EN BANC
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HENRY P. LANOT, substituted by MARIO S. RAYMUNDO, Petitioner, CHARMIE Q. BENAVIDES, Petitioner-Intervenor,
- versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 164858 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is
a petition for
certiorari[1]
assailing the Resolution
dated 20
August 2004,[2] the Resolution dated 21
May 2004[3] of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, and the Advisory dated 10 May 2004[4] of COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin S. Abalos (“Chairman Abalos”) in SPA No. 04-288.
The
The
Finally, the
The Facts
On 19 March
2004, Henry P. Lanot (“Lanot”), Vener Obispo (“Obispo”), Roberto Peralta
(“Peralta”), Reynaldo dela Paz (“dela Paz”), Edilberto Yamat (“Yamat”), and Ram
Alan Cruz (“Cruz”) (collectively, “petitioners”), filed a petition for
disqualification[8]
under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before
the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio
were candidates for Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz
were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the
Petitioners alleged that Eusebio
engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside
of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of
people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2)
uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a
press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers,
posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren
in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him.
In his Answer
filed on
Director Ladra
conducted hearings on 2, 5 and
The Ruling of the Regional Director
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, undersigned respectfully recommends that the instant petition be GRANTED. Consequently, pursuant to Section 68 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code, respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO shall be DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor, Pasig City for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Further,
undersigned respectfully recommends that the instant case be referred to the
Law Department for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the possible
violation by the respondent of Sec. 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code.[12]
The Ruling of the COMELEC
In a
resolution dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to ORDER:
1.
the disqualification of respondent VICENTE P.
EUSEBIO from being a candidate for mayor of
2. the Election Officers of District I and District II of Pasig City to DELETE and CANCEL the name of respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO from the certified list of candidates for the City Offices of Pasig City for the May 10, 2004 elections;
3. the Board of Election Inspectors of all the precincts comprising the City of Pasig not to count the votes cast for respondent VICENTE EUSEBIO, the same being cast for a disqualified candidate and therefore must be considered stray;
4. the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City not to canvass the votes erroneously cast for the disqualified candidate respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, in the event that such votes were recorded in the election returns[;]
5. the Regional Director of NCR, and the Election Officers of Pasig City to immediately implement the foregoing directives[;]
6. the Law Department through its Director IV, Atty. ALIODEN DALAIG to file the necessary information against Vicente P. Eusebio before the appropriate court.
This Resolution is immediately executory unless restrained by the Commission En Banc.[13] (Emphasis in the original)
In a Very Urgent Advisory[14] dated 8 May 2004, or two days
before the elections, Chairman Abalos informed the following election officers of the resolution of the COMELEC First
Division: Director
Ladra; Atty. Romeo Alcazar, Acting Election Officer of the First District of
Pasig City; Ms. Marina Gerona, Acting Election Officer of the Second District
of Pasig City; and all Chairmen and Members of the Board of Election Inspectors
and City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City (collectively, “pertinent election
officers”). Director Ladra repeated the
dispositive portion of the
On election
day itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of the three questioned COMELEC
issuances. In a memorandum, Chairman
Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the COMELEC First Division’s
Considering
the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration timely filed by Respondent,
Vicente P. Eusebio[,] with the Commission En Banc, you are hereby ENJOINED
from implementing the Resolution promulgated on
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission En Banc DENIES the motion for suspension of the counting of votes and the canvassing of votes. However, in order not to render moot and academic the issues for final disposition by the En Banc and considering that on the basis of the Resolution of the FIRST DIVISION, the evidence of respondent’s guilt is strong, the Commission En Banc hereby ORDERS to SUSPEND, UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS OF THE COMMISSION, the proclamation of respondent in the event he receives the winning number of votes.[19] (Emphasis in the original)
On
On
WHEREFORE, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to LIFT AND SET ASIDE the order suspending the proclamation of the respondent.
