FIRST
DIVISION
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PEDRO R. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, - versus - Respondent. |
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G. R. No. 156888 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: November
20, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 3
December 2002[1]
and 7 January 2003[2]
Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002
entitled Victoria M. Rodriguez, Pedro R.
Santiago and Armando G. Mateo versus Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the
application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint[3] for Recovery of Possession of Property, filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against respondent
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on 12 March 2002, before the RTC of
Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74. Included in said complaint was a prayer for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order.
In their Complaint filed before
the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando
G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, alleged that:
Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and
administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order,
dated February, 1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, “In the Matter of the
Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes, etc.”, (sic) of
Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court at
x x x x
In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was
the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that (sic)
certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891
Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol x x x.
x x x x
On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in
her capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez,
leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two
parcels of land of Hermogenes Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x.
x x x x
By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro
R. Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land consisting of
2.5 hectares, more particularly the improvements located at
Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two
aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo, defendant is
claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over them. More particularly,
defendant is using these two parcels of land for its (sic) own commercial and
other purposes.
It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to
recover possession of the property from the defendant so that she could comply
with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.
x x x x
[D]efendant
is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over the parcels of land
described in paragraph 7 hereof. Lately, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago was
informed by purported agents or employees of the defendant that he should
vacate the premises he and his family are occupying since defendant would be
needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to do this since
it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner, Victoria Rodriguez (sic)
has already leased the premises to plaintiffs
Respondent SBMA, in its counter
statement of facts,[5] contends that sometime in
1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue
of her employment with respondent SBMA, availed herself of the housing
privilege accorded to the latter’s employees; that due to said privilege, she
was allowed to lease a housing unit[6]
inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement, however, “shall
be terminated if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;”[7]
that on 31 January 2002, Liwanag Santiago’s employment contract concluded; that
since said contract was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee
of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA
Housing Policy, she and her family were asked[8] to
vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit.
On
Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent
SBMA filed a Motion to Dismiss[10]
the abovementioned complaint on the argument, inter alia,[11] that
the latter failed to state a valid cause of action.
On
Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a
Spanish title which they claim is still a valid, subsisting and enforceable
title. Despite the fact that said title was never registered under Act 496,
the land Registration Act (later PD 1529), plaintiffs still claim
that they have a cause of action.
The court is not convinced.
The action filed by plaintiffs is for
recovery of possession based on the ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the
disputed property evidenced by a Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of
law particularly the enabling clauses of PD 892, said type of title can
no longer be utilized as evidence of ownership. Verily, Spanish titles can no
longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. (Citation
omitted.)
As such and on its face, the complaint indeed
failed to state a cause of action simply because the court can take judicial
notice of the applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent decisions of
the Supreme Court to the case at bench.[14]
Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in the second assailed Order
dated
Hence, petitioner
I.
WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
OWNERSHIP OF LANDS;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN VIEW OF THE
FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE
OTHER THAN THE SPANISH TITLE; and
III.
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN
ANSWER, WAS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP.
In essence, the present petition poses as
fundamental issue for resolution by the Court the question of whether or not
the RTC committed reversible error in denying the application for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as well as dismissing the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
The Court’s Ruling
As the
appeal of respondent
Petitioner
As
the trial court stated, “(F)undamental is the rule that a defendant moving to
dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of action is regarded as having admitted
all the allegations thereof, at least hypothetically”. (sic) The Complaint
specifically alleged that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great-great-great
granddaughter of and the sole heir and administrator of the late spouses
Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in his lifetime Hermogenes
Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that
certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891
Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant was, therefore, deemed to have
admitted these allegations. And, with such admissions, then there would be no
more need, at least at this stage of the case, for the plaintiffs to present
the Spanish title. In other words, the inadmissibility of the title, as argued
by the defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no more need to present
this title in view of the admissions.”
Citing
the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[17]respondent
SBMA, however, stresses that “Spanish titles can no longer be countenance as
indubitable evidence of land ownership by sheer force of law, particularly, the
enabling clause of P.D. 892 in expressly providing that, if not accompanied by
actual possession of the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be
utilized as proof or evidence of ownership x x x.”
A priori,
before the Court goes into the resolution of the fundamental issue raised by
the instant petition, a critical matter must be dealt with – the fact that the
assailed orders of dismissal of the complaint and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, respectively, of the RTC had already become final and
executory against Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the case. It
must be remembered that petitioner
Nevertheless,
even if we were to overlook the foregoing grievous error, we would be hard
pressed to find fault in the assailed orders of the RTC. The present petition is
substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio
C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,[18]
that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad
de Torrenos of 1891, has
been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real
property.
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and
petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover possession of the
subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the
sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo
de Propriedad de Torrenos. Promulgated on
P.D. No. 892 became effective on
Registration proceedings under the
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may
still be presented as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided
in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have
not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject
to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by
proof of actual possession; . . .
Since
Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject
Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation omitted.)
