in the above-captioned case dismissing the complaint against Teodoro Jose D. Hirang for perjury.
Section 12(c) of Department Circular
No. 70 dated
We considered the arguments raised and discussed in the petition, as well as respondent’s comment thereon, but found no cogent reason to justify a reversal of the assailed resolution. The evidence on record, by and large, does not engender enough faith that respondent is guilty of the charge. Here, respondent, at least, believes that the facts stated in his affidavit are true at the time he subscribes the same, not to mention that, through the footnote on the affidavit, respondent did, likewise, explain why no claim for reimbursement was made in some of the notices.
In passing, the date
WHEREFORE,
we resolve to DISMISS the instant petition.[40]
Patently,
petitioner filed his complaint against respondent with the Ombudsman despite
the pendency of his petition for review in the DOJ. It turned out that the DOJ would sustain the
rulings of First Assistant Sulla and respondent, respectively. There was thus no factual and legal basis to
file any administrative complaint against respondent.
In this case, petitioner failed to
establish his claim that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint. Indeed, the Ombudsman was justified in
dismissing the administrative case against respondent. The latter cannot be held administratively
liable for the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner against Nazareno and
Hirang without the authority or approval of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasizing that the Ombudsman and
the City Prosecutor have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses
involving public officers and employees. It is only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan that the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to investigate;
hence, in such cases, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.[41]
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure likewise provides:
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. – If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If
upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice
may prescribe or motu proprio,
the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting
another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply
in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, in cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor has the duty to forward the
case to the Ombudsman for proper disposition. In such cases, Section 4 provides that no
complaint may be dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
However, the impugned dismissals in
the present case involve complaints over offenses which were found to be
committed not in relation to office and within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts (I.S. No. 01J-43460 is a complaint for perjury while I.S. No. 01H-32904
is a complaint for libel). When the case
involves an offense not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular
courts, the investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to forward his
recommendations together with the records of the case to the Ombudsman for a
final disposition.
Petitioner ascribes administrative
liability to respondent for allegedly not following OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 when he dismissed the Nazareno and Hirang cases. We are not convinced.
For one, respondent did not actually
ignore OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001. In fact, respondent dismissed the Nazareno
case on the honest belief that he was complying with the guidelines set forth
in said circular. The Nazareno case was dismissed
by respondent based on the finding that the offense committed by respondent
therein was not in relation to office. Paragraph 2 of OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No.
95-001 provides that offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by the
regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Provincial/City Prosecutor, which shall rule thereon with finality. Respondent is not obliged to forward cases
involving offenses not in relation to office to the Office of the Ombudsman.
An offense is deemed to be committed
in relation to the accused’s office when such office is an element of the crime
charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge
of the official function of the accused.[42] Respondent found that the interview Nazareno
had given to Business World was his personal and private undertaking, and not
related to the performance of his duty as a PDIC officer. Whether or not such finding is correct is
beyond the reach of the administrative case filed against him; such question
should be properly resolved in the petition for review of the City Prosecutor’s
resolution with the DOJ.
Neither can respondent be made
administratively liable for the dismissal of the Hirang case in which he had no
participation. The negligence of the
subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the absence of evidence of
the latter’s own negligence.[43]
Finally, it has been declared that
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is just an internal agreement between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.[44]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Edgardo P. Cruz,
concurring; rollo, pp. 27-35.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[3]
Rollo, p. 53.
[4]
Id.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] The Joint Circular reads:
TO: ALL
GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
ALL
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTORS
AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION
OF RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS, AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND
CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In a recent
dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the SUPREME COURT on the
extent to which the OMBUDSMAN may call upon the government prosecutors for
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by
his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was
Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise known as “AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL
AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED” and its implications on the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by
public officers and employees.
Concerns
were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by discussions on
jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
and by procedural conflicts in the filing of complaints against the public
officers and employees, the conduct of preliminary investigations, the
preparation of resolutions and informations, and the prosecution of cases by
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants as DEPUTIZED PROSECUTORS
OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
Recognizing
the concerns, the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, in a
series of consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be observed
in the investigation and prosecution of cases against public officers and
employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees IN RELATION TO OFFICE whether cognizable by the SANDIGANBAYAN or the REGULAR COURTS, and whether filed with the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall be under the control and supervision of the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by the REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated and prosecuted, by the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR, which shall rule thereon with finality.
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending prosecution together with the duly accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the appropriate approving authority.
4. Considering that the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN has jurisdiction over public officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of cases involving public officers and employees, the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall submit to the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN a monthly list of complaints filed with their respective offices against public officers and employees.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Secretary Ombudsman
Department of Justice Office of the Ombudsman
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Land Bank of the
[34] Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141857,
[35] People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 617.
[36] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., 204 Phil. 296, 300 (1982).
[37] People of the
[38] Rollo, pp. 132-134.
[39]
[40]
[41] Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No.159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 70.
[42] Zapatos v. People of the
[43] Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan),
Inc., G.R. No. 154499,
[44] Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, supra note 32, at 72.