FURTHER, the City Board of Canvassers is DIRECTED to complete [the] canvass and immediately proceed with the proclamation of the winning candidate for Mayor of Pasig City without prejudice to the final outcome of the case entitled, “Henry P. Lanot, et al., vs. Vicente Eusebio[, ”] docketed as SPA No. 04-288.[21] (Emphasis in the original)
Eusebio was proclaimed as Pasig City
Mayor on
On
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution promulgated by the First Division dated
Hence, this
petition.
The Issues
Lanot alleged
that as the COMELEC’s issuances are not supported by substantial evidence and
are contrary to law and settled jurisprudence, the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Lanot raised the following issues before
this Court:
A.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC, IN ISSUING
[ITS] RESOLUTION DATED
1.
by setting aside the Resolution of
Disqualification promulgated by its First Division on
a) erroneously, whimsically and maliciously ADOPTED and APPLIED Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 2050 to this case,
b) capriciously VIOLATED COMELEC Resolution 6452 and Sec. 6, R.A. 6646,
c) erroneously, whimsically and capriciously ARROGATED unto themselves a quasi-judicial legislation, and
d) erroneously and maliciously MISAPPLIED the Albaña and Sunga cases to the case at bar;
2. by referring the case to the Law Department for investigation, it illegally, erroneously and maliciously DISMISSED the electoral aspect of the case and whimsically VIOLATED Resolution 6452 and Section 6 of RA 6646;
3. by disregarding the Order of disqualification, it erroneously and whimsically IGNORED and DISREGARDED the inchoate right of petitioner as the winning party.
B.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS RESOLUTION
DATED
1.
by lifting and setting aside the Order of
suspension of proclamation by winning candidate issued on
C. WHETHER CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS OF THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF POWER, AUTHORITY OR DISCRETION OR LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
1. by unilaterally enjoining the implementation of the Order of Respondent’s disqualification despite the condition therein that it could only be restrained by the Commission En Banc, and whether or not he illegally, erroneously and blatantly whimsically grabbed the exclusive adjudicatory power of the Commission En Banc.
D. WHETHER RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDING THE RESOLUTION OF MAY 5, 2004 AS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTED AND IN FAILING TO ORDER THE PROCLAMATION OF PETITIONER.
E. a) WHETHER THERE ARE PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT RESPONDENT EUSEBIO’S DISQUALIFICATION.
b) WHETHER RESPONDENT EUSEBIO
SHOULD BE DEEMED DISQUALIFIED WITH FOUR (4) AFFIRMATIVE VOTES OF COMMISSIONERS,
TWO (2) VOTES FROM COMMISSIONERS BORRA AND GARCILLANO WHO VOTED FOR THE
DISQUALIFICATION IN THE
RESOLUTION (ANNEX “B”) AND TWO (2) VOTES FROM COMMISSIONERS TUAZON, JR. AND SADAIN WHO VOTED TO DISQUALIFY HIM IN THEIR DISSENTING OPINION (ANNEX “A-1”) SHOULD REFERRAL OF THE CASE TO THE LAW DEPARTMENT BY RESPONDENT COMELEC BE DECLARED A PATENT NULLITY.
F. IN CASE OF DISQUALIFICATION OF RESPONDENT EUSEBIO, WHETHER PETITIONER LANOT CAN BE PROCLAIMED AND ALLOWED TO SIT AS MAYOR-ELECT, AND WHETHER THE DOCTRINES IN TOPACIO, CODILLA, JR., LABO AND OTHERS APPLY IN THIS CASE.[27]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition
has no merit.
Parties to the Present Petition
On
The law and
the COMELEC rules have clear pronouncements that the electoral aspect of a
disqualification case is not rendered inutile by the death of petitioner,
provided that there is a proper substitution or intervention of parties while
there is a pending case. On Raymundo’s
substitution, any citizen of voting age is competent to continue the action in
Lanot’s stead.[28]
On Benavides’ intervention, Section 6
of Republic Act No. 6646, or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (“Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987”), allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification
even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered. Although Eusebio was already proclaimed as
Pasig City Mayor, Benavides could still intervene, as there was still no final
judgment in the proceedings for disqualification.[29]
The case for
disqualification exists, and survives, the election and proclamation of the
winning candidate because an outright dismissal will unduly reward the
challenged candidate and may even encourage him to employ delaying tactics to
impede the resolution of the disqualification case until after he has been
proclaimed.[30] The exception to the rule of retention of
jurisdiction after proclamation applies when the challenged candidate becomes a
member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, where the appropriate
electoral tribunal would have jurisdiction.