This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of
possession only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points
out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish
title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who
actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. (Citation
omitted.) Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the
applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the
Moreover, legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a
particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated. An apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions of the statute. (Citation
omitted.)
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892
should be interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole
statute. (Citation omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole
presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip
them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set
a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all
Spanish titles under the
All holders of Spanish titles should have
filed applications for registration of their title on or before
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in
actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with
the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of
P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or
in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion
does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real
property on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land
Registration Decree (Citation omitted.) or the
Therefore, without legal
or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality
to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their
Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action.
In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary
for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.[19]
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition
must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of
herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the
aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws,
the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such
that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue.
The
principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART.
8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the
With the above provision of law and preceding
discussions, in tandem with the Court’s pronouncements in numerous cases, i.e.,
Director of Forestry v. Muńoz;[20]
Antonio v. Barroga;[21]
Republic v. Court of Appeals.;[22]
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals;[23]
Carabot v. Court of Appeals;[24]
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court;[25]
Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;[26]
Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona;[27]
and Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,[28]
it is quite evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in taking heed
of our final, and executory, decisions – those decisions considered to have
attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the use of Spanish
titles to evidence ownership are concerned. For it is the better practice that
when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same.[29]
The doctrine of stare
decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has
been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be
followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity of or privity of parties.[30]
This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is
even said that such decisions “assume the same authority as the statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of
those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto.”[31]
Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons,
otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this
Court would be immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in the
stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.[32]
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 892 which took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) within six months from
the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16 August 1976.[33]
If not, non-compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real
property.
In the case
at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced
as indubitable evidence of land ownership.[34]
And, without
legal or equitable title to the subject property, Victoria M.
Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim
entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to that
upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the
owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control
and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property.[35]
Therefore,
the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Anent
the argument of petitioner Santiago that by filing the Motion to Dismiss,
respondent SBMA already admitted all the allegations of the complaint such that
the question of whether or not the subject Spanish Title was inadmissible or
not had become immaterial.
We do
not agree.
Basic
is the rule that in a motion to dismiss complaint based on lack of cause of
action, the question posed to the court for determination is the sufficiency of
the allegation of facts made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action.
It is beside the point whether or not the allegations in the complaint are
true, for with said motion, the movant only hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, that is, assuming arguendo
that the facts alleged are true, the facts alleged are insufficient for the
court to render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint.
Consequently,
by anchoring their right to recover possession of property on the subject
Spanish title that has been divested of any legal force and effect in
establishing ownership over the subject real property, the complaint filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and
petitioner Pedro R. Santiago was correctly dismissed by the RTC for lack of
cause of action.
In
fine, there is nothing more left to be argued as regards the Spanish title of
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The issue has been settled and this Court’s final
decision in the said cases must be respected.[36]
This Court’s hands are now tied by the finality of the abovementioned
decisions. The Court has no alternative but to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed 3
December 2002[37]
and 7 January 2003[38] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002, are hereby AFFIRMED. Cost
against the petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairman
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, Presiding Judge; Annex “E” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 68-71.
[2] Annex “G” of the Petition; id. at 79.
[3] Annex “A” of the Petition; id. at 27-34.
[4]
[5] Respondent SBMA’s Memorandum; rollo, pp. 171-184.
[6]
[7]
[8] 5 March 2002 Notice to Vacate; Annex “B” of respondent SBMA’s Comment; id. at 104.
[9] Records, p. 29.
[10]
[11] The other grounds are lack of jurisdiction and state immunity from suit.
[12] Presidential Decree No. 892 took
effect on
[13] Now Presidential Decree No. 1529, entitled the Land Registration Decree, as amended.
[14] Rollo,
pp. 70-71.
[15] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 10 – 11; id. at 159 – 160.
[16] Section 2 (b) of Rule 41 respecting appeals from the Regional Trial Courts states that:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
x x x x
(c) Appeal by
certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
[17] 333 Phil. 597 (1996).
[18] G.R. No. 157447,
[19]
[20] 132 Phil. 37 (1968).
[21] 131 Phil. 879 (1968).
[22] G.R. no. L-56077,
[23] 228 Phil. 304 (1986).
[24] 229 Phil. 374 (1986).
[25] G.R. No. 73085,
[26] G.R. No. 91797,
[27] G.R. No. 66130,
[28] G.R. Nos. 103727 & 106496,
[29] Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
389 Phil. 455, 461-462.
[30] A.C. Freeman, A treatise on the Law of Judgment by Edward W. Tuttle, Vol. II [1925 ed.], G. 630, 1329.
[31] Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Palomar, 124
Phil. 763 (1966).
[32] Pepsi-Cola
Products Phils., Inc. and PEPSICO, Inc. v. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 167866,
[33] Supra note 20 at 166.
[34] Supra note 23 at 93.
[35] Narciso Peńa, et al., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 3 (1994 ed.).
[36] Supra. note 30.
[37] See note 1.
[38] See note 2.