There is no law or jurisprudence which says that intervention or
substitution may only be done prior to the proclamation of the winning
candidate. A substitution is not barred
by prescription because the action was filed on time by the person who died and
who is being substituted. The same
rationale applies to a petition-in-intervention.
COMELEC’s
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Propriety of Including
Eusebio’s Name in the Pasig City Mayoral Candidates and of the Counting
of Votes and Canvassing of Election Returns
In its
Lanot claims
that Chairman Abalos whimsically grabbed the adjudicatory power of the COMELEC
En Banc when he issued the
Lanot’s claim
has no basis, especially in light of the
Suspension of these proceedings is tantamount to an
implementation of the Resolution of the FIRST DIVISION which had not yet become
final and executory by reason of the timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. A disposition
that has not yet attained finality cannot be implemented even through indirect
means.[31]
Moreover, Chairman Abalos’
the votes cast for him shall not be counted.” Under Section 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or
resolution of a Division in a special action becomes final and executory after
the lapse of fifteen days following its promulgation while a decision or
resolution of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory after five days
from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court.
Propriety of the Lifting of the Suspension of
Eusebio’s Proclamation
In the same
Resolution
No. 7128 -
x x x x
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt certain policies and to direct all Board of Canvassers, as follows:
1. to speed up its canvass and proclamation of all winning candidates except under the following circumstances:
a. issuance of an order or resolution suspending the proclamation;
b. valid appeal[s] from the rulings of the board in cases where appeal is allowed and the subject appeal will affect the results of the elections;
x x x x.
Resolution
No. 7129
x x x x
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other elections laws, has RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to refrain from granting motions and petitions seeking to postpone proclamations by the Board of Canvassers and other pleadings with similar purpose unless they are grounded on compelling reasons, supported by convincing evidence and/or violative of the canvassing procedure outlined in Resolution No. 6669.
We agree with
Eusebio that the COMELEC En Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its
Propriety of the Dismissal
of the
Disqualification Case and
of the
Referral to the COMELEC
Law Department
Lanot filed
the petition for disqualification on
In its
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election. (Emphasis added)
The COMELEC also quoted from Sunga v. COMELEC to
justify its referral of the
disqualification case to its Law Department.
x x x We discern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.[35]
For his part,
Eusebio asserts that the COMELEC has the prerogative to refer the
disqualification case to its Law Department. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed to the COMELEC. Moreover,
the pendency of a case before the Law Department for purposes of preliminary
investigation should be considered as continuation of the COMELEC’s deliberations.
However,
contrary to the COMELEC En Banc’s reliance on Resolution No. 2050 in its
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Moreover, this Court’s ruling in Sunga was further
explained in Bagatsing v. COMELEC,[36] thus:
The COMELEC in Sunga obviously misapplied Resolution No. 2050 in dismissing the disqualification case therein simply because it remained unresolved before the election and, in lieu thereof, referring it to its Law Department for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent for violation of the election laws. Notably, there is nothing in paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 2050 which directs the dismissal of the disqualification case not resolved before the election. It says the COMELEC “may motu prop[r]io or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws.” The referral to the Law Department is discretionary on the part of the COMELEC and in no way may it be interpreted that the COMELEC will dismiss the disqualification case or will no longer continue with the hearing of the same. The reason for this is that a disqualification case may have two (2) aspects, the administrative, which requires only a preponderance of evidence to prove disqualification, and the criminal, which necessitates proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. Where in the opinion of the COMELEC, the acts which are grounds for disqualification also constitute a criminal offense or offenses, referral of the case to the Law Department is proper.
x x x x
It bears stressing that the Court in Sunga recognized the difference between a disqualification case filed before and after an election when, as earlier mentioned, it stated that the referral of the complaint for disqualification where the case is filed before election “is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.”
Indeed, the
The criminal aspect of a
disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a
candidate for an election offense. The
prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists.[37] If there is probable cause, the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper
court. Proceedings before the proper
court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to
convict.[38] A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from
holding a future public office.[39]
The two
aspects account for the variance of the rules on disposition and resolution of
disqualification cases filed before or after an election. When the disqualification case is filed
before the elections, the question of disqualification is raised before the
voting public. If the candidate is disqualified
after the election, those who voted for him assume the risk that their votes
may be declared stray or invalid. There
is no such risk if the petition is filed after the elections.[40] The COMELEC En Banc erred when it ignored
the electoral aspect of the disqualification case by setting aside the COMELEC
First Division’s resolution and referring the entire case to the COMELEC Law
Department for the criminal aspect.
Moreover, the
COMELEC En Banc’s act and Eusebio’s assertions lose sight of the provisions of
Resolution No. 6452 (“Resolution 6452”), “Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field
Officials the Hearing and Reception of Evidence of Disqualification Cases Filed
in Connection with the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections; Motu
Proprio Actions and Disposition of Disqualification Cases,” promulgated
on 10 December 2003. The pertinent portions of Resolution 6452
provide:
Section 1. Delegation of reception of evidence. — The Commission hereby designates its field officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear and receive evidence in the following petitions:
x x x
c. Petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification;
x x x
Sec. 2. Suspension of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. — In the interest of justice and in order to attain speedy disposition of cases, the Comelec Rules of Procedure or any portion thereof inconsistent herewith is hereby suspended.
Sec. 3. Where to file petitions. — The petitions shall be filed with the following offices of the Commission:
x x x
b. For x x x local positions including highly-urbanized cities, in the National Capital Region, with the Regional Election Director of said region;
x x x
PROVIDED, in cases of highly-urbanized cities the filing of petitions for disqualification shall be with the Office of the Regional Election Directors. x x x
x x x x
The Regional Election Directors concerned shall hear and receive evidence strictly in accordance with the procedure and timeliness herein provided.
Sec. 5. Procedure in filing petitions. — For purposes of the preceding section, the following procedure shall be observed:
x x x x
C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x may be filed any day after the last day [of] filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
2. The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies with the concerned office mentioned in Sec. 3 personally or through a duly authorized representative by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; or
x x x
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Elections Code; or
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
x x x x
Indeed, what
the COMELEC did in its
x x x [T]he preliminary investigation for purposes of finding sufficient ground for [Eusebio’s] disqualification, has already been accomplished by the RED-NCR prior to the election. There also appears no doubt in my mind, that such recommendation of the investigating officer, RED-NCR, was substantive and legally sound. The First Division agreed with the result of the investigation/recommendation, with the facts of the case clearly distilled in the assailed resolution. This, I likewise found to be in accord with our very own rules and the jurisprudential doctrines aforestated. There could be no rhyme and reason then to dismiss the electoral aspect of the case (i.e., disqualification) and refer the same to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. As held in Sunga, clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The criminal aspect of the case is an altogether different issue.
Sunga
said the reason is obvious: A candidate
guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply
because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to
determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. All
that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that
the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This
scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and
purpose of the law.[41]
We agree with
Lanot that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
dismissal of the disqualification case pending preliminary investigation of the
COMELEC Law Department. A review of the
COMELEC First Division’s
Rightful
Eusebio’s Questioned Acts
We quote the
findings and recommendations of Director Ladra as adopted by the COMELEC First
Division:
The questioned acts of [Eusebio] are as follows:
1) The speech uttered on February 14, 2004
during the meeting dubbed as “Lingap sa Barangay” in Barangay San Miguel, Pasig
City wherein [Eusebio] allegedly asked the people to vote for him and solicited
for their support x x x:
x x x x
2) Another speech given on March 17, 2004
in ROTC St., Rosario, Pasig City wherein
[Eusebio] again allegedly uttered defamatory statements against co-[candidate]
Lanot and campaigned for his (respondent’s) and his group’s candidacy.
x x x x
3) He
caused to be published in leading newspapers about a survey allegedly done by
Survey Specialist, Inc. showing him to be leading in the mayoralty race in
x x x x
4) He
paid a political advertisement in the Philippine Free Press in the amount of P193,660.00
as published in its issue dated
x x x x
5)
The display of
billboards containing the words “Serbisyo Eusebio” and “ST” which means “Serbisyong
Totoo” before the start of the campaign period.
x x x x
6) Posters
showing the respondent and his running mate Yoyong Martirez as well those
showing the name “KA ENTENG EUSEBIO” and “BOBBY EUSEBIO” in connection with the
dengue project were posted everywhere even before the start of the campaign
period.
x x x x
7)
Streamers bearing the words “
x x x x
8)
Stickers of [Eusebio] were
likewise pasted all over the city before the start of the campaign period.
x x x x
9) [Eusebio] engaged in vote-buying by
distributing shoes to the students while telling the parents that by way of
gratitude, they should vote for him.
x
x x x (Emphasis in the original)[42]
Eusebio argues
that: (1) Lanot is in estoppel for participating in the proceedings before the
COMELEC Law Department; (2) Lanot abandoned the present petition also because
of his participation in the proceedings before the COMELEC Law Department; and
(3) Lanot is guilty of forum-shopping. These arguments fail for lack of understanding
of the two aspects of disqualification cases.
The proceedings before the COMELEC Law Department concern the criminal
aspect, while the proceedings before this Court concern the electoral aspect,
of disqualification cases. The
proceedings in one may proceed independently of the other.
Eusebio is
correct when he asserts that this Court is not a trier of facts. What he overlooks, however, is that this
Court may review the factual findings of the COMELEC when there is grave abuse
of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in the COMELEC’s decision, order
or resolution.[43] We find that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its
Our review of the factual findings of
the COMELEC, as well as the law applicable to this case, shows that there is no
basis to disqualify Eusebio. Director
Ladra recommended the disqualification of Eusebio “for violation of Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code.” The
COMELEC First Division approved Director Ladra’s recommendation and
disqualified Eusebio. Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. — It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election. (Emphasis supplied)
What Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is “an election campaign or partisan
political activity” by a “candidate” “outside” of the campaign period. Section 79 of the same Code defines
“candidate,” “election campaign” and “partisan political activity” as follows:
SECTION 79. Definitions. — As used in this Code:
(a) The term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties;
(b) The term “election campaign” or “partisan political activity” refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
Thus, the
essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political
activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates;
(3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.
The second element requires the
existence of a “candidate.” Under
Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy” to
an elective public office. Unless one
has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a “candidate.” The third element requires that the campaign
period has not started when the
election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a
public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under
Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the
day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80
for acts done prior to such last day.
Before such last day, there is no “particular candidate or candidates”
to campaign for or against. On the day
immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and
Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done “outside” the
campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to
acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period
and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running
for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the
last day or close to the last day.
There is no
dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political
activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is
whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436
(“RA 8436”) moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to
120 days before election day. Thus, the
original deadline was moved from
Section 11 of RA 8436
provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.[44] (Emphasis added)
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only
purpose for the early filing of
certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of
official ballots. This is clear from the
following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national officials?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he’s already a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began [sic].
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring about one’s being a candidate.
SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
x x x x
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?
THE
CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this
provision is just to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots,
this provision does
not intend to
change the campaign
periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.[45] (Emphasis added)
Thus, because
of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official
ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing
of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing
to become immediately a “candidate” for purposes other than the printing of
ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
to those filing to meet the early deadline.
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the “election periods as x x x fixed by existing law” prior to
RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline “will still not be considered as a candidate.”
Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code, the applicable law prior to RA 8436, the campaign period for
local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the 2004 local elections, this puts the
start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
This also puts the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy,
under the law prior to RA 8436, on 23 March 2004. Eusebio is deemed to have filed his
certificate of candidacy on
this date for purposes other than the printing of ballots
because this is the interpretation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
most favorable to one charged of its violation. Since Section 80 defines a criminal
offense,[46]
its provisions must be construed liberally in favor of one charged of its
violation. Thus, Eusebio became a “candidate” only on 23 March 2004 for purposes
other than the printing of ballots.
Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a “candidate” on 23
March 2004, even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political
activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Such acts are protected as part of
freedom of expression of a citizen before he becomes a candidate for elective
public office. Acts committed by Eusebio on or after 24 March 2004, or during
the campaign period, are not covered by Section 80 which punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
We now examine the specific
questioned acts of Eusebio whether they violate Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
We begin with the 14 February 2004
and the 17 March 2004 speeches of Eusebio:
1) The speech uttered on February 14, 2004
during the meeting dubbed as “Lingap sa Barangay” in Barangay San Miguel, Pasig
City wherein [Eusebio] allegedly asked the people to vote for him and solicited
for their support x x x:
2) Another speech given on March 17, 2004
in ROTC St., Rosario, Pasig City wherein [Eusebio] again allegedly uttered
defamatory statements against
co-[candidate] Lanot and campaigned for his (respondent’s) and his group’s
candidacy.[47]
(Emphasis in the original)
The 14
February 2004 and 17 March 2004 speeches happened before the date Eusebio is
deemed to have filed his certificate of candidacy on 23 March 2004 for purposes
other than the printing of ballots.
Eusebio, not being a candidate then, is not liable for speeches on 14
February 2004 and 17 March 2004 asking the people to vote for him.
The survey showing Eusebio leading in
the mayoralty race was published before Eusebio was deemed to have filed his
certificate of candidacy on 23 March 2004.
Thus:
3) He
caused to be published in leading newspapers about a survey allegedly done by
Survey Specialist, Inc. showing him to be leading in the mayoralty race in
Pasig City.
x x x x
They also presented Certification
issued by Mr. Diego Cagahastian, News Editor of Manila Bulletin dated 10 March
2004 and Mr. Isaac G. Belmonte, Editor-in-Chief of Philippine Star dated March
2, 2004 to the effect that the articles in question came from the camp of
[Eusebio].[48]
(Emphasis in the original)
Eusebio is not liable for this
publication which was made before he became a candidate on 23 March 2004.
The political
advertisement in the
Philippine Free Press
issue of 7 February
2004 was also
made before Eusebio
became a candidate
on 23 March 2004. Thus:
4) He
paid a political advertisement in the Philippine Free Press in the amount of P193,660.00
as published in its issue dated February 7, 2004.[49]
(Emphasis in the original)
The display
of Eusebio’s billboards, posters, stickers, and streamers, as well as his
distribution of free shoes, all happened also before Eusebio became a candidate
on 23 March 2004. Thus:
5)
The display of
billboards containing the words “Serbisyo Eusebio” and “ST” which means “Serbisyong
Totoo” before the start of the campaign period.
x
x x x
6) Posters
showing the respondent and his running mate Yoyong Martinez as well those
showing the name “KA ENTENG EUSEBIO” and “BOBBY EUSEBIO” in connection with the
dengue project were posted everywhere even before the start of the campaign
period.
x
x x x
Petitioners’
witnesses Alfonso Cordova and Alfredo Lacsamana as well as Hermogenes Garcia
stated in their respective affidavits marked as Exhs. “L” and “L-1” that the
pictures were taken on March 3, 7 & 8, 2004.
x
x x x
7)
Streamers bearing the words “Pasig
City is for PEACE” were likewise displayed with the two letters “E” prominently
written.
x
x x x
Said
streamers were among those captured by
the camera of the petitioners’ witnesses Hermogenes Garcia and Nelia Sarmiento
before the start of the campaign period.
8)
Stickers of [Eusebio] were
likewise pasted all over the city before the start of the campaign period.
x
x x x
9) [Eusebio] engaged in vote-buying by
distributing shoes to the students while telling the parents that by way of
gratitude, they should vote for him.
The
affidavits of Ceferino Tantay marked as Exh. “M” and Flor Montefalcon, Norie
Altiche and Myrna Verdillo marked as Exh. “O” are uncontroverted. Their statement that free shoes were given to
the students of Rizal High School was corroborated by the Manila Bulletin issue
of February 6, 2004 which showed the picture of the respondent delivering his
speech before a group of students.
x x x x[50]
(Emphasis in the original)
Based on the
findings of Director Ladra, the questioned acts attributed to Eusebio all
occurred before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Indeed, Director Ladra applied Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio precisely because Eusebio committed
these acts “outside” of the campaign period.
However, Director Ladra erroneously assumed that Eusebio became a
“candidate,” for purposes of Section 80, when Eusebio filed his certificate of
candidacy on 29 December 2003.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio
became a “candidate,” for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director
Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436,
Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which
requires the existence of a “candidate,” one who has filed his certificate of
candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.
Eusebio
asserts that Section 11 of RA 8436 exculpates him from any liability for the
questioned acts. Eusebio points out that
Section 11 contains the following proviso:
Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: x x x
Eusebio theorizes that since the questioned acts admittedly
took place before the start of the campaign period, such acts are not “unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate.”
We find no
necessity to apply in the present case this proviso in Section 11 of RA
8436. Eusebio’s theory legalizes
election campaigning or partisan political activities before the campaign
period even if a person has already filed his certificate of candidacy based on
the election periods under existing laws prior to RA 8436. Under Eusebio’s theory, Section 11 of RA 8436
punishes unlawful acts applicable to a candidate only if committed during the
campaign period.
By definition, the election offense
in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be committed during the
campaign period. On the other hand, under
Eusebio’s theory, unlawful acts applicable to a candidate cannot be committed
outside of the campaign period. The net
result is to make the election offense in Section 80 physically impossible to
commit at any time. We shall leave this
issue for some other case in the future since the present case can be resolved
without applying the proviso in Section 11 of RA 8436.
Effect of Eusebio’s
Possible
Disqualification
As second
placer, Lanot prayed that he be proclaimed as the rightful Pasig City Mayor in
the event of Eusebio’s disqualification.
As third placer, Benavides, on the other hand, prays that she be
proclaimed as the rightful Pasig City Mayor in the event of Eusebio’s
disqualification and in view of Lanot’s death.
Even if we assume Eusebio’s disqualification as fact, we cannot grant
either prayer.
The
disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated
because of the disqualification.[51] Votes cast in favor of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes, against whom a petition for
disqualification was filed before the election, are presumed to have been cast
in the belief that he was qualified. For
this reason, the second placer cannot be declared elected.[52]
The exception
to this rule rests on two assumptions.
First, the one who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified. Second, the voters are so
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but nonetheless the voters still cast
their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[53] Lanot and Benavides failed to prove that the
exception applies in the present case.
Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Eusebio is disqualified,
the rule on succession provides that the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Pasig City
shall succeed in Eusebio’s place.[54]
WHEREFORE,
we DISMISS the
petition. We find no grave abuse of
discretion in the 10 May 2004 Advisory of Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and in
the 21 May 2004 Order of the Commission on Elections En Banc. We SET
ASIDE the 20 August 2004 Resolution of the Commission En Banc since
respondent Vicente P. Eusebio did not commit any act which would disqualify him
as a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C.
GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Per Curiam Resolution with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and Commissioners, Resurreccion Z. Borra, Virgilio O. Garcillano, and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr., concurring. Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. wrote a separate dissenting opinion, where he was joined by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain. Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 91-104.
[3] En Banc Order with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Virgilio O. Garcillano, and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr., concurring. Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier inhibited himself from the case. Id. at 155-159.
[4] Id. at 163.
[5] Per Curiam Resolution with only Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Virgilio O. Garcillano participating. Presiding Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier had no part. Id. at 105-150.
[6] En Banc Order with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., concurring. Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain, Virgilio O. Garcillano, and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. dissented in part, stating that the issue of Eusebio’s guilt must be decided on the merits. Id. at 160-162.
[7] This Resolution was referred to as the “resolution promulgated by the First Division dated 8 May 2004” by the COMELEC En Banc. A “Very Urgent Advisory” issued by Chairperson Abalos on 8 May 2004 was addressed to Atty. Esmeralda Amora-Ladra, Acting Regional Election Director of the National Capital Region; Atty. Romeo Alcazar, Acting Election Officer of the 1st District of Pasig City; Ms. Marina Gerona, Acting Election Officer of the 2nd District of Pasig City; and all Chairmen and Members of the Board of Election Inspectors and Pasig City Board of Canvassers. The 8 May 2004 Advisory merely reiterated the dispositive portion of the COMELEC First Division’s 5 May 2004 Resolution. Id. at 151-152.
[8] Id. at 164-215.
[9] Id. at 216-240.
[10] Id. at 241-293.
[11] Id. at 294-337.
[12] Id. at 148.
[13] Id. at 149.
[14] Id. at 151. See also note 7.
[15] Id. at 153.
[16] Id. at 338-351.
[17] Id. at 163.
[18] Id. at 355-357.
[19] Id. at 162.
[20] Id. at 158.
[21] Id. at 158-159.
[22] Id. at 521-538.
[23] G.R. 163302, 23 July 2004, 435 SCRA 98.
[24] 370 Phil. 625 (1999).
[25] 351 Phil. 310 (1998).
[26] Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 95
[27] Id. at 11, 14-16.
[28] See The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 25, Sec. 1; COMELEC Resolution 6452 (2003). See also Mercado v. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999).
[29] See Mercado v. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999).
[30] See Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 370 Phil. 625 (1999); Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310 (1998). See also Lomugdang v. Javier, 128 Phil. 424 (1967) and De Mesa, et al. v. Mencias, et al., 124 Phil. 1187 (1966). Although the cases of Lomugdang and De Mesa concern election contests, these case underscore this Court’s policy of disregarding the statutorily prescribed time limit in allowing petitions for substitution and petitions in intervention. Moreover, in contrast to disqualification cases where the issues may be raised by any voter or political party, election contests raise questions which are personal to the protestant and protestee and may arguably be considered extinguished by the death of either party. Yet Lomugdang and De Mesa not only allowed substitution and intervention, they further declared that the perceived urgency in deciding election cases should give way to the ends of justice.
[31] Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 161.
[32] The COMELEC promulgated both Resolutions on 16 May 2004.
[33] The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, Section 6.
[34] See Nolasco v. COMELEC, 341 Phil. 761 (1997).
[35] Supra note 25, at 321-322.
[36] 378 Phil. 585, 598-600 (1999).
[37] Omnibus Election Code, Section 265.
[38] See
Bagatsing v. COMELEC, supra note 35; Sunga v. COMELEC, supra note
25; Nolasco v. COMELEC, supra
note 33.
[39] See Omnibus Election Code, Section 264.
[40] See Bagatsing v. COMELEC, supra note 37.
[41] Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 103-104.
[42] Id. at 135-148.
[43] See
Nolasco v. COMELEC, supra note 33.
[44] Republic Act No. 9006 now allows all elective public officials, local or national, to hold on to their elective offices even after filing their certificates of candidacy. Section 14 of RA 9006 provides:
SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. — Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
[45] Minutes of Bicameral Conference Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, 16 December 1997, as certified by Director Antonia P. Barros, Legislative Records and Archives Service.
[46] Omnibus Election Code, Section 262.
[47] Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 135, 139.
[48] Id. at 142.
[49] Id. at 143.
[50] Id. at 143-146.
[51] See Kare v. COMELEC, G.R. 157526, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 264; Loreto v. Brion, 370 Phil. 727 (1999); Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999); Reyes v. COMELEC, 324 Phil. 813 (1996); Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA 400; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 297; Abella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100710, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 253; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, 1 August 1989, 176 SCRA 1; Geronimo v. Ramos, No. L-60504, 14 May 1985, 136 SCRA 435.
[52] See Loreto v. Brion, 370 Phil. 727 (1999).
[53] See Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. 125955, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 481.
[54] See The Local Government Code, Republic Act No. 7160, Section 44 (1